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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 1 *January* 1957

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[F]ounded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discon[tin]ued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded [19]24), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the [R]oyal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, [L]ondon, S.W.1.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

Editor: MURIEL GRINDROD

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (*12 issues a year*)
including postage inland and overseas 30s.

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. For addresses of agents in the United States and Commonwealth, see inside of back cover.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 2 *February* 1957

CONTENTS

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DOCUMENTS ON THE SUEZ CRISIS

26 July to 6 November 1956

SELECTED AND INTRODUCED BY

D. C. WATT

Here are the texts of the principal documents on the Suez Crisis, from the nationalization of the Canal to the cease-fire. They have been selected and are accompanied by a long Introduction by D. C. Watt, author of the Chatham House memorandum *Britain and the Suez Canal: The Background* (August 1956, mimeographed, 3s. 6d.). In his Introduction, Mr Watt examines the conceptions underlying the policies of the principal actors in the crisis, and follows the interaction of these policies at the two London Conferences, in the Menzies mission to Cairo, in the setting up of the Suez Canal Users' Association, and at the United Nations. He also deals with the increase in tension on Israel's borders and in North Africa.

The documents, nineteen in number, include the Suez Canal Convention of 1888; the Egyptian Law of 26 July 1956 Nationalizing the Canal; the Eighteen-Power Proposals of the First London Conference (16–23 August) and the statement issued after the Second London Conference (21 September); the Resolutions of the Suez Canal Users' Association; the Proposals made by India and by Mr Hammarskjöld, after the direct Anglo-Franco-Egyptian talks in New York, for a settlement of the dispute; the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel (30 October); the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions moved by the United States (2 November), Canada (4 November), and Canada, Colombia, and Norway (5 November).

The pamphlet contains an outline map of the Middle East.

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Chatham House, St James's Square, London, S.W.1

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 3 *March*

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London, S W.1.

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* * *

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 4 *April* 1957

CONTENTS

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Telephone. Whitehall 2233

Editor MURIEL GRINDROD

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (12 *issues a year*)
including postage inland and overseas 30s.

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N W.10.

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 5 *May* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), The World Today is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

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ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (*12 issues a year*)
including postage inland and overseas 30s.

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Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 6 *June* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1

* * *

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 7 *July* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

* * *

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 8 *August* 1957

CONTENTS

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• • •

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 9 *September* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), The World Today is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

Editor: Muriel Grindrod

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(*in the U.S.A. and Canada*, $6)

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W.10 (telephone Gladstone 1186).

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 10 *October* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

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Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W.10 (telephone Gladstone 1186).

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 11 *November* 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), THE WORLD TODAY is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

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Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W.10 (telephone Gladstone 1186).

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 12 December 1957

CONTENTS

Founded in 1945, when with the *Chronology of International Events* (discontinued in December 1955) it replaced the *Bulletin of International News* (founded 1924), The World Today is issued from the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Telephone: Whitehall 2233

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THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 1 *January* 1957

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Note of the Month

Relief to British Reserves from the International Monetary Fund

THE country has become familiar since the end of the war with 'balance of payments' crises. In 1947, 1949, 1951, and 1955 an adverse balance of payments has been the occasion for emergency measures, because it has threatened the monetary reserves with exhaustion. Crises due to the depletion of reserves are no novelty; the financial crises of the nineteenth century, especially those of 1847, 1857, and 1866, had precisely that character.

The International Monetary Fund, which was set up by the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 and entered into operation in 1946, was devised to reinforce monetary reserves on appropriate conditions. Each member of the Fund contributed to it an assigned quota, a proportion (normally one-fourth) in gold, and the rest in its own currency, and became entitled to buy the currency of any other member up to certain prescribed amounts. The Fund does not lend; a member buying foreign currency pays in its own currency, so that the Fund accumulates additional holdings of the currencies of the buying members while its holdings of the currencies which it sells are correspondingly diminished. No interest is charged. But there is a service charge of one-half per cent on any holding of member's currency in excess of 75 per cent of its quota; there is a scale of charges graduated according to the amount of the excess and to the time the excess is outstanding. The charge starts after three months at 2 per cent, and rises in the course of several years to 5 per cent per annum. It is analogous to a premium on forward exchange. This rising charge reflects the policy of the Fund to provide only against a temporary shortage of reserves. A chronic shortage is to be remedied by suitable monetary measures and credit measures on the part of the member country.

The quota of the United Kingdom is $1,300 million. Ordinarily a member is restricted to buying foreign currency to an amount raising the excess over 75 per cent of its quota ($975 million) by 25 per cent ($325 million) in any one year. And in 1947–8 the

U.K. bought $300 million. In 1949 and 1951 no application was made to the Fund, for there was an understanding that members which were receiving Marshall Aid should not have recourse to the Fund. The sterling equivalent of the $300 million obtained in 1947–8 has all been liquidated, partly by purchase of sterling by Japan and Brazil, partly by direct repayment.

The Treasury announced on 10 December that the Government has made arrangements with the Fund, under which it may purchase with sterling up to the full amount of the quota of $1,300 million. Of this a sum of $561,470,000 is to be drawn immediately. So the Fund has used its discretionary powers to allow the U.K. to use more than 25 per cent of its quota in the current year.

The balance of $738,530,000 is also to be available within the year, under what is called a 'stand-by' arrangement, that is to say an option to buy currencies of other members up to that total. The stand-by arrangement was resorted to in 1952 for the convenience of Belgium, and was adopted as a permanency in the same year for members desiring to be safeguarded against a contingent shortage of reserves at times when they did not need actually to make a purchase.

The sum of $571,470,000 is presumably calculated to meet the country's immediate and foreseeable needs.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury said, in reply to a question on 11 December, that the dollars are to be repurchased by the Fund within three years.

CORRIGENDUM

In the Chronology of Events in Hungary and the Middle East, published in *The World Today*, December 1956, the U.N. resolution providing for an emergency international force is dated 4 November (*v.* p. 485). This resolution was in fact adopted just after midnight on the night of 4–5 November and is now always referred to as the resolution of 5 November.

The Hungarian Revolution

THE rising in Hungary, which began on 23 October 1956, became victorious on 30–31 October, and was repressed, at any rate temporarily, by foreign intervention which began on 4 November, was a revolution in the terms of 1641 in England, and even more of 1789 in France. Like all classical revolutions, it aimed at the substitution of a liberal regime for an absolute one, and like all classical revolutions it was preceded by demands for peaceful reforms. There were contributory factors, such as demands for economic betterment and national independence. The motive power, however, was the urge for freedom, both for the individual and for the State. As in 1848, when the revolution of the liberals against the absolutists developed into a rising against the Holy Alliance, so in Hungary in 1956 the liberal revolution was bound to develop into a struggle against the absolute power of the Soviet Union, which has become the embodiment of 'reactionary' forces in the literal meaning of the word.

For one of the consequences of the Hungarian revolution is the necessity for reassessing such political catchwords as 'Right' and 'Left', 'reactionary' and 'progressive'. It has made it clear for the first time that the Soviet system as it now stands, in spite of vestiges of de-Stalinization, is the representative of absolute power. In Hungary now the term 'restoration' no longer means the re-establishment of an obsolete, semi-feudal, capitalist system, such as prevailed before 1945: it means the reinstatement of the Stalinist regime. The *Coblenzards* of today are not the *émigré* politicians who live in the Western countries. They are above all Rákosi and Gerö, who are kept in reserve in Moscow. Like all classical revolutions, the one in Hungary was not instigated from abroad. Western influence was no stronger than that exerted by English liberal thought on the French Revolution.

FROM PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY TO PARTY DICTATORSHIP

The post-war history of Hungary can be divided into various stages. In 1945, after the collapse of the Hungarian Fascist regime, there was a complete political vacuum. The reorganization of the country took place under the auspices of the Hungarian Communists returning from Moscow, on whose advice local national councils were formed. This council (Soviet) system constituted the transition to a political reshaping in accordance with Western

democratic principles. In 1945, for the first time in the history of Hungary, free and unrestricted elections took place.[1] The result was a coalition Government with a peasant middle-class majority in which, however, the Communists acted as shock troops. They soon reserved for themselves the two key positions: the Ministry of the Interior, held by László Rajk, who ruthlessly established Communist control over State security, and the post of Minister of Agriculture, which was given to Imre Nagy, a Moscow-trained Communist of peasant descent, whose name therefore came to be associated with the 1945 land reform. Both of these politicians who were the first to represent the Communist Party in the post-war Hungarian Government were later to be disowned as traitors or deviationists. This transition stage of a 'People's Democracy' lasted until the beginning of 1948. It expressed the dual trends of post-war Stalinist policy, which vacillated between co-existence and Soviet imperialism. During this period the Communist Party obtained control of the two principal instruments of power, the police and the army. Moreover, through shock troop tactics, it succeeded in gradually disintegrating or weakening the non-Communist parties. Nevertheless until September 1947 the situation was still fluid, and a possible reversion from a rigid Zhdanovist policy to co-existence would still have left the way open for a political system governed by democratic principles.

The turning point came in September 1947, when Zhdanov's absolutism *à l'outrance* made itself felt through the formation of the Cominform. The enforced merger of the Communists with the Social Democrats in February 1948 led to the one-party Government which subsequently, abandoning the pretence of being a 'People's Democracy', evolved into a total *Gleichschaltung* to the Soviet system. In August 1950 Hungary adopted the 'Stalin constitution' but even before this, in 1949, the system of Stalinist purges within the Party had begun with the trial of László Rajk. Rákosi, the most *bien pensant* among the Stalinist potentates, volunteered to stage this trial, the object of which was to outlaw the deviationist Tito. The liquidation of Rajk and the 'soit disant' Titoists was followed by the total Russian ideological annexation of Hungary. From 1949 onwards, until Stalin's death, the decimation within the Communist Party went on, directed by Rákosi,

[1] Although there was a general franchise during the inter-war period, voting in urban areas was not secret, and the pressure brought to bear on the voters always ensured a majority for the Government party—the 'oligarchy', to use C. A. Macartney's definition

whose absolute power was similar to that of Stalin. His instruments were Gábor Péter and Mihály Farkas, the Berias of Hungary. As at the time of the Holy Alliance, the mere suspicion of free-thinking was sufficient to incur imprisonment, torture, and the death sentence. The majority of the Hungarian Communists who had spent the war years in England or France were either killed or imprisoned, as they might have carried with them the germs of democratic indoctrination. This reign of terror sowed the first seeds of serious discontent within the Communist Party.

As in Russia, this ruthless exercise of absolute power, unprecedented in the history of Hungary, led to a spontaneous urge for relaxation after the death of Stalin. In June 1953 Imre Nagy was appointed Prime Minister, to carry out the changes in planned economy advocated by Malenkov: increase in the production of consumer goods, and the slowing down of the compulsory collectivization of agriculture.[1] But Rákosi still remained Secretary-General of the Party and Gerö the principal protagonist of economic planning. Nagy's 'reforms' were therefore greatly handicapped by the continuation of the rigid party leadership, but his regime left the door ajar for a mitigated expression of free criticism within the Communist Party. Nagy did in fact abolish the strict Zhdanovist control of thought, and it was thus that the spiritual preparation of the Hungarian revolution was made possible mainly by the writers, who played exactly the same part in conditioning the people as did the French philosophers and writers prior to 1789. Of course, Rousseau, Voltaire, and the encyclopaedists prepared the ground half a century in advance; the same function was fulfilled by the Hungarian writers in little more than a few months.

In March 1955 Rákosi succeeded in persuading the Kremlin that Nagy had gone too far with his new course, and the Stalinist regime was re-established with certain modifications. After Nagy's dismissal Rákosi put the clock back in almost every respect, with one exception: criticism within the Party and comparative freedom of literary expression continued. The possibilities inherent in this were strengthened by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which made de-Stalinization respectable and indeed compulsory. In the light of this change, and also in consequence of the new Soviet approach to Tito, a number of former victims of the Stalinist regime were released from prison,

[1] See 'The "New Line" in Hungary', in *The World Today*, January 1955.

mong others János Kádár, who before his arrest had played a rominent part in the Central Committee as a potential accomplice f Rajk. These men were now, if not reintegrated into political eadership, at least free to express their views.

In June 1956 Rákosi was sacrificed to the new Soviet rapprochenent with Tito. Although he was succeeded as Secretary-General y a no less rigid Stalinist in the person of Gerö, this did provide he occasion for expressing opposition through attacks on the personality cult' as represented by Rákosi, who retired to Russia.

PREPARING THE REVOLUTIONARY CLIMATE

The Hungarian Writers' Union's periodical, *Irodalmi Ujsàg* (The Literary Gazette), prepared the climate for free discussion and pposition to the authorities. Originally controlled exclusively by Communist writers, it now voiced the conflict of the non-conformsts, such as Tibor Déri, Gyula Háy, and Tibor Tardos, with the fficial party line—a conflict which came to assume the character f an open resistance against *dirigisme* in matters spiritual. It was luring the Nagy Government that Tibor Déri and Gyula Háy first ormulated their opposition against the oppression of spiritual reedom. After the re-establishment of the Rákosi regime they were subjected to Party censure. In the spring of 1956, after the oth Party Congress, they and their friends of the non-Communist intellectual *élite* were again able to put forward their views n *Irodalmi Ujsàg*, whose circulation as a result leapt within two nonths from 5,000 to 40,000. It was in fact the Writers' Union hat undertook the first step towards a liberal revolution when lecting its new Presidential Committee in September 1956. All onformist Communist writers were blackballed. The new committee consisted only of the non-Communist intellectual *élite* and uch Communist writers as had already come out at an earlier tage in support of spiritual liberty.

While the preparation of a revolutionary climate through inellectuals runs parallel with what took place in 1789, the first mass esponse to these preparatory steps shows similarities with the eginnings of the 1848 revolutions, also set in train by university tudents. They were the first wide stratum to seize the opportunity iven for free discussion. In the spring of 1956 the Communist tudents in Budapest formed the 'Petöfi Circle'[1] which, in its

[1] Named after the Hungarian lyric poet and patriot Alexander Petöfi (1823–49).

ginnings, confined its arguments to the various aspects of Party litics within the framework permitted by the new policy in-gurated by the 20th Party Congress. The non-conformists śri and Tardos took part in the inception of this new forum. ie repercussions of this new opportunity for freedom of expres-n were tremendous. The non-Communist, or at any rate anti-alinist, student elements, having learned the lesson of Com-inist infiltration, penetrated into this circle which, under the etext of criticizing the Stalinist line, became the ground for dis-ssing the basic principles of political freedom. Characteristically, e of their unanimous demands was for the abolition of the com-lsory teaching of Russian. The central authority was as un-cided in its response as the Khrushchev-Bulganin policy has en since its inception. For some time the meetings of the :töfi Circle' were suspended. When, however, new discussion oups were formed in all the provincial universities the Petöfi rcle in Budapest was again allowed to function. The temporary spension only helped to expand its membership and scope.

It was in these debates that the concrete demand for Imre igy's rehabilitation and for a public trial of the Hungarian rias was voiced. Imre Nagy was associated with the relaxation political and economic pressure and also with comparative inde-ndence from the Soviet Union in the Titoist sense. He became : symbol of reformist tendencies within the Communist Party ice, while faithful to the principle of public ownership, he vocated a limited political freedom and national sovereignty. ider the cloak of attacks on the personality cult, the students o demanded freedom of expression, speech, and assembly; a vision of the still rigid central Party and State authority; in :ir own sphere, a complete revision of the system of instruc-n in schools and universities; and free intercourse with the est.

In the middle of October the reformist climate created by the ellectuals and the students received a further impetus from ents in Poland. The fall of Minc, whose role in Poland cor-sponded to that of Gerö, the election of the new Polish Central mmittee, with Gomulka as its General Secretary (who was ccessful in persuading Khrushchev and Bulganin that it was 'er for the Soviet Union to accept the Polish way to Socialism stead of repressing it by force of arms), stirred up hope and ssion in Hungary. On 22 October the Petöfi Circle formulated

its demands. The principal points were as follows: the reinstatement of Imre Nagy; revision of the second Five-year Plan; administration of the factories by the workers; the expulsion of Rákosi from the Communist Party; the public trial of Farkas; the rescinding of the Central Committee's resolutions of December 1955 on free expression in literature and of June 1956 on restriction of the Petöfi Circle's activities; all trade agreements with the Soviet Union to be made public; relations with the Soviet Union to be established on a basis or equality; and, in the specific sphere of students' organizations, the Communist-controlled Students' Federation (D.I.Sz.) to be reorganized on democratic lines. The last demand has to be seen in the light of the endeavour of the Party leadership to canalize the aspirations of the youth movement by making use of the D.I.Sz. to voice such aims as were confined to instruction and organization, omitting those with wider political implications.

On 22 October the Petöfi Circle, which in the meantime had expanded into a new democratic student organization (M.E.F.E.Sz.), decided to organize a mass demonstration. This took place in the afternoon of 23 October. The students first assembled before the statue of Petöfi. From there they proceeded to the statue of Bem, the Polish general who fought for Hungary in 1848, where the peasant-writer Péter Veres read out a resolution of the Writers' Union which reiterated the demands of the Petofi Circle in a more concrete manner. Defining the policy which later was taken over by the revolutionary bodies, it declared that Hungary's national policy should be based on Socialism, but its relation to other countries, including the U.S.S.R., should be regulated on a basis of equality, as formulated by Lenin; it expressed concern over the fate of Hungarian minorities in the other Socialist countries; it reiterated the demand that the factories should be run by the workers and experts themselves, and urged the independence of the trade unions; the peasants were to decide for themselves whether to join co-operatives or not, and the system of compulsory grain deliveries was to be revised; it further demanded a change of leadership in the Party and the reinstatement of Nagy and the other victimized Communists. At the same time it firmly declared itself against any counter-revolution; it demanded the re-establishment of the 'Popular Front' established by the 1945 political parties, and a free and secret ballot to elect parliamentary representatives.

FROM DEMONSTRATION TO REVOLUTION

The subsequent events are well known. The students on proceeding to Parliament Square were joined by thousands of industrial workers claiming the reinstatement of Imre Nagy. It was at this stage that the demonstration developed into a revolt. Some of the demonstrators proceeded to the Stalin monument, others to take possession of the Radio building. At that moment, two actions taken by the central authority ignited the flame of out-and-out revolution. One was the broadcast speech of Gerö, the General Secretary of the Party, protesting against nationalist excesses; although repeating anti-Stalinist clichés, he again provocatively proclaimed that Hungary's relationship to the Soviet Union had been governed by equality since 1945. The other was the dispatch to the Radio building of the political police, who fired the first shots at the students and workers. The police were reinforced by detachments of the army, and then the miracle happened: the soldiers either joined the students and workers or handed over their weapons to them.

By 24 October the rising extended throughout the whole country. It became evident that it was being carried out by the people in complete unity. The only body that fought against it was the political police, whose number was estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 men. The industrial workers declared a general strike; this remained the revolution's principal weapon in all subsequent phases. The central authority, represented by Gerö, again applied the dual Communist tactics. Imre Nagy was called in to head the Government, which otherwise remained unchanged. At the same time Gerö, without Nagy's knowledge, called on the Russians for help, and the Red Army started its attack. It was thus that the revolution evolved into a fight for national independence. It gained impetus and its aims expanded. Just as in 1848, when the revolutions in Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, and Italy evolved from liberal revolutions into fights for national sovereignty, the prime object of this revolution became the withdrawal of Russian troops, culminating in the declaration of neutrality.

Throughout the following days the Communist central authority gave in too slowly and their concessions were too few. After accepting Imre Nagy as Prime Minister, they reorganized the Central Committee with the participation of such members as Ferenc Donáth, Géza Losonczy, György Lukács, Ferenc Muenich, and Nagy himself—men who, during the Rákosi regime, had been

excluded from the leadership as deviationists. The next day Gerő was dismissed and replaced by Kádár, who had spent the greater part of the Rákosi regime in prison. Progressive sections of the Communist Party (in contrast to the 'reactionary' Stalinists) considered him as a potential representative of a Titoist policy of independence, a hope that has not been justified by events. This change in the Party took place, apparently, under the direction of Mikoyan and Suslov, who flew to Budapest on 25 October. On 27 October Nagy formed his new Cabinet, which for all practical purposes was still a one-party Government with the exception of the participation of two members of the Smallholders' Party, the former President, Tildy, and the Party's former Secretary-General, Béla Kovács, who had spent ten years in prison from 1946 to 1956. The participation of the latter was only symbolic, as he was still at his home in Trans-Danubia and unable to get to Budapest, surrounded as it was by the Red Army. The withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, first demanded by the Györ Revolutionary Council on 29 October, was announced by the Government two days later. On 29 October the Minister of the Interior announced the dissolution of the political police. On 30 October Nagy denied responsibility for calling in the Russians; the Budapest radio admitted that it had lied in the past, and Kádár made attempts to save the Communist Party in a regenerated form. At the same time a number of orthodox Stalinists such as Erzsebet Andics, Bela Szalai, and Bela Vegh proceeded to Szolnok, one of the Russian Army bases under the Warsaw Pact. Their aim was the restoration of a Stalinist nucleus of the Communist Party under the protection of the Russian authorities.

On 31 October it was confirmed that Soviet troops had left Budapest by daybreak, but Soviet tanks still remained in Parliament Square. By then Cardinal Mindszenty had been released, and this gave impetus to the formation of Catholic political organizations. His radio appeal, made two days later, was misrepresented in the Western press. Although his reappearance as a public figure might not have been fortunate, he did not ask for restitution of Church property, i.e. the estates that were distributed in 1945, but for restitution of Church institutions and organizations, i.e. schools and such organizations as 'Actio Catholica' and the Catholic Youth Movement. It was a less fortunate step of the Cardinal's to order immediate disciplinary action against such priests as had taken part in the 'peace movement'. On 1 November

the Peasant Party was transformed into the 'Petőfi Party' and it elected a Presidential Council formed entirely of writers. Anna Kéthly became President of the re-established Social Democrat Party. On 2 November Imre Nagy formed his new Coalition Cabinet with the participation of the Social Democrats and the Petőfi Party. All Communist Ministers were left out with the exception of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, and Kádár.

During the first stage of the revolution, from 23 to 29 October, the fighting was mainly confined to Budapest, but at the same time the whole country underwent a political reorganization inspired by the practice of the Bolshevik revolution but with the object of fighting against the Bolshevik regime. The result of ten years' Communist indoctrination was a refusal of the dogma while applying some of the method. The central authority was replaced by local governing bodies, local councils (Soviets), which were formed in every factory, municipality, city, and county. The factories were taken over by the workers' councils. The administration was taken over by the national councils, consisting of delegates of workers, peasants, the army, and the youth organizations. Each national council worked out programmes defining political, economic, and administrative aims. These programmes show a surprising unity of purpose. They are all variations of the demands first defined by the intellectuals, differing only in emphasis. The national councils of the agricultural districts stressed the urgent need to revise the compulsory co-operative system, whereas the councils of predominantly industrial districts laid emphasis on the workers' demands for freedom of organization and for the workers' right to run the factories. The councils of the larger political units, such as cities and counties, gave priority to demands for political freedom in every aspect. However, all these manifestoes demanded the withdrawal of the Russian troops as the pre-condition of national independence. And they all agreed in adhering to the basic economic principles established since 1945, i.e. land reform and the public ownership of industry. They repudiated any effort to re-establish the pre-1945 regime with just as great a determination as they resisted the return to Stalinism.

The armed resistance of the security police, with the subsequent support of the Russian Army and the declaration of martial law, naturally gave increased impetus to the demands of the revolution. On 23 October a Gomulka-like solution might still have been satisfactory. After five days of fighting it had become obsolete. Nothing

ess than Hungary's complete withdrawal from the Soviet orbit ind the full re-establishment of democratic representation would uffice. During those five days, Imre Nagy manœuvred. In those irst days he was in fact a prisoner of the Russians. He tried to vork out a compromise, to induce the Russian withdrawal, but at he same time not to lose control over the revolution. He almost ucceeded. On 29 October the Russian Army consented to evacuate Budapest and the fighting ceased. The Russians realized their own lilemma. Although they were aware of the risk of permitting Hungary's democratic transformation, they also realized that the nly way of preventing it was ruthlessly to oppress those revoutionary bodies which had been set up in accordance with the Soviet principle. They must have also been aware of the effects hat an armed suppression of a popular revolt would have on the Communist world, on the Western Communist Parties, and, above ill, on the non-committed countries. As usual, they prepared for wo courses. On 29 October they began the withdrawal of their roops from Budapest and expressed willingness to discuss the vacuation of Hungary, but soon after they reinforced their garrisons in the north-eastern part of the country.

FIVE DAYS OF FREEDOM

Thus there followed the second stage of the revolution: five lays of freedom, from 29 October to 3 November. During these ive days the Government and the revolutionary bodies gradually stablished a complete unity of purpose. Within a day or two, the old political parties were re-established and all newspapers suppressed during the one-party dictatorship reappeared. New parties and newspapers came into being. Every national council, actory council, youth organization, and professional organization vas feverishly producing programmes and manifestoes. The Prime Minister was approached by delegation after delegation, but in this ilmost kaleidoscopic picture a unity of purpose had arisen, unprecedented in modern Hungarian history. It was determined by he basic purpose of re-establishing political liberty but at the same ime retaining the institutions that aimed at economic equality. This naturally led to the almost complete disintegration of the Communist Party, although its members still formed part of the Government, headed by a Communist. During those days it was ilready noticeable that the Communists participating in the Government spoke two different languages. Nagy, although prob-

ably faithful to Communist tenets, came to the conclusion that the economic transformation of the country could only be saved by introducing political democracy. Kádár, on the other hand, still spoke the Communist idiom. The cleavage between people and party had become final. Nagy had chosen the people and Kádár the party.

On 30 October Moscow radio reported that the Soviet Government was ready to discuss with the Warsaw Pact countries the question of troops stationed in their territories, and referred to the possibility of reorganizing the inter-relation of the socialist States in an almost Titoist spirit. On the same day, Sir Anthony Eden announced the ultimatum sent to Egypt and Israel by Britain and France. The subsequent reaction of the whole world, above all of the United States and the Afro-Asian nations, must, it would seem, have played a vital part in the decision of the Soviet Union to commit the second aggression against Hungary.

THE SECOND RUSSIAN ATTACK

The third and most tragic stage of the Hungarian revolution started in the early morning of 4 November, when the reinforced Russian Army attacked Budapest. Nagy was deposed and took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. The Russian Commander at Szolnok installed Kádár as Prime Minister. It is assumed that Kádár joined the group of Hungarian Stalinists at Szolnok either just before or just after the Russians started their second attack. From 4 November onwards for a week the principal Hungarian broadcasting services were operated from Szolnok and not from Budapest. It was from there that Kádár announced the formation of his Government on 4 November, and it was the commander of the Russian troops at Szolnok who on the same day made the first appeal to the people not to resist the Russian forces. During the following week, Kádár's whole authority was confined to the Szolnok broadcasting station. He alleged that he formed his Government as early as 1 November; at a later stage he changed the date to 2 November. In fact it was not till 7 November that he was sworn in as Prime Minister, as it was only then that his group could get hold of President Dobi, the head of the State.

The Russians miscalculated the power of resistance of the Hungarian people. During the second period of fighting the gravest part of it was not in Budapest but in the other industrial centres. During the short-lived period of freedom the workers'

councils formed armed guards who, together with units of the Hungarian Army, transformed the principal industrial centres, such as Dunapentele, the Hungarian 'Ruhr' district around Miskolc, and the industrial suburbs of Csepel and Ujpest, into strongholds of armed resistance. There was also fighting in a number of country districts where the mountainous terrain was favourable to guerrilla warfare. Radio stations were operated by the workers' and national councils, sending out desperate and pathetic appeals for help to the United Nations, to Mr Hammarskjöld, and to President Eisenhower. The armed resistance lasted for six days. Kádár's endeavours to declare his Government the legitimate successor of the revolution, and his promises to carry out a number of the demands that the revolution had formulated, met with as little response as the allegation that the Nagy Government had to be eliminated since it had become an instrument of counter-revolution. The Communist Party as such had ceased to exist. The small group of orthodox, though mainly anti-Stalinist, Communists who rallied round Kádár had not yet been able by mid-December to re-establish authority.

THE FOURTH STAGE: PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Although the six days of fighting involved immense sacrifices (the number of Hungarian dead is estimated at 35,000) the workers have not given in. The thousands of refugees who left the country since 4 November gave as reasons for this determination the spirit of despair, and also the hope that after the American Presidential election, due to take place four days after the second Russian aggression, the United States might have organized support for Hungary in the United Nations. Few Hungarians thought in terms of armed support, although it appears that the information service of the American broadcasting organizations did raise false hopes, not by making promises, but by implication. Most Hungarians were hoping, however, that the United Nations might exert the same political and diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union to cease fighting in Hungary as it did on Britain and France in the matter of Suez. Such hopes continued to prevail. For, after the cessation of the fighting on 11 November, the revolution entered its fourth stage—that of passive resistance, which is being carried on almost entirely by the industrial workers.

As a measure against both active and passive resistance, the Russians introduced the weapon of intimidation by the organiza-

tion, or at any rate the threat, of large-scale deportations, mainly of young people who participated in the fighting or who could have done so. They again miscalculated the effect this would have. It not only strengthened resistance but also speeded up the mass exodus, which by mid-December amounted to over 1 per cent of Hungary's population.

At this juncture it is not possible to assess Kádár's part with certainty. There is no evidence as to whether he offered himself to the Russians to act as the head of a puppet Government, or whether he was forced to do so. He was doubtless an anti-Stalinist with sympathies for Tito, but, when faced with the dilemma of whether to co-operate with the people as Nagy did, thus threatening the complete disappearance of the Communist Party, or whether, against his former convictions, to accept unmitigated Russian authority for Hungary, he chose the latter as the lesser evil. This opens up an interesting prospect as regards Tito's possible attitude if he had to choose between the establishment in the adjacent countries of non-Communist regimes based on political freedom, or total subordination of those countries to the Soviet Union: would he follow the example of Kádár, who abjured his former beliefs about the necessity for independence of socialist countries, or would he rather have as neighbours political democracies which, while preserving their independence, would exemplify the collapse of the Communist regime?

During the period following 11 November Kádár was unable to re-establish any instrument of authority and had to rely entirely on the weapons of the Red Army. He had to recognize by lawful decree the revolutionary institutions, the revolutionary committees, and the workers' councils, but he tried to canalize their power. His efforts to use them for his purposes were pursued by negotiation, promises of concessions, and threats. Whenever threats were followed by punitive action, the workers' councils replied by calling for general strikes. From time to time they permitted a partial resumption of work, but whenever Kádár tried to tighten his grip the strikes started again. On 9 December he outlawed the workers' councils and introduced martial law, with summary jurisdiction for all those found carrying arms. At the same time he called on 'reliable Communists' to volunteer for a Communist militia. This appeal proved that throughout the previous four weeks he had been unable to reorganize the political police, just as he failed to re-establish the Party cells. It is estimated that the

total number of Communist officials (*Parteifunktionäre*) who faithfully served the Rákosi regime was about 30,000. Those who took active part in the reign of terror would have nothing to lose by joining such a militia. But the workers are still armed, and they would doubtless retaliate in the same way as the French resisters did towards those collaborators who actively served the Germans.

The thousands of refugees who have left Hungary report another interesting symptom of the present mood of the people. One of their chief feelings is disappointment in relation to the West, and above all the United States. It is felt that America has betrayed its mission as leader of the free world by virtually 'conniving' at the Russian aggression—for this is how many Hungarians assess American policy, as expressed by the passivity of the United Nations. It had been confidently expected that the U.N. under American leadership would act at least as energetically over Hungary as over Suez.

It is still too early to evaluate the effects of the Hungarian revolution on the relationship between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. It appears to have shown up, for the first time, the failure of a Communist regime in a country with Western traditions and civilization. It has also shown up the inability of the free world to take advantage of this and initiate, from the position of strength created by this revolution, a European settlement. Such a settlement would have to include a solution of the German question, involving certain concessions by the N.A.T.O. Powers as a *quid pro quo* for Russian retrenchment in Europe. But whatever the outcome may be, the Communist rule in Hungary has collapsed. As a fiction, it can be maintained by the force of the occupying Power. But at this moment the Soviet rulers may be recalling Stalin's words, that 'as soon as the Bolsheviks sever themselves from the masses and lose their connection with them . . . they will lose all their strength and become a mere cypher.'

A. R.

Syria on the Move

Ascendancy of the Left Wing

RECENT developments in Syria have attracted general attention throughout the world and caused concern both among Syria's neighbours and in the Western capitals. The present article sets out to review the emergence of the new forces in Syria in whose hands political power is now concentrated. Whether they are indeed 'left-wing' is a moot point; the very title of the present study is a concession to time-honoured usage rather than a precise definition. Ever since the appearance of Fascism and Communism on the international scene the European political landscape has frequently defied the traditional classification into left, right, and centre. In the Middle Eastern context 'Left' and 'Right' are meaningless to an even larger degree. The 'Left' in the Arab countries opposes the social and political set-up at home, favours domestic reforms, combats the 'feudal' forces. But it certainly does not conform to the established Western left-wing pattern of radical democracy, humanism, internationalism, and so on. The situation is further complicated by the fact that even the newer, totalitarian categories do not exactly apply. The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, probably the most important political factor in Syria now, used to be called 'semi-fascist' by outside observers only a few years back. More recently this party has usually been called 'left-wing'. It has been an over-simplification of a rather complex issue in both cases, and this goes for the assessment of many other political groupings in the Arab world as well.

The rise of 'leftist' forces in Syria has to be viewed in the wider context of Syrian domestic politics during the last twenty years, the failure of parliamentary democracy there, the disintegration of the old parties, and an almost permanent economic crisis. When the country gained full political independence in 1944-5, one of the old political parties, the one headed by Dr Shahbandar up to his assassination, had already ceased to exist as an important political factor. Its rival, the National Bloc, led by Shukri al Quwwatli and others, was in power after 1943, but failed to give the country efficient leadership. Torn by factional strife, the party was identified with the rule of individual and economic vested interests and the many affairs of corruption which came to public knowledge. The since defunct Republican Party (founded

by Jamil Mardam in 1947) and the People's Party (which came into existence after the fusion of some dissidents from the National Bloc and a group of Aleppo politicians) promised radical changes while in opposition. But after they entered the Government they proved to be no better qualified than their predecessors to provide efficient administration and carry out long-overdue political, social, and economic reforms.

From 1949 to 1954 Syria was ruled by military dictators. The Palestine war of 1948 had precipitated these *coups d'état*. But public opinion was, for some time at least, not unsympathetic to the Colonels who had taken over the Government; it was believed, apparently, that military dictatorship could hardly be worse than the rule of the old discredited parties. Shishakli's regime was overthrown early in 1954 and since then Syria has until very recently been a parliamentary democracy once more. However, the old tensions and the old discontent have not been overcome. During most of this time the country has been ruled by a coalition of the old Nationalists and the People's Party, which, it soon appeared, had not learned much since its débâcle in the late 'forties. As a result, the influence of various 'leftist' oppositionist groups has greatly increased over the last two years: first in the streets of the Syrian cities and among the peasants of certain regions, and later also among the army officer corps and eventually in the Government itself.

THE ARAB SOCIALIST RENAISSANCE PARTY

The most interesting of the parties, and, in view of its many sympathizers in the Syrian army command, probably the most important at present, is the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. In view of its close contacts with parties in other Arab countries and its efforts to establish an alliance of 'Arab Socialist' parties, its emergence is of more than local significance. It came into being as the result of the merger, in September 1953, of two separate groups, the Arab Renaissance Party (*Al Ba'th*) and the Arab (or Republican) Socialist Party. The history of the 'Renaissance' group goes back to the late 1940s. It was headed by Michel Aflaq (a leading member of the Syrian Communists up to 1943), and its Secretary-General was Salah ad-Din Bitar, who is now Syrian Foreign Minister. The party was based mainly on a group of young intellectuals in Damascus, Deir az Zur, and a few other centres. It was strongly oppositionist, demanded neutralism in

world politics, and stood for a socialist programme at home. Aflaq's demands for equality for women and the disestablishment of Islam brought him into sharp conflict with all the authorities. *Al Ba'th* never attained much political importance; in the 1949 elections for parliament only one of its members was elected. The party executive thereupon decided to act as an 'educational association' for the propagation of its political theories rather than as a political party. Aflaq himself has not been entirely free from opportunist deviations: he agreed for a time in 1949 to serve as Minister of Education in a 'feudal' Government, and he promised, under some pressure apparently, to collaborate with Colonel Husni Za'im and later with Shishakli. But on the whole his policy has been based on left-wing principles and not on that expediency which was presumably the cause of the relative failure of his group.

Akram al Haurani, the head of the Arab Socialists, is a very different type of political leader. A brilliant speaker and dynamic personality, his political career is distinguished by determined efforts to achieve political power rather than by close adherence to socialist (or any other) principles. His party was originally founded as an 'anti-feudalist' group of young intellectuals in Hama, his native city, and in Homs, during the winter of 1949–50. His group organized and actively supported the peasant movement in the northern districts of Syria, and from the very beginning took great care to establish close contacts with certain sections of the officer corps. Haurani also organized small storm troops which frequently clashed with the members of the old parties and the feudal families. In its programme everything was promised to everybody: the party was to be 'national-socialist-popular-progressive', standing for reforms in all walks of life, raising of the living standard, destruction of feudalism, nationalization of physical resources, and a republican, parliamentary regime. However, when Haurani's relative Colonel Shishakli took over he became one of the main supporters of military dictatorship and for some time served as Minister of Defence. It was only towards the end of Shishakli's rule that the two quarrelled, and for a brief period Haurani became a political refugee.

After the restoration of the parliamentary regime in 1954 the united party remained at first in opposition. Within the party, Haurani with his extremist nationalist slogans gained the upper hand over Aflaq, who put the main emphasis on a socialist, refor-

mist programme. (There were other points of discord between them: Aflaq, who had some considerable first-hand experience of Communism, opposed co-operation with that party, whereas Haurani, a man of less experience but more ambition, favoured close collaboration.) While in opposition the party strengthened its influence among the urban intelligentsia and the students and intensified its 'anti-feudal' propaganda among the peasants. It made considerable headway in the elections of September 1954, when sixteen of its members were elected. There is some reason to assume that well-wishers within the officer corps had a hand in this success: the party's election campaign had been financed in part from unspecified army funds. In this campaign the party appeared in favour of Arab unity and as the most rabid anti-Western group, outstripping even the local Communists, who were somewhat impeded by the Moscow 'peaceful co-existence' strategy. It also came out as the most militant Arab nationalist party, attacking even Colonel Nasser for compromising with the British over Suez.

Shortly after the elections the party agreed to enter a Government coalition with the Nationalist right-wing. In January 1955 the party Council was convened for the first time in several years and details were given about the establishment of a common leadership of all Arab socialist parties, to be sponsored by the Syrian party. The parties referred to were the Jordan *Ba'th*, the Iraqi National Democrats (now National Congress), and the Lebanese Progressive Socialists. There have been close relations ever since with the first two, whereas the Lebanese party came gradually to dissociate itself from the nationalist-extremist demands and the pro-Soviet orientation of their Syrian comrades.

Meanwhile the internal tug of war continued: Haurani insisted that the aim of the party was to gain power with whatever allies it could find on the way, while Aflaq said that the main target should be to propagate the ideals of socialism and Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East. This dissension led to a split in September 1955 when several leading party members and parliamentary deputies, among them Galal as Sayyid, secretary of Al Jezira district, left the party. Nevertheless, the growing internal crisis in the country and the mounting tension in the Middle East prevented a general split. Haurani, never at a loss for a revolutionary slogan at a critical moment, put out a new one: 'The establishment of a revolutionary Government for the mobilization of all

forces for the coming war against Israel'.[1] The party tried to absorb the remnants of Shishakli's movement (the Arab Liberation Movement), while its collaboration with the Communists became very close indeed. But above all, its alliance with sections of the army general staff had by the autumn of 1956 become one of the crucial facts in Syrian domestic politics.

THE COMMUNISTS

The Syrian Communist Party, illegal up to 1954 and semi-legal until recent months, has now come into the open. The party publishes several newspapers of its own (*An-Nur*, *At-Tali'a*, etc.) and has been behind the publication of several other ostensibly unaffiliated organs (e.g. *Ar Ra'i al am*, *Barada*). Its leader, Khalid Bakhdash, has been to Egypt and has talked freely about his own and his party's activities. Many details hitherto unknown have been revealed—including even the type of classical music that Bakhdash prefers (his favourites are Borodin and Tchaikovsky). Broadly speaking, however, these revelations hardly call for a modification of the general picture of the Syrian Communist Party that had already emerged during the past few years: that of a small but extremely active and well-organized party with a capable leadership, which puts much stress on its patriotic convictions and works largely through a variety of 'front organizations'. Khalid Bakhdash has been at great pains to emphasize (in interviews with Egyptian newspapers) that his political biography is not really different from the life and tribulations of any other radical Arab patriot, and he has with rare consistency played down the anti-religious character of his party. He has even blamed the Syrian Socialists for putting undue stress on their anti-clerical opinions at a time when all the efforts should be directed towards the establishment of a wide national front—recalling in this respect the period of the 'Popular Front' in Europe, when the Communists sometimes blamed the Socialists for their over-intransigeance towards Catholic and right-wing parties.

The Syrian Communists met with some setbacks in 1956. Early in the year Bakhdash was elected a member of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Damascus Parliament, but later he was removed in view of certain suspicions on the part of members of the other parties. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which five or six years ago was inclined to be pro-Soviet, has of late become

[1] *Kul Shai'*, 13 December 1955

rather anti-Communist. This presumably has something to d with the fact that in 1950 the Communists were not yet a real riv to the Brotherhood, whereas at present their influence in the citi constitutes a serious challenge. On the whole, however, Bakhdas has been quite successful in neutralizing public opinion, and th accusations directed against his party (on account of his meeting with Israeli Communist leaders in Moscow, and in view of allega tions about 'Communism being a Jewish invention') have fallen fla

Indeed, this concentration of anti-Communist propaganda o religious and racial factors may even have helped Syrian Com munism. Wide sections of the public have thus been led to believ that a Communist is easily recognizable as a man fighting Islam But as the Syrian Communists profess to be tolerant in thi respect, people argue that they are obviously bona fide Aral nationalists rather than real Communists and so there is no reaso to worry about an imaginary 'Communist danger' in Syria. Recen declarations made by leading Syrian politicians, denying th existence of any such danger in Syria, have to be explaine against this background, which is a direct outcome of the unsuc cessful attempt to pin down Communism exclusively to th religious issue. It may also be mentioned in passing that the Syrian Communists have enlisted the support of quite a number of influential Damascus *ulama* in their 'front' organizations, who are willing and able to defend them against accusations from the Muslim orthodox camp.

During the past years Communist speakers have drawn the largest crowds at political meetings. The party is also said to have considerable funds at its disposal. It has paid much attention to 'front' organizations such as, for example, the Syrian Students' Union (affiliated to the Communist I.U.S.) or the newly founded League of Arab Writers. The contacts between the party leader-ship and its sympathizers among the officer corps have been less publicized but during the past year much progress has been made there too. (Some of the officers originally belonging to the Haurani wing of the Socialists have apparently been won over by the party. It is of some interest to note that the army high command 'recog-nized' the Communist Party even before it had been legalized by the Government. There was an official exchange of letters be-tween the army high command and the party leadership after the assassination of Colonel Malıki.[1]) In Arab politics, the Syrian Com-

[1] See below.

nists have come out in favour of the Egypt-Syria-Jordan ity; their stand has been welcomed by the Egyptian press which it to some lengths to demonstrate that though there was no m for a Communist party in Egypt herself, it could fulfil a ful function in other Arab countries.

The Syrian Communist Party is now the largest and best anized Communist party in the Arab world[1] and one of the ling forces in the country. It could not rule the country alone, l short of direct Soviet intervention it does not intend to do so. as a guide and mentor behind the Socialists, the pro-Soviet nents among the Nationalists and Independents (Khalid al n), and above all the army officer corps, it has already de- vely influenced the course of events.

THE ARMY

The Syrian officer corps has, with only short interruptions, yed a decisive role in Syrian politics throughout the last seven rs. Such intervention has taken place at times in many other ntries; when other institutions broke down or became dis- lited, ambitious young soldier-politicians have stepped in with without invitation. In Syria, as in other Arab countries, the er corps has shown a passionate interest in politics, though it hardly been ever united in its purpose. The Syrian army is ll: it numbered 10,000 men in 1948, and today has about six ades with 42,000 men. The few hundred officers with the rank aptain or above who constitute the backbone of the army have relled among themselves in the past not only (and perhaps not ıly) on political lines. They have frequently been divided on onal grounds in the struggle for power, and other considera- s, such as the interests of the community or clan they repre- ed, have also been important.

he Maliki affair may serve as an illustration of the enormously plicated relations existing between various factions of officers, between them and the political parties. Adnan al Maliki, deputy f of Staff and a leading supporter of the Socialists in the army, assassinated early in 1955; the trial of the murderers and their mplices lasted for many months and became the most im- ant domestic issue. On the face of it this was just another

has denied, however, that it gives or transmits instructions to the other Communist parties, stressing that 'all parties are equal' (*At-Tali'a*, ovember 1955).

battle in the struggle between the Socialists and Antun Sa'ade's Syrian Nationalists. But during the trial it appeared that personal reasons were also involved: Maliki had offended several brother officers by not promoting them, and at least one of them, Ghassan Jadid, subsequently sentenced to death *in contumaciam*, became involved in the affair.

The whole maze of relations between various groups of officers, and between them and the parties, is far too complex to be described in detail. Suffice it to mention that Shishakli's overthrow in 1954 was brought about by a junta headed by Colonels Faisal al Atassi and Amin Abu Asaf (a Druze), subsequently joined by Colonel Mahmud Shawkat, Lieut. Colonel Omar Kabani, and the Chief of Staff Shawkat Shuqair. They promised at the time that the army would return to the barracks and cease to meddle in politics. But this interlude did not last for long. A group of young and ambitious officers, friends of Akram al Haurani and supporters of the Socialists, thought that a far more active role should be played by the army in view of the inefficiency of the parliamentarians. They succeeded in removing many of their rivals and opponents from key positions. The most important of them, the *deuxième bureau*, headed for a long time by Mahmoud Shatra, was taken over by one of this group, Ra'is Hamdani, who in his turn handed it over to the leader of the group, Captain Abdul Hamid Saraj. Saraj brought about the downfall of the Chief of Staff, Shawkat Shuqair, in the summer of 1956. (One of the unofficial reasons given was that Shuqair, a Lebanese by origin, had adopted Syrian nationality only a few years previously and was therefore unacceptable to Syrian patriots.) The new man, Tawfiq Nizam ad-Din, was a rather colourless officer without military experience and political ambitions who had however faithfully served the various Syrian regimes during the last decade.

The group headed by Saraj is at present in full control of the Syrian army and, according to most reports, of the country in general. Their political convictions are radical: they want a change in Syrian politics and in the Arab world as a whole, in accordance with the lead given by Colonel Nasser, the Socialists, and the Communists. This radicalism is admittedly of a vague character, and their pro-Nasser, pro-Soviet orientation has less to do with Marxism-Leninism (or any other ideology) than with a general feeling that these are dynamic, purposeful movements which somehow 'get things done'. Back in the 'thirties the same officers

would almost certainly have become pro-Fascist (as so many Iraqi officers did at the time). Their anti-Western attitude has similar reasons: the West stands for the *status quo* in the Middle East, and has been allied with the 'old forces' in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan which these officers want to replace. Saraj seems to be firmly in the saddle at present; an attempt by the Government to remove him last September by appointing him military attaché in Paris failed. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to identify Saraj and his junta with the entire Syrian officer corps and the army. The old rivalries, political and private, continue to exist; by the appointment of the Saraj group's own members to key positions many other officers have been antagonized and would probably be only too eager to square accounts with the present ruling faction. The source of strength of the Saraj junta is its close contacts with important political forces (the Socialists and the Communists) inside the country, and, even more, its alliance with Nasser and, of late, the Soviet Union. Previous military juntas in Syria had not such strong international support.

SYRIA ON THE MOVE

Syria has for long been regarded by Soviet observers as the most promising country in the Middle East. Recent events have shown that these hopes have not been misplaced. In view of the news blackout imposed by the Syrian army in early November it is difficult to assess exactly how close Syria has moved towards Moscow. The news published by the Syrian press and radio since then has been based mostly on the Soviet and Egyptian news agencies. Syrian political leaders have been brought to the microphones of Damascus radio and have declared that the reports about the progressive 'satellization' of the country are mere hostile inventions. But the Soviet military build-up in Syria and the Communist propaganda monopoly are obviously not inventions. Nor is it known to what degree the Syrian Government continues to be a free agent. According to some observers, it was only to be expected that the growth of Communist and Soviet influence in Syria would be played down, for those behind it are undoubtedly afraid that too sudden a development of this kind would arouse contrary forces in the other Arab countries.

It would be mistaken to attribute in retrospect the growth of Soviet influence in Syria entirely to 'left-wing' activities in that country. Some sections of the right-wing parties have contributed

equally, if not more, to the rapprochement with Russia which has now reached its climax. They include Shukri al Quwwatli, the President of Syria, who went on a State visit to Moscow in late October 1956, and Sabri al Asali, who tried to ban the publication of news critical of the Soviet Union even before the army introduced political control on the satellite pattern. As far as the right wing is concerned these were concessions of minor importance made to a restive public opinion. In any case, these forces felt they had no other alternative: they felt their support slipping away. They could either have come out in favour of a radical domestic reform programme, which for many reasons they were unable to do, or decided to follow a 'radical' foreign policy. The dilemma facing these circles (not only in Syria) has been fittingly described by Sir H. A. R. Gibb:[1]

> Inevitably, as the nationalist leaders felt mass support slipping away, they made ever more violent efforts to regain it by continuing to harp on the continued presence of European forces or enterprises or controls, or on the hidden hand of Western diplomacy and on Western support of Zionism. When accused of neglecting social issues, they insisted that those were secondary and controversial, and must not disrupt the nation's united determination to achieve its national aims. However genuinely the politicians desired national independence, they did not know what to do with it. Concentrating on its negative aspect as freedom from foreign interference, and without positive program, they could only try to fill the void of policy by propaganda.

This propaganda led almost inevitably towards a pro-Soviet orientation as the way of lesser resistance. This is still frequently combined with a naive but sincerely held belief that no lasting harm can possibly ensue from close collaboration with the Soviet Union, and that those who endorse it are perfectly able to take care of themselves.

But the old nationalist forces are now very much on the way out. Among those who now rule Syria from behind the scenes, some are Communist or pro-Communist and want Syria to become part of the Soviet orbit. The others view current events only in the framework of local politics, and do not greatly care about the international implications one way or another.

W. Z. L.

[1] See 'Perspective of the Arab World', in *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1956

The Return of the Saar to Germany

ALMOST a year to the day after the Referendum in the Saar on 23 October 1955, that is to say on 27 October 1956, a series of agreements was signed to regulate the incorporation of the Saar in Western Germany: most of these treaties were between France and Germany, but two of them also involved Luxembourg and one the Coal and Steel Community.[1] After lengthy negotiations, agreement was reached on the major issues perhaps more easily than observers had anticipated. At an early stage it had been agreed that the Saar would be politically joined, as an eleventh *Land*,[2] to the Federal Republic on 1 January 1957; German law had already become valid in the Saar on 1 August 1956, while the German social insurance system was introduced there as early as June. From the economic point of view, however, the Saar was to remain a part of the French Union for three further years, that is to say until 1 January 1960, giving time, it was hoped, for the organic development of the Coal and Steel Community to soften the impact of the change. The international agreements of October 1956 were concerned with the conditions of the economic transfer.

Once the Coal and Steel Community had been founded, M. Grandval, as French High Commissioner or Ambassador in the Saar, habitually justified the economic attachment of the Saar to France by working out a sum: this showed that the production of coal and steel by the France-Saar Union could be approximately balanced against that of Germany, thus creating a fundamental equilibrium in the Coal and Steel Community. With the rapid industrial expansion of Western Germany after 1950 the sum had become increasingly incorrect, and it was clear that if the Saar was to be part of the West German economy there was no way of working it out at all. One of last October's agreements, however, was made with the Coal and Steel Community: it provided that France should still have the same number of representatives as Germany in the Parliament of that body, or rather that the three Saar representatives who had hitherto voted with France would in future be replaced by Frenchmen. This was a handsome formal concession.

[1] These were subsequently accepted by the French and German Chambers in December.

[2] The French having extended its frontiers, the territory of the Saar was now larger than it had been in the League of Nations period.

AN ECONOMIC COMPROMISE

For France, however, the essential and immediate problem had become to ensure an adequate supply of coal so as to develop the mines and the new steel-mills of Lorraine to a level of production which should fill the gap left by the Saar. Obviously this problem was entangled with old Franco-Saar disputes over the exploitation of the Saar mines, and above all with the long-standing quarrel about the coal of the Warndt.[1] The Warndt coalfield lies beneath the Saar and a small adjacent strip of Lorraine from whose shafts the French had worked Saar coal from beyond the France-Saar frontier: since Warndt coal was the best coking coal in the Saar, and since some of the other Saar mines were showing signs of exhaustion while the Warndt contained reassuring reserves, the Saarlanders had felt great bitterness about this French intrusion.

The Germans have now agreed that France is to have 90 million tons of German coal by the end of 1980. Of this total the French will be able to mine 66 million tons themselves, an amount which is estimated to be one-twelfth of the total reserves of the Warndt. Until the end of 1960 the French are free to mine as they hitherto have done, but after that they will be entitled to mine coal in the southern section (North Merlebach and St Fontaine) of the Warndt only. The remaining 24 million tons which the Germans have promised that France shall receive will be provided from the Saar or elsewhere in Germany, as the Germans may choose; it will be provided at cost price. After 1980 France is still to be guaranteed a third of the coal production of the Saar, to be bought, however, at the market price. As the settlement of Franco-German debts arising out of coal transactions would have been extremely complicated, Dr Adenauer agreed with M. Guy Mollet, when they met in Luxembourg in the autumn, to cancel the whole account between them; this meant that royalty payments owed by France to the Saar for the earlier lease of the Warndt were cancelled too. These arrangements were not altogether welcome to the Saarlanders—indeed a former Minister suggested that the autonomous Saar had obtained better terms from France. But they prepared to sink two new shafts in the Warndt, thereby hoping to create 20,000 fresh jobs. And after 1980 the French will give up the shafts from which they have mined Warndt coal. Meanwhile it seemed worth while to the Federal Government to pay this price for the Saar, or rather for a satisfied and reasonably prosperous France.

[1] See *The World Today*, May 1953, p 197.

The development of Lorraine requires not only a dependable supply of Saar coal but also improved communications for the export of the produce of Lorraine. For this reason the French have for years been pressing for the canalization of the Moselle (which winds like an eel), an unwelcome project for Saarlanders, Rhinelanders, and Luxembourgers alike, since it will stimulate French competition. The Germans have nevertheless agreed not only to the 90 million tons of coal for France but also to the canalization of the Moselle from Thionville, the headquarters of the great SOLLAC concern in the industrial heart of Lorraine, down to the river's junction with the Rhine at Coblenz: they have even agreed to contribute nearly a third of the expense—i.e. 120 million marks—towards the total cost of 370 million marks. Thus the French will pay 248 million and the Luxembourgers 2 million marks. By a separate agreement France has promised compensation to Luxembourg. On the other hand the French have made some concessions to the Germans with regard to the Alsace canal, waiving an old privilege granted by the Treaty of Versailles to draw off water from the Rhine, and giving up a plan to extend the canal to Breisach.

In the inter-war years, and during those which have followed the second World War, the Saar has often been privileged to enjoy a two-way commercial traffic, but it has suffered the evils of an uncertain future. An attempt has now been made by the October agreements to preserve and extend this open market while putting an end to the penalties inflicted by transitional status, and above all to the lack of investment and scarcity of capital goods. German capital equipment, in so far as it will not affect industries competing with France, is to be allowed into the Saar duty-free immediately. In the immediate future also the *Autobahn* from Mannheim to Kaiserslautern is to be continued to Saarbrucken and the Saar railways are to be electrified. These are German announcements, not part of the Franco-German agreements, but they herald an improvement in Saar communications, which had suffered flagrantly from the general feeling that no one knew in which direction they were to lead.

One of the intricacies of the Saar question has long been that Saar light industry dreaded German competition: indeed, even last summer the porcelain industry of Merzig was still lamenting the transfer of the Saar to Germany. Hence the October agreements have preserved the duties upon German consumer goods

entering the Saar during the next three years, though there is provision for delayed payment for purchases made between now and 1960. Although there is great popular demand for German consumer goods, it is being arranged that there shall be no great increase in imports of them—amounting perhaps to a value of 3·5 instead of 3 milliard francs—during the next three years. After 1 January 1960 duties will not be imposed upon trade between France and the Saar, which is to be kept at its 1955 proportion of about 165 milliard francs' worth of goods from France to the Saar and of 100–110 milliard francs' worth in the other direction. If German goods replace French ones, or if for any other reason French exports to the Saar fall by more than 25 per cent, then Saar exports to France would also be curtailed. At any rate after the end of 1959 the Saar will enjoy almost unqualified freedom of trade with both Germany and France.

Most of the provisions so far enumerated had already been worked out by June 1956 and were merely made more precise in October. But there was one point which caused almost insuperable difficulty and was only settled in the autumn. This was the question of the currency. The Germans objected to making the change-over from francs to marks in the Saar at the official rate of exchange (83 francs to the mark) which, they believed, overvalued the franc: indeed, they wished the transfer to be made at the rate of 100 francs to the mark. Finally, however, they gave way over this, too, and agreed to accept the official figure of 83 francs to the mark. To prevent speculation, the change will be made at an unspecified date not later than 1 January 1960. With their far more rapidly growing production, and without hostility from the anti-colonialists of a former extra-European empire to face, the Germans could afford to be generous to France. The concessions made by Bonn were regarded with considerable disfavour by the new political leaders of the Saar, who had been brought into prominence on the crest of a wave of noisy nationalism in opposition to the Statute to which Dr Adenauer had agreed. Nor were these leaders much gratified to find that—to take one example—the Saar would only be represented to the extent of 26 per cent in the German *Saargrubengesellschaft*, whereas in the *Saarbergwerke* which preceded it Saar and French representation had been equal.

The great outcry in the Saar however was not about these matters but about the question of the huge steel works at Völk-

lingen.[1] Until 1945 this concern had belonged to the local family of the Röchlings: the head of the family, Hermann Röchling, had been a keen Nazi, and after the war he was condemned and imprisoned by the French as a war criminal. In October 1954 the French authorities, having sequestrated the biggest steel-mills of the Saar such as Völklingen and Neunkirchen, promised that these two concerns would be freed from French control before the plebiscite in October 1955. The promise was fulfilled at the last moment in the case of Neunkirchen, but in the meantime the French and German Governments had jointly arranged to buy the Völklingen mills for 200 million Swiss francs. Great indignation was worked up over this, especially by Dr Schneider and his Democratic Party: the matter of Volklingen became part of their attack upon Dr Adenauer who, they declared, had tricked the Röchlings into accepting far too small a sum. During 1956 Dr Schneider frequently demanded a second plebiscite to express the feelings of the Saarlanders in favour of the reinstatement of the Röchling family. At last in the middle of November, two or three weeks after the Franco-German Agreements had been signed, it was announced that Volklingen would be restored to the heirs of Hermann Röchling immediately, in return for a reparation payment of only 3 milliard French francs (about 35 million marks).

POLITICAL GAINS AND LOSSES

In this manner the way has been prepared for a German *Land* to live for three years as part of the economy of France. What this involves is suggested by the fact that in November details were being worked out for the Federal Republic to levy direct taxes in the Saar after the end of 1956, whereas indirect taxation will go to France until the end of 1959. Nor do political developments in the Saar during 1956 suggest that this co-habitation will be achieved without friction. In this connection one or two contemporary features of political life in the Saar deserve to be recorded. On the one hand the two-thirds majority which rejected the project for Europeanization embodied in the Statute has very naturally and almost inevitably pursued a fiercely nationalistic course. On the other hand the one-third minority which supported the Statute has unexpectedly survived.

In the elections to the Saar Landtag on 18 December 1955 the pro-German Saar C.D.U. gained 14 seats, Dr Schneider's party

[1] See *The World Today*, December 1955, p. 533.

13, and the pro-German Socialists 7, giving the combined *Heimatbund* 34 out of a total of 50 seats. The C.D.U. leader, Dr Hubert Ney, became Prime Minister, with a *Heimatbund* Cabinet containing three other Christian Democrats, two Schneider Democrats, two Social Democrats, and a non-party expert as Minister of Finance. It was presumed in Germany that the polemics of the plebiscite campaign would soon be dispensed with and that the Saar C.D.U., an almost purely Catholic party, would absorb the C.V.P., the Catholic People's Party which still followed Herr Hoffmann and sent twelve representatives to the Landtag. Negotiations to this end were conducted in March and April 1956 by a C.D.U. emissary from Germany. But they ended in an appeal to the international court which had been set up by the Western European Union,[1] the C.V.P. asking for protection against Dr Ney's threats against them as traitors and separatists. Thus the two Catholic parties, C.D.U. and C.V.P., fought bitterly against one another in the local elections in the Saar on 13 May. In July the Saar C.D.U. was absorbed into the German C.D.U., but Herr Hoffmann's party, still protesting against Dr Ney, joined the small *Zentrum* party in Germany. The *Zentrum*, which was less conservative than the C.D.U., had lost its representation in the Bundestag in 1953 when the small parties were eliminated: although its leaders thought the Saar should be German, in association with the Bavarian Party they stand for federalism within Germany—this and their social policy formed the basis of their understanding with the Saar C.V.P. The pro-German Socialists of the Saar, led by Herr Kurt Conrad, had already, during the campaign preceding the referendum, declared themselves part of the German Social Democrat Party. On 18 March the Socialists who had favoured the autonomy of the Saar dissolved their party, most of whose members then joined Herr Conrad.[2]

The hero of the referendum was neither Dr Ney nor Herr Conrad but Heinrich Schneider, a clever lawyer and a former Nazi with a number of familiar techniques. When Dr Ney formed his Cabinet at the end of 1955, Dr Schneider chose to be elected President of the Landtag, a position which provided him with influence and initiative. He regretted the fusion of the Saar parties into German politics and refused to allow his Democratic Party

[1] It was designed to prevent the penalization of the losers under the plebiscite.

[2] At the beginning of December 1956 Herr Conrad's party resigned from the *Heimatbund*, by mid-December it had not yet been decided whether its representatives would remain in Dr Ney's Government.

(D.P.S.) to be absorbed by the German F.D.P. to which it was presumed to be most akin. On the contrary, Dr Schneider wished to prolong to the uttermost the pre-plebiscite alliance of the pro-German parties in the *Heimatbund*, for it was as the leader of the *Heimatbund* that he had gained a certain predominance. And it was in the spirit of the *Heimatbund* that many officials who had favoured autonomy were dismissed without the W.E.U. international court being able to help them. Indeed, according to C.V.P. sources, a number of former S.S. men are being brought back into the police. It is in the spirit of the *Heimatbund*, also, as expounded by Dr Schneider, that the streets of Saarbrücken and Dillingen are no longer named after anti-Nazis such as Max Braun and Willi Graf, nor even after Heine and Goethe, but rather after the Hohenzollerns and their generals. The two bridges of Saarbrücken, formerly named according to the French towns to which they led, have now been labelled as the Bismarckbrucke and the Luisenbrucke. After this the *Frankfurter Rundschau* brought out a series of articles called 'So deutsch ist die Saar' and there was adverse comment elsewhere in the German press.

Ever since the Treaty of Versailles the Saarlanders have grumbled, sometimes justifiably and sometimes not, about the French schools in the Saar. In the 'twenties there was some French pressure with denationalizing intent. But since the second World War the French have thought in terms only of the internationalization of the Saar, and many Saarlanders—though probably always a minority—have welcomed the opportunities this might bring. The Hoffmann Government introduced daily French lessons into the primary schools, an advantage for clever children and a disadvantage for the rest. The French lycée in Saarbrucken attracted some German children, as French lycées habitually do attract non-French pupils—it may even happen in London. It has, however, now been laid down that Saar children will not learn French before they are ten and then only if they wish to do so. No German pupils are in future to attend the French lycée until they have completed their regular eight years at a German school.

The most interesting institution in the Saar between 1948 and 1956 was the new University founded in a former barracks built among the woods not far from Saarbrücken. It was founded as a bilingual Franco-German academy and aspired with considerable sincerity to be European: the French contributed half the funds. The fees were particularly low, for it was intended to pro-

vide education for the sons of the miners and other workers of th Saar to an extent to which no German University offers such thing. Some people hoped that when the Saar became politicall German this international and working-men's University, shorn of the excessive number of French professorships which ha originally been helpful, might yet survive. But this is not to be The University will now be purely German. There will exist separately but in loose connection with it, a French Institute. I should be added that the new German rector, Professor H Hübner from Erlangen, gave general satisfaction when he delivered his inaugural address on 14 November 1956.

Until the General Election in Western Germany, which is to take place in the second half of 1957, the Saar is to send thre observers to the Bundesrat in Bonn and ten to the Bundestag, th latter to reflect the relative strength of the political parties in th Saar Landtag. This would mean that two members of the C.V.P would go to Bonn, and this the Saar C.D.U. and Socialists at first accepted: but Dr Schneider, in the name of the *Heimatbund*, fo long objected to the Hoffmann 'traitors' appearing in the Bundestag, and was able to win a majority in the Landtag to his support

When it comes to the Election campaign in the Federal Republic the Saarlanders will participate like other Germans. Among the Saar politicians only Dr Schneider's future political activitie give rise to much speculation. It seems clear that he is bidding for an important role in a highly nationalistic reaction against th pro-Western policy of Dr Adenauer, whom he constantly attack as no true patriot—the Chancellor, he maintains, by supporting th European Statute for the Saar,[1] was willing to lose that territory for Germany, and is equally indifferent to the fate of Sovie Germany and, of course, of the former German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. Dr Schneider claims himself to be th champion *par excellence* of *Wiedervereinigung*, that is to say, th reunification of Germany: he has proved it, he says, by his action in the Saar which he envisaged as only a part of the *Wiedervereinigung* campaign: if he is more judicious in his pronouncements than Prince Löwenstein, who recently exhorted the East Germans to follow the Hungarian example and rebel, he has no intention of ceding his position to the Prince. It is in this connection significant that he refuses to allow his party to be merged in the F.D.P. In

[1] Dr Ney's version, expounded at Stuttgart last October, is that Dr Adenaue agreed to the Statute because he knew that it would be defeated.

Bonn last October he addressed a big meeting of German refugees from Eastern Europe. He claimed that the Saar Statute had shown the Western Powers to be opposed to German unity, and he advocated the neutralization of a reunited Germany; indeed he spoke of a neutral cordon which should embrace Finland, with Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, ending in the south with Yugoslavia. In view of the disruptive, possibly even eruptive, influence of Dr Schneider, which fortifies the rising current of opposition to Dr Adenauer's Westernism, it is not surprising that military service is not to be demanded from the Saarlanders until after their economic incorporation in Western Germany on 1 January 1960.

While the Saarlanders have been courted with economic favours from both Germany and France, since the Treaty of Versailles they have never yet been quite politically free in the normal Western sense. In the days of the League of Nations, although they were free to speak they were governed by an international committee which was not responsible to them. Then in 1935 they voted themselves into the 'freedom' of the Third Reich. From 1947 they were governed by a succession of Hoffmann Cabinets which were, economically at any rate, responsible to France. Openly pro-German parties and their newspapers were banned as unconstitutional, and certain individuals were expelled. But although the pro-Germans among them abused the Hoffmann regime as a police-State, the Saarlanders in his days were not much afraid to say either this or anything else they thought, and they could read the French and German press as they pleased. Although human rights, in the name of which Hoffmann was so often attacked, are now officially restored, Saarlanders who are not necessarily enthusiasts for German reunification à la Schneider today feel isolated and afraid: they are afraid for their jobs, if they still have them, and they are afraid, for instance, that their letters are censored—is this, they ask, if it be true, because Dr Schneider is compiling a black list for future use? On the other hand there is no comparison with the situation that existed in 1935, when the Socialists, Liberals, and anti-Nazi Catholics either fled or were sent to concentration camps. In 1935 a penniless Herr Hoffmann barely escaped to France with a large family of children, otherwise he would probably not have survived. In 1955 he lives in the Saar much abused but not molested, and a small German party has amalgamated with his.

It is interesting that even in the post-plebiscite atmosphere some 30 per cent of the Saar electorate has hitherto remained faithful to Herr Hoffmann's idea. Indeed in the *Kreisratswahlen* (local elections) on 13 May 1956, by comparison with the elections to the Landtag in the previous December, both Herr Hoffmann's C.V.P. and Dr Ney's C.D.U. gained a few adherents, while Dr Schneider's D.P.S. lost a few. When a small margin is allowed for the effects of non-violent intimidation it appears that nearly a third of the Saarlanders would still welcome autonomy under an international authority and the intimacy with France which geography, economics, and a status of this kind might be expected to bring. This in the circumstances is a remarkable epitaph to be inscribed upon the tombstone of the Saar Statute upon which M. Mendès-France and Dr Adenauer agreed in October 1954.

E. W.

Changing Political Attitudes in the German Federal Republic

THE present preoccupations in the Middle East sometimes make people forget that British policy is going to be vitally affected at its very centre by political developments in Germany. As the Federal Republic gains in strength and stature, her political decisions will increasingly help to determine the balance of forces in Europe. When we remember the results of the second World War and compare developments in Germany with those in, say, France or Italy, it must seem remarkable that she appears to have achieved greater internal stability than either of her two neighbours. Will this stability be maintained?

For an answer it will be necessary to look not merely at the political institutions of Western Germany but also at the trend of public opinion and at some of those other institutions which help to determine the political climate of a country.

There has certainly been a decline of political sectarianism in Germany. A few years ago, members of the Bundestag representing

different political parties would always sit at different tables in their dining room. At one table there would be only Social Democrats, at the next one only Christian Democrats, and they seldom met. That has changed, not only in the restaurant, but in politics generally. It has changed because, for one thing, younger people are gradually coming into prominence today who seem to be more sober, more realistic, and less tied to worn-out political dogmas than were their predecessors. The change may sometimes be a result of boredom with abstract political ideas; they have been ridden to death in the German past. One of the main causes of this development is probably the orientation of the two great political parties towards the middle of the road. This again is not due to ideological reasons, but to social and economic facts. Since the currency reform Germany has enjoyed rising prosperity side by side with a growing sense of political and economic stability. That has tended to make the whole nation if not bourgeois, at any rate *bürgerlich*. There is a greater readiness to talk calmly about differences in outlook, whether religious, economic, or political.

This process has gone so far that some German observers are now complaining that the sober attitude of young Germans towards political and ideological questions is a proof of their lack of idealism. These critics complain that young Germans are often more interested in acquiring a new motor scooter than a new idea, but perhaps it is a welcome change in German politics for people to be interested in tangible improvements. The acquisition of motor scooters may prove a more peaceful activity than the acquisition of ideas has proved in the past. Moreover, this new materialism is by no means peculiar to Germany.

There is at the same time an increased readiness to examine Germany's recent past. It will be remembered that it was one of the objects of re-education to encourage this self-examination. In the first phase of Allied occupation the Germans were said to have had their noses rubbed in their recent past. They did not like the process and tended to react against it, so that foreign observers came back somewhat disappointed with the results of these efforts. Two factors, above all, militated against success. First, it was a process largely applied from outside, and, secondly, the events which the Germans were asked to examine were too recent in their past. Nations often require a certain distance from their own past behaviour before they can become critical of it, and it seems as if this process has only just started in Germany—perhaps because

there is no longer the same need automatically to turn self-examination into self-justification.

The evidence can be found in plays and films, books and newspaper articles which are written today probing critically into the behaviour of the Germans during the period of the Third Reich. This is not a mass movement—such things are rarely so in any nation—but it affects the thinking minority and might therefore in due course seep through to a much larger number of people. There is here an attempt to draw a reasonably honest picture of the Nazi period. Again, this attempt is not made in response to a mass demand. It is made by a relatively small number of people who feel the urge to do so and thus develop their own method of encouraging self-examination.

Those who have had recent opportunities of discussing political subjects with Germans, either in public or privately, have returned feeling that the most advanced section of German opinion is to be found among those who make the opinions—journalists, broadcasters, adult educationists, and to some extent university teachers. One illustration of their educational effort is the annual commemoration of 20 July 1944, of the attempt which Germans made to liberate themselves from the oppression of the Nazi regime. Every year recently there has been a growing attempt in the press and in broadcasts to show that conscience is the ultimate citadel of freedom, and to stress the need for Germany to cure herself of those features in her past which brought her to disaster. It seems that this readiness to examine the recent past is beginning to extend to schools other than grammar schools. A change here can only be expected if it is accompanied by a change in the position held in society by both the universities and the grammar schools.

Nevertheless, this new political attitude may continue to grow if there is a larger influx of younger people into positions of leadership—if, for example, younger members get into the Bundestag after the next elections and obtain office. To some extent this has already happened in the Parliaments of the *Länder*. The German politicians of the Weimar period are gradually being replaced by people who are not necessarily better but who are different. The 'Young Turks' of North Rhine/Westphalia are a case in point. Their emergence aroused a certain amount of consternation among outside observers. Here was a group of politicians, roughly between the ages of forty and fifty, who had come to the fore and in due course changed the composition of the North Rhine/West-

phalian Government by ousting the C.D.U. in a *Land* which is one of its strongholds. The 'Young Turks' do not appear to be primarily interested in principles but in power, or, at any rate, office. They may not constitute an improvement on their predecessors, but the sacrifice of principle to expediency is not an unknown feature in the political life of other countries.

The Free Democrats, the party in which the 'Young Turks' carried out their revolt, are perhaps less attached to principles than others. They are still trying to find their proper place in German political life. A good deal may depend on their ultimate choice, not because of their own weight but because the F.D.P. may be in a position, after the next elections, to determine which of the two great parties—the C.D.U. or the S.P.D.—shall lead the new Federal Government. It is of course possible that their hopes may be disappointed. The S.P.D. and the C.D.U. may agree to cut out the F.D.P. by forming a coalition Government. Some of the Christian Democrats, particularly their Protestant members and trade union representatives, seem to favour such a course. A coalition of this kind would of course only be possible without the present Chancellor. The S.P.D., eager to obtain office and trying to attract the middle-class vote, might prefer the C.D.U. to the F.D.P. if a choice has to be made. It is perhaps significant that in the elections for the National Executive of the S.P.D. at their last Party Conference those unpaid members of the Executive obtained the highest number of votes who had been successful in obtaining office for their party in their own *Land*.

Some leadership on the great issues of the day might have been expected from the German universities. But the universities are now beginning to be conscious of their own need for internal reform. Today they tend to appear as overcrowded islands of academic existence. They do not feel the urge to influence public life which the British universities, for example, have shown by establishing extra-mural departments as a means of helping to create an informed opinion outside their own walls. The great majority of German university teachers do not believe that they should exercise such a function in society. But here again traditional attitudes seem to be changing. A few German universities are now making some contribution to adult education, and one of them, Göttingen, has recently established what is in effect the first extra-mural department in Germany. The assistance given to this experiment by British universities has been greatly welcomed.

An increased awareness of public responsibilities may once again follow from a change in leadership. The new Chairman of the West German University Vice-Chancellors' Committee (*Rektorenkonferenz*), Professor Coing, the *Rektor* of Frankfurt University, started his first year of office with a courageous article demanding extensive and far-reaching reforms. This produced a fairly encouraging reaction from the more outspoken of his professorial colleagues and from some people in responsible positions outside the universities. While there is as yet little evidence that the universities are looked upon as the property of the nation and not merely as the preserves of higher learning, opinion both inside and outside their walls seems to be changing. With growing insistence the question is raised whether material achievements alone can provide a society with its scale of values.

Perhaps one may hope that the changes which have been indicated here are going to prove more significant for the future of Germany than the voices from the past, such as the rallies of S.S. members[1] which received so much publicity. It is certainly true that if S.S. officers were to be admitted to the new German army the hope for a new spirit in that army would have to be abandoned. It must, however, be said that in this field German democrats have tended to stultify their own purposes. They have argued about the structure of the army, they have tried to make certain that military leaders will at all stages be subject to parliamentary control, but they have not tried to ensure that enough democrats will go and join the army. It looks like a repetition of 1918 when finally the German army came to be manned by adherents of the old regime because the supporters of the Republic would not serve. Many political leaders are of course aware of this danger but are reluctant to risk their popularity by pointing out that pious criticism of the past is not enough.

Nor have they given sufficient backing to the group of army reformers in the Federal Ministry of Defence. These young officers, grouped around the department dealing with the 'inner structure' of the future army, tried to ensure that it would be a citizens' army. The old guard cautiously kept quiet at first, merely passing the word that these were utopian ideas incompatible with military efficiency, a view eagerly shared by similar members of the old guard in other countries. Now the advocates of blind obedience may soon feel strong enough to launch their counter-

[1] Held at Hanover and Minden in mid-September 1956.

attack. Or they may quietly take over. The dangers of such a development hardly need elaborating. The democratic leaders in Germany will then have helped to produce the very situation which they have always feared. They have suffered from split personality. They never wanted an army, of course, but once it had to come they rightly insisted that it should be different from the one they had before. But their own political parties seem to have prevented them from providing the one safeguard that could be built into the army, namely, a new kind of leadership.

There is therefore a risk here that one very important part of the old Germany may reconstitute itself. Something rather similar seems to have happened in the civil service. A good deal of political neutralism can be found there—neutralism not in relation to either foreign policy or domestic party conflicts, but as far as inner attachment to certain basic political principles is concerned. Many of those who now occupy important positions in the civil service would probably work quite as faithfully for a different political system, as did their predecessors. The Nazi system could hardly have achieved its early successes without the dutiful co-operation of civil servants who often were not Nazis themselves

In an account of German political developments the trade unions must obviously occupy an important place. The unified trade union movement established after 1945 constitutes a new element in German society. Socialist, Christian, and Liberal trade unionists who had frequently been opposed to one another before Hitler came to power had met again in Nazi concentration camps. Those who survived decided that it might be better to settle their differences in order to avoid fresh concentration camps. The new organization has about 6 million members, something like a third of the total number of 'gainfully employed' persons. It has claimed a very much larger influence on social and economic developments than the old trade union movement. In the early days there was much discussion about co-determination, or *Mitbestimmung*—the participation of workers' representatives in the management of the basic industries. The demand for economic democracy had first been raised in 1918, and the support given to Hitler by sections of German industry had seemed to underline the need for democratic control of economic power. Co-determination was conceived as a means of re-distributing political power by giving the workers a share in determining the use of economic resources.

If workers' representatives were to exercise managerial functions,

they clearly required additional education and training. The trade unions therefore established an impressive number of colleges and other educational institutions in order to prepare their members for the exercise of these new tasks, particularly in the coal and steel industries where co-determination was secured. The German trade unions have thus claimed and obtained more formal powers than the British trade unions, but it is doubtful whether they are in fact more powerful today than they were in the days of the Weimar Republic. For one thing, economic policy is not planned by those boards on which the trade unions are now represented. And there has also been a tendency for their representatives to become assimilated to those boards. This development was predicted by their British colleagues, who maintained that to attempt to be on both sides at once would risk producing a conflict of loyalties. Trade union representatives, they said in effect, would be liable to change their point of view as they changed their place in the bargaining process.

It cannot be said that the German trade unions today are actively engaged in the transformation of society, although they originally conceived that to be their task. Like trade unions elsewhere, they are trying to get the best out of the existing society for their members—better wages, shorter hours, improved conditions of work. At present, with a growing shortage of labour, they are reasonably successful, but they also have to meet the competition of employers who provide their own workers with these improved conditions without waiting for trade union action. The system of taxation favours an employer who provides houses or flats for his workers. If a worker living in a flat owned by his firm is asked whether it might not have been better for taxes to have been properly collected from his employer so that the Local Authority could have built his block of flats, his answer is likely to be, 'In that case I shouldn't be here, because the Local Authority wouldn't have built it, or at any rate not so quickly or cheaply!' In other words, while many members of the German trade union movement still believe in theory that society should be transformed, they are for most practical purposes convinced of the superior value of a free economy. Whatever the precise nature of the existing economy, it seems to have justified itself by producing more goods, better flats, cars, clothes, and furniture than any other economy they have heard of—and sometimes even better wages than their trade union has been able to negotiate for them.

As elsewhere, general prosperity has reduced the desire for basic social changes. An economic crisis would change the picture more quickly in Germany than in some other countries. Meanwhile, however, there will be a growing demand for more leisure time and perhaps a reduction in the furious tempo of German industrial activity. After all, human energy is limited, and the trade unions are voicing a popular demand when they insist on a five-day week.

The German trade unions have always regarded the defence of democracy as their most important task. Are they today in a better position to carry it out than they were in 1933? There is no simple answer to that question. One of the best ways of defending democratic institutions is the creation of good citizens, and the trade union movement should be one of the training grounds. Inside its own organization it can provide members with opportunities to exercise responsibility and leadership. The German movement, however, has always tended to rely on a relatively large apparatus of full-time officials, together with ample provision for trade union education. But the acquisition of democratic virtues is not a theoretical process; practical experience is needed too.

Some recent developments have raised the question whether the German trade union movement is likely to be split again by the establishment of a Christian (mainly Catholic) trade union organization. Such a split seems very improbable. Catholic trade unionists know very well that any federation of their own would be very much smaller than the one in which they now share the leadership. They can hardly relish the idea of returning to a reduced influence and a rather more modest establishment. Nor is it likely that the Socialist trade union members are planning to increase their appeal to class-consciousness. Former divisions of this kind are rapidly losing their validity. The German working class today does not present a setting for militant socialism, any more than that of most other industrial countries.

The revival of interest in religious activities may prove to be of some significance. It is particularly marked inside the Protestant Churches. The distribution of numerical strength as between Catholics and Protestants in Germany has changed radically as a result of the division of the country. Whereas formerly Protestants outnumbered Catholics by about two to one, the two denominations are now of about equal strength in the Federal Republic. The growth in the influence of the Catholic Church and the experiences under the Nazi regime seem to have presented a challenge to the

Protestants to which they are beginning to respond. They have, for example, established a series of short-term residential colleges, called Evangelical Academies, where people who are by no means all Protestants come together to discuss pressing social, political, or economic questions in an atmosphere free from any narrow sectarianism. Both denominations now attract hundreds of thousands of people to their annual conferences. Between three and four hundred thousand people attended the 1956 Evangelical Church Conference at Frankfurt. Some twenty thousand of these came from the Soviet Zone, under their own steam and at considerable risk. Discussion groups, held in great exhibition halls, were attended by several thousand people each who sat for hours in oppressive heat, making notes or taking a passionate part in discussions. Again, they included citizens from the Soviet Zone who, giving their name and address, argued with the Soviet Zone Ministers who had come under the guise of Christians to attend this conference.

A few months ago a leading German periodical, *Die Gegenwart*, started a lively discussion by publishing an article entitled 'Is National Socialism dead?' The author, a well-known historian, pointed to the fact that there had not only been an economic miracle in Germany but a political one as well. In the last free elections before 1933 the Nazis and the Communists, those hostile brothers, together polled more than half the total vote. Today they have both been reduced to insignificance in free elections.

Here in Britain Nazism has always been looked upon as one of various expressions of a basic German attitude to politics. The question which people ask here is, has the basic German attitude changed so much that it is not likely to find a similar expression in the near future? Any answer to this question must take into account the fact that the changing of basic attitudes in any nation takes rather more time than the enthusiasts for re-education assumed in 1945. The change has certainly begun. Whether it will continue must of course largely depend on the Germans themselves, but it will depend also on external factors, on the continuation of stability, of prosperity, and, above all, on the building of more effective Western unity.

W. B.

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 No. 2 February 1957

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Notes of the Month

Yemeni Background

TAKING advantage of the anti-British climate generated by the Suez affair and the lack of sympathy shown in many quarters to the Anglo-French intervention, the Zeidi Imam of the Yemen has renewed attacks on the Aden Protectorate and has again been instigating Protectorate tribes to cause trouble. In 1955 the Yemen concluded a fresh treaty with the U.S S.R. and this was followed by contacts with several satellite countries. The new approaches to Russia are being followed up by a visit from the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo and no doubt material help is being given. All this has its origin in the Zeidi claim to Aden and the Protectorate, and there have been earlier attempts to capture them. The previous Imam Yahya, father of Imam Ahmed, started aggression against the Protectorate soon after the Turks left the Yemen in 1918. He occupied Dhala from 1920 until 1928 when he was driven out.

The Imam bases his claim, first, on his descent from Zeid, son of Ali Zein, son of Hussein, son of Ali and Fatima the Prophet's daughter; secondly on the temporal power acquired by the Imams of Sada; and thirdly on the rulership of Yemen (which in Arab geographical terms includes Aden and the Western Protectorate) exercised by the Imams of Sana.

The first ground is valid only in Zeidi eyes. British estimates of Zeidi strength have long been 'about one third'. The late Imam's account book put the Zeidis at 55 per cent and the Shafis at 45 per cent. What is certain is that South-West Arabia contains far more Sunnis of the Shafti school than it does Zeidis, who are a Shia sect.

From 1630 to 1728 the Sana Imams ruled Yemen, including what is now the Aden Protectorate, but never very effectively. Prior to 1630 the Zeidis never had influence in that region. Between 1728 and 1760 what is now the Western Aden Protectorate, and the Red Sea region of what is now the Yemen, both with Shafi population, became independent of the Imams who were left supreme only in the Highlands.

In 1839 the British took Aden and gradually the now independent Sultans and Sheikhs of the neighbourhood entered into protective treaty relations, which left them complete internal autonomy. In 1840 the Turks came back and ruled the present Yemen until 1918. The Imam started operations against the Protectorate in 1919 and occupied the Red Sea region in 1925. By the treaty of Sana of 1934 the Imam agreed to put his claims to the Protectorate (which as Zeidi Imam he could not renounce) into abeyance for forty years, and in the meantime to discuss the frontier as it then existed. It was agreed in 1951 to appoint an Anglo-Yemeni Commission to demarcate the 1934 line at points at which its position was in doubt. In 1953 proposals for federation in the Protectorate were regarded by the Imam as a breach of the treaty and caused suspicion among many of the Protectorate people. The Imam held, and no doubt believed, that the treaty meant that nothing should be changed in the Protectorate: in the Protectorate feeling was due to a fear of 'colonialism'.

When relations with Egypt deteriorated, the 'Voice of the Arabs' radio played a large part in stimulating unrest. The Arabs of the Protectorate want nothing more than their internal independence under British protection as they enjoyed it until about 1953. While they would never willingly exchange British Protection for Zeidi rule, it must be recognized that in the wider context of the Middle East their sympathies will necessarily be more on the Arab side.

The Yemenis have suggested a meeting of British and Yemeni officers on the frontier, and the Protectorate Rulers, whom the Governor of Aden has consulted, have agreed to this being held, subject to prior Yemeni evacuation of territory occupied.

Reorganization in Soviet Economic Administration

RECENT changes in one of the Soviet planning bodies confirm that trial and error continue to play a considerable role in the national economy. Personnel re-shuffles and administrative reorganization have occurred more than once since the end of the war. The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was reorganized in 1948. In the spring of 1949 its head, N. Voznesensky, was re-replaced by his deputy M. Z. Saburov. In June 1950 Gosplan was again reorganized, becoming a committee of the Council of Ministers, with the support of two new committees, one for the promotion of modern techniques, the other to ensure supplies of equipment and materials.

In May 1955, after fresh complaints, the State Planning Committee was split into (a) a State Planning Commission for long-term planning (Gosplan), and (b) a State Economic Commission for current planning (*Gosekonomkommissiya*), both attached to the Council of Ministers. The former Minister of Oil Industry, N. K. Baibakov, became head of the first, Saburov head of the second. Some decentralization was introduced, giving republics, the chief industrial administrations, and even factories 'more scope for initiative'.

One of the major complaints at that time was dislocation of the planned output: although overall figures of particular industries might show satisfactory plan fulfilment, individual trusts or enterprises lagged behind; or, as frequently happened, factories fulfilled their targets in volume but not in detail. Another complaint was about the mad rush (*shturmovshchina*) for plan fulfilment in the last ten days of each month.

Today, apparently, the situation is still unsatisfactory. Among the latest complaints are those directed against the bureaucratic attitude of the Commission for current planning, which, it is said, still keeps factories waiting for essential supplies; does not encourage engineering plants to do independent work on new models; compels inventors of new machine tools to embark on their mass production, even when they happen to be scientific-technical research institutes; and tolerates delays in negotiations about technical details at Ministry level, instead of leaving them to the factories concerned. Mr Baibakov himself 'regretfully' admitted shortcomings in his own organization, Gosplan.

These criticisms and complaints were tackled by the Central Committee of the party at the end of December. Mr Bulganin reported on the national economy in general, Baibakov and Saburov on their respective planning bodies. The resolution passed (*Pravda*, 25 December 1956) confirms the criticism previously vented. The upshot of the session was another reorganization of the Commission for current planning. It has now been taken over by M. G. Pervukhin, who will have the support of six deputies with the rank of Ministers, all old and experienced hands. He himself was Minister of the Chemical Industry in the 1940s. He also remains First Deputy Premier. No announcement has yet been made about Saburov, also a First Deputy Premier; it would seem that he has been dropped.

The European Common Market

SINCE the war various attempts have been made to bring about the economic integration of Europe. As long ago as 1947 the Committee for European Economic Co-operation discussed proposals for a European customs union. This particular scheme disappeared on to the agenda of a study group. Less far-reaching schemes were afterwards discussed, of which Benelux, although springing from an earlier discussion, is the chief surviving representative. The creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) in 1948 touched off a new series of activities on more general lines. The O.E.E.C. soon assumed much wider functions than were required for its original purpose of acting as the European agency of the distribution of Marshall Aid funds. So far as economic integration is concerned the chief of these were the development of the European Payments Union and of the O E.E.C. Code of Trade Liberalization.

The next advance towards true economic integration was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. By the Community Treaty signed in Paris on 18 April 1951, the six countries concerned—Western Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux States—agreed to place the control of their basic resources in the hands of supra-national institutions. The Community Treaty replaced the separate national markets for coal and steel by one unified market. This involved the elimination of six obstacles: customs duties and quantitative restrictions on movements of coal and steel between member countries; discriminatory transport rates; price discrimination for domestic and export sales within the Community area; cartels and agreements in restraint of trade; Government subsidies; and Government control of prices.

The Community was conceived as the first of three major steps in the integration of the economic and political life of Europe.[1] It was to be followed by the European Defence Community and the European Political Community. The failure of E.D.C. and the abandonment of the European Political Community left E.C.S.C. high and dry as the sole trophy of the federalist movement. But this setback soon proved to be only temporary. The Coal and Steel Community proved more successful than had been anticipated by the opponents of the supra-national approach. M. Monnet, its

[1] See 'The Schuman Plan and the Council of Europe', in *The World Today*, November 1952.

principal advocate, decided to resign his office of President of the High Authority at the end of his initial term of office in order to devote all his energies to working for the cause of a United States of Europe. His enthusiasm was shared by the Benelux countries. At the Messina Conference of 1–2 June 1955 they put forward a plan for unification in the economic field. Two important schemes emerged—that for Euratom, a European atomic energy pool, and that for a general Common Market. In order to prepare the agreements needed to implement these plans a group of experts was appointed, working under the direction of heads of delegations. This Committee, which met under the chairmanship of M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, submitted its findings to the Foreign Ministers of the 'six' on 21 April 1956.[1] On 30 May 1956 the Foreign Ministers endorsed the report, which is now an official policy statement of the six countries.[2]

In the interval between the Messina Conference and the presentation of the Spaak Report the French elections took place, putting into office a Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary favourable to European integration. M. Monnet in the meantime had formed a pressure group known as 'The Action Committee for a United States of Europe'. This group has amongst its members prominent non-Communist trade union leaders, and in particular some Socialists who had hitherto shown no great enthusiasm for supra-nationalism. At the meeting of Foreign Ministers held at Venice at the end of May 1956 it was agreed that the work of drafting treaties for both Euratom and the Common Market should be put in hand.

It is interesting to recall that the Messina Conference passed almost unnoticed in the British press and that interest in the Common Market was low right up to the meeting of the O.E.E.C. Council in July last. At this meeting the small countries of the so-called 'Low Tariff Club' (Benelux, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries) made the running just as Benelux had done at Messina. This took the form of a revolt against further removal of quantitative restrictions on trade without reduction of tariffs. This plan was not particularly welcome to Britain as any tariff reductions made were to apply equally to the other members

[1] *Rapport des chefs de délégation aux ministres des Affaires Étrangères (Comité intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messina)*, Brussels, 1956.

[2] No official translation of the Spaak Report has appeared in English but a few summaries have been published, for example: 'The Spaak Report—a summarized translation of Part I', in *Planning*, 17 December 1956.

GATT according to the most-favoured-nation commitments. he results were a statement by the Economic Secretary to the reasury, Sir Edward Boyle, expressing the Government's in- rest in the Common Market, and the British proposal for a ecial O.E.E.C. working party to study the possible forms and ethods of association between the Common Market and the other .E.E.C. countries, in particular the possibility of establishing a ree Trade Area.

Since then British interest in the Common Market has been sus- ined by statements by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, debates the Council of Europe, statements by the Federation of British dustries, the Trades Union Congress, and the Association of hambers of Commerce, and by innumerable articles in the press.

THE COMMON MARKET PROPOSALS

As the experts were asked to discover how a Common Market uld be created, not whether it should be, the Spaak Report con- ins little or no argument in favour of the project. In modern nditions the separate national markets of Western Europe are too nall to enable economies of size to be realized in industry except the cost of creating monopolies. The creation of a Common larket involves three basic requirements: first, the abolition of all rriers to trade; secondly, the drawing up of market rules to event distortions due to national policies; and thirdly, additional eps that will be needed to ensure that the resources of Europe are lly used and developed.

The transformation of the national economies will be spread er a transitional period of twelve years, divided into three four- ar phases. A further period of three years will be added if cessary, so that the Common Market would be fully operative ter twelve or fifteen years.

The actual form of the Common Market is conditioned by the ternational obligations of the member countries. GATT requires at no new preferences should be created among member coun- ies through tariff reductions unless a Customs Union or Free rade Area is formed. The report concludes that a Customs Union the only practical form for the Common Market. Three other nditions are laid down by GATT. A Common Market with a mmon external tariff must include the major part of the trade tween its members; it must be set up within 'a reasonable length time'; and the level of its common external tariffs must not be

higher than the average of the different tariffs which it replaces.

Common institutions will be required to supervise the working of the Common Market. Four bodies are suggested. A Council of Ministers will be the instrument for consultation between Governments to co-ordinate national economic policies. Secondly, a European Commission composed of members appointed in common by member Governments will ensure that the Common Market rules are properly applied. Thirdly, a judicial body will be required to decide on problems of treaty violation, and it is suggested that the Court of Justice of E.C.S.C. should fulfil this function. Fourthly, it is proposed that the Common Assembly of E.C.S.C., with its membership suitably increased, should act as a forum for debates on the actions of the European Commission and on other matters. In addition there will be an autonomous investment fund whose purpose will be to provide funds for the realization of projects of common interest, regional developments, and adjustments made necessary by the opening of the Common Market.

THE FUSION OF MARKETS

The first basic requirement for the creation of a Common Market is the fusion of the several national markets by the abolition of all barriers to trade between them. Internal tariffs will be abolished in three stages. In the first four-year stage they will be reduced by 30 per cent in three 10 per cent steps after one, two and a half, and four years. The second four-year stage will see a further 30 per cent reduction in three 10 per cent steps after five and a half, seven, and eight years. The final 40 per cent will be carried out in the last four or possibly seven year phase. A measure of flexibility is introduced by the proposal for a complicated system of grouping and weighting of tariffs which will give members some choice in deciding which tariffs to reduce first without sacrificing the principle of across-the-board tariff cuts.

The common external tariff which is an essential feature of a Customs Union will be based on an average (arithmetical mean) of existing national tariffs for each commodity. This tariff will take effect gradually during the transitional period. New rates will apply from the start for goods where the existing unadjusted rates do not differ more than 15 per cent above or below the mean. Where the spread is wider than this the new rates will be introduced gradually. By the time tariffs within the Common Market have been eliminated the common external tariff will be in full

operation. A safeguard clause, enabling member countries running into difficulties to postpone the application of the common external tariff, is to be written into the treaty. The granting of a dispensation under this escape clause will be the prerogative of the European Commission. It will only be of a temporary character and must not affect more than 5 per cent of the total value of imports from outside countries. A system of certificates of origin, quotas, or bans on re-exports will have to be enforced to avoid malpractices.

The work of reducing quota restrictions and liberalizing trade has already been undertaken by O.E.E.C. Compared with the reference year 1948, some O.E.E.C. members have now achieved a 90 per cent liberalization of trade. The Report points out that the work of O.E.E.C. is limited in various ways. In particular, reduction of quotas can take place simultaneously with manipulation of customs duties for purely national ends. It is proposed that after the first stage in tariff reduction has taken place quotas will be increased by 20 per cent annually so that all quota restrictions will have disappeared before the end of the transitional period. In the same way export controls within the Common Market must have been abolished by the end of the first four-year period.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is an essential feature of the Common Market and the industry is one of those which would benefit most from a wider market. Its special difficulties, both economic and social, lead to State intervention in many countries not only to guarantee prices but also to organize markets, develop research, and facilitate investment. Other difficulties arise from the considerable differences between costs, sales, prices, and productivity in different regions of the member countries. Further, the inclusion of agriculture is essential if the balance of trade between member countries is to be maintained. Tariffs on agricultural products will be reduced during the transitional period in the same way as other duties. Special powers will be granted to stop agricultural imports when home prices fall below certain levels.

The development of a Common Market in agricultural produce involves consideration of a number of policy questions, in particular price stability, the extent to which countries intend to remain self-sufficient, what safeguards are to be granted to smallholders, and whether manpower could be used more productively elsewhere. Existing national practices will be reviewed by the European

Commission and proposals for their gradual abolition or integration into the common agricultural policy will begin to come into force after the end of the first four-year phase. All separate national protective measures should have disappeared by the end of the transitional period. This does not mean that all agricultural produce will be treated alike in the Common Market. There will be a free market for some produce with protection against imports from outside countries provided only by customs duties. For some key products special marketing organizations may be set up using such devices as import monopolies, stock piling, and price guarantees.

POLICY FOR THE COMMON MARKET

The abolition of tariffs will not in itself ensure the free play of competition. The Report sets out rules for the elimination of distortions in the form of subsidies, restrictive practices, and monopolies which the European Commission will be given powers to enforce. Apart from direct discrimination, differences in national legislative and administrative systems may also prevent free competition. The Report insists that the fact that taxes or social security benefits are higher in one country than another does not of itself distort competition. Such cost differences are part of the basic data of the economic system in the same way as the lack or abundance of mineral reserves, or high or low living standards. The degree of deliberate harmonization needed for the proper working of the Common Market is limited. It must combat only those specific distortions which favour or handicap certain branches of economic activity. The Report suggests that the European Commission should make a special study of specific distortions resulting from such matters as direct or indirect taxation, the financing of social security systems, certain price regulations, working conditions such as equal pay for men and women, and different credit policies. In transport, rate discrimination on grounds of nationality will be abolished in the first four-year period. After that tapering rates for international through traffic will be introduced as has been done already in the case of coal.

The problem of exchange rates is recognized by the Report. The free play of competitive forces can be distorted by the maintenance of unreasonable exchange rates by member countries. If a country's overall balance of payments remains in equilibrium it suggests that its internal cost and price levels are about right at the prevailing exchange rate. The Report favours reliance on monetary policy to

correct any temporary disequilibrium. While the progressive creation of a Common Market will introduce new factors into the balance of payments situation, it would be unwise to meet them by abrupt changes in exchange rates, and adjustments will, it is hoped, take place in the structure of production costs.

A Readaptation Fund will be started to safeguard workers against the risks of unemployment arising from the opening of the Common Market. Where a firm wholly or partly closes down, the Fund will meet half the cost of retraining workers or moving them to other areas. The Fund will also be used to maintain the incomes of workers temporarily unemployed as part of an officially approved reconversion scheme. These measures will only apply in cases where labour changes are directly due to the creation of the Common Market. The readaptation proposals are to be supplemented by measures to give freedom of movement to all workers.

Freedom of capital movements will also be introduced before the end of the transitional period. The aim will be to remove conditions limiting free capital movements. Priority will be given to the liberalization of transfers connected with debt servicing, real estate deals, and the abolition of protectionist barriers to foreign investment.

Finally the Report proposes an Investment Fund with three main tasks. These are, first, to finance projects of general interest such as atomic energy plants, which might be beyond national resources; secondly, to finance the provision of basic services, such as electricity supply, in the less developed regions of the Common Market; and thirdly, to help in carrying out Government-sponsored reconversion schemes necessitated by the opening of the Common Market. The Fund is to have a basic capital of one billion dollars subscribed by member Governments. Further funds would be obtained by borrowing on the capital market.

Several amendments to the Report have been made during the treaty-drafting conference. In addition a number of important issues are still undecided. Foremost among these is the French claim that social policies covering wage levels, provision of equal pay, the length of the working week, and scales of social benefits and charges should be harmonized progressively in step with reductions in tariffs. Other problems are fixing of the precise level of external tariffs, the right to reintroduce trade restrictions in face of balance of payments difficulties, the operation of the Investment and Readaptation Funds, the treatment of agriculture, the inclu-

sion of overseas dependencies raised by France and Belgium, and the constitution and powers of the various institutions. There is also the problem of deciding whether the plan should proceed automatically from one stage to another or whether progress should be conditional on the unanimous agreement of the Governments concerned. Some of these difficulties will have been resolved by the time the treaty is signed. The rest will be discussed in detail in the national Parliaments during the debates on its ratification.

THE BRITISH POSITION

The British attitude to the movement for European unity has been one of cautious reserve. Britain has played an active part in intergovernmental bodies, notably O.E.E.C., but both Socialist and Conservative Governments have found no difficulty in refusing invitations to participate more fully in E.C.S.C. Last year saw a considerable increase in interest and both Socialist and Conservative back-benchers have put down motions in favour of the free trade ideas. The British attitude to the Common Market became more positive when it began to look as though the scheme would be realized. Three possible courses of action had to be considered: joining the Common Market, ignoring it, or finding some way of associating with it through a Free Trade Area.

The first course was never very seriously considered because of Britain's special position in relation to the Commonwealth. Moreover, full membership of a Common Market would mean a complete reversal of the protectionist trade policies followed by Britain since the Ottawa Agreements of the early 1930s. The Commission's proposals involve not only a removal of barriers to trade but a transfer of control over tariff policies to the European Commission. Full-scale integration of economic policies will undoubtedly involve integration of social policies, and this is a step which the trade union movement and the electorate generally is not yet prepared to take. Indeed the statement made by the T.U.C. on the Common Market proposals states categorically that standards of wages and social security must be safeguarded before Britain is committed in any way.

Then again there is the peculiar position of Britain as guardian of the gold and dollar reserves of the Sterling Area. This guardianship may be one of the prices Britain is paying in order to maintain her prestige among the nations of the world. But it is a price that she has so far paid willingly. The future of sterling as an inter-

national currency is involved. No one has yet suggested that Britain should give up her responsibilities or ask the Commonwealth countries to make some other arrangements.

The second main difficulty involved in Britain's relationship with the Common Market is over Imperial Preference. Some 50 per cent of U.K. exports to the Commonwealth countries receive tariff preference, and about 55 per cent of Commonwealth exports to Britain. The average preferential margin is about 6 per cent in each case, and even so these are being gradually reduced.

A further problem which full membership of the Common Market would involve would be the creation of anti-Imperial Preference. Full membership would mean that goods coming to Britain from the Commonwealth would have to pay the common tariff. New Zealand butter would pay duty, butter from Holland would come in free. Such a prospect is politically unthinkable however strong the economic arguments for British membership of the Common Market may be.

The second possible course of action is for Britain to ignore the Common Market. To do so would invite severe losses. The fusion of the 'six' will create a very powerful bargaining unit. The six account for one-eighth of Britain's external trade but Britain accounts for only one-twelfth of their external trade. Britain has therefore much less to bargain with if a tariff-raising argument should be started. Whatever level is adopted for the common external tariff, the elimination of internal tariffs will make it increasingly difficult for British manufacturers to compete in the West European market. Cost inflation in Britain already handicaps exporters in competition with German manufacturers. To take no action would mean that the opening of the Common Market will give German industry a tariff preference of anything up to about 20 per cent in a market which accounts for one-eighth of British exports. Also the volume of trade with the primary producing countries of the Commonwealth has been increasing at a very slow rate in the post-war years. The industrial areas have meantime offered increasingly attractive markets. Trade between primary producing countries and industrial areas increased by only 38 per cent between 1948 and 1954. Trade between industrial areas rose in the same period by 57 per cent. The West European market is in fact one of the fastest growing export markets. It would clearly be inviting economic disaster for Britain to cut herself off from such a market.

It is in the broader perspective that the arguments against taking no action are most convincing. The Common Market will have a population of 162 million. The cost advantage that Continental industries will receive in mass-producing goods for a market of this size are enormous. In addition the opportunities for capital formation and investment in such an area will serve further to emphasize the difficulties now facing Britain in these matters. British industry would inevitably fall further behind in the export race.

THE FREE TRADE AREA

The third course of action, and the one which it now appears will be followed, is that Britain will participate in a Free Trade Area covering most of the O.E.E.C. countries. The difference between a Free Trade Area and a Common Market is largely in the treatment of third countries. As a member of a Free Trade Area Britain would be able to retain tariffs with third countries at their present level while removing all tariffs on goods from the Common Market countries. The British Government would retain control over monetary, fiscal, and commercial policies. Her position in relation to the Sterling Area reserves would not be affected.

Imperial Preference would still present a problem. In a Free Trade Area whilst there would be no tariff discrimination against Commonwealth products, the preference for them over those of the Common Market countries would disappear. This difficulty can be got over if agricultural products and raw materials are excluded from the Free Trade Area, as the majority of trade attracting preferences is in these products. And this is the solution now proposed.

The Working Committee of O.E.E.C. to examine the practicability of setting up a Free Trade Area to work with the Common Market is reported to favour the scheme. The countries likely to join in addition to Britain are the Scandinavian Powers with Iceland, and Austria, Switzerland, and Eire. The remaining O.E.E.C. members—Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey—do not on the face of it look likely candidates for the scheme. The size of the market formed by the six and Britain together with Austria, Switzerland, and the Scandinavians is of the order of 240 million. If all the possible members are included the population figure goes up to 311 million.

The task of making a Free Trade Area will not be easy. The first step will be the removal of customs duties throughout the

area except for those categories of trade declared excluded products. The whole process will be a gradual one taking place in stages similar to those contained in the Common Market plan. The second main change will be the abolition of all quota restrictions, again over a period of years. The O.E.E.C. Code of Trade Liberalization has already taken the O.E.E.C. countries a long way down this particular path.

One complication that will have to be dealt with is the difficulty arising from the fact that member countries retain varying external tariffs. Unless free internal trade is limited to goods produced in the Free Trade Area all imports from third countries will come in through the country where the external tariff is lowest. The Spaak Report chose a customs union in order to avoid these complex problems. The report of the O.E.E.C. working party, however, now seems to indicate that practical solutions can be found.

So far as British industry is concerned, the reaction has been broadly in favour of participation. The Federation of British Industries made a report to the President of the Board of Trade at the beginning of November last in which it was stated that of 664 member firms canvassed 479 were favourable to negotiations for participation in the Free Trade Area, 147 were opposed, and thirty-eight had not been able to reach a decision. The Association of Chambers of Commerce reported at the same time that of a total membership of 60,000 some 37,000 were in favour of 'examining the possibilities of associating with the six common market countries by means of a partial free trade area'. The T.U.C. report, while stressing the need to safeguard living standards and the level of social security benefits, was also in favour of participation.

The next move will be the signing of the treaty setting up the Common Market. This is now timed for late February. The treaty will then have to be ratified by the six national Parliaments. This may take as long as six months and is the most critical phase of the whole operation. The safeguards demanded by France on harmonization of social security payments before the reduction of tariffs begins, and the arguments over the inclusion of overseas territories, will not be reconciled in a hurry. When the treaty is ratified, and few would say that it will not be, negotiations for association with it can begin. The method to be followed is not yet clear, but presumably O.E.E.C. will act as the parent body. What is clear is that the bargaining stage is now about to start. The Common Market once it is formed will be a very rigid institution.

Britain has taken the first steps towards a new political relationship with Western Europe. Properly handled this could mean not only great economic advantage but also a new opportunity for political leadership.

R. B.

Gold Coast Independence

Prospects and Problems of the New State of Ghana

BRITISH policy in Africa is widely believed to stand or fall by the success of the handing-over of power to the Nkrumah Government in March. Will this act of state be followed by comparatively stable conditions, or by a collapse of the structure erected since the war, accompanied by violence, open or hidden, and the end of central authority in large and important areas of the country?

It would be a bold prophet who would hazard a guess, but it is perhaps worth considering some of the strands in an excessively complicated situation, some of which are purely local, others common to other territories in British Africa, and most of them not realized in the outside world, which tends to think in terms of simple political power-grouping and discussion in constitutional terms.

An earlier article in this review[1] discussed the background and the course of events from 1954 up to September 1955. It may be convenient, before attempting an analysis of the present situation, to give a brief summary of political events since then, remembering always that their framework and terminology is even more remote in relation to the various peoples of the Gold Coast than in other, more homogeneous societies. For example, the word for 'Federation' in Twi, the principal language of the country, means 'separation'; the word for 'Opposition' in many languages of the country can only be translated by 'enemies'. Thus the political philosophy that characterizes the British conception in Africa, embodying the hope that people's psychologies will be conditioned by institutions and abstract ideas, is correspondingly weakened. With this essen-

[1] 'Towards a Federal Gold Coast?', in *The World Today*, November 1955.

tial warning, we may consider the development of a power struggle carried on according to rules appropriate to the last stage of occupation by a colonial Power which believes in the absolute superiority, in all conditions, of the process of discussion, compromise, and individual liberties, summed up in the generic term democracy.

THE VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The mission, then, of Sir Frederick Bourne, in the autumn of 1955, proved almost totally abortive. He was unable to meet any of the principal leaders of the Opposition, and his proposals, which envisaged greater devolution to Regional Assemblies, with safeguards for that essential part of the basic *Weltanschauung* of the great majority of Gold Coast peoples, the chiefs, fell dead from the press. An attempt was made in February 1956 to convene a conference at Achimota to consider his proposals. But, although it was attended by seven organizations, regional or functional for the most part, such as trade unionists or ex-servicemen, it was boycotted by the principal groups hostile to Nkrumah: the Asanteman Council, the Northern Territories Council, the National Liberation Movement, the Northern Peoples' Party, and the Togoland Congress. In July, therefore, at the behest of London, a General Election was held to test the question whether the Government's desire for immediate independence commanded a 'reasonable majority' in the country, whose population of 4,620,000 had at that time 1,460,000 on the electoral rolls. The Government entered the lists with a confidence that was not shared by many European observers, who set against a narrow success in the Togoland plebiscite in May a very damaging inquiry by an independent commission under the Nigerian judge Jibowu into maladministration, to use no stronger a word, in the conduct of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, particularly in regard to loans to cocoa farmers.[1]

In the event, the judgement of the Government was entirely confirmed against the fears of doubters. No less than 397,941 voters, out of a total poll of 698,908 voted for Kwame Nkrumah—a total of 57 per cent as against 54 per cent in 1954, yielding exactly the same number of seats in the Legislative Assembly,

[1] In Togoland, 67,529 voters, almost all from the politically conscious Ewe in the South, voted against integration with an independent Gold Coast, and 92,775 for it. The latter were made up mainly of voters in the North, who have been sundered for fifty years from their tribal centres in the Gold Coast.

71 out of 104. Many of these results were obtained by bribery and chicanery of all kinds; but a remarkable testimony to the claim of the Convention People's Party to be the only country-wide party was given in Ashanti, where they won 8 seats out of 21, mainly in the Brong areas in the north-west, and significantly large minorities in many centres in Ashanti proper, where a cold terror aimed against them had been reigning for nearly two years. In the Northern Territories they gained 11 seats out of 26. Of the seven municipalities they gained five, losing only the two Kumasi seats. Their losses in Ashanti they made up by a completely clean sweep of the 39 seats of the Colony, even in those Twi-speaking areas in the hill country where it was expected that the National Liberation Movement might make inroads.

This majority, increased by one Independent, was regarded by London as 'reasonable', and on 3 August a motion in favour of Independence was passed by 72 to 0, as the Opposition refused to attend. They sent a delegation to London under Professor K. A. Busia to plead that the motion had not gained a majority in all the regions concerned; but they failed to convince either Mr Lennox-Boyd or Mr Aneurin Bevan. On 18 September it was announced that Independence would be inaugurated on 6 March 1957. After this, for the first time since 1954, it looked as though some compromise might be hammered out. In October round-table discussions were held between the main political parties and in the four Territorial Councils, on the basis of final proposals drafted by the Government. These included Regional Assemblies armed with powers similar to those of the London County Council: subsidiary legislation, executive committees financed by central grants and precepts, in short a wide range of local autonomy in functional services, together with a House of Chiefs to consider all matters referred to it, and to advise on custom. A concession in favour of the North was the transference of lands to the State Councils. Unfortunately, a speech by the Prime Minister on 12 November, which lasted nearly four hours, showed that these discussions had again proved abortive.

The differences, on the surface at any rate, seem capable of resolution. But they conceal the essential truth that Gold Coast politicians, the Opposition especially, have no confidence in each other, perhaps because they have no real confidence in the terms in which their power-struggle is being conducted. The fourteen differences listed by Dr Nkrumah boil down to roughly six, all

safeguards that the minorities feel essential once the protecting power of Britain is withdrawn. These are:

1. The National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.) wants a Council of State, consisting of the Governor-General, the four 'Heads' of Regions, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Attorney-General, who should be an official and not a politician. This Council would make all appointments to the higher civil service and to the Judiciary. They might also hear appeals from the courts. An obscure provision suggests that they should also consider all things 'touching the prerogative'. The Government declares that the proposal is entirely impracticable It may be noted that since April all appointments to the Bench have been assigned to the Prime Minister; previously under the new regime he could appoint only the Chief Justice and Appeal Judges.

2. The Regional Assemblies should have powers similar to those of Northern Ireland rather than those of the L.C.C. In other words, money raised in their borders should only be spent in their borders; this is a matter of especial concern to Ashanti, where practically the entire wealth of the Gold Coast is concentrated. The proposal would also allow magistrates to be appointed regionally, and autonomous police forces. A minor point is the refusal to consider two RegionalAssemblies for Ashanti.

3. There should be a Second Chamber, of forty-eight, made up of chiefs and elder statesmen, as well as the four Houses of Chiefs already agreed to.

4. A Bill of Rights should be written into the Constitution. This the Colonial Office has rejected on the ground of delay in drafting. The Government suggests the publication of such a Bill, to be passed immediately after Independence.

5. There should be a non-party commission on the electoral law, following the precedent of Ceylon, to prepare constituencies of equal size, restricted to citizens.

6. The Asanteman Council, taking a leaf out of the book of the Union of South Africa, want all constitutional changes to be passed by a two-thirds majority of both Houses, sitting together. But they go further: they want a two-thirds majority in both Regional Houses in a majority of Regions. The Northern Territories Council want a two-thirds majority buttressed by a referendum. The Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs in the Colony want a referendum. The Trans-Volta-Togoland Council alone are content to leave arrangements to the Government, and to normal voting.

It would be tedious to continue this catalogue, which shows the depth of suspicion entertained towards a central Government which, indeed, has scarcely been in existence for ten years on any representative scale. In the debate, the Government proposals were carried by 70 to 25. In December the British House of Commons passed a Bill empowering the declaration of independence

or the new State of Ghana within the Commonwealth. In Ashanti, he N.L.M. and Asanteman Council have announced their intenion of seceding, and plans are being made, it is said, for a House f Assembly, for taxation, and for postage stamps. Although the North is included in Ashanti plans, Government emissaries are lso active there, with offers of greater financial assistance to this ery backward region.

PROS AND CONS FOR OPPOSITION

The most important thing is not to debate whether this susicion is justified but to recognize that it exists. Nevertheless, in n analysis of the total situation in the Gold Coast, it is pertinent o determine quite how far this deep-seated fear and hatred of the Nkrumah Government is based on fact.

We may start with the credit side: the quite astonishing impulse owards modernization which has been launched in the last five ears, under the stimulus of the enormous world prices offered for ocoa. Since 1951 £23 7 million has been spent on communicaions, with 830 miles of fine tarred road added to a system which vas already in advance of other parts of British Africa, together vith six major bridges and innumerable smaller ones. In 1956 lone, the Volta River has been bridged at the narrows at Adome y a 22-foot motor-way 805 feet long, supported by a single arch. Two important bridges, scarcely smaller, were opened in October n the trunk road to the North, over the Nasia and the White Volta. The key triangle Takoradi–Kumasi–Accra is having its base ompleted with an *autobahn* along the coast; while a new rail link vas opened in February 1956 between Achiase, on the Western ine Takoradi–Kumasi, and Kotoku on the Eastern line. A second harbour at Tema east of Accra, with a breakwater over a mile into he sea, is slowly being built despite great technical difficulties.

Further, education has been allocated £19 million under an Accelerated Development Plan which has doubled the number of hildren at primary school since 1952 (443,750 today) and quadupled those at the thirty-two secondary schools (now 8,900). To cope with the grave lack of teachers an impressive chain of eacher-training centres has been built throughout the country, t which over 3,000 are receiving instruction. Inevitably, these nethods show signs of strain, notably in the quality of the intake t the University College, which now, with a faculty of nearly 100, as only 329 students, seventeen of them women, with a pass list

of under 200 graduates. All the same, its comparative failure is made up for by the success of the newer College of Technology at Kumasi, whose recruitment this year was not far off the numbers of the University College. The strange Mass Education movement, with its ceremonies a cross between local festivals and Nazi or Communist demonstrations, gives the country perhaps 16,000 new literates every year. In health over £5·5 million has been spent; here the most dramatic, though not perhaps the most useful, achievement is the really magnificent new hospital at Kumasi.

All these and other signs of progress are changing the face of favoured areas in the country to an extent bewildering to anyone who knew it ten years ago. Our purpose is to determine where the credit lies and whether the momentum can be maintained.

Obviously, much of the achievement is due to the expatriates whose expert services make realization possible. And yet the advances were made under the ægis of an African Government. This fact in itself has liberated a vast amount of energy which would not otherwise have been given. The Opposition would point to a number of policy decisions which have given grave offence, such as the 'propaganda' hospital at Kumasi, which it was proposed to call after the Prime Minister, or some of the errors in design due to haste and lack of inspection of the sites involved (in particular, the £900,000 spent on a 100-room hotel in Accra, where the cost of a simple room will probably be prohibitive). They also question transactions such as the payment by the Industrial Development Board of £275,000 for four open-air cinemas owned by Syrians in Accra, and £300,000 for a Government newspaper which has not yet started. But the main question is whether the modern structure, pushed on by Nkrumah as the heir of the British, can be maintained once the British and other expatriates have departed, as many of them have already done, notably in July 1955 when the old Unified service came to an end.[1]

The misgivings of the Opposition extend to the present state of Africanization of the governing structure of the country. In 1952 in the Senior Civil Service there were 1,322 expatriates and 520 Africans; today there are 1,167 expatriates and 1,524 Africans. Of these latter, there are now 91 in the so-called 'superscale' posts, three Permanent Secretaries, three first-class Administrative

[1] 'Abolition' terms including £8,000 for loss of career were taken by many men in their late thirties, who were just entering their period of maximum service to the country.

Officers, and eleven Heads of Department. It is a delicate matter to assess the success of the new direction; the European inevitably sees a falling-off in efficiency and standards, according to his own yardstick, which is not necessarily absolute or entirely relevant to the kind of state that best suits the psychological needs of African people. Faults of personality, failures to consult or to check, are common to all who work in the tropics, and indeed in other places as well. What is perhaps more serious is the difficulty experienced by Africans appointed to the Administrative Service in rural areas, particularly in the North, where chiefs do not regard them with the respect formerly given to the British, and can only be made to provide even elementary services by a threat, for example to withhold a licence for gunpowder. A particular difficulty also experienced by the Government has been the recruitment of able and disinterested men for the very important para-statal bodies, the five statutory boards (of which the most important is the Cocoa Marketing Board), the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the Industrial Development Corporation, and the Agricultural Development Corporation. These bodies are the constant target of rumour as fountains of patronage, but it is hard to determine whether their main shortcomings are moral or technical. It is certainly true that the leading posts are generally the reward of politicians.

Probably the most vital of all the fields in the modernization of the Gold Coast is that in which the new ways touch the peasants, and here few would say that local government, according to British democratic practice, has proved an unqualified success, despite a vast number of small projects, village halls, schools, clinics, dispensaries, and so on. These have transformed the scene only very occasionally, where the local chief is a young and enlightened man, as in Anfoega. Otherwise, the 180 local councils set up in the last five years, with powers similar to those of rural and urban districts in Britain, have been mainly remarkable for party struggle and a complete executive apathy. Many have been replaced by management committees, often of nominees picked out by the Accra Ministry but unknown in the area. It seems significant that in the last three years there have been no local council elections.

In any assessment of the future, the role of the security forces is clearly of paramount importance; and here also there is an atmosphere of doubt. There are some 5,500 men in the Gold Coast police, and about the same number in the Gold Coast Regiment, which came under local control in July, with an annual

cost of £2½ million. The Army has a cadre of 224 officers, of whom some forty are Africans, twelve of them in training. But what is most important for the future, supposing the pattern of democracy requires the short circuit of open force, is that most of the fighting troops (as opposed to the technicians) and most of the militarized escort police are men from the North, owing no local allegiance, as they come from the parched lands of Haute Volta and the French Sudan. No one knows what role they would play in any state of emergency, nor what would happen if their British officers were withdrawn. Meanwhile, a Police Reserve has been formed, mainly from the educated classes; there were 1,300 volunteers in Accra alone, of whom 465 were selected.[1]

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

This article has viewed the Gold Coast mainly through the eyes of outsiders, or perhaps through the eyes of those who are determined to enforce change. But perhaps something of the Government's difficulties has been conveyed, even in this sphere. There is one final problem which is beginning to rear its head, and that is the economic one. It may be stated baldly: in mid-1954 the world price of cocoa had reached a peak of over £500 a ton: early in 1956 it fell to £264 a ton: today, it is barely over £200 a ton. As cocoa represents a very high proportion of the wealth of the Gold Coast, the prospect of maintaining the recurrent charges of the manifold social enterprises started in the boom years is a grave one. Exports in 1955 were valued at £96 million, a fall of £17 million, all due to cocoa. Imports were £88 million, an increase of £22 million. So far as Government revenue is concerned there was a fall during 1956 of no less than £21 million in the export duty on cocoa, from £35 million to £14 million. At the same time, expenditure was put at £46 million. The measures taken were to transfer cocoa money to the general revenue and to increase the import duty on luxuries. Later, however, Government departments were required to make estimates allowing for various reductions. Meanwhile, the public has been assuaged by the removal of the import duty on cheap cloth and on one or two other commodities. The Cocoa Marketing Board, for its part, has from its enormous reserves maintained the price to farmers of £4 a load.

[1] The soldiers and police are only the picked men among the 400,000 Northerners who provide all the heavy labour in the South. It is estimated that £10 million in wages cross the French frontier every year.

The economic future of the new State is therefore doubtful. Cocoa, the blessing and curse of the country, remains the principal source of wealth, and the swollen shoot disease has not as yet made serious inroads on the 500 million trees, of which 32 million have been cut out and 19·5 million re-treated, with nearly 13·5 million acres plotted.[1]

As for other commodities, timber exploitation increased during 1956 from 19 million to 37 million cubic feet, and diamonds replaced manganese as the third most important export, although the increase was mainly in the Central African Selection Trust workings at Akwatia (1,186,827 carats, against 1,071,443 carats gained by Africans). The gold mines are feeling the pinch shared by all low-grade mines in Africa, and in February 1956 the oldest of them, at Abosso, closed down after a long and tenacious strike by the Miners' Union. An American oil company has been drilling down to 5,600 feet at Nzima, in the far west of the country, so far without success. As for the grandiose Volta River project to obtain 210,000 tons of aluminium a year from bauxite deposits east and west of Kumasi at a smelter at Kpong, it unfortunately seems to have sunk (or swollen) to the dimensions of a pipe-line dream. For the cost, as revealed in three elaborate volumes published last July, may be no less than £350 million, against £100 million in 1952, a figure utterly beyond the present resources of the Government, even when assisted by the U.K., the two principal aluminium companies, and possibly the World Bank, which sent a mission in October. A more promising initiative may result from the reported activity around Tarkwa and from the arrival of a mission from the U.K. inquiring into fissionable material.

There is little real industrial development, with the Corporation responsible for a furniture factory, nails, textiles, soap, vegetable oils, a brick works (which cannot compete with imported tiles), and the four cinemas. It also supports a biscuit factory, cigarette manufacture, brewing, coca-cola, and a plant for oxygen.

It is probable that the best hopes of the Gold Coast, from the economic point of view, lie in agriculture, perhaps based on an enlightened plantation system. The Agricultural Development Corporation is already experimenting with a pineapple estate, and successful tests have been made with pipe tobacco, although no

[1] A useful project conducted by teams from the Social Welfare Department has sold 15,000 Mysto sprays. A less promising initiative has been the propagation of 2 million seedlings of Amazonia, a quick-growing plant, with a coarser flavour.

great attempt has been made towards extension work among the farmers. Those who are hopeful that the country may emerge from dependence on a single crop such as cocoa, which requires scarcely any effort, look to the shallot fields of Anloga as a vision of the future. Here, on a sandy coastal spit between lagoon and sea, Ewe farmers near Keta have for a long time been tending miles of well-tended beds, with brick wells, irrigation channels, and careful fertilization. Today this labour, whose origins are lost in the mists of time, brings over £350,000 to the district.

One difficulty of the present economic position is that the young State will lose outside support just at the moment when it most needs it—when, for example, it ceases to be, even in theory, a beneficiary from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and the Colonial Development Corporation, neither of which bodies has in fact given it a vast amount of assistance during its period of boom. On the other hand, good judges think that reserves are sufficient to maintain the recurrent charges on all schemes that have already been started.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

So much for the short-term view, seen from a purely Western outlook. The verdict must be that the chances of a developing good life are as good in the Gold Coast as in most other under-developed countries, although it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will come under purely 'democratic' forms. The real problem, or so it seems to the writer, lies in another field of thought entirely, the nearest definition of which comes from the prescient if not very practical former rival of the Prime Minister, Dr J. B. Danquah, who recently said: 'Britain developed our territories; Ghana must develop our people.' Clearly, the ambitions of a 'new man' such as Nkrumah—the prospect of a Navy, the hope of setting up Ghana as a rival to Liberia as the future nucleus of a Federation of West African Republics—mean little to the mass of the people, who at the moment have no territorial concept at all, and remained almost completely indifferent to the Togoland plebiscite or to the fateful June durbar in Tamale, when the Governor had to tell the Northern chiefs that Great Britain was renouncing her treaties with them. These secular ambitions do not touch the people nearly; and it is probable that the greatest reproach of Nkrumah, whose will is really the only unifying factor in the Gold Coast today, is that he has been so caught up in the

whirl of development—the creation of modern amenities, a stadium, a library, a state house, a national museum, a national bank, in short a capital which could stand comparison among the nations of the world—that he has had little time to consider with any care the basic characteristics of the old tribal culture of the Gold Coast. Indeed, his apparent thought for the next phase is purely social: the redemption of the people from the hopeless squalor in which they are living, in spite of, or even perhaps because of, modern materials.

There is a reason why Kwame Nkrumah, like any other modern Nationalist leader in British Africa, eschews the old forms. If he recognized them, he would have to admit his own usurpation of authority, according to African ideas, which are perhaps more rigid in the Gold Coast than in any other area. He may, as Life President of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.), put on the outward trappings of a chief—the palanquin, the umbrella with the party colours, red, white, and green, the gilded symbol of the cock. But in the mind of the conservative opposition of the hinterland (or, as they think, the heartland) he is a parvenu, the son of a Liberian father and Nzima mother, with whom it is not really possible to talk.[1] Regional opposition, from the rich Ashanti country around the organic capital Kumasi; tribal opposition from the organized Ashanti nation, which would have conquered the entire area a hundred and fifty years ago if the European merchants had not intervened; cultural opposition from the Akan peoples, based on a modified hierarchy of blood, the worship of ancestors, the concept of *ntoro* (male principle) and *abusua* (female principle): such are the deeper problems of the new State, and the reason for the constitutional deadlock. Indeed, so deep are the cultural differences between the Westernized towns and the forest villages that it is perhaps unlikely that a common patriotism towards the existing 'Ghana' will ever develop on the pattern understood by Western nations. Instead, we may be at the first stage in a redrawing of the map of the whole of West Africa, on the traditional tribal basis, linked to the land. With this may go the destruction of the traditional extended family system, so admirable socially, so ruinous economically. Only in this context may it be possible to 'cast the kingdoms old into another mould'.

[1] Some observers indeed have seen the National Liberation Movement action as a national 'destoolment', following the traditional pattern of the Akan culture, which is still immensely strong.

Such a process is not one which can be carried out quickly. In the typical proverbs of 'deep' Twi, '*ɔsram mfi dekoro ntwe ɔman mu*' —'The moon does not move across the country in a single day.' The weapons which may assist it are new to Africa, such as the Gold Coast Broadcasting Service, which is just beginning a forward development after twenty-one years in the colonial context. Such a force, if seen primarily as a cultural and long-term influence, and not as a short-term political arm of propaganda, may have an incalculable role to play in building up common images and breaking down the incredibly limiting local rivalries, based on the 200 languages and dialects of an area the size of Britain and including the huge and empty Volta basin. It may even serve to propagate national myths, like those evolved in the fertile brain of Dr Danquah, the inventor of the name 'Ghana', the Negro empire which persisted from A.D. 300 to A.D. 1100 around the middle Niger, hundreds of miles from the northern boundaries of the modern Gold Coast.[1]

To the question asked at the beginning of this article, then, it is exceedingly difficult to give a positive answer. The Gold Coast is like all other British African territories in its basic outline, namely a congeries of tribal groups, brought together artificially, and looking for the wider loyalties and beliefs that are sought by the rest of the world, from a stage much earlier in time. The country has probably a larger mixture of the natural man than other societies, with long experience of a higher religion to melt some of the corners of human egotism and enlarge the narrowness of human imagination and understanding. Christianity, although strong organizationally in the towns and along the roads, is inevitably divided, and even overlaid by a reviving fetishism, where it is not sapped by modern agnosticism. Only in very few instances indeed do its basic attitudes seep into individual souls formed by the harsh realism of the old culture, which preaches 'Life is War'; and practises what it preaches. Islam is expanding more rapidly than Christianity, but it is even more riven by discordant groups linked with existing political parties. There is as yet little sign of Communism, for the conditions, external and internal, do not exist for so characteristic an expression of the impersonal society.

[1] He also believes that the Twi-speaking peoples derive from the people of *Tu*, the people of the bow or power, in other words the Turanians who lived in Mesopotamia before the Semites and, coming to Africa, spread the idea of a Supreme Being, *Nyame*, the common name for God in a vast area of Central Africa reaching down to the Congo.

In other ways, the Gold Coast is totally different even from a territory like Nigeria, which so closely resembles it in this basic outline. Most of the differences are to its advantage, seen from the point of view of wider political development. It is a small area, though seriously handicapped by the forest, where most of the people live, and which imposes isolation and a formlessness and sameness hard to grasp for those who have not experienced it. It is comparatively rich. It has had five hundred years of experience of Europe, both for good and evil, and a significant percentage of the coastal people have mixed blood. A much larger proportion than elsewhere speak English, or understand it. The Ghaneans as a whole, although not apparently as gifted as other peoples such as the Yoruba, have, like the Baganda, shown instinctive cohesion when confronted by a challenge that they understand, as in the famous cocoa 'hold-up' of 1938. Their basic characteristics, again apparently common to the Negro everywhere, quickness, shrewdness, humour, noted by every European observer since Bosman in the early eighteenth century, along with lack of continuing effort and basic providence (in a climate that is inimical to the idea of providence or possessions), may secure stability at a level, and under circumstances, which could not be tolerated by the more specialized and less flexible European; and by this means bring the characteristic voice of Africa to the councils of the Commonwealth.

H. S.

Austria's Economic Prosperity

AUSTRIA has been much in the news of late as the country to which the thousands of refugees from Hungary first made their way. Though many of the refugees have now been passed on to other countries, a considerable number will stay on in Austria; and in any case an influx of the dimensions of the original refugee wave is not easy for a small country like Austria to take in its stride. It may therefore be of interest to examine the economic situation of this neutral State which, so soon after its own emancipation, has suddenly been called upon to provide a refuge for its neighbours.

THE REFUGEE INFLUX

Between the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution, on 23 October 1956, and 15 January 1957, about 170,000 Hungarian refugees crossed the Austrian frontier. Despite the aid by various foreign humanitarian organizations, by the International Red Cross, and by the United Nations Refugee Organization, Austria has so far borne by far the heaviest burden resulting from the influx of the refugees. Accommodation posed particularly great problems in view of the existing severe housing shortage, and emergency measures had to be adopted, such as the closing of public schools and their conversion into living quarters for refugees.

Up to 15 January 1957 almost 100,000 refugees had left Austria for settlement in other countries, among them more than 20,000 for the United States and 11,000 for the United Kingdom, but some 70,000—a figure which corresponds to about 1 per cent of the Austrian population—still remained in Austria, and more refugees—recently at the rate of four to five thousand a week—continued to arrive. When Vice-President Nixon visited Austria before Christmas he was told by the Austrian authorities that 30,000 refugees, or about 10,000 families, could be absorbed into the Austrian economy, provided some assistance was given for the construction of housing and other facilities that would have to be provided for them during an adjustment period. Estimates on the cost of settling 10,000 families on a permanent basis run as high as \$60 million—allowing for an average expenditure of Schillings 150,000 (or \$6,000) for the construction of a flat and connected expenditure—and Austria certainly could not raise anything like that amount from internal sources. The Austrian Government has so far also borne most of the cost for the care of the refugees, but it will probably be reimbursed to a large extent by foreign countries. The U.S. Government is said to be planning to make commodities available to Austria under its agricultural surplus programme, the Schilling counterpart funds being used to reimburse the Austrian Government for the expenditure incurred in connection with the refugees.

As to the prospects for finding work for the refugees, the situation is favourable for skilled workers, construction workers, and farm labourers, but professional and clerical workers may find it more difficult. The Austrian trade unions, which had in the past refused in principle the admission of foreign labour, have declared

their willingness to collaborate with the employers for a smooth integration of the refugees.

AN EXPANDING ECONOMY

Since 1954, when the deflationary effects accompanying the Schilling stabilization measures of the previous year were overcome, Austria has been experiencing an economic boom which is unprecedented in the country's history. Austria's economic recovery since the end of the war in many instances resembles that of Western Germany. Both countries started from a very low level but, with the help of foreign aid, an abundant supply of cheap labour, and a determination to invest a very high proportion of the national income, both were able to maintain an average rate of growth of the national product substantially higher than that of most other Western European countries.

The Austrian gross national product increased by more than 9 per cent in 1954 and by over 10 per cent in 1955—the year of the conclusion of the State Treaty which restored Austria's full political sovereignty. Expansion was at a slower rate in 1956, and the increase in the gross national product for that year is estimated at only 4–5 per cent. The expansion in 1954 had arisen mainly through a sharp rise of exports (following the devaluation of the official rate of exchange carried out in May 1953) and was later strengthened by a rapid growth of private investment. Private consumption also increased as a consequence of higher wages and the virtual achievement of full employment. The falling off in the rate of expansion in 1956 is principally due to the petering out of investment activity as the capacity limits in the industries producing investment goods were reached and as the Government adopted restrictive monetary and fiscal policies in order to preserve financial stability and avoid unfavourable repercussions on the balance of payments. This development corresponds to a rather similar trend which can be noticed in many other European countries, where the Governments have been led to take various measures in order to prevent their booming economies from becoming entangled in an inflationary spiral. In Austria, people are acutely aware of the consequences of inflation—having experienced its several phases after both World War I and World War II—and it is the good fortune of the present generation to have found in Dr Kamitz a Finance Minister who will not make any easy compromise with financial stability, since he regards it as

the indispensable foundation for a long-term economic expansion.

Austria's economy is now basically stronger than ever before. Industrial production has risen to almost two and a half times the level of 1937, and the gross national product in real terms is now almost twice as high as it was in that year, while steel production has risen three times and electric power more than four times. Important investments effected during the war years in the field of the heavy and basic industries, such as a large steel mill, a nitrogen fertilizer plant, an artificial fibre factory, a large aluminium plant, and several others, as well as the investments of the post-war period, mainly carried out in connection with the European Recovery Programme, have greatly strengthened the industrial basis of the country. The production of machinery and capital goods has become increasingly important, replacing to a certain extent consumer goods which were Austria's traditional pre-war products. As the world demand for equipment has greatly increased, this shift was very much to Austria's advantage. Substantial progress has also been made in agriculture, despite a sharp fall in the agricultural labour force. Whereas in 1937 domestic production accounted for 75 per cent of the total food consumption, it now covers about 85 per cent—and in the meantime there has been an increase in population of more than 200,000. One of Austria's most valuable assets are her forests; the high prices for timber and timber products on world markets encouraged production, and exports of these products, together with paper and fibre products, now represent about one-third of Austria's total exports.

The shift in population which has been going on during the past ten years diminished the lopsidedness of its geographical distribution which resulted from the splitting-up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Vienna and its suburbs now have some 400,000 fewer inhabitants than in 1937 and the western and southern provinces some 600,000 more. The extremely high level of unemployment which characterized the inter-war years (e.g., in 1934 there were almost 600,000 unemployed against about 1,400,000 employed, and in 1937 unemployment averaged about 500,000) has not recurred in the Second Republic; even during the years 1952–3, when the Schilling stabilization entailed some deflationary effects, the number of unemployed did not exceed 150,000–180,000. In 1956 some 800,000 more workers were employed than in 1937. The ratio of unemployment fell during the summer months to less

than 3 per cent, and in some industries, especially in the building sector, there was actually a scarcity of labour. The only problem that remains to be solved is that of seasonal unemployment during the winter months, when, because of the cold weather, building activity is sharply curtailed. Thus at the end of December 1956 the number of unemployed had risen to 161,000, while there were 2,130,000 employed, so that the unemployment ratio amounted to 7 per cent.

The attainment of full employment during the summer would not have been possible without the continued maintenance of a very high level of investment since the end of the war. During the years 1948–55 Austria devoted an average of 19 per cent of her gross national product to investment, reaching as much as 24 per cent in 1955, while the corresponding proportion for Western Europe as a whole during that year was only 18 per cent.

The foreign trade position has greatly improved by comparison with the pre-war period, and the effects of the deterioration of the terms of trade—which is due to the greater rise in the price of imported raw materials than in that of industrial export goods—were compensated by a larger increase in the volume of exports than of imports. In the first three-quarters of 1956 the import volume exceeded the 1937 average by 96 per cent, and the export volume was 125 per cent higher than in 1937. Austria had to re-adapt her foreign trade structure after the war, to replace her former markets in Eastern Europe and gain a new foothold in the Western countries. Her exports were made competitive mainly because of the relatively cheap cost of labour (cheap in relation to most of the other Western European countries) and the successful devaluation of the exchange rate in 1953. With the improvement of her external position she made rapid strides toward the liberalization of imports. At present some 90 per cent of imports from the O.E.E.C. area and some 40 per cent from the dollar area are free from any quantitative import restrictions. The balance on invisible transactions has also much improved, largely due to the sharp increase in foreign tourism, whose earnings now amount to approximately one-seventh of Austria's merchandise exports.

The official gold and foreign exchange holdings, which reached a peak in the third quarter of 1954, declined in 1955, but rose again in 1956. In November of that year they stood at $415 million, which corresponds to about five months of current imports, and represents therefore a very satisfactory level.

EFFECTS OF THE STATE TREATY

The conclusion of the State Treaty in May 1955 has had a very invigorating influence on the Austrian economy and has greatly enhanced confidence in the country's economic and political future. The financial burdens which it imposed proved less onerous than had originally been expected. At the end of the first year for reparations to the Soviet Union (the term 'reparations' is not strictly correct, as these deliveries are made in connection with the transfer to the Austrian Government of those enterprises which had been handed over as former German assets to the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference) goods amounting to $25,090,000 had been delivered, besides the stipulated delivery of 1 million tons of crude oil evaluated at approximately $20 million. Austria thus scrupulously observed the terms of the agreement. These deliveries to the Soviet Union were, however, not greater than the quantities of goods which had been taken out of the country under the Russian occupation, and they were to a large extent supplied by the factories which had previously been under Russian control, so that this did not hinder the development of exports to other countries. The loss of foreign currency attributable to the withdrawal of the occupation forces was compensated by the sharp rise in foreign tourism, particularly in the case of Vienna, where all the hotel rooms were booked for many months in advance and rooms in private homes were selling at a premium. The restoration of buildings damaged during and after the war and the construction of new ones will bring some relief as from the spring of 1957, but a cultural centre like Vienna, where because of the many artistic, musical, and commercial events the season lasts throughout the whole year, could certainly do with many more modern and well-equipped hotels.

A major reason for the call for a General Election in May 1956[1] was the divergence between the two partners in the coalition Government, the People's Party and the Socialists, concerning economic policy and, in particular, the management of the nationalized enterprises and the exploitation of oil. The sweeping victory of the People's Party did not make the formation of a new coalition Government any easier, as the Socialists wanted to maintain the *status quo* under which the Socialist Minister of Transport and State Enterprises controlled the nationalized

[1] See 'A Year after the Staatsvertrag in Austria A Political Balance Sheet', in *The World Today*, July 1956.

industries. This was obviously not acceptable to the People's Party, which emphasized that the State enterprises should be run along commercial lines and should as far as possible be taken out of the sphere of party politics. The Socialists finally agreed to the creation of a limited liability public corporation, whose board of directors is represented by a six-member committee consisting of three People's Party and three Socialist Cabinet Ministers, with Chancellor Raab, as Chairman, having the decisive vote.

This new corporation, which was entered on the trade register on 1 August 1956, constitutes one of the biggest holding companies in Europe, comprising about sixty of the most important enterprises in Austria in the field of mining, iron and steel, mechanical and chemical industries, oil, and natural gas, and employing some 125,000 persons. The formerly Russian-controlled enterprises which are now included in the holding company employed about 26,000 persons. Some progress was made in the past year towards their full integration into the Austrian economy, but substantial further investments are required for their modernization and rationalization. Their immediate need for working capital was partly satisfied by means of a law permitting the Government to give a partial guarantee for credits extended to them by the commercial banks. A large part of the repayments or interest payments of loans out of counterpart funds granted under E.R.P. to Austrian enterprises was allocated to these former Russian-controlled industries. They have also received funds corresponding to the U.S. Government credit in local currency arising from the sale of United States agricultural surplus commodities to Austria. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has so far only granted credits to Austria for the development of electric power resources, has shown interest in these industries. The President of the Bank, Mr Eugene Black, who visited Vienna at the end of November 1956, is reported to have discussed the problem of financing investments in the manufacturing industries, and special attention was undoubtedly given to the problems of the industries located in the former Soviet occupation zone.

POWER AND OIL DEVELOPMENTS

So far the World Bank has granted four loans to Austria. The first two, granted in 1954 and 1955 and amounting to $12 million and $10 million respectively, were twenty-five-year 4¾ per cent loans for the construction of the Reisseck-Kreuzeck and Luenersee

hydro-electric power projects. The other two loans, totalling $31 million, were granted simultaneously in September 1956, at an interest rate of 5 per cent. One of them, for $21 million, was made for the Ybbs-Persenbeug project, a large hydro-electric plant under construction on the Danube River about eighty miles up-stream from Vienna, which will have a capacity of 192,000 kilowatts from six generating units. Half of these units are scheduled to be in operation early in 1958, the rest by the end of 1959. The other loan, amounting to $10 million, will be used for two thermal plants utilizing domestic lignite. Because of the rapid rise in industrial production Austria has little power reserve capacity, despite extensive development of her power resources since the end of the war. As at present only about one fourth of her water power reserves have been or are being opened up, many profitable and economic projects for the development of hydro-electric power can still be carried out—certainly more than in most of the other European countries. The fact that for many years to come Austria can economically satisfy the growing demand for energy through the development of electric power—apart from the exploitation of her oil and natural gas resources—explains the small role which the peaceful use of atomic energy so far plays in the country's long-term economic programmes. The case is not too different from that of the United States, where large quantities of conventional fuel will be still available for a relatively long period at an advantageous cost, which therefore makes the development of atomic power for industrial use a less pressing economic problem. Austria has, however, shown great interest in the world-wide collaboration for the development of atomic power, and the Austrian Government's invitation to establish the seat of the International Atomic Agency in Vienna was unanimously accepted by this organization's preparatory conference.

Through the conclusion of the State Treaty Austria also obtained control over her large oil and natural gas resources, which make her the second most important producer in Europe (after Rumania).[1] Output of crude oil amounted to 3·6 million tons in 1955 and to a little less in 1956. Austria's own oil requirements are less than this total, even after allowing for the 1 million tons which has to be delivered to the Soviet Union for the next nine years. But owing to the limited capacity of her refining industries Austria on the one hand needs more petrol, especially of the super grades, and

[1] And excluding the U.S.S.R.

e fuel oils than she can produce, and, on the other hand, has ıluses of petroleum and gas oil available for export.

rom the above considerations it is obvious that Austria has not ı so directly hit by the Suez crisis as most of the other Euro- ı countries, but she may still experience some shortages in the ›ly of petrol and fuel oil. No limitation of consumption or ›ning has so far been introduced, but in accordance with the .E.C. resolution economies in the use of these scarce products ; recommended to the public. Fortunately consumption of ol during the winter months falls well below the yearly average ıany motorists store away their cars rather than risk them on the and snow-covered roads of the mountainous country. In ;r to ease the situation on the internal fuel oil sector the trian Government asked the Soviet Government to agree to a ıction of the stipulated shipments of fuel oil to the Soviet on. As a result of this the amount of crude oil to be supplied he Soviet Union during the months January–March 1957 ld be approximately 100,000 tons less than that originally /ided for. It was agreed that Austria would instead ship a esponding amount of other goods. As the blocking of the Suez al affects only a small part of the country's foreign trade— ıt 4 per cent of imports and 7 per cent of exports—the direct act on the economy is not very great, but because of her ng ties with the other European economies Austria will also the repercussions of the difficulties experienced by these ntries. The increase in the prices of raw materials on the world kets and in freight rates will make Austrian imports more ex- sive, and it is also feared that any great disturbance in the ıomies of France and the United Kingdom—either in the form recession or of strong inflationary pressures—may very well /e contagious.

FINANCIAL POLICY

ı the present booming economic situation, characterized by full ›loyment and increasing labour costs and a slow but steady ısure on prices, any tensions in one economic sector may bring ut repercussions in the rest of the economy, and it is therefore aramount importance to pursue a cautious monetary and fiscal cy and restrain too rapid an expansion. During the past years ıl policy has not to any great extent been used as an anti- ical weapon, but postponement or cancellation of some public

investment projects helped to keep the construction boom under control and reduce public expenditure. Generally speaking, greater reliance was placed on measures of monetary policy, such as changes in the discount rate, the obligation for commercial banks to keep minimum cash reserves, the fixing of credit ceilings, and various other informal agreements between the monetary authorities and the banks. The combination of these measures has proved effective in slowing down the credit expansion. The level of interest rates is very high—bank loans carry a rate of 9 to 10½ per cent, mortgage loans bear interest at 6½ per cent to 7 per cent, and the recent public bond issue was also carried out at a rate of 6½ per cent. As the maintenance of a tight money policy and of high interest rates tends to discourage the expansion of the capital market it may well be worth while to explore whether measures of fiscal policy could increasingly be used for the purpose of restraining overall demand.

The overall Budget showed a surplus of about half a billion Austrian Schillings in 1954 and a deficit of about 1 billion Schillings in 1955, which means that the result in both years was much more favourable than the original Budget forecasts, mainly because of the increase in public revenue which was attributable to the continued expansion of economic activity. The financial burdens resulting from the State Treaty and from the setting-up of armed forces have so far been absorbed without great strains, but rising military expenditure is likely to present greater problems in future years. The deficit in 1956 is expected to be somewhat bigger than that of 1955, although it may not quite reach the forecast of 2·1 billion Schillings. The deficits are largely financed out of the proceeds of Government bond issues carried out in previous years.

The establishment of the Budget for the year 1957 posed grave problems, as on the one hand demands for additional Government expenditure ran as high as 13 billion Schillings by comparison with the 1956 Budget, while on the other hand a decline in the rate of increase of public revenue is to be expected. Dr Kamitz remained stalwart in his defence of a balanced Budget and cut down on the demands of the various Ministries, while at the same time refusing to raise new taxes, which in his view would only frustrate efforts for a further rise in productivity. The ordinary Budget for 1957 now reckons with a revenue of 30·4 billion Schillings, or 4·3 billion more than was budgeted under the 1956 proposals.

xpenditure is expected to reach 31·2 billion Schillings, up some billion on the year. To the deficit of 860 million Schillings on rdinary account must be added as yet uncovered expenditure n extraordinary account of 700 million Schillings, so that the precast for the overall Budget deficit for 1957 works out at 1,570 illion Schillings, or some 600 million less than the deficit con-mplated under the 1956 Budget. In fact the Minister hopes that le rise in revenue will be bigger than the forecast, which would rther reduce the actual deficit. In the event that public revenue iould substantially exceed the forecast—several Cabinet members ave thought this likely—a supplementary conditional Budget has een provided for, involving the expenditure of almost 2 billion chillings. This Budget contains items of different degrees of riority, but it will be carried out only if additional revenue beyond ie amounts required to meet the ordinary and extraordinary eficits becomes available.

The ordinary Budget for 1957 included cover for the raising of ivil servants' salaries to the full level provided for in the civil ervice law, but only in the second half of the year. The early in-rease in salaries had been one of the promises expressed during ie election campaign, and the postponement till July 1957 caused reat disappointment to Government employees and led to strike ireats by such groups as the police and the postal services.

In order to make possible the complete valorization of civil ervants' salaries as from 1 January 1957, without increasing the udget deficit by the 600 million Schillings which are necessary for iis, the People's Party proposed the sale of some of the State's wnership rights in nationalized enterprises, such as the three big ommercial banks, a proposal which after heated discussions with ie Socialists was accepted by the Government.

The three biggest Austrian banks, the Creditanstalt-Bankverein, ie Österreichische Länderbank, and the Österreichisches 'reditinstitut, had been nationalized after the war, together with iany mining and industrial companies and the Danube Shipping 'ompany. Although they are formally under the supervision and ontrol of the Ministry of Finance the three banks are being run ke private enterprises, and their executive boards and managing irectors have repeatedly shown their independence *vis-à-vis* the Government. The return to private ownership of the banks, of the ormer Russian-controlled 'German assets', and of some industrial nterprises remains the aim of the People's Party whose liberal

concepts of free enterprise and of a free market economy were approved by a majority during the recent elections.

The plan of the People's Party was to issue so-called *Volksaktien* (popular shares) in small denominations, which would be widely spread among the population and would, in particular, give the small saver an opportunity to invest in shares. In the past savings by private individuals were effected mainly in the form of short-term deposits with the savings banks and other financial institutions which for legal and traditional reasons cannot be used for loans to private industry, while the public's buying of bonds remained somewhat limited and of shares practically nil. It is the fact that savings are not made in the form most appropriate for long-term financing, rather than a general lack of savings, that is responsible for the narrowness and weakness of the Austrian capital market. Industrial investment is therefore carried out almost exclusively through self-financing out of profits, through the counterpart funds from foreign aid which are allocated by the Government, and with the aid of bank loans. The influence of the banks in the control of industry, and the rigidities and oligopolistic situations it entails, have been widely criticized, but this can obviously not be changed until the capital market is strengthened and can assume the role of channelling the accruing savings of the public into long-term industrial financing. Because of the special weakness of the share market at the present time any increase in the flotation of ordinary shares may affect share prices very rapidly and lead to wide fluctuations, which would hardly make security saving any more popular among the public. The plan for the issue of popular shares will have to take this into account. Besides removing some legal obstacles, such as the minimum face value of shares which at present amounts to 1,000 Schillings, it will also be necessary to do away with the tax discrimination in favour of fixed interest bearing securities, and above all the investor must be provided with an incentive to save in the form of shares rather than in any other way; this can only be achieved through an adequate distribution of dividends and a steady and orderly development of share prices.

It may be questioned whether it was opportune to start this ambitious new project, which to the author's knowledge has not been attempted in any other country before, with the issue of bank shares rather than with those of industrial enterprises, as the banks may not be able to pay out dividends for some time, owing to the

strict provisions of the bank reconstruction law with regard to the banks' own capital formation. Moreover, the practical execution of the popular shares plan may take some time, perhaps as much as two years, while the 600 million Schillings in question are needed for the first half of 1957. It was therefore proposed to form an investment trust, in which the three banks will participate, which will first make advances to the State. The immediate effect is consequently a short-term borrowing by the Government from the banks until these shares have been sold. The banks are expected to take big parcels of their own shares into their portfolio so that only a smaller amount will be distributed in the form of popular shares to the general public. The Minister of Finance emphasized that such a transaction, implying the sale of State property in order to cover current civil expenditure, will not be repeated. Indeed, it would be very dangerous if it became normal practice to satisfy the various demands for higher Government expenditure by selling public property!

The experience gained with the issue of the bank shares will be valuable for the extension of the popular shares project to other sectors of the economy, such as the oil industry. While the popular shares will not be available to foreigners, efforts are being made in order to attract foreign capital for investment in Austria. The internal political stability, and the fact that the country has been declared neutral, as well as purely economic considerations, such as a relatively low wage level and the existence of modern and highly efficient basic industries, would appear to provide incentives for foreign investors; the Austrian economy could certainly derive great benefits from closer ties with foreign countries and an even fuller integration into the world economy. It is to be hoped that the events in Suez and in Hungary will not entail a diminution of the necessary confidence on the part of foreign investors.

If Austria can succeed in securing the financing of a high level of investment and can thus further increase the productivity and efficiency of her industrial sector and maintain her international competitive position, her prospects for future economic growth and an improvement in the standard of living are very good. As a small country she is greatly influenced by the general economic trends in Western Europe, and the maintenance of a high level of activity in this part of the world is therefore of great importance to her. In view of her special geographical position it is also clear that prosperity and economic progress in Austria are of great political

value to the West, as they cogently demonstrate to the count behind the Iron Curtain the kind of achievements of which a sn country in the free world is capable.

E. P

The Burma-China Frontier Dispute

DISPUTES over the Sino-Burmese frontier are of long standi There are two areas, both wild and remote, in which disagreem over the boundaries has been particularly active. The first a most important of these is the Kachin area in northern Burn where no agreement on demarcation has ever been reached; second and ostensibly the principal subject of the recent disput the Wa district, which forms the north-eastern part of the pres Shan State In the Kachin area the Chinese have been known claim an area extending as far west as the Chaukan pass on Indo-Burmese frontier; further south they claim those parts the Shan and Wa States that lie east of the Salween.

It has been suggested that the Chinese have for some ti followed a policy of fomenting discontent in the Kachin State a small groups of Chinese are said to have crossed frequently into State, either on 'friendly visits' or to hold 'conferences' in mountains. In this connection, too, attention has been drawn to setting up, in China itself, of an 'Autonomous Kachin Peopl Government', analogous to the 'Autonomous Thai Peopl Government' which has caused such agitation in Bangk Whether either of these 'autonomous Governments' merits su attention is doubtful, and in any case Chinese infiltration into Kachin State, although it involves larger stretches of territo does not seem, rather surprisingly, to have caused so mu anxiety in Burma as similar efforts in the Wa State. According t Rangoon broadcast, on 23 September 1956, at the All-Bur Peasants' Union Executive Conference, the Prime Minist U Ba Swe, speaking of the presence of Chinese troops in the State, said that '. . . the violation only concerned this State, sir borders in other areas were still undefined and the Chinese troc were constantly moving.'[1] Burmese Kachins had moreover beg to return these 'friendly visits': the Kachin State Minister visit

[1] B.B C Monitoring Report, Part V, The Far East, No 599, p. 32.

China at the end of October. He afterwards attempted to refute charges of Chinese 'aggression' in the Kachin State, maintaining that after the achievement of independence internal instability had prevented the central Government from investigating the boundary question and that Chinese troops who crossed the border through ignorance could not be termed aggressors.

In the area of the Wa State,[1] the boundary was first fixed by a convention signed in 1894 which was subsequently modified in 1897. Under this latter convention a joint commission was appointed by whom the frontier, as described in the agreement, should be 'verified and demarcated', in order to 'avoid any local contention'. It was intended that this commission should reach agreement in not more than three years from the date of its first meeting, which was to take place not later than twelve months after the signature of the convention. In fact, the commission did not reach agreement until 1904, and even then a section about 200 miles in length in the Wa area was not finally demarcated. The British Government undertook to observe provisionally the Scott line (so called after Sir George Scott, one of the original members of the commission), which included most of the Wa State as part of Burma. This line lay farther east than the 'Liuchen' Line, so called after General Liu and Mr Chen, the Chinese members of the commission. The Liuchen Line intersected the Wa State, allotting the valuable Lu Fang silver mines to China.

The situation remained unchanged until 1933, when there were some skirmishes between Chinese irregulars and Burmese frontier police as a result of a visit by a party of British geologists to mines in the area. In 1934 the British Government protested against Chinese incursions, and accordingly in 1935 a second commission was set up. This consisted of five commissioners, two appointed by the British Government and two by the Chinese, with a Swiss, Colonel Iselin, appointed by the League of Nations to act as neutral Chairman with a deciding vote. In 1937 the Iselin Commission produced a unanimous report which determined a definite frontier line in the Wa area. In June 1941 the report of the commission was confirmed by two Notes, one of which laid down the frontier between Burma and Yunnan, while the other defined an area on the Burmese side of the frontier in which the Burmese

[1] Burma has never at any stage in her history succeeded in exercising any close control over this remote area, which is populated by extremely wild and ungovernable people.

Government agreed to permit 49 per cent Chinese participatioı in any mining enterprise. These proposals, however, were neve ratified, and the frontier still remains a subject of dispute.

On 21 January 1956 it was announced that senior officials fron Burma and China were to hold a meeting on 7 February at Lweje on the Burmese side of the Burma-China border, to discus demarcation problems and the opening of a highway between th two countries. *The Nation* (Rangoon) of 8 February 1956 said tha the meeting was, however, not a 'Border Meeting in the ol sense. . . The three main objects of the meeting are: (1) to mak the border people "Union conscious", (2) to promote friendshi between Burma and China, (3) to let the Chinese hear some of th local problems and—if they are willing—to help find solutions fo them.' According to the New China News Agency, a com muniqué issued by the Burmese Government on 2 March 195 said that the conference had 'served to acquaint the people in th border region of Burma with the present status of the Union o Burma. It has also served to promote friendlier relations betwee the border peoples of Burma and that (*sic*) of the Chinese People' Republic. . . These relations were based on the five principles o peaceful co-existence. . .'[1] It was shortly afterwards rumoure that the Burmese Government was anxious to reopen discussion on frontier problems because of the dissatisfaction expressed i the Burmese press over the Lweje talks.[2]

At the beginning of July 1956 there were reports that th Burmese border police units were being replaced by regula Army formations, in the face of alleged increasing Chinese Com munist troop concentrations in the area; on 31 July *The Natio* reported that Chinese troops had crossed the north-east frontie and had set up outposts. They were unofficially reported to hav been sixty miles inside Burmese territory along a 500-mile stretc inside the frontier areas of the Wa and Kachin States. A Govern ment statement later said that 'while the Government of the Unio of Burma cannot but be seriously concerned over this develop

[1] New China News Agency Bulletin, 5 March 1956.

[2] 'The Lweje Conference has been rightly hailed as a historic meeting, sinc it is the first of its kind to take place. Politically, however, it was nothing mor than the most limited and preliminary gesture towards the establishment o border relations. . . The sum total of the Conference's political gains was the Chinese agreed that border conferences were a good idea and took back wit them a copy of the problems listed by our border people for their own leaders. (*The Nation*, 13 February 1956.)

ment, it is emphasized that the situation is not such as to warrant the treatment accorded to it by *The Nation*.'[1] The statement also said that 'the Union Government have already brought this to the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China and negotiations are in progress with a view to the withdrawal of these troops to the Chinese side of the border.'

Reports also appeared in the Burmese press that skirmishing had been going on for some time along the frontier.[2] It later appeared clear that Chinese Communist troops had crossed into Burmese territory in the areas where Kuomintang irregulars were active after 1949,[3] had remained there ever since, and had as a result come into conflict with Burmese patrols. On 4 August 1956 the Peking *People's Daily* denied that Chinese troops had invaded Burma and said that they were stationed in the border area to preserve peace. The paper went on to say that differences over the boundary could be settled only by negotiation and stated that the Chinese troops would not retire until a settlement had been reached. U Ba Swe, while minimizing the friction between China and Burma, insisted that the Chinese troops must be withdrawn before discussions could take place. He said there were only about 500 Chinese troops inside Burmese territory, spread over an area of between 700 and 1,000 square miles, but at a press conference on 7 August he claimed that 'the borders of the Wa State are clearly defined. . . According to international practice we are bound by the Treaty of 1941. In our negotiations with the Chinese Government we have pointed this out and asked them to withdraw to their side of the border.'[4] A report from Rangoon had suggested earlier that the Burmese might put the case to the United Nations Security Council in November if the situation had not altered by then, but this proposal, if it was ever seriously considered, seems to have been dropped.

Meanwhile reports of Chinese troop movements inside Burma became more alarming, and although U Nu insisted in an interview that 'sufficient goodwill exists between Burma and China to ensure a just settlement . . .' he admitted that 'the matter is one

[1] *The Nation*, 1 August 1956. [2] *ibid* 1, 7, and 8 August 1956.

[3] Their presence (in the Wa State) was first known in 1953 (*The Nation* 11 August 1956) though it is probable that some Chinese troops had crossed the border in 1950 following the movement of refugee KMT troops into the same area.

[4] *The Nation*, 8 August 1956.

that we must tackle with the greatest patience...'[1] On 3 September 1956 the *Rangoon Daily* published what it claimed to be the terms of a Chinese Government note on the subject, suggesting that Burma should withdraw her troops from the northern frontier territories, forming part of the Kachin State, which the Chinese claimed fell within their territory, while the Chinese would withdraw their own forces from the Wa State. Other sources quoted in the same paper said that the Chinese Government had expressed its willingness to settle the dispute in accordance with the past treaties executed between Burma and China, a proposal which appeared designed to revert at the expense of the Burmese to the situation before the British entered Burma. Earlier U Nu was quoted[2] as saying that Chou En-lai was to visit Rangoon in December in response to a Burmese Government invitation; it was expected that the frontier dispute would be discussed during his stay.

According to a statement made by U Kyaw Nyein, the Deputy Prime Minister, in the Burmese Chamber of Deputies on 29 September, negotiations had been started and were progressing smoothly. On 2 October U Ba Swe said at a press conference that the negotiations had reached a stage when the 'Chinese Government has accepted in principle the withdrawal of the troops away from the boundary line established in 1941'[3]—that is, the Iselin Line in the Wa State. He added that Chinese troops who had crossed the northern frontier had now left Burma.

On 24 October 1956 U Nu went to Peking for talks with the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr Chou En-lai; on his return a joint communiqué was issued on 9 November which stated that during these talks the Chinese had put forward a 'fair and reasonable proposal',[4] to which the Burmese Government promised to give 'consideration'. In the meantime the two Governments arrived at an 'understanding' that from the end of November 1956 Chinese troops would withdraw from the area to the west of the 1941 line, while Burmese troops would withdraw from Hpimaw, Kangfang, and Gawlum—three areas in the Kachin State—the withdrawal to be completed before the end of 1956.

This communiqué makes it fairly clear that China's purpose in invading the Wa State was in fact to establish a position from which to bargain over the Kachin frontier. The Kachin frontier

[1] New China News Agency Bulletin, 30 August 1956.
[2] See *The Hindu*, 31 August 1956. [3] *The Times*, 3 October 1956.
[4] New China News Agency Bulletin, 12 November 1956.

north of Myitkyina was left undefined by the 1897 Commission, and the British subsequently claimed that it should lie along the watershed between the Salween and Nmai Kha rivers. The Chinese, however, maintained that they had rights over areas west of the watershed including Hpimaw, Kangfang, and Gawlum, 115 miles north-east of Myitkyina, on the grounds that the villages had paid tribute to an overlord on the other side of the Salween. The British offered to buy out these rights and, despite refusal by the Chinese, eventually occupied Hpimaw in 1913. The pass between Burma and China at Hpimaw is the lowest in the area and the only one open in all weathers. It is defended by a fort. In 1914 the McMahon line, which follows the watershed, was drawn up by British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives, but the Chinese at once repudiated it, and no other settlement was ever reached. Another area of dispute, strategically even more important, is the Namwan Assigned Tract, recognized Chinese territory, which juts into Burma some forty miles south of Bhamo and which was originally leased from China, since the best route for the main eastern Burmese north-south highway lay across it. Major improvements to this road are now in progress. The Communist Chinese regime has consistently refused to accept the rent previously paid for this area.

On 10 November 1956 U Nu gave a press conference in Rangoon throwing light on the Chinese claims and his attitude towards them. According to *The Nation* of 11 November, he stated that the Chinese Government had signified its willingness to accept and respect the existing boundary between Burma and China, and to forego all past claims, save in respect of Hpimaw, Gawlum, and Kangfang, which it wished to form part of China, and the Namwan Assigned Tract which it wanted returned. He was in favour of acceding to the Chinese demand because he was convinced Premier Chou had made it in a just and conciliatory spirit. U Nu gave examples of Chou's conciliatory spirit in refraining from contesting the McMahon and Iselin lines in their entirety. He went on to say that the only condition which Premier Chou attached was that there should be a 'package deal' embracing the McMahon line, the Iselin line, Hpimaw, Gawlum, and Kangfang and Namwan. China could not agree to a piecemeal settlement. *The Nation* commented that 'although the terms of the "Package Deal" are not such as to fill us with thankfulness . . . the less critical among us might even welcome them with a sense of relief. . . We have saved

our necks, but it seems we may have to suffer the loss of an ear.'[1]

On the same day *The Nation* reported that the Burmese War Office had announced that all Chinese forces had been withdrawn beyond the Iselin line and that arrangements would be made to withdraw the Burmese garrison from Hpimaw within the stipulated time. It was later stated that the withdrawal of Chinese troops had been completed on 12 December. It is believed that Burmese troops have also been withdrawn.

Chou En-lai arrived in Burma on 10 December for a ten-day visit. U Nu, who had left for Buddhist celebrations in Ceylon, was not there to continue discussions with him, but he was able to review the border question with U Ba Swe, and the two Prime Ministers made a joint journey to Mangshih in Yunnan to attend a festival of peoples from both sides of the border. The outcome of these talks, however, was not striking, for the final communiqué, after describing the course of Chou's 'goodwill' visit to Burma, simply stated the Premiers 'discussed in a spirit of cordial and mutual understanding the question of the settlement of the Sino-Burmese boundary line. These discussions have led to the further clarification of the Chinese and Burmese points of view and have brought the problem nearer to a solution satisfactory to both countries.'[2]

Some observers have taken this communiqué to express a hardening of Burma's attitude to China's claims. Certainly, despite the visit of the Kachin leaders to China and despite the convivialities at Mangshih, the Kachins appear to feel no wish to see part of their State ceded to China. According to *The Nation*, Kachin leaders deny that any of their ancestors in those parts to be ceded ever paid tribute to China, and it is on the past payment of tribute that the Chinese claim to Hpimaw, Gawlum, and Kangfang rests. As U Nu pointed out in his press conference of 10 November,[3] the Constitution of Burma requires that territorial changes affecting a State within the Union have to be approved by the State Council concerned. It seems likely that any cession of Kachin territory to China will encounter opposition in the Kachin State Council, and now that immediate pressure in the shape of Chinese troops in the Wa State has been withdrawn, the Burmese Government may make the attitude of the Kachins a ground for resisting the 'package deal' proposed by Chou En-lai.

E. G.

[1] *The Nation*, 11 November 1956.
[2] New China News Agency Bulletin, 21 December 1956.
[3] See *The Nation*, 11 November 1956.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 3 *March* 1957

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Notes of the Month

Israel's Financial Position

How has Israel's economy stood up to the strain of rearmament and the Sinai campaign? The people in Israel have realized that they must tighten their belts and bear the burden of increased taxation. Last November the Government introduced new indirect taxes and floated an internal loan of I£40 million (the equivalent of £8 million). It called on Jewish communities abroad for an emergency appeal for funds in addition to the regular annual appeal, and it obtained an immediate response. In the United States the appeal was for $100 million, in addition to the $50 million raised each year by the United Jewish Appeal. In the United Kingdom it was for £2 million. Against this, Israel has suffered a suspension of economic aid from the United States Government since November. That aid includes help under the Point 4 Budget, and surplus food products, which for some years had been made available to Israel. Moreover, negotiations for a loan of $75 million through the Export-Import Bank were stopped until Israel completes the withdrawal of her troops from Sinai and Gaza. The indemnities in kind delivered by the German Federal Republic have, however, been maintained, and amounted to about $70 million in 1956.

The Government Budget for the current year 1957–8 shows a substantial increase on that for 1956–7. The ordinary revenue is estimated at I£461 million, as against I£413 million in 1956–7, the main increase being in customs duties. And the revenue derived from foreign grants and loans is I£325 million as against I£300 million. Total expenditure is estimated at I£849 million, as against I£769 million in 1956–7. The main increases are for defence and, strikingly, for education. The budget for development is much the same as in the previous year, I£234 million as against I£220 million. In his Budget speech Mr Eshkol, the Financial

Secretary, could point to a substantial rise in the cultivated area o over 20 per cent compared with the figures of 1955–6. Domesti production now covers 65 per cent of Israel's food, and, in addition provides for export of citrus fruit and other products to the valu of $35 million, and the cotton crop valued at $3·5 million. I industry, however, expansion of output was much slower an exports rose in the last year by only 4 per cent. A big effor which was made in 1954–5 to improve the balance of trade ha been inevitably checked by the paramount need of expensive re armament; and the estimated figures for this year show a furthe regression due to the steep rise in imports. The deficit in th balance of trade has been increased from $250 million to $27 million, i.e. by 10 per cent. The deficit in the balance of pay- ments is estimated at $380 million, compared with $307 millio in the previous year, an increase of 24 per cent. The output of oi from Israeli wells is developing slowly. During the last year i supplied about one-tenth of the needs, and the import of oil is a bi item.

In order to prevent inflation the Government has limited th credit for building, and has contrived to check an increase in th cost of living. As a result the index rose by less than 4 per cent in comparison with the figure of the previous year.

One of the favourable factors in Israel's economy is the increase of the Merchant Marine, the ships being built mainly in Germany as a part of the indemnities. During 1956 two modern passenger and freight ships and two oil tankers were added, and during this year twelve more vessels are expected. That will bring the tonnage to over 200,000 tons, and it is estimated that by 1960 it will be half a million tons. If the free navigation of the Gulf of Akaba and the Suez Canal is assured to Israel, the prospects will be much brighter That will open a market for her in the East and greatly reduce the cost of the chief imports.

A further strain on Israel's economy in the last year was the in- crease of immigration from 36,000 to 60,000, mainly from North Africa; and the estimate of immigration for this year is at least 70,000. A fresh stream has started from Egypt.

Italian Socialist Reunification and the Venice Congress

THE Venice Congress of the Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.), held from 6 to 10 February, which many had expected would take a long step on the road towards reunification of the two Italian

Socialist parties, instead produced fresh confusion and uncertainties. The two parties concerned are the P.S.I., under Signor Pietro Nenni, and the P.S.D.I. (*Partito Sociale Democratico Italiano*), which under Signor Giuseppe Saragat broke away just ten years ago because of the P.S.I.'s increasingly close association with the Communists.

Since 1947 the two parties had taken very different roads. The P.S.I., bound to the Communists politically by a unity-of-action pact and by a 'popular front' policy, and collaborating with them in a joint trade union, retained most of the Socialist working-class support; in the last General Election in 1953 they obtained 3½ million votes and 75 seats in the Chamber; the party's apparatus remained autonomous, but it became increasingly difficult for the P.S.I. to adopt an independent line. The P.S.D.I., on the other hand, became a partner in the Government Centre coalition; it never managed to obtain the hoped-for support from the working-classes, but it formed its own trade union; at the 1953 Election it secured about 1¼ million votes and 14 seats in the Chamber (a considerable decline from its 1948 Election position); and while it certainly acted as a counterpoise to some of the more conservative tendencies in the coalition's predominant party, the Christian Democrats, it was never strong enough to exercise a powerful influence in the Government.

That was how matters stood between 1948 and 1953, during the period of the Christian Democrats' undisputed supremacy. This was also, incidentally, the De Gasperi era: and Signor De Gasperi was a profound believer in that ideal of Catholic-secular collaboration of which the four-party Centre coalition was the political expression. Since his death the force of that ideal has come to be less strongly felt in the Christian Democrat party, and the continued presence of the small secular parties—the P.S.D.I. among them—in the coalition is probably now regarded by many Christian Democrats as a political necessity rather than as a vital principle.

That same period of 1948–53 was the time of closest collaboration between the P.S.I. and the Communists. This was the true 'popular front' era: the two parties had in fact fought the 1948 Elections on joint 'Popular Front' lists, and their policies coincided closely over a wide field of subjects. The most that the Socialists could do to maintain their identity was to strengthen their own party apparatus, for which the party Vice-Secretary, Rodolfo

Morandi, was largely responsible. The structure of local and provincial officials which he built up still stood firm after his death in 1955, and it has played no small part in the events of the Venice Congress.

The General Election of June 1953 brought a weakening both of the Christian Democrat party and of the other Centre parties; and it was soon after that Election that Signor Nenni initiated a move towards obtaining a better position for his own party. He first put forward the possibility of collaboration between Catholic and secular workers, involving an 'opening towards the Left' on the part of the Christian Democrats. Then came suggestions for a 'Socialist alternative' which would act as a sort of 'third force' between the poles of Communism and Christian Democracy which by now threatened to divide the country. With this proposal he drew a step nearer towards propounding a reunification of the two Socialist parties which would mean the detachment of the P.S.D.I. from the Centre coalition. And it was at this stage that outside events began to precipitate matters: for the revelations of the Khrushchev report last spring produced among the Socialists a reaction very different from that of the Communists. While the latter, after some initial uncertainty, adhered to the orthodox Moscow line, Signor Nenni roundly condemned the crimes of Stalin, and in so doing drew nearer to his old comrades of the P.S.D.I.

Reunification of the two Socialist parties, first mooted at a private meeting between Signor Nenni and Signor Saragat at Pralognan last August, received a further impetus from the events in Hungary and Poland in October–November, which for the first time brought open division among the Communist ranks. By that time a joint P.S.I.–P.S.D.I. committee had been set up to discuss the prospects of reunification International Socialism had taken a hand, in the person of the French Socialist leader M. Commin, who spent some time in Italy in September taking soundings among the two parties. And the coalition parties, and in particular the Christian Democrats, had been forced to take into account the possibility that, were reunification really to take place, they might be faced with a totally new situation which might precipitate a General Election, due in any case next year. For the two months before the Venice Congress everything waited upon its outcome.

In the event, this long-awaited Congress has produced no ready solution. For while Signor Nenni obtained a practically unanimous vote in favour of reunification, the results of the subsequent

voting for the P.S.I. Central Committee showed that only some 30 per cent were wholeheartedly in support of his policy. In proposing reunification, Signor Nenni was prepared to concede that there must be a definite break with the Communists: 'unity-of-action' pacts were a thing of the past; in foreign policy, while still opposing military blocks, he would agree to supporting a policy of European unity and joint defensive organization. As for the P.S.D.I., the next step must lie with them, and would presumably involve their quitting the Government. All this the Congress endorsed. True, among the many speeches made there was difference in emphasis, the syndicalist leader Signor Foà cavilling at the idea of a trade union split, Signor Riccardo Lombardi wanting reunification 'right now' without more ado, while Signor Pertini, the well-known Resistance leader, appeared to be the only out-and-out opponent of a break with the Communists. But it was not until the subsequent, and secret, voting for the Central Committee that these differences took on positive form. In this Committee of 81 members, Signor Nenni's followers obtained 27 places, the so-called 'Morandiani'—the men of the apparatus—30, followers of Signor Lelio Basso (now closer than formerly to Signor Nenni's views) 15, and the definite opponents of a break with Communism, under Signor Pertini, 9.

The reasons for this setback are not hard to seek. It had always been suspected that Signor Nenni was well in advance of his party in regarding reunification as a practical possibility for the near future (so too, incidentally, on the P.S D.I. side, is that party's secretary Signor Matteo Matteotti, who has all along been more optimistic in this connection than Signor Saragat). The results have shown that, for the present at any rate, the rank and file of the P.S.I. consider the price too high to pay—the price not only in terms of a definite break with the Communists which might eventually reach even trade-union levels, but also, and more significantly, in terms of a clean sweep of the old party apparatus to make way for younger men more ready to make the new policy work. This is what the entrenched party officials of the Morandi era could not face.

Thus the setback at this particular stage appears to have come about more over questions of internal party procedure and positions than over questions of ideology; and as such, given time, it may not be beyond the powers of Signor Nenni to remedy it. For he is one of the most astute Italian politicians today, and has to a

quite exceptional degree the sort of antennae that enable him to gauge the state of opinion, whether in his own party or in the country at large—it is, indeed, this particular faculty that probably accounts both for his extreme caution and for some of his apparent past tergiversations.

At the same time in considering the stages which have led up to this particular phase of the reunification efforts it is perhaps not quite beside the point to recall the view recently expressed by the left-wing Catholic historian Arturo Jemolo. Writing in *Il Ponte* (January 1957) shortly before the P.S.I. Congress, he suggested that events in Hungary might even have caused the prospects of Socialist reunification to recede rather than bring them nearer. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the view commonly held. But Jemolo argued that reunification would, ultimately, only have a *raison d'être* on a basis of (i) the P.S.D.I.'s departure from the Government, and (ii) the formation of a Socialist Opposition party which, with the other small like-minded groups of the Radicals, Republicans, and Unità Popolare, could eventually have formed a Government. But that would imply two things: (i) a state of opinion in the country which would guarantee that the inevitable consequent Rightward swing of the Christian Democrats would not first produce a Salazar type of single-party regime; and (ii) that the Communists would sometimes be 'alleati non sconfessabili' (allies who could on occasion be countenanced). And, he concluded, the more the Communists came to be regarded as 'untouchable' allies, the more difficult it would be to prevent such a Rightward swing by the Christian Democrats, and thus the worse it would be for Italian democracy as a whole.

Such arguments may appear tortuous, yet they may well weigh not only with the P.S.D.I. but with some of the more enlightened Nenni Socialists, who cannot but realize that any unified Socialist party that aspired to Government would be bound to rely on Communist votes in such matters as, for instance, policy governing the means of production (oil, electricity, or the mechanism of State intervention in industry).

In any case the decision is now postponed for several months, for the P.S.I. must set their house in order, while the P.S.D.I., in the person of Signor Saragat, is at present inclined to congratulate itself on a lucky escape from premature involvements. Italians in general are left with two reflections: that there is still no end in sight to the long story of dissension when their Socialists are gath-

ered together; and that perhaps the time-worn Centre coalition may after all still have something to be said for it.

Cross-Currents in German Foreign Policy

ONE of the most important facts to be borne in mind about Western Germany during the first months of 1957 is that the third General Election since the establishment of the Federal Republic will take place in September. For both the Government and the Opposition this means that additional care must from now on be taken in the formulation of policy. This was clear during the two debates in the Bundestag on 31 January and 1 February on foreign policy and defence respectively. If there was little alteration in customary parliamentary invective, the terms in which policy was expressed avoided extremes and it might almost be said that the Government's statement of its policy and the Opposition's attack upon it lacked the usual degree of conviction. This was not attributable solely to the forthcoming Election, since the debates took place in the shadow of recent events in Suez and in Eastern Europe. That the situation in Poland and the suppression of the Hungarian revolution have increased the concern of all Germans with the problem of reunification scarcely needs to be stressed. This has been reflected in recent policy statements by the Governments, not only of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, but also of the Soviet Union.

In the German Democratic Republic, Herr Ülbricht told the S.E.D. Central Committee on 1 February that a peaceful solution of the German problem must be through an All-German Council composed, on the footing of equality, of representatives of the two German States on the basis of electoral laws in force in each; reunification would thus be achieved through a Confederation which would establish a customs and currency union and prepare for all-German elections. Socialism in West Germany was not a condition for unity, but a nationalization referendum and a plebiscite on withdrawal from N.A.T.O. should take place there. The economic plan for 1956 had not been fulfilled, and that for foreign trade had been affected by reduced deliveries of coke and coal from Poland—the repercussion of events in Hungary and the blocking of the Suez Canal. Agricultural production had been insufficient in the past few years, and increased exports of industrial goods were needed to cover import requirements. Ulbricht said he rejected the ideas of economists in the S.E.D. who advocated

abolition of central planning, the direction of the economy by monetary manipulations, and the operation of the law of supply and demand. Equally, he refused to consider suggestions of 'workers' self-management' on Yugoslav lines.[1]

Mr Bulganin, in a letter to Dr Adenauer published in Bonn on 11 February, urged the deepening of the mutual understanding and co-operation implicit in the Moscow negotiations of 1955 and the setting up of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. He reminded the Chancellor that Soviet policy is based on peace and co-operation with all States 'with an independent internal political system' and declared that the strengthening of trust and a friendly co-operation between 'our two countries would without doubt facilitate also the unification of Germany which the people sees as its most urgent national task... The reunification of Germany would not, however, be brought nearer if people attempt to ignore the fact of the existence of two German States'. Improvement in the relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union would be very useful in helping the Governments of the two German States to solve the problem of reunification. Mr Bulganin urged a substantial increase in trade between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and the conclusion of a trade treaty, and an agreement for scientific and cultural co-operation. Finally, he turned to a subject which could not fail to arouse interest in the Federal Republic when he proposed a consular agreement to help in the solution of questions concerning the repatriation of nationals of both countries.

In a foreign policy debate in the Bundestag on 31 January, the Foreign Minister said that the Federal Republic would perhaps have to make concessions to achieve German unity, but not in the direction of a decrease in freedom and security. Only N.A.T.O., behind which lay the strength of the United States, and not a general security system, could afford the Federal Republic the security she required. More recently the Chancellor has been reported as expressing his belief in a change in the direction of international policy in the foreseeable future and as having declared that the hope for reunification was now better grounded than formerly, though he underlined the fact that impatience and too quick action might damage its prospects. But the paper of the Social Democrat Opposition (*Vorwarts*, 8 February), attacking the

[1] B.B.C., *Monitoring Report*, Part IIA, No. 800, 6 February 1957, pp. 39, 41–2.

remilitarization policy of the Government, argued that the Chancellor was not interested in reunification and had in effect put the subject into cold storage. In the foreign policy debate the leader of the party, Herr Ollenhauer, had argued that since Hungary and Suez it was no longer true that security could be safeguarded by a military alliance; the Anglo-French intervention had shaken the confidence of other members of N.A.T.O. and he doubted whether the alliance could ever recover. He had, however, previously given a pledge that if his party were returned to power in the forthcoming Election it would honour the Federal Republic's treaty obligations to N.A.T.O.—on the basis of a voluntary army and not through conscription—until those obligations could be revised or replaced by a new security system.

Herr Ollenhauer has now outlined this security system, prefacing his summary by a statement that it was a truism that reunification and N.A.T.O. were mutually exclusive. The proposed pact would provide for a non-aggression commitment; arbitration for the settlement of differences; limitation and control of armaments within the territories covered; an undertaking of support against all aggression which could not be blocked by any participant's veto; and a guarantee by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Against this background of internal and international jockeying for position, the Federal Government carries on the day-to-day conduct of its defence and foreign relations policy in accordance with its treaty obligations and previous declarations. The Federal Chancellor's recent utterances have made it clear that he regards General Speidel's recent appointment as C.-in-C. Land Forces, Central Europe, and the setting up in Washington of a working group of representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to review the problem of reunification in relation to European security, as renewed recognition of the Federal Republic's position of equal partnership in the Western defence community. From the standpoint of Federal policy he is now able to point to the fact that the much-discussed and reshaped military contribution to Western defence is now under way. Under the conscription law 100,000 young men registered on 21 January and about 10,000 of them are due to be called up in April, while a volunteer army of approximately 75,000 men is now in training. And, if the Federal Government's total contribution to support costs at the time of writing appears likely to be smaller

than last year, it has now, according to the head of the German delegation at Anglo-German talks recently held in London, been decided additionally 'to furnish mutual defence aid in the spirit of the N.A.T.O. alliance bearing in mind that the burden of armaments weighs heavier on Britain than on others'.[1]

[1] *The Financial Times*, 9 February 1957.

ERRATUM

In the article on 'The Hungarian Revolution', in *The World Today*, January 1957, two points should be corrected on p. 4. At 9 lines from the bottom, the date of Hungary's adoption of the 'Stalin constitution' should be August 1949, not 1950; and in the footnote, 'voting in urban areas was not secret' should read 'voting in rural areas . . .'

President Eisenhower and Congress

Peace and Prosperity under Strain

LESS than four months ago an overwhelming majority of the American people re-elected Mr Eisenhower as their President on the assumption that only he could assure to them a continuance of the peace and prosperity which had come to the country during his first four years in office. That both are going to be harder to maintain during his second term than they were to achieve during his first is already obvious from the evidence of the President's own messages to the new Congress. Unprecedented priority was given to the threat to peace in the Middle East when President Eisenhower in person gave Congress his proposals for dealing with the crisis there even before he delivered his annual report on the state of the Union, customarily the first business of each session. The threat to prosperity now presented by inflation was the underlying theme of his later reports on the state of the Budget and of the economy.

To the Democrats, who have a majority in both Houses of Congress (although a very precarious one in the Senate), the President's urgent request for new powers to deal with the Middle Eastern situation was not only an admission on his part that he had not understood soon enough the growing seriousness of developments there, but also a proof of their party's contention during the election that the Administration's, and particularly Mr Dulles's, lack of a constructive approach to the Arab world and to Israel had been directly responsible for the deterioration in political conditions there. Indeed, it appears that, except within the State Department and the White House, there was in the United States little of the emotional reaction to the British attack on Suez that was so widespread in Britain itself; the attack may not often have been approved in America, but it was widely excused.

In the circumstances the Democrats can hardly refuse to give the President the additional authority he wants. Nor do many of the right-wing Republicans, however unhappy they may be about this latest concession to internationalism, dare oppose what is, after all, a direct move against Communism. Nevertheless, sixty members of the House of Representatives voted against the resolution. But there were 355 votes in favour and the majority in the Senate, where the vote will probably have been taken before this

article appears, should be equally satisfactory, now that the Democrats there have forced the Administration to accept their condition: this was for the Senate to conduct a full inquiry, after the resolution had been approved, into American policy in the Middle East during the last ten years. The Democratic attack on Mr Dulles, the Secretary of State, will be developed during these inevitably lengthy hearings and, as a result, there is no longer much expectation that his tenure of office may be nearly over. For his health seems miraculously restored and President Eisenhower is not one to dismiss a loyal colleague when he is under fire.

Doubts on two contradictory constitutional grounds have arisen about the military clause of the President's resolution, which would authorize him to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to protect any Middle Eastern country against armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism. It is argued, as it was argued in the case of the similar Formosa resolution two years ago, that the President as Commander-in-Chief needs no authority to order American troops into action and that it is detracting from the constitutional powers of his office to give such authority. His request, say the Democrats, is another demonstration of his lack of leadership. On the other hand there are those in Congress who feel that it is undermining the Congressional right to declare war to give the President general authority to use armed force when he thinks fit. Controversy over these points has done something to counteract the main purpose of the resolution, which was to demonstrate to Russians and Arabs alike that the United States is indeed united in its determination to punish aggression in the Middle East quickly and effectively.

But so far more harm has been done by the discussion over the other, complementary, part of the resolution, which would authorize the President to give any nation in the Middle East economic and military assistance if this were needed to maintain its independence. All that he actually wants for the current year is greater freedom in the use of $200 million which has already been appropriated; a similar sum for each of the next two years will be included in the coming requests for funds for the regular foreign aid programme. But around the economic clause in the Middle Eastern resolution has crystallized the already well-established reluctance in Congress to vote money for vague long-term foreign aid projects—or indeed for any foreign economic aid at all. As a

result, in his evidence Mr Dulles was forced both to give more details than he had wished of what the Administration did, and did not, intend to do with the money, and to make various promises and accept various conditions about what would in fact be done with it, in order to induce Congress to authorize it at all. This has weakened what was not in any case a very strong American hand and has reduced the bargaining effectiveness of the President's programme.

One of the reasons why the debate over the Middle Eastern resolution has been so unexpectedly long and bitter, and why it has centred in the Senate, is that Senator George is no longer there to lead the Democrats along the bipartisan path of co-operation with the Republican Administration. His successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the eighty-nine-year-old Senator Green of Rhode Island, is as good an internationalist, but he has not Mr George's experience or, more important, his influence. The Republican leaders on the committee, Senators Wiley, Alexander Smith, and Knowland, who should be putting the President's case, are solid but hardly inspiring figures. This has given opportunities, which they are well equipped to take, to the energetic young Democrats who now dominate the committee. Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Humphrey, and the others are firm internationalists who believe that the United States has a duty to play a more active part and to show more initiative than it has done recently in the world at large and in the United Nations particularly. Furthermore they are ambitious men and belong to a party which is looking for a candidate for the next Presidential election. Naturally they are very ready to put themselves in the public eye when a worth-while occasion offers.

Another such occasion has also offered recently—and Senator Kefauver especially is taking advantage of it—in the partial breakdown of the scheme for supplying Europe with oil from the Western hemisphere to make up for the shortage resulting from the closing of the Suez Canal. The story is extremely complicated, but it is possible—although not necessarily justifiable—to maintain that the Administration should have taken charge from the beginning and that the American oil industry as a whole, or perhaps only certain sections of it, has been exploiting Europe's difficulties to further various private ends of its own. All of this is being made much of by certain Democrats, mainly those from oil-consuming rather than from oil-producing states. It seems as if the

argument may lead to yet another of those full-scale investigations of the oil industry which have become traditional with the monopoly-hunters.

Such excuses to criticize what the Administration has, or has not, done are particularly welcome to the progressive Democrats since they find it hard to criticize what the Administration wants to do. President Eisenhower's programme for the coming session of Congress might have been offered by his Democratic predecessor, Mr Truman, as, indeed, might his earlier programmes also, in the main. Mr Eisenhower may not go as far as the progressive Democrats would like, but he is trying to go a great deal farther than either conservative Democrats or right-wing Republicans intend to let him

After his Middle Eastern plan, the President's most pressing requests to Congress dealt with financial aid to the states to enable them to build enough classrooms for the rapidly rising number of children now coming into the schools; measures to enable the Government to ensure that Negroes are not denied their voting and other civil rights; and relaxation of some of the most inequitable of the restrictions on immigration. Mr Eisenhower's other legislative recommendations, adding up to about a hundred in all, deal with such things as the anti-trust laws and trade union pension and welfare funds, with protecting small business men and developing the country's natural resources, with strengthening economic ties with other countries (especially by joining the Organization for Trade Co-operation and the International Atomic Energy Agency), with more help for farmers, for the few areas where there is persistent unemployment, and for housing (mainly through loan and mortgage programmes), and with encouraging voluntary health insurance schemes and better unemployment benefits. The only unusual request, and one that is already being much discussed, was for a special commission to study the country's financial structure and how it has developed since the last such study, fifty years ago, which led to the establishment of the central banking system. Congress, recently much concerned with banking, is quite ready to set up such a commission, but it wants to provide the members itself, not to authorize a group of independent citizens as the President wishes.

Another of the President's requests was, as had been expected, for a continuation at present rates for another year of excise taxes on cars, cigarettes, and spirits, and of taxes on corporation in-

comes. Without this, and without a continuation of the prosperity which means steadily rising tax revenues, there would once more be a deficit in the Budget in prospect. According to present estimates, receipts in the 1958 fiscal year, which begins next July, will be $73·6 billion, compared with $68·1 billion in the 1956 year which ended last June, and expenditures will be $71·8 billion compared with $66·5 billion. The President's requests to Congress for authority to incur obligations which will be paid for in future years make it clear that Government outlays will continue to rise however much he may try to cut down wherever possible—unless of course a satisfactory disarmament agreement can be reached. It is a galling admission for a President who came to office pledged to keep peace-time expenditures down to $60 billion a year. But with an expanding and ageing population the cost of existing social welfare schemes must go up, and the new weapons are so expensive that they more than offset any saving in military manpower which they may make possible. Defence alone accounts for nearly 60 per cent of total spending and over two-thirds—$2 billion—of the estimated increase in 1958 over that expected this year is for defence.

Congress can refuse to give the President as much as he has asked for, but experience shows that it is in fact likely to press more money on him rather than less. Last year, for example, the Democrats gave him an extra $900 million for military aircraft and missiles, and they are still much concerned that the United States may be falling behind its potential enemies in the development and production of such weapons. The trend of Government spending, therefore, not only dampens hopes of tax reductions, dear as they are to all politicians, but accentuates the inflationary pressures which have been building up during the past year in an economy which is working at full capacity; the national output rose by over $20 billion during 1956 and was running at a record annual rate of $424 billion during the last quarter. There are no longer men, machines, or raw materials to spare—or at least there were not until very recently; the forces of supply and demand have pushed the cost of living, remarkably stable during President Eisenhower's first term, up by 3 per cent in the last twelve months, with much of the rise occurring during the more recent of them.

The President now tacitly admits that monetary policies, the restraints on credit which have been operating so effectively, have done as much as they can be permitted to do. Whether or not in-

flation can be checked in the present dynamic economy depen(in Mr Eisenhower's view, or rather in that of his economic a visers, on the moderation of businesses and trade unions alike, whether the one keeps down its price increases and the other wage demands. He has even dropped a hint, which has arous much indignation, that if such moderation is not exercised volu tarily some attempt may be made to enforce it.

In admitting that credit cannot be tightened further, the Pre dent has come round to the opinion held by many of his Dem cratic critics and has demonstrated that his economic philosop is basically as progressive as theirs. For he agrees that any grea shortage of money would have undesirable social effects: sm business men are finding it hard to borrow money for their neec building of new houses, especially the cheaper types, is falling (because mortgage credit is scarce; local communities cannot co struct schools and roads and sewers because they have to pay su high interest on loans. There comes a point, if a broad view is tak of the national welfare, when these after-effects of the credit tre: ment seem worse than the inflationary disease, particularly if t treatment is no longer being effective in any case. The only diffe ence between Mr Eisenhower and the progressive Democrats over the moment when that point arrives; they claim that arrived months ago, he that it is only now in sight. Otherwise h New Republicanism is hardly distinguishable from their New De:

The final proof of this came with his own Secretary of tl Treasury's reaction to the Budget message. Mr Humphrey is o of the ablest and most intelligent men in the Cabinet, but he is al an orthodox Republican business man. He did not hesitate to t(Congress that he disagreed with the philosophy of the late Budget—which is drawn up in the President's own executi office, not in the Treasury—and with its acceptance of ever-risi Government expenditure. This, Mr Humphrey believed, wou bring an economic recession 'to make your hair curl'. To this M Eisenhower replied that, if a recession came, he would meet it wi deficit spending, a public works programme with the Governme putting more money into the economy than it takes out of it.

When he spoke Mr Eisenhower thought that the difference opinion between him and Mr Humphrey was of no immedia relevance. Since then the stock market has begun to feel that befo long it may be: the sluggishness in motor-car output, cutbacks i some other industries, the failure of house-building to pick up, tl

postponement of some plans for capital expansion, all suggest that perhaps an economic downturn is coming sooner than the President realized. All of this is very speculative—few if any economists forecast any such development in 1957—but before Mr Eisenhower's second term is ended his prosperity may be under as great a strain as his peace already is.

N. B.


Federation in the British West Indies

Problems and Prospects

THE islands of the British Caribbean, now standing on the threshold of federation, comprise the following colonies: Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados; the Windward Islands of Grenada, St Lucia, Dominica, and St Vincent; and the Leeward Islands of Antigua, St Kitts, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands. The two mainland colonies of British Guiana and British Honduras stand in close relation to these islands. But they do not, at any rate for the moment, wish to join the new Federation, which is likely to come into operation early in 1958.

The islands are all very small. Jamaica, the largest, has a total land area of 4,470 square miles. Barbados, the oldest British colony in the Caribbean, covers only 166 square miles. The islands are scattered along a great arc which reaches from British Honduras, on the mainland of Central America, to British Guiana, on the mainland of South America. It is a whole day's flight from Jamaica, at the western end of the arc, to the little island of Barbados out in the Atlantic at the eastern end. It is a thousand miles from Jamaica in the north to Trinidad, in the south, where the federal capital is to be.

Until after the second World War inter-island communication was very difficult. When Mr Wood, later Lord Halifax, visited the islands in 1921, he drew attention to the fact that letters from Jamaica to Barbados usually went via the United Kingdom, as being the quickest way. Even today, although most of the islands have small airfields, inter-island communications are surprisingly


THE BRITISH WEST INDIES
AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES
ST KITTS – B W I territories
Miles
0
500
GULF OF MEXICO
USA
Nassau
BAHAMA IS (Br)
CAICOS IS
TURKS IS
CUBA
CAYMAN IS
JAMAICA
Kingston
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
PUERTO RICO
VIRGIN IS
ANGUILLA
LEEWARD IS
ST KITTS
NEVIS
ANTIGUA
MONTSERRAT
GUADELOUPE
DOMINICA
MARTINIQUE
WINDWARD IS
ST LUCIA
ST VINCENT
BARBADOS
GRENADA
TOBAGO
Port-of-Spain
TRINIDAD
CARIBBEAN SEA
ARUBA
CURAÇAO
BONAIRE
MEXICO
Belize
BR HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
COSTA RICA
CANAL ZONE
PANAMA
PACIFIC OCEAN
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
Georgetown
BRITISH GUIANA
NETH GUIANA
FRENCH GUIANA
BRAZIL
G R Versey

inadequate, and it is probably still true to say that most of the people remain all their lives on their island of origin.

The vast majority of West Indians are Negroes. There is, however, in all the islands, a fair-sized and growing coloured group, a sprinkling of Asiatics, and an even smaller sprinkling of white people. In Trinidad and British Guiana there are large and influential East Indian minorities, both of these islands having been developed by indentured Indian labour after the slave trade had been abolished.

In the past, these were the sugar and spice islands, highly prized, and in consequence changing hands fairly often as the fortunes of the various European countries which owned them waxed and waned. They were all developed on an estate basis, and produced, as they still do, primary agricultural crops for export. Now, the estate pattern is by no means so uniform, for peasant agriculture has made deep inroads into it. But the islands still depend, for the most part, on agricultural export crops, although the variety of crops grown is now considerably larger. The predominant one is still sugar. But citrus, bananas, cocoa, coconuts, sea-island cotton, coffee, and spices are also grown. Great efforts are made to grow enough food for home consumption, but this is still, for the most part, an unrealized goal. The area as a whole is markedly lacking in the raw materials of industry. But there are oil and asphalt in Trinidad, and bauxite is mined in Jamaica and British Guiana.

POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

If the British West Indies are poor in natural resources—at any rate as far as the islands are concerned—they are all too rich in population. The rate of increase is such that the present population of around 3½ million is likely to be doubled within the next thirty years. The result of this constant increase, occasioned by a falling death rate, is that attempts to provide more nearly adequate social services, and to find employment for a larger proportion of the labour force, are apt to come to nothing because the yearly increase in the population takes up the margin of improvement and leaves the position little changed. Indeed, great effort is required to maintain even existing standards. The position is further complicated by the facts that the population is very young (some 37 per cent are under fourteen years of age) and that the ratio of women to men is unusually high, particularly in the urban areas.

Both these factors militate against a high level of productivity.

The situation might not be serious if the people of the British Caribbean were content with the relatively low standard of living that has so far obtained. But they have now, in increasing measure, political and social aspirations which can only be satisfied if their standard of living can be materially raised. This being so, the first and by far the most important problem for the British West Indies is to halt the population increase.

The average number of children born to a West Indian woman is five or six. In the rural areas—and the British West Indies is overwhelmingly rural—families are often very much larger. As elsewhere, however, the size of the family is considerably smaller among the higher income groups and the better educated. But in the British West Indies these groups constitute a very small fraction of society. A significant increase in their numbers could provide the answer. The argument thus goes round in a circle. If the average family was wealthier and better educated, there would be fewer children. If there were fewer children the family would be wealthier and better educated. The problem is how to break the circle. There would appear to be three possible ways of doing this: emigration, birth control, or industrialization.

The first method, emigration, was the safety valve which brought relief from population pressure in the past. Now, however, most of the traditional outlets have closed down. United States immigration policy is highly restrictive; neither Central nor South America wants a large influx of Negro labour; the other Caribbean islands have now enough labour of their own; and the United Kingdom can absorb only a very small part of the surplus

The second method, namely the successful practice of birth control, probably requires a degree of sophistication which the rank and file of the peasantry does not possess. The religious difficulties involved would in any case be very great, in that Trinidad and the Windward Islands are predominantly Catholic, and in Jamaica the Catholics are a powerful, if small, minority. Family organization is loose, so that no pressing responsibility weighs upon fathers of large families. And, possibly outweighing all the other difficulties in the path of family planning, virility and fertility are very highly prized.

The third method, industrialization, is in some respects the most promising avenue of approach. Most people are agreed that the British West Indies must remain first and foremost an agri-

ıltural area. But it is very generally felt that agriculture could and ıould be buttressed by industry wherever this can be developed. part from the industries based on oil in Trinidad and on bauxite ı Jamaica and British Guiana, a variety of secondary manufacturıg industries are already established in the area. Among them the ıost important group is that based on food-processing, particurly the processing of citrus fruıt for export, which is being rapidly ‹panded. Sugar provides the raw material for another group of ‹port ındustries—for ınstance rum, and the fancy molasses prouced in Barbados. Sugar by-products are also used as the raw ıaterials for a variety of industries producing for local markets, ıch as plasterboard, cardboard containers, and the like; and ıch foodstuffs as margarine, biscuits, and edible oils are manuıctured for local consumptıon. Both Trinidad and Jamaica have, ıthin the last few years, establıshed cement factorıes, since this is product, hitherto ımported, for whıch there is large and ıncreasıg demand. Another group of ındustries, important in Jamaica, the cigar and cigarette group. Textile and knitted goods are roduced for the local market, usıng, to some extent, imported ıw materıals. Other home ındustries are taılorıng, dressmaking, nd the making of shoes and sandals and of furniture. In addıtion, a arıety of mıscellaneous small industrıes are springing up, some f them backed by American capıtal, in Trinıdad and Jamaıca. ndustrıalızatıon ıs the watchword of the ambıtıous young, who see ı ıt a way of escape from the age-old servitudes of agriculture and ·om the monotonies of rural lıfe.

The example of neighbouring Puerto Rico has demonstrated ȯw much can be achieved, even ın a primarily agricultural area, y the deliberate and intellıgent fosterıng of secondary industries. ꞌut this ısland is adȷacent to large and hıghly dıversified American ıarkets, and is insıde the American tarıff wall. The Brıtish islands re, ıf only for geographical reasons, of necessity in a much less ʳell-favoured position.

FEDERATION PROSPECTS

These small islands, with all their problems, intend now to ederate. The next step, probably not very far off, will be Dominɔn status within the Commonwealth. It may at this time be perinent to inquire what consequences are likely to ensue, both for he Commonwealth and for the thirteen island dependencies conerned. It is clear that federation *per se* does not necessarily pro-

vide a solution. Indeed, with all the centripetal forces of the twentieth century at work, it may seem very questionable to embark on a federation of the decentralized Australian pattern. Yet there seems no alternative. A unitary state would be impossible, if only because of the great distances involved. A federation on the Canadian pattern would be unacceptable for the same reason, and also because, at present, each island treasures the attributes which differentiate it from the others much more highly than the characteristics which are common to them all.

On the other hand, the peoples of the British West Indies want, probably above everything else, to advance as rapidly as possible towards the goal of self-government. Here, as elsewhere, political ambition grows apace. But it is inconceivable that this could be achieved by each island separately. As has been mentioned already, the whole population of the British Caribbean does not exceed 3½ million, or half that of Austria. Barbados, an island particularly ambitious for political advance, has a population of slightly over 200,000, and is thus a population unit comparable in size with the town of Harrow. Further, if political independence is to be anything other than an empty phrase, it must carry with it at any rate some measure of economic independence. This, if it is to be achieved at all, can only be brought about through a carefully planned regional economy. The hard fact must be, and has been, faced, that, island by island, these small, isolated, agricultural communities are not economically viable units.

The peoples of the B.W.I. are deeply dissatisfied with the low standards of living which have so far obtained. Rightly or wrongly, they measure themselves against the yardstick of the metropolitan country, not against other tropical areas with natural resources comparable to their own. Young West Indians yearn for the pleasures and amenities of urban life. These they cannot enjoy without industrialization. But industrialization, they have come to realize, can only be effectively achieved if the region pools its resources and forms a common market. Political and economic ambitions thus require that these islands, each so proud of its own separate history, each with its own distinct flavour, different from its neighbours and glorying in this differentness, shall now come together to form one political and economic unit within the Commonwealth.

What will this new federation of islands, separated from each other by great distances of sea, small in area, poor in natural

resources, and heavily overpopulated, have to offer to the Commonwealth? There can, in the first place, be no doubt at all as to the loyalty of the whole British West Indies to the Commonwealth in general and to the United Kingdom in particular. Through all the vicissitudes of the colonial relationship, which has lasted, in the case of some of the islands, since the seventeenth century, British West Indian leaders of all parties have been unwavering in their support for the mother country. To British West Indians of whatever race or colour, England is 'home', and all they know, for better or for worse, of civilization stems from that single source. There are very many richer areas in the Commonwealth, many with far greater strategic implications. There are none more wholly loyal to the British connection, and this in spite of long-standing close and friendly cultural and economic ties with North America. *Civis Brittanicus sum* has been the proud boast of a whole society, ranging from the illiterate Negro peasant to the exclusive white planter.

The British West Indies brings another asset to the Commonwealth. This is a multi-racial area in which the art of living together in one society has been more fully and happily mastered than, perhaps, anywhere else in the world. It is true that at one end of the social and economic scale is the Negro or the East Indian peasant, and at the other the white planter. But between these two poles the racial groups tend increasingly to merge into each other. The children of the many British Caribbean racial groups attend the same schools; their men and women work side by side in the same businesses and worship in the same churches. They eat in each other's houses, and they inter-marry. This is not to deny that a light skin is still a highly prized social asset. But it is a social asset in the sense in which to be of Anglo-Saxon stock is a social asset in the United States. It is undeniably a good thing to have, but it is not the *sine qua non* of social, political, or economic success.

These, from the Commonwealth standpoint, are factors which go to the credit side of the ledger. It would be idle to deny that there are entries to be made on the other side.

It is by no means a foregone conclusion that federation will be a success. In the past, each island has tended to look with great suspicion, not to say dislike, on its neighbours, and 'confederation' has spelt a diabolical plot hatched by the Colonial Office to rob the planters of their ancient privileges. However, in 1945, when

West Indians had become used, during the war years, to some measure of co-operation and mutual self-help, Colonel Oliver Stanley's initiative in reopening the issue was generally welcomed. And in the subsequent years the activities of the Development and Welfare Organization, the Colonial Development Corporation, the Regional Economic Committee, and the various regional commodity associations which began to spring up, further inclined public opinion in this direction.

The idea of federation was first formally discussed in 1947 at the Montego Bay Conference, which was convened in Jamaica for that purpose. However, Jamaica and Trinidad, the two largest and wealthiest islands, were at that time luke-warm in their reactions, seeing in the scheme an attempt to fasten responsibility on them for the smaller grant-aided islands. The mainland areas of British Honduras and British Guiana stood aside, as they still do, unable to decide between an island and a continental destiny. The large East Indian minorities in Trinidad and British Guiana are afraid of losing their special privileges and their great local prestige in a larger, and of necessity almost wholly Negro, federation: such fears have played, and still play, a part. And the larger and more prosperous islands feared and still fear the influx of great masses of unskilled indigent labour from the poorer and smaller islands. These and many other difficulties remain.

Nevertheless, after the Montego Bay Conference the idea of federation came to be ever more widely sponsored. Students, professional people, and business-class groups became steadily more enthusiastic. Participation in the West Indian Conferences of the international Caribbean Commission had encouraged politicians from the British West Indies to regard themselves as a group with common interests, a common history, and a common destiny. The representative committee set up by the Montego Bay Conference to prepare a federal plan, headed by Sir Hubert Rance, later Governor of Trinidad, reported in 1949. In April 1953, after very full discussions in the island legislatures, a meeting was held in London at which the colonies concerned adopted the Rance proposals, with certain modifications. A final draft was adopted at a second conference in London in February 1956[1] and in July 1956 Parliament passed a Bill enabling the British Government to introduce a federal Constitution for the island colonies by Order in

[1] *Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation held in London in February 1956*, Cmd 9733.

Council, with provision for the later inclusion of British Guiana and British Honduras if these territories should so desire.

The new Federation will be based upon the decentralized Australian model. There will be an elected House of Representatives of forty-five members, and a Senate of nineteen members, the latter being a nominated body with revising functions. The federal Cabinet or Council of State will, as a result of a wise and courageous reversal of an earlier decision, contain no nominated members. However, for the time being the Governor-General will nominate three officials to attend the Council, and take part in its discussions, without the right to vote. The exclusive legislative power of the federal legislature will be limited to defence, external affairs, and external loans; but it is hoped that these powers may be increased when the Federation has had time to put down some roots. The provision that no person can be a member both of a unit legislature and of the federal legislature will require what may well be a difficult choice from the leading politicians of the area.

The new Federation will be confronted, sooner or later, with most of the problems which have faced the island legislatures in the past. Will the pooling of resources, human and material, yield the results so greatly desired? Or will the people of these small islands, and the United Kingdom taxpayers who have so long and so patiently done their best to help them, be saddled with the burden of yet one more piece of redundant governmental machinery? The answer must depend primarily upon the peoples of the British West Indies themselves, and very especially upon the present generation of politicians. The three outstanding leaders in the area today are Mr Norman Manley of Jamaica, Mr Grantley Adams of Barbados, and Mr Eric Williams of Trinidad. The first two are politicians of long standing, well known and greatly respected throughout the British West Indies. Mr Eric Williams is a newcomer to political life. He was until recently an official of the Caribbean Commission. He is first and foremost an intellectual, and most of his ties are with the United States rather than with the United Kingdom. Politically, all three men stand to the left of centre, though none is extremist in his views. All three are of much more than average ability, who would probably make their mark in politics in any society. The British Caribbean is fortunate in having such leaders at this time.

M. P.

Finland Today

FINLAND—the land where Eastern and Western culture meet, the country which lives under the shadow of the U.S.S.R.! That is the way in which many people think of this land of 60,000 lakes, of forests, rocks, and marshes. But there is another Finland, a country where old customs and old traditions are preserved but new ideas are encouraged; where wooden buildings and cobbled streets lie cheek by jowl with the most modern buildings and thoroughfares; and where passenger traffic takes readily to streamlined buses or aeroplanes. Modern industrial towns like Tampere (Tammerfors) can well compare, except for size, with any industrial city in Europe, and the capital, Helsinki, with its wide streets full of traffic, its avenues, its beautiful old and new buildings, and its lovely countryside and approaches along the sea, can rival the beauty of Stockholm, the 'Venice of the North'. The war brought a great deal of devastation to Finland, but it also created an unparalleled opportunity for her architects and town planners, and they were quick to avail themselves of it. Today the towns, and especially the capital and its surroundings, are full of attractive buildings because Finnish architects usually succeed in preserving the natural surroundings of the houses they build, so that modern dwelling-houses, post-war churches, and even factories are surrounded by a natural frame. Thus in Finland the expansion of towns is not spoiling the countryside as is so frequently the case in other countries; rather do town and country meet and melt into each other to the enchantment of all those accustomed to the old continental type of city or town. At the same time these new buildings contain every convenience which housewife or factory worker can demand.

THE WESTERN APPROACHES

A traveller visiting Finland for the first time might do well to begin with her ancient capital, Turku (Åbo), for it provides an interesting example of the development which the country has undergone since the war. To the homely wooden houses surrounding an inner courtyard, which are by no means inhabited only by humble folk, there have now been added the modern blocks of flats that line the upper part of the main street towards the stadium and the handsome libraries of the Finnish and Swedish universities. The railway station, situated on the periphery rather

ı the manner still found in some English country towns, is a harming example of modern Finnish architecture and can compare with the much-renowned railway terminus of Helsinki. A bus ·om Turku to Helsinki arrives in the centre of the capital and thus emonstrates at once the difference between the two cities which is ıdeed startling, being by no means only a matter of degree. Ielsinki is mainly a city of stone and cement. In the older parts of ıe town there are the same long streets of plain rather ugly stone uildings that can be found in other European cities, but they are radually being superseded by striking six- to eight-story dwellings. ome 45 per cent of the buildings in and around the capital are ewly erected since the war.

More than ten years have passed since the Finnish people were ıced with the formidable task of rebuilding their bombed towns nd their ravaged countryside, repairing their economy, and re-ettling the thousands of their fellow-citizens who had been ren-ered homeless by the war and the evacuation of ceded territories. Jl this they had to do while under the burden of the enormous ar indemnities imposed upon them by the victors, which could nly be met by starting new industries. Earlier articles in this ournal[1] have told how the Finnish people succeeded in overcom-ıg their problems by sheer hard work and grit (*sisu*), and this rief survey therefore begins in the spring of 1956 when the innish people once again had to elect a new President.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

On 1 March 1956 President Paasikivi's second term of office was ue to expire. The great service he had rendered his country since e had first been elected to high office, after the Armistice in 1944, ad gained him so widespread an affection, amounting almost o reverence, among his people that, had he chosen to stand again, o rival candidate would have had a chance of success. He refused o do so in view of his advanced age—he was in his eighty-fourth ear—and in fact he died only eighteen months later. The two ıost widely backed candidates for the Presidency were therefore he Agrarian Dr Kekkonen, Prime Minister, but for two brief ıtervals, since the summer of 1953, and the Social Democrat Ir K. A. Fagerholm, who from the autumn of 1948 to the spring f 1950 had been Prime Minister of a minority Government dur-

[1] See, e.g., 'Finnish Outlook', 'Finland's Reparations', and 'The Political cene in Finland', in *The World Today*, April 1950, July 1952, and May 1955.

ing a rather difficult period. His greatest achievement during t time was probably the introduction of a bill abolishing VALI the Finnish Secret Police established by the Communist Minis of the Interior Yrvö Leino during the premiership of Mr Pekk A third candidate, really non-party but sponsored by the C servatives, who stood a reasonable chance of success was former Governor of the Bank of Finland, now Finnish Amb sador to the Court of St James, Mr Sakari Tuomioja. At the end 1953 Mr Tuomioja had been asked by President Paasikivi to fo a business Government after the resignation of one of Dr K konen's Governments, and had proved a very successful and p gressive Prime Minister until the General Election in the follo ing year.

The final result of the Presidential election in February 19 was one of the closest ever seen in Finland. Dr Kekkonen beat nearest rival Mr Fagerholm by only two votes—by 151 to 1 Immediately afterwards he invited Mr Fagerholm to form Cabinet, and the latter succeeded in establishing a coalition of own party with the Agrarians and with one member each from t Swedish and the Finnish People's Parties. Mr Rolf Törngr representing the Swedish Party, became Foreign Minister, a p which he had for some time held under Dr Kekkonen.

At the outset the new Government was gravely handicapped a nation-wide strike which began on 1 March and involved so 200,000 members of S A.K., the Finnish Trade Union Federati who downed tools in order to support their unions' demand for all-round 5 per cent wage increase. Apart from the serious effect this strike on industry and on the general life of the communi its settlement, three weeks later, cost the Finnish economy de for a 10 per cent wage increase was conceded, and employ consequently had to be compensated by various economic co cessions, including a reduction in income tax. It was estimat that the total cost of the strike amounted to 13–14 milliard Fin mark, of which about 8 milliard represented loss in earnings a 5 milliard loss of export income.

But this was not the end of the country's difficulties. In t autumn the Government, in an effort to stabilize the positio reduced, and in some cases entirely abolished, subsidies on ce tain consumer goods. As the cost of living was thereby increas to a new high level and exceeded the limit on which the Mar agreement had been based, the unions demanded full compens

tion, a demand which was promptly rejected by the employers, whereupon the workers in December elected a committee with authority to demand full restitution. This is how the position stands today. It is hoped that both parties will in the end prove less obstinate and aid the Government in overcoming the serious economic crisis which threatens.

The general economic position, apart from that on the labour front, also gives rise to concern. Although world demand for some of Finland's main export goods, such as paper and cellulose, remained satisfactory during 1956, the demand for sawmill produce etc. declined. This seems partly to have been due to the persistent rumours of a possible devaluation of the Finnmark. At the same time increased production costs, due to the events of 1956 just related, rendered Finnish industry less able to compete with other overseas sellers, and the severe credit restrictions introduced by the Bank of Finland did not help. Nor did the fact that imports, according to statistics at present available, rose substantially, at least during the first nine months of 1956. In addition, Great Britain is Finland's best customer and any downward trend in the economic position of the United Kingdom would also have repercussions on Finnish economy.

EASTERN RELATIONS

While her internal position thus gives rise to some concern, Finland's foreign relations continue to be satisfactory. In fact, her relations with the Soviet Union have been steadily improving, especially since that day in September 1952 when her obligations under the peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. were declared settled in full. Since then Finland has joined the Nordic Council.

An event which caused particular satisfaction was the announcement, during a visit of President Paasikivi to Moscow in September 1955, that the Porkkala area would be returned to Finland.[1] On 26 January 1956 Finnish troops entered the evacuated territory and set up the Finnish flag. It stands to reason that an area used for military purposes by a foreign Power is not tended as well as would have been the case had the nation which owns it been responsible. It is estimated that it will take at least five years to clear up the district and put it in good order, bearing in mind

[1] On 19 September 1944, under her peace treaty with the U.S S R., Finland leased this territory to the Soviet Union for fifty years for the establishment of a naval base. In return the Russians renounced their right to the Hängö peninsula which they had leased under the peace treaty following the Winter War.

the neglected condition of agricultural land and rural drainag and the necessary rebuilding of houses and farm buildings. On th other hand, Porkkala has been returned to Finland thirty-eigh years before the date agreed upon in the peace treaty, and it is a area which used to be the market garden for the citizens of Hel sinki, also providing them with some 8 million litres of milk an 25,000 tons of fish a year. It is therefore well worth a special effor by Government and people alike to get it back into productior

One of the main difficulties in this task is that of resettlement The original inhabitants, mainly Swedish-speaking Finns, hav settled elsewhere, and not all are willing to give up their ne homes and start afresh in a devastated area unless the condition offered for doing so are more attractive than appears to be the cas at present. So far only between eight and nine hundred people ar again permanently living there, compared with a previous popula tion of some 7,000. In January 1957 the Government decided t grant modest loans to support agricultural rebuilding in th district. The houses built by the Russian army do not in any wa compare with the buildings the Finns are accustomed to, and in th Kirkkonummi district, for instance, all of them have been sold a public auction and realized only 250,000 Finnmark (£270). O the other hand, the naval station at Helsinki will, according t recent reports, be transferred to Porkkala, and there are som indications that the naval port and an underground power plan built there by the Russians, as well as a Russian cantonment o the island of Obbnäs, will be used by the Finnish defence forces

There are other signs that Finnish-Russian relations are th object of careful attention on both sides. An agreement of Octobe 1955 provides for a direct air service between the two capitals an permits the Finns to use their own planes, a most unusual con- cession; while another agreement, of December 1955, allows them to use a length of railway running through Ladogan Karelia, an- other territory ceded to the Russians, whose loss made necessary a large detour for all goods traffic. The Finnish Prime Minister visited Moscow in February 1957 at the invitation of the Russian Government, but no further Russian concessions have resulted from it.

Finland's foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the remainder of the world must, of course, be viewed against the background of her post- war political and economic situation; but, inevitably, it is especially affected by her relations with Russia. Nevertheless her Govern-


ıent manages to steer the country's policy in a manner which can-.ot be described as subservient to the Soviet Union. Thus Finland as sent a military contingent to join the United Nations Force in ›uez, and since her admission to membership of the United Iations in November 1955 she has played her part there with ignity. In an official policy statement last November the Foreign Minister, Mr Törngren, proclaimed Finland's continued inten-ion to remain outside any conflict of interest between the great 'owers. She would follow an independent and neutral foreign olicy and consider international problems impartially. Referring o events in Hungary, Mr Törngren said that Finland had been nable to associate herself with resolutions which could only have ggravated the conflict between the great Powers without advanc-ıg any peaceful solution of the Hungarian problem.

THE NEGLECTED NORTHLANDS

The last decade has seen great changes in the provinces of Oulu nd Lappi—the much-neglected northern half of Finland. Several easons account for this. First, extensive areas of this region had een laid waste by the retreating Germans in 1944 and the need for econstruction was urgent. Secondly, the cession to Russia of the 'etsamo corridor and the eastern halves of Salla and Kuusamo parishes as big as English counties) called for a resettlement pro-ramme in an area otherwise formally excluded from being re-arded as reception territories. Thirdly, the loss of resources in Karelia has implied a reassessment of those in the north. Fourthly, teadily improving communications have increased the region's ccessibility. Thus, airways now stretch north from Rovaniemi to valo, snow-ploughs keep open all the main highways for winter ›us communications, the State railways extend their network nore deeply into the north-eastern interior (e.g. Taivalkoski), orry roads open up new softwood country. Fifthly, new technical levices have given a new value to northern resources—for ex-mple, improvements in long-distance power transmission (a listance of six or seven hundred miles is now economically and echnically feasible), cheaper tunnelling methods in power-plant onstruction, rapid and efficient air survey and aero-prospecting. Rising softwood prices have also deepened the zone of profitable umbering.

The promotion of such developments must be backed by nechanical as well as human energy. Finland lacks both coal and

NORTHERN FINLAND



From map of Finland published by the Finnish Land Survey Office (Maanmittaushallitus)

oil. Coal has been imported in more recent years chiefly from Poland, and in the near future will come increasingly from the U.S.S.R., while oil too comes chiefly from the U.S.S.R. Finland therefore sets great store by her own moderate water-power re-

sources. Along the Oulu and Kemi rivers the two northernmost provinces possess the principal hydro-electric power potential of the country. The falls and rapids of Oulujoki have been almost completely built up since the war by the Imatra Voima Oy. (the State power company). Elaborate plans exist for Kemijoki and its tributaries, where a private company, the Pohjola Voima Oy., competes with State enterprise. Indeed, a veritable war of the rapids—*koskensota*—is waged over the purchase of power sites, rights of ownership, and priorities in development. Nowhere is this more evident than along the picturesque gorges of Kitkajoki (at Jyrvalä), Oulankojoki (at Kuitaköngas), and Kuusinkijoki (at Kuikankorva) which drain to the White Sea. The western boundary river, Torniojoki, calls for Swedo-Finnish collaboration. This battle for power also shows itself in another way. Is the energy to be used for promoting new local industries or for sustaining power-hungry industry in south Finland? Oulu is a city which successfully demonstrates a diversity of industry based upon local power—an electro-chemical plant (Typpi Oy.) has even been established there since the war. The proposed erection of a great softwood milling complex in the Röyttaa area of Tornio assumes abundant power on the one hand and on the other hand is conceived as a corrective to regional underdevelopment. Opponents of the scheme consider that investment in existing southern plants would be more economically rewarding.

The northern half of Finland has only one-eighth of the country's 4 million inhabitants; but it has a birth rate higher than most other parts. In its underdeveloped state, the territory has been one of seasonal and cyclical unemployment, underemployment, undernourishment, emigration, and frequent social discontent. It is hoped that the improvement of economic conditions will bring about a new social stability. Finland is anxious to increase the population of historic Pohjola ('the north country', as it is called in *Kalevala*) and to root its northern inhabitants in the soil. As with Norway and Sweden, Finland wishes to avoid a population vacuum in territories which march beside those of the U.S.S.R. To improve living conditions of the northern half means diverting substantial capital from the south. In the north men are not merely working with so much more land but with so much less money. Improvement takes place by direct investment (in widespread land reclamation and public works projects) and by indirect support (by means of favoured transport rates, pro-

portionately larger subsidies for agricultural products, family allowances, etc.). Such investment is often not economic, but it is regarded as one means of combating the left-wing political tendencies which are the legacy of a formerly depressed rural area. The Lutheran Church is also vigorous in communities where half of the inhabitants may incline to the Communist or near-Communist faith. From the high-pitched roofs of at least two of the splendid new churches, reconstructed by overseas gifts, the blue fells of the Karelian S.S.R. can be seen. This is indeed a countryside calling for worker priests.

The political frontiers of north Finland contrast strongly. Overgrown highways to the east die out at the barbed-wire boundary line: the impressive embankment which carries the Kelloselkä railway towards the Murmansk line has no traffic and no customs post. Only in one restricted area has there been intercourse—Jaänikoski, which was acquired by the U.S.S.R. from Finland in 1947. Finnish engineers contracted to harness the Rajakoski falls to meet the needs of the nickel-mining community in Russian Petsamo. To the west, by contrast, contact across Finland's Scandinavian boundary is lively. The number of motorable highways increases each year (e.g. the present opening up of the Utsjoki route) and Finland is seeking road contact along the west side of the Pasvik river to link the Inari district with East Finnmark. Such a highway could facilitate movement of high-latitude Finnish softwoods to an ocean outlet on Varanger fiord. The processing of softwoods before export from this area is under discussion, as is also a possible rail extension from Rovaniemi. Rail communication with Sweden is not practicable because of a break in gauge. It is a fact of incidental consequence that Arctic routeways also encourage an increasingly lucrative tourist trade.

There is no all-embracing North Finland Plan to compare with the North Norway Plan; but there is a widespread awareness of the need to integrate north and south Finland. This frontier land, where ice and snow prevail for six months, is one of relaxed social codes and tightened physical restraints, of considerable deficiencies (fruit and vegetables cost much more than in the south), of local surfeits (salmon, smoked reindeer, and cloudberries!), of centrifugal tendencies and strong local allegiances (underlined in such a poem as the *Song of Lapland*, by Uuno Kailas). Today, the votes of this problem area are a force to play with in the Finnish Diet. A hundred years ago, Zachris Topelius, professor of history,

writer of romances and fairy stories, and a founding father of Finland, wrote that 'The north intrudes everywhere, restrains us, tyrannises us; it is the principal fact in all our history.' Every year adds new overtones and undertones to his comment.

A. H. H.
W. R. M.

Politics in Japan

THE increasingly confused political situation in Japan has, at least temporarily, been stabilized by the choice of Mr Tanzan Ishibashi as President of the Liberal-Democratic Party in succession to Mr Hatoyama and by his subsequent automatic election by the Diet to the post of Prime Minister. Unfortunately the underlying causes of the confusion have by no means been eradicated. Of these by far the most important is the rampant factionalism prevailing in all Japanese political groupings, and most conspicuously within the ranks of the conservative Government party. The official unification over a year ago of the Liberal and Democratic Parties has done nothing to improve the situation; in fact, since that time conservative factionalism seems to have got more out of hand than ever, and recently it would appear that only fear of a Socialist Government has prevented an open split among the conservatives.

CONSERVATIVE FACTIONALISM

There are at present some half a dozen factions (*ha*) within the Liberal-Democratic Party (the Ishii faction, Ono faction, Kono faction, Ikeda faction, etc.), and almost every important political figure is associated with one of these groups. To add to the complication, some of the factions (the Kishi *ha* and Ishii *ha*, for instance) are themselves suffering from internal splits. As their names imply, the factions are essentially based on personal loyalties—the duty of the members to support the faction-leader in his struggle for power and the reciprocal duty of the leader to obtain desirable posts for as many of his followers as possible. There is very little in the way of consistent ideological differences, and nothing, for instance, corresponding to the Catholic issue

which serves to divide political groups in a country like Franc

By its nature, political factionalism is particularly blatant wh the time comes for filling party and Cabinet posts, and rece weeks have witnessed an unashamed scramble for power among t different conservative groups. The three-cornered race betwe Mr Shinsuke Kishi, Mr Mitsujirō Ishii, and Mr Tanzan Ishibas for the post of Party President had been continuing for sor months with increasing heat, but its final solution was surprising calm. On 15 December a full convention of the Liberal-Dem cratic Diet members in an unprecedented move chose their ne President by an open vote instead of by the traditional method giving formal approval to a candidate already selected behind tl scenes by party leaders. The vote was a very close one, M Ishibashi defeating Mr Kishi by 258 votes to 251 on the secor ballot. On the first ballot Mr Kishi had received the largest numb of votes, but subsequently Mr Ishii switched his support to M Ishibashi, thus giving him the necessary majority.

In this lay the seeds of future difficulties and factional strif The Ishii faction immediately insisted on their share of Cabin seats for having given Mr Ishibashi his majority; then, havir failed to receive what he thought to be his due, Mr Ishii refused t join the new Cabinet. For his part, Mr Kishi claimed half of th sixteen Cabinet seats for his faction on the ground that the votir had virtually resulted in a draw. On being offered four Cabin seats, including that of Foreign Minister for himself, Mr Kisl at first declared that none of the members of his faction woul join the Cabinet unless more than five posts were offered to them In addition, Mr Ishibashi was faced with the question of giving du consideration to the Ono, Miki, and Ikeda factions, all of whor had helped bring about his victory.

At the time of his election Mr Ishibashi boldly declared. ' shall use the proper men in the proper places, be fair in handlin questions of personnel, and dissolve the factions. Also the selectio of party leaders and Cabinet members will be based on th principle; the question of who belongs to what faction, or wh played what role in the election of the party president, shall b given no consideration whatsoever.'[2] These were fine sentiments but if Mr Ishibashi had in fact based his appointments to part

[1] As the *Japan Times* leader remarked (24 December), 'Political experts ar naturally reminded of pre-war days when the armed forces could torped Cabinet-formation plans at any time by refusing to accept a Cabinet post.'

[2] Quoted in *Asahi Evening News*, 28 December 1956.

ınd Cabinet posts purely on merit and overlooked the demands of he various factions, it is doubtful, given the realities of Japanese olitics, whether he could have maintained the slightest harmony vithin the party; with all the powerful factions against him, his lays as President would have been strictly numbered. In the event, Mr Ishibashi was obliged, after several days of hard bargaining vith the different groups, to appoint a 'coalition of factions Cabinet', which is generally regarded as having a makeshift ıature. The balance of power seems to have changed, in that the Kono-Kishi factions, which were dominant in the Hatoyama ıdministration, have largely lost place to the Miki-Ikeda factions; ret the system remains much the same—the Government consists of an uneasy alliance of cliques, each struggling to increase its own nfluence and exploiting every national and international issue for his aim.

The main dangers of this faction-system (for the continuance of which it would of course be grossly unfair to blame Mr Ishibashi ıimself) appear to be twofold. First, there is the crippling effect vhich it has on the formation and implementation of Government olicy. In recent months this has been seen most dramatically in he conduct of the negotiations with the Soviet Union,[1] when not nly was the Foreign Minister at loggerheads with his own Government, but the Government party itself was hopelessly split as to he proper course to pursue. When an agreement was signed with he Soviet Union, and as a result Japan was finally admitted to the Jnited Nations in December, the dominant (Kono) faction of the Hatoyama Government did its best to present this as a diplomatic riumph. The fact was, however, that Japan could in all likelihood ıave obtained an agreement with Russia on substantially better erms more than a year ago during the negotiations in London. To ıave allowed the Soviet talks to become a leading issue in domestic actional politics was to weaken Japan's already poor bargaining osition *vis-à-vis* Russia. The only recent issue on which the conservatives have been aggressively united has been the extension of he Strike Control Law; and the manner in which the factions combined to force through this particular measure against strong Socialist opposition was not one that redounds especially to the credit of the Liberal-Democratic Party.

Having established relations with the Soviet Union and having

[1] See 'Japan and the Moscow Negotiations with the Soviet Union', in *The World Today*, November 1956.

at last achieved her ambition of being admitted to the Unite Nations, Japan now enjoys the best opportunity she has had fo many years of playing a constructive part in world affairs. Con tinuance of factional strife within the Government party, howeve may well prove to be a fatal hindrance. The main foreign polic issue confronting the Government is undoubtedly that of ex panding trade with China and the related problem of adjustin relations with the United States. Mr Ishibashi has for lon favoured an expansion of the China trade and a more independen foreign policy. His Foreign Minister, Mr Kishi, however, is con sidered to be wholly pro-American and by no means anxious t press for a relaxation of the trade restrictions imposed by the Co ordinating Committee of the United States, Great Britain, an France (COCOM) or for a revision of the U.S.-Japan Securit Treaty.

The most pressing domestic issue is that of the Budget for th next fiscal year. Here, as well as in the more important long-term problem of unemployment, it may be wondered to what extent Mr Ishibashi, with his 'expansionist' views on economic policy, will see eye to eye with his Finance Minister, Mr Hayato Ideka, who is known for his strong belief in tight money and a balanced Budget. In fine, it would appear that Mr Ishibashi's new Cabinet, like its predecessor, is a delicately balanced coalition of competing factions, rather than a group of men picked for their special abilities and firmly united behind the Prime Minister and his policies. It remains to be seen whether Mr Ishibashi will be able to break through the surrounding factionalism to implement constructive domestic and foreign policies.

The second danger of the faction-system is in the long run probably even more serious: namely, that growing popular disillusionment regarding the present system of party government will, as before the war, contribute to the gradual decline of parliamentary democracy as a whole and to the assumption of power by some group or groups who claim to offer a more efficient, honest, and patriotic type of leadership. Scepticism concerning the Diet and politicians in general has steadily increased during the past years. Each week brings reports of fresh scandals involving greater or lesser sums of money, and it is widely believed that almost every person in public life, from the Cabinet Minister downwards, is to some degree corrupt, and as a corollary that virtually every public post is for sale. It is not necessary here to examine to what extent

ıis belief may be justified; the important thing is that it is held by ɔ many people and that it naturally plays into the hands of ex-remists at both ends of the political spectrum. An important ason for the genuine popular acclaim over Mr Ishibashi's lection was that he has the reputation of being one of the few ntirely honest politicians in the country. A second reason un-oubtedly is that he is not specifically associated with any of the liques. He is believed to be independent and to have the courage f his convictions; people remember how, as Finance Minister in ıe post-war Yoshida Cabinet, he stood up to the Occupation uthorities and as a consequence was purged from public life. dded to all this is the fact that Mr Ishibashi is the only Japanese rime Minister in recent decades credited with a good grasp of conomics.

The initial enthusiasm about the orderly manner in which Mr shibashi was chosen and about the nature of the choice itself as rapidly followed by dismay when immediately thereafter ıe unseemly scramble started among the various factions for posts ı the party and the Cabinet, and when it became clear that Mr shibashi, despite all his qualities and his resolutions, was by and ırge obliged to bow to the system of distributing Cabinet posts in ccordance with factional strength. Thus one commentator wrote, The formation of this Cabinet was a disgraceful performance ... nd it further deepened and widened the public feeling of con-mpt and disgust in regard to the political leaders of the nation... f the selection of party leaders and Cabinet ministers was the first al test of Prime Minister Ishibashi, then he has failed already.'[1]

This widespread sense of disillusionment has already led to equent demands that Mr Ishibashi should immediately dissolve ıe Diet and put his new Government to the test of a general lection. This is felt to be necessary on the grounds of con-titutional principle, in that no elections were held either at the me of the unification of the Liberal and Democratic Parties or hen Mr Hatoyama formed his third Cabinet in November 1955. t is also suggested that successful elections would give Mr shibashi a chance of winning real control of his party. Almost o per cent of the people who replied to a recent (22–23 December) ublic opinion poll held by the *Asahi Shimbun* were in favour of a rompt dissolution of the Diet. Even leading business men (though sually opposed to elections, which represent a considerable ex-

[1] Hideo Nomura in the *Asahi Evening News*, 28 December 1956.

pense for them in campaign funds) are reported now, in the light of the ever-increasing conservative factional struggles, to be in favour of dissolving the Diet at an early opportunity. But it would appear doubtful, so long as the present faction-system persists, whether even the most successful elections would greatly improve the situation within the Government party. Mr Ishibashi himself is reported to be opposed to early elections, but it is nevertheless widely felt that he will be obliged to call a dissolution within the next few months. Should elections be held in the near future, the recent scramble for power among the conservative factions will undoubtedly influence some of the floating vote. 'One thing is certain,' writes the *Japan Times* (24 December), 'and that is that the Liberal-Democrats have given themselves a black eye in the estimation of the people by their disgraceful bickering over Cabinet posts. They have cancelled out the good impression they gave at their party convention, and they have left the ugliness of their greed and selfishness. And they are by such actions digging their own graves while their political opponents in the Socialist camp are making gains at the expense of the conservative blunders.'

SOCIALIST PROSPECTS

The Socialist Party at present has 151 seats out of 467 in the Lower House and 81 out of 250 in the Upper House, a sufficient number to block any attempts at constitutional amendment, but not to prevent the conservatives from forcing through legislation, such as the extension of the Strike Control Law. The Socialists now advocate a speedy dissolution of the Diet, no doubt in the hope of profiting from popular discontent over the prolonged conservative wrangling. But the public opinion poll held by the *Asahi Shimbun* just before the formation of Mr Ishibashi's Cabinet indicates only 28 per cent of the people as backing the Socialist Party, compared with 30 per cent last August, the corresponding figures for the Liberal-Democratic Party being 36 per cent and 33 per cent.[1]

Despite the unexpectedly good results obtained by the Socialist Party in the Upper House elections last July, and despite the recent amalgamation of the Labour-Farmer Party, even the most sanguine Japanese Socialist can hardly be confident that his party will assume power in the near future. There are many reasons for

[1] A Kyōdō News Service poll held at the beginning of December showed a similar drop in support for the Socialists since last spring

the continued relative weakness of the Socialist Party and only a few of these will be suggested here. First, the Socialists, despite their official unification in October 1955,[1] continue to suffer from the same besetting ill that afflicts the conservatives, namely factionalism. In addition to the main faction headed by Mr Mosaburō Suzuki, there is a faction under Mr Suehiro Nishio on the right, factions under Mr Jiichirō Matsumoto and Mr Hiroo Wada on the left, and a middle-of-the-road faction under Mr Jōtarō Kawakami, the former chairman of the Right-wing Socialist Party. In the Socialist Party there is a far stronger ideological basis for these divisions than in the case of the conservatives, but the debilitating effect of the constant factional struggle for leadership is much the same.

A greater weakness, however, lies in the fact that Socialist strength still depends so largely on its association with the trade-union movement. For instance, of the forty-nine Socialists who were successful in the July elections, thirty-four were former members of the Sōhyō labour federation. A comparative study of the party's voting strength indicates to what extent the Socialists have until now relied on the hard core of the trade-union vote in the cities. Not only have they failed to penetrate effectively the all-important agrarian constituencies, but there are large sections in the city population, particularly small private shopkeepers and employees of medium and small enterprises, who tend to vote heavily for the conservatives. Although the Socialists are still far from obtaining a full trade-union vote, it is generally felt that however much they succeed in extending their support among urban workers, they will not thereby obtain a Diet majority. In other words, if the Socialists are to form a Government, it is essential that they win the support of a much wider cross-section of the population. Accordingly, in drafting its policies for 1957, the Party's Central Executive Committee stipulated that, in view of the past over-reliance on trade unions, they would in future separate their activities from those of Sōhyō, eliminate the trend to the left, and expand the scope of supporting elements, including fishermen and small business groups. With this aim in view, they have announced a large-scale national movement, designed to appeal to all except 'right-wing elements', to abrogate 'unequal treaties centring on the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Pact' on the basis of four important objects—protection of the 'peace' Constitution, objection

[1] See *The World Today*, November 1955, pp. 458–60.

to military bases, return of Okinawa, and establishment of normal relations with Communist China. It seems doubtful, however, whether slogans of this type are likely to help the Socialists in their penetration of traditionally conservative agrarian constituencies.

Yet perhaps the most important factor preventing any significant increase in the anti-conservative vote is Japan's relative prosperity. Economically 1956 has been the best post-war year, with a rice harvest second only to the previous year's record, steadily increasing production in almost every field, expanding exports, and a noticeably rising standard of living for all except the least favoured elements of the population, such as Hokkaido farmers, disabled war veterans and their families, and unemployed university graduates. Under such circumstances it is inevitably difficult for the Socialists to persuade the voters that the conservatives are leading the country to ruin, or that the close alliance with the United States is completely opposed to Japan's best interests. Any serious deterioration in economic conditions, particularly in the unemployment situation (which, with the still rapidly increasing population, remains potentially the most menacing), could well bring about a swing of votes away from the conservatives, unless the latter proved able to tackle the problem equitably and efficiently. The danger in Japan, however, is that economic crisis, rather than playing into the hands of the Socialists, would be far more likely to bring about a swing away from the parliamentary system itself, whose roots are still so shallow and whose prestige still so slight, this in turn would pave the way for the emergence of extreme groups on one side or the other.

THE COMMUNISTS AND THE EXTREME RIGHT WING

These extremes are at present too weak to pose any immediate threat. Although Communist Party membership is reputed to have risen during the past year to a figure of 125,000, of whom some 30 per cent are trade unionists, the party has in other ways been passing through a bad period; and if general elections are held in the next few months, it is extremely doubtful whether the Communists will add to their present exiguous representation of two seats in the Lower House. During the past few months there have been many embarrassing revelations of discord within the party, notably in connection with the expulsion last September of one of the leaders, Mr Shigeo Shida, on grounds of 'shameless debauchery', and the dismissal in November from the Central

Committee of Mr Etsurō Shiino, a veteran party leader, on charges of immorality. Various corrupt business activities conducted on a fairly large scale by the Japanese Communist Party have also been brought to light. In the international field, the tough Russian stand during the recent peace talks, and especially the cynical manner in which the Soviet Union exploited its continued detention of Japanese prisoners-of-war as a bargaining point in the negotiations, have not added to the popularity of the party.

Far more damaging than any of this, however, has been the Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolt. There is evidence of considerable confusion and disunity within the Japanese Communist Party itself regarding the Soviet Army's suppression of the Hungarians following the 'peace line' propaganda, and although no Japanese Jean-Paul Sartre has yet appeared, the recent Russian action has certainly opened the eyes of large numbers of people in the country, especially among the younger generation, who might otherwise have been responsive to Communist blandishments. Whether the Soviet intervention will, as some observers have suggested, result in swinging the balance for the Japanese Communists, who have for so long vacillated between Moscow and Peking for their leadership and guidance, remains to be seen. Yet, so far as winning mass support and implementing the united-front policy are concerned, the Hungarian bloodshed has done the Japanese Communists as much harm as anything that has happened in recent years.

At the other extreme, ultra-nationalist groups have recently come into the limelight as a result of their organized and vociferous opposition to the ratification of the joint Japan-Soviet declaration. The most serious anti-Soviet demonstration since the end of the war took place in November when a group of about three hundred men representing various rightist organizations broke into the compound of the Soviet Fisheries Mission in Tokyo, stoned the building, and subsequently engaged in violent encounters with the police. There have been numerous similar instances on a smaller scale during the past months. It is clear that the ultra-rightist leaders, especially those associated with the Kyūkoku Kokumin Undō ('National Salvation Movement'), were using opposition to the Soviet negotiations to test their strength and to advance the unified right-wing front, for which they have been working since 1953. Apart from their anti-Communist activities, rightist organizations have concentrated on attacking political corruption

and parliamentary confusion. As before the war, this is a leading theme in their propaganda; it also extends to action, as when ultra-rightist groups picketed the recent Liberal-Democratic convention with flags bearing slogans against 'corrupt politicians' and even tried to break into the auditorium.

According to a recent police survey, there are at present about 1,000 rightist organizations, with a total membership of about 100,000. Of this number more than 600 are listed as 'dangerous' and about thirty groups are under special surveillance. Yet, despite their growing membership and their recent increase in activities, the fact remains that the ultra-rightists are still hopelessly split among themselves with regard to aims, methods, and leadership, and have so far failed to obtain any real popular support. It is only in the context of a definite weakening of the present parliamentary system that they would be likely to exert effective influence as part of a general trend towards authoritarianism; in this connection it must always be remembered that the right-wing groups are, on the whole, in a far stronger position to exploit growing nationalist sentiments than are their rivals on the extreme left.

For the time being, then, the chances are that the Liberal-Democratic Party will remain in power, though with increasingly effective opposition from the Socialists. Much depends on the extent to which Mr Ishibashi is able to break through the deeply imbedded faction-system in his party and to implement his New Year pledge to establish a system of good government in which the nation's trust in politics and administration will be enhanced. In recent months conservative politics appear to have reached a post-war nadir and it will be regrettable indeed if factionalism is allowed to continue rampant during the coming year. For what is at stake here is not simply Mr Ishibashi's own career as Prime Minister, nor even the preservation of a Liberal-Democratic Government, but popular faith in the system of parliamentary democracy itself.

I. I. M.

THE WORLD TODAY

***Volume* 13 *No.* 4 *April* 1957**

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Notes of the Month

The Cyprus Deadlock

AFTER many months of deadlock in the Cyprus dispute, a series of new initiatives in the last few weeks produced a flurry of expectation that something more promising was about to happen—though there was still no more than a narrow margin between realization of these hopes and a fresh renewal of deadlock. First, on 22 February, the Political Committee of the United Nations voted by 76 votes (including those of Britain, Turkey, and Greece) to none (with Afghanistan and Panama abstaining) in favour of a resolution proposed by the Indian delegate, Mr Krishna Menon, calling for 'a peaceful, democratic, and just solution' and urging that negotiations should be 'resumed and continued to that end'. (The Greek interpretation of these words was that negotiations should take place between Britain and the Cypriots, particularly Archbishop Makarios; but the British and Turkish interpretation was that they should take place between the British, Turkish, and Greek Governments.) Three weeks later, on 14 March, came the second new initiative: the Cypriot-Greek rebel organization, E.O.K.A., issued a leaflet offering to order a 'suspension of operations' as soon as Archbishop Makarios were released, so that he could take part in resumed negotiations. The text was carefully worded and related to the U.N. resolution of 22 February. It was obviously approved, and probably inspired, by the Greek Government, whose interpretation of the resolution it followed.

The British Government's reaction to this offer, after the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, had returned to London for consultation, was the third of the new initiatives, and contained the first official reference to the fourth—an offer of mediation by the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Council. The announcement made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Lennox-Boyd, in the House of Commons on 20 March contained two separate points. The first was to report the offer from the North Atlantic Council, the political organ of N.A.T.O., which

H.M. Government had decided to accept. The second was to 'note' the declaration of E.O.K.A. made the previous week and to indicate that Archbishop Makarios would be released from the Seychelles (but not 'at this stage' allowed to return to Cyprus) if he would make a public statement calling for the cessation of violence by E.O.K.A.

The offer of N.A.T.O. mediation was at once rejected by the Greek Government—though a few days later came hints both from Athens and from the Seychelles that the door was not so absolutely closed as it appeared to be. On the issue of the Archbishop, the gap between the British and the Cypriot-Greek positions was at least much narrower than ever before. The terms offered by E.O.K.A. did not include the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus, though they did make clear the intention that he should participate in negotiations. The latter intention was ignored in the British Government's reply to the offer; and presumably both the British and the Greek Governments assumed that the Archbishop would necessarily be excluded from any discussions conducted under the auspices of N.A.T.O., which would take place between the three Governments concerned (British, Turkish, and Greek) as members of N.A.T.O.

Although, therefore, the campaign of violence in Cyprus appeared to have been reduced to a low level by the success of security measures since November last, a political settlement appeared to be no nearer than before. This is in fact hardly surprising, for what has to be recognized about the Cyprus dispute is that there can be no satisfactory solution to it at all in the ordinary sense of the words—that is to say, a settlement reached by mutual persuasion and reasonableness. The essential reason why this is so is because the Turks will never willingly accept any arrangement which admits the eventual possibility of *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) and the Greeks will never willingly accept one which excludes it. ('Self-determination' has lately become an ambiguous word to use in this context, because H.M. Government, having explicitly conceded the principle of self-determination for Cyprus last summer, has since explained that the principle may be separately applied to the Greek and Turkish populations, and thus lead to partition.) The only participant to the dispute which has retreated at all from the positions of principle taken up in 1954–5 is the British Government, and that only under the pressure of events. Either the Greek or the Turkish Government will have

also to retreat before the dispute can be declared settled, and neither is likely to be persuaded to do so by the mere exercise of reason. A compromise between the positions of principle defined above is clearly a logical impossibility.

'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia?

MR SASTROAMIDJOJO has again been ousted from the premiership of Indonesia by the Army. His second Cabinet, formed in March 1956 after the results of the 1955 General Election had finally been compiled, was a coalition of three of the four major parties—the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.), Nahdatul Ulama, and Masjumi—together with some minor parties. The Communists had to be left out, although his original intention had been to bring them in as well. The idea of a Cabinet of 'national unity' was espoused by President Sukarno, who took it still further after his tour of several Communist countries. In October the President voiced his desire 'to bury all the present political parties', and expressed his preference for 'guided democracy'. At the same time, a rift appeared between him and Vice-President Hatta, who resigned his office; and there were reports of an attempted Army coup d'état led by the former deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Lubis This was followed in December by a coup in north and central Sumatra led by the Army commander, Colonel Simbolon, who repudiated the Sastroamidjojo Government while maintaining his allegiance to President Sukarno and urging reconciliation with Dr Hatta.

These dissensions were reflected in the Cabinet, where the Masjumi and two of the minor parties began to urge that the Government should resign in favour of a Cabinet headed by Dr Hatta. Failing to persuade the other parties in the coalition, the Masjumi and its allies withdrew from the Cabinet in January. Although the Government retained a majority, its authority was severely shaken by this second blow, all the more because the seceding parties had strong support in the outer islands.

At this juncture President Sukarno began to ventilate his new 'conception' of a 'Revolutionary Council', with himself as chairman, to which the Cabinet would be responsible. It transpired subsequently that the Presidential 'conception' consisted in the creation of an all-party Cabinet which would eliminate the Opposition and include the Communists both in the Government and in a 'National Council' which was to 'advise' the Cabinet.

From the viewpoint of the P.K.I. (the Communist Party) this 'conception' was immaculate, and the P.N.I. also approved it; but it encountered strong opposition from the Masjumi and its allies. After some hesitation, the Nahdatul Ulama, which held the balance of power in Parliament, also came down against the President's proposal; and Dr Hatta added his criticism of Communist participation in the Government.

While the P.K.I. demonstrated in Djakarta in favour of the President's scheme, the military commander of East Indonesia, Lieut.-Colonel Sumual, followed the example of his colleagues in central Sumatra and on 4 March declared against the Government, urging reconciliation between President Sukarno and Dr Hatta. Similar action was taken in quick succession by the military commanders of south Sumatra and Kalimantan on 9 and 11 March, leaving the Sastroamidjojo Government in control of little more than the island of Java. The Government could hold on no longer, and resigned on 13 March.

President Sukarno promptly proclaimed martial law, and asked Mr Suwirjo, another P.N.I. leader, to try to form a Cabinet. Mr Suwirjo's first attempt—to form a Government without either the P.K.I. or the Masjumi—foundered on the objection of the Nahdatul Ulama to joining a Government without the Masjumi, which was the strongest party in the outer islands, and on the objection of both parties to coalition with the Communists; whereas the P.N.I., following the President's lead, declined to accept the Masjumi without the P.K.I.

The roots of the crisis lie in dissatisfaction with the prevailing administrative bureaucracy, inefficiency, and corruption, and in disappointment with the functioning of a political regime based on an over-centralized Constitution and an inappropriate electoral system. From these stem discontent with the lack of economic betterment and a desire for more local autonomy, due to resentment against the Javanese and a feeling that the outer islands contribute more to the national economy than they receive in return.

Broadly, the political alignment of the major parties is, on the one side, the P.N.I. and the P.K.I. supporting President Sukarno in his proposal to substitute 'guided democracy' for parliamentary democracy; on the other, the Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama rejecting collaboration with the Communists and advocating a policy of reform under the leadership of Dr Hatta. While the mass

appeal of the President is still unrivalled throughout the country, Dr Hatta has great personal prestige particularly in the outer islands. In this situation, the Army holds the balance. The dissident commanders have professed their loyalty to President Sukarno, but at the same time they have evinced their support for Dr Hatta. That they would prefer not to have to choose is shown by their repeated urgings for a reconciliation between the two. But if they were obliged to choose, President Sukarno might also be confronted with a choice—between the Army and the P.K.I.; and that is a cogent argument for compromise.

Soviet Troops in Eastern Europe

DURING the last few months delegations from all the satellite States except Albania, led by the highest Government and Party officials, have paid visits to Moscow. In all cases the presence of Soviet troops in the territories of the U.S.S.R.'s allies was mentioned either directly or by implication. In view of the appeal for disarmament and the condemnation of N.A.T.O. and American bases which formed a feature of all the declarations, it was considered necessary to justify the existence of Soviet bases on foreign territory. The usual formula was that they were essential because of the existence of an aggressive military bloc in Western Europe, and particularly because of the remilitarization of Germany and the existence of N.A.T.O. bases. Since the publication of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the aggressive designs of the United States have been particularly emphasized in all Soviet propaganda. In each case care was taken to underline the essentially peaceful and defensive nature of the Warsaw Pact and (even after the events in Hungary) the equality of its members, their respect for each other's sovereignty, and their non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Treaties were concluded with Poland (on 17 December 1956) and with Eastern Germany (on 13 February 1957) concerning the legal status of Soviet troops in those countries. Both agreements start with a preamble to the effect that the temporary presence of Soviet troops does not impair the sovereignty of the country and cannot lead to interference in its internal affairs. However in the next clause there is a significant divergence between the two texts. In Poland the size of the Soviet contingent is regulated by a special agreement between the two Governments, and the movements of Soviet troops for training and other purposes require the

permission of the competent Polish authorities. The German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, is merely promised consultation on the size of Soviet contingents, while the places for their manœuvres outside the bases are to be 'agreed' with the German authorities. Even more significant is Clause 5 of the Soviet-Polish agreement, according to which:

> The procedure for entry into Poland and exit from Poland of Soviet military units as well as of persons serving with the Soviet troops . . . questions connected with their stay on the territory of the Polish People's Republic, and the types of appropriate documents shall be determined by special agreement between the Contracting Parties.

There is nothing in the German-Soviet agreement which would give the East German Republic power to object to or in any way control the entry of people or units stationed on her territory.

The next clause is also more favourable for Poland than for Eastern Germany. In the former case it provides for consultation and agreement on the use of installations by Soviet troops; in the latter it merely mentions that all installations used at present will continue to be at the disposal of Soviet forces. The clauses dealing with the legal position of Soviet troops are similar in both cases. In general those troops are subject to the law of the country in which they are stationed except in cases of crimes committed by them against the Soviet Union, or in the execution of their duty, when Soviet law is to be applied. A clause on payment for transit and internal troop transport is included in the Polish but not in the East German agreement. One significant clause (No. 18) present only in the East German agreement reads:

> In case of a threat to the safety of Soviet troops on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, the Headquarters of the Soviet troops in the G.D R. is empowered to take measures to eliminate this threat, with appropriate consultation with the Government of the G.D.R. and taking into consideration the relevant conditions and measures taken by the Government of the G.D R.

The Hungarian delegation which left for Moscow on 19 March might, it was believed, also bring back an agreement about Soviet troops in that country, whose presence there had constituted one of the major grievances of the October rising.

Czechoslovakia and the East European Ferment

THERE may have been many, both in East and West, who looked for a more positive Czechoslovak reaction to events in Poland and Hungary than the solidly pro-Soviet line which has in fact been followed in Prague, and which successfully blotted out all manifestations of the true sympathies of the Czech and Slovak people. The fact remains that, while revolt blazed in Hungary and reform made its way in Poland, the U.S.S.R. was able to rely on the Czechoslovak Communists to keep their country in line. They even went so far as to move troops to the Hungarian border immediately after the first outbreaks in Budapest, thus fulfilling the twofold purpose of sealing off the frontier and making a threatening gesture directed against the Hungarian revolutionaries.

Czechoslovakia is the geographical link between Poland and Hungary. It can be argued that a revolt there might have driven Gomulka's experiment far beyond its intended scope. It would have given the Hungarians a better chance of success, and it could have touched off a really effective East European challenge to Soviet control. Faced by a rebellious front of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians, ranged from the Baltic to the Yugoslav frontier, the Soviet Army would have had a most formidable task in reasserting its hegemony in that area, and the West might have found it more difficult to remain inactive. On the other hand, the result might well have been an ineffectual bloodbath on a scale far exceeding that of the Hungarian rising.

The absence of an adequate response to the crisis was due to a number of objective causes which, while they created conditions favourable to an outbreak both in Poland and in Hungary, served to prevent it in Czechoslovakia. In times of emotional stress there is a tendency on the part of outside observers either to ascribe their own emotions to the people concerned or to go to the other extreme of overestimating the significance of purely material factors such as economic hardship. It is nevertheless a fact that men who are hungry and who have difficulty in providing for their families are more likely to demonstrate in the streets than those who enjoy at least a measure of economic security. Life in Czechoslovakia is certainly drab, but by comparison with conditions in both Poland and Hungary the standard of living is almost luxuri-

ous. The Czechoslovak economy has always been much mor advanced than that of its fellow satellites, and the long-standin traditions of an industrial community served to preserve thi superiority despite bureaucratic mismanagement, which has bee the bane of all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Ther is enough food, and a working-class family where both husban and wife go out to work can manage tolerably well. On the othe hand, both in Poland and in Hungary it was much more difficul to earn enough to keep going, and it is significant that the first cr on the lips of the Poznan demonstrators was a demand for bread It is worth recalling that in the summer of 1953 Czechoslovaki also had an outbreak of demonstrations by industrial workers notably in the former Škoda works in Plzeň, and that the immed diate cause then was a particularly stringent currency reforn which deprived them of the bulk of their savings.

Intellectual ferment preceded the decisive developments botl in Warsaw and Budapest, but the movements assumed a funda mentally national and revolutionary character only after they ha gained the support of the industrial workers and the army. I Warsaw Gomulka's tower of strength was in the industrial suburbs and he was successful only because he had skilfully placed hi supporters in key positions in the armed forces, including th military police formations. In Budapest a student demonstratio grew into a national revolt only after the workers and soldiers ha joined in. In Czechoslovakia, too, the Twentieth Congress of th Soviet Communist Party was followed by a great deal of unres among students and intellectuals,[1] but the authorities kept thi tendency under close control and never allowed it to get out o hand.

There was, moreover, no one in Czechoslovakia who could have bridged the gap between the intellectuals and the urban proletariat as Gomulka did in Poland. Czechoslovakia even lacked any figure whose personality could have provided a rallying point for dissident forces, like Nagy in Hungary. It is extremely doubtful if a bourgeois politician of pre-1948 vintage, even if such men were still to be found at liberty in Prague, could appeal to the Czech industrial workers today with any prospect of success. There is no popular opposition leader—he would have to be a socialist or even a 'national' Communist—and the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, consisting of a particularly uninspiring lot of

[1] See 'Caution in Prague', in *The World Today*, August 1956.

uppets, never produced an individual big enough to stand comarison with a man of Gomulka's toughness of character and olitical skill. In Slovakia, a Catholic opposition might be able to raw on some support among the peasantry, but the really imortant political positions are in the industrial centres of the ohemian Provinces. Slánský, whose name is often coupled with ıch so-called opposition Communists as Gomulka or Kostov ıerely because he fell victim to a Stalinist purge, could never have ıpired to national leadership, and would probably have had no esire to play such a part, as he was one of the most loyal instruıents of Moscow's policy in Eastern Europe. Dr Clementis, who as executed with him and who was accused of 'bourgeois naonalistic tendencies', enjoyed only local support in Slovakia. The ıtal absence of a leader who would have been able to put himself the head of a movement for greater Czechoslovak independence st autumn was an insurmountable obstacle to any large-scale ction on the part of those who would have been prepared to ıoulder the risks of an anti-Soviet mutiny. This was the main ıfference between conditions in Czechoslovakia on the one hand ıd Poland and Hungary on the other, and both the potential ppositionists and the leaders of the Prague regime were well ware of it.

In assessing the political attitudes of East Europeans it is necesıry to bear constantly in mind their unhappy position between the vo millstones of German expansionism and Soviet imperialism. ı the case of Hungary, a non-Slav people, this factor has exerted ss influence, but even in Poland, with its age-old anti-Russian adition, it constantly presents all politically minded people with a ıoice of two evils. Undoubtedly this consideration helped to keep ıe Polish revolution on the rails, at least from Moscow's point of ıew, for the U.S.S.R. is the only great Power which has recognizd the Oder-Neisse frontier. The Czechs, too, regard the U.S.S.R. s their sole protector against a resurgent Germany, for they annot forget that the Western Powers once before failed to safeuard Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Every Czech, gardless of his political views, would think twice before severing l ties with the U.S.S.R. and gambling his country's future on the ıance that a renewed German *Drang nach Osten* would be conıned by the West. The memory of Munich has become part of ıe national subconscious, and it has always been one of the most owerful weapons in the Communist arsenal of anti-Western

propaganda. Munich was a national disaster of exceptional magnitude, not least in its psychological effect on a people who had been keyed up to fight for its existence only to allow its morale to be deflated like a punctured balloon. The damage done then needed decades to be made good, and the generations raised during the Nazi Protectorate and under Communist rule could hardly be expected to achieve this task. This intangible effect of the Munich affair must also have affected the Czechoslovak attitude during the recent crisis.

There is also the historic factor of the attitude adopted by the various peoples of Eastern Europe towards the Russians. In Poland Panslavism has never been much more than an empty phrase, and Polish-Russian relations are based on centuries of oppression and contempt. In Hungary, too, the legacy of the Russian intervention on behalf of the Habsburgs in 1849 is very much alive. It would be unfair to blame the U.S.S.R. for the misdeeds of the Tsars, and unnecessary, too, in view of the excesses which accompanied 'liberation' by the Soviet Army during the last war. However, the dislike of Russia in Poland and Hungary is of much longer standing than in Czechoslovakia, where people's experiences with the big Slav brother are comparatively recent. It would seem that both the Poles and the Hungarians would be much more eager than the Czechoslovaks to seize the opportunity for any action directed against Russia.

Despite these circumstances, it is a fact that there was some response in Czechoslovakia to events in Hungary. At the beginning of March the Czechoslovak press reported the trial of a group of hitherto unknown individuals, accused of having prepared a demonstration in Prague on 28 October, the old Czechoslovak independence day, and of sending a letter to the United Nations in protest against the suppression of personal freedom in Czechoslovakia. The effects of the Soviet action in Hungary and of the initial successes of the Hungarian insurgents certainly worried the Czechoslovak regime. From the very beginning both press and radio took up what can only be described as a Stalinist position, and long before the final Soviet attack on Budapest *Rudé Právo*, the Czechoslovak Communist daily, accused Nagy of 'threatening the building of socialism and undermining working class unity' [1] The official Czechoslovak attitude to Hungary is perhaps best illustrated by a cartoon which appeared in the Prague satirical

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 31 October 1956

eekly *Dikobraz* on 15 November 1956. It shows a sad-faced Hun-ırian gipsy orchestra, consisting of a landowner acting as fiddler, ith a dollar note stuck to his forehead, a top-hatted capitalist ɔlding a double bass with its strings broken, and a sinister-looking iest in cassock and biretta playing the cembalo. The caption ads: 'Their song has ended.'

Rudé Právo was on its toes to point out Czechoslovakia's posi-ɔn in relation to Germany,[1] and on 3 November, the day before e final onslaught against the Nagy Government, President ápotocký thought it advisable to make a nation-wide broadcast nouncing the 'white terror' in Hungary. He recounted some of e alleged benefits bestowed on the Czechoslovak people by his gime and warned against 'reactionary gangs' who had sent spies ıd saboteurs to Czechoslovakia. 'We shall not allow anyone to reaten our socialist system,' he said '. . . We are not such fools to give democratic rights to hostile elements.' It is not by ıance that the number of spy trials and reports of arrests of leged Western agents in Czechoslovakia has gone up to a remark-ıle degree since last October.

Of all the Soviet satellite Governments that of Czechoslovakia as quickest to proclaim and demonstrate its support for Kádár. n 15 November a Czechoslovak delegation, headed by Premier roký, went to Budapest, and a communiqué was issued in which joined with the Kádár Government in denouncing the action ken by the U.N. General Assembly with regard to Hungary.

The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party et on 5 and 6 December to discuss the situation arising from the ıst European crisis. It affirmed its loyalty to the U.S.S.R., pressed its sympathy with Kádár, and attacked Tito's criticisms Soviet actions in Hungary. Novotný, its First Secretary, told e Committee that both the Yugoslavs and the Poles had been in ror in trying to put forward some sort of 'national Communism', ıd he deplored the Polish Party's failure to make good its mis-kes in economic policy in time. He attacked the Polish press for ving space to reactionary propaganda and spoke of 'false bour-ois views' which had penetrated the Polish Party and had led Central Committee to sanction the dissolution of collective rms. He said: 'It is quite obvious why we have some reservations th regard to the Polish situation.' With some justified satisfac-ɔn he stated that the Czechoslovak Government had never

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 1 November 1956.

allowed the economic situation to deteriorate to an extent whic
would have provided an opposition with a platform.[1]

However, even in the Czechoslovak press doubts were voiced
Thus in the weekly *Literární Noviny* (22 December) the write
K. J. Beneš[2] asked: 'Are we not also responsible for the Hun
garian events? Perhaps we did not attach enough importance t
all those things which have been happening around us, such a
the shattering facts about the true nature of the Rajk trial. Which
ever way I turn, I cannot rid myself of the sincere and depressin
thought that I, too, am partly responsible.'

Two days later *Rudé Právo* took K. J. Beneš to task for hi
'intellectual confusion', and the Slovak Communist daily, *Pravda*,
warned plaintively: 'We must not give way to pessimistic voice
from abroad.' The Communist weekly *Tvorba*[4] also warned Bene
and any others who might share his views that they were givin
comfort to the enemy who was trying to undermine the funda
mental positions of Communism itself under the pretext of cri
ticizing Stalinism.

The caution with which Prague treated the developments arisin
from Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Con
gress of the Soviet Communist Party, and the reserve with whic
the policy of easing some of the political control of the People'
Democratic regime was applied, have proved the Czechoslova
Communists right, at least from their own point of view.[5] In thei
appraisal of the explosive character of the destalinization proces
they have shown themselves to be more prescient than the Kremli
itself. True, their position was made easier by the comparativel
favourable economic situation in their country, but they playe
their cards well, and the U.S.S.R. owes them a considerable debt
Part of this was paid when a Czechoslovak delegation went to
Moscow last January to be acclaimed by Soviet propaganda as the
representative of an exemplary Communist Party and to receive a
pledge of continued Soviet economic support.

As far as the Czechoslovak Communists are concerned the chie
adverse effect of developments in Poland and Hungary was in
the economic sphere. The integration of the economic plans of the
East European People's Democracies has been violently upset. Fo

[1] For Novotný's speech see *Rudé Právo*, 8 November 1956.
[2] In no way related to the late President Edvard Beneš.
[3] *Pravda* (Bratislava), 28 December 1956.
[4] *Tvorba*, 3 January 1957.
[5] cf. *The World Today*, August 1956.

ample, Czechoslovakia had counted on considerable imports of al from Poland, and the decision of the Poles to curtail severely eir exports of coal must have been a blow to Czechoslovak heavy dustry. On the other hand, immediately after it was put in office the Soviet army the Kádár Government had to restore some mblance of normality in Hungary. Its comrades in Prague were ıick to help by diverting supplies of electricity to Hungary, at e expense of their own industrial requirements.

Immediately after the return of the Czechoslovak delegation om Moscow the Party embarked on a campaign to raise the outıt of coal, and towards the end of February the Central Comıttee issued directives designed to ensure a more flexible management of the Czechoslovak economy to enable it to meet any shorges or troubles which might arise.

Despite the apparent ease with which they have weathered the ısis, the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party must alize that Communism as such has received a very serious blow. t the moment they are preoccupied with the immediate task of tıng as the industrial spearhead of the Soviet bloc and at the me time maintaining the living standard of their people. There little chance that the Hungarian revolt will be repeated anywhere se in Eastern Europe in the near future, unless pressures from ıtside the area serve to create an unexpected situation, or unless e U.S.S.R. commits another blunder. The fate of the Hungarian surgents and the passive attitude of the West last autumn will scourage any similar attempts. The Prague regime therefore ems to be more secure than ever, particularly as it is now the remlin's favourite child. There are far too many strategic, litical, and economic considerations involved to allow the S.S.R. to countenance any weakening of the present Government in Czechoslovakia. There are many unsolved problems, too, ırticularly in relation to the Warsaw Pact and the unreliability the satellite armies exposed by the crisis. The main problem, wever, is the future of Communism, and it is improbable that e Czechoslovak Communists will be able to make any contribuın to that apart from the purely negative policy of sitting tight ıd holding on to their positions. They must be troubled by the lish experiment and afraid of any development which would ssen Poland's dependence on the U.S.S.R., such as interıtional recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Effective interıtional guarantees against German expansion would also affect

their own *raison d'être* as guardians of the Soviet alliance, and if Poland succeeds in creating for herself an independent place as a socialist country, the example of a successful revolution by evolution—an achievement so close to the Czech way of effecting political changes—on the other side of the frontier might prove too much for Prague.

J. F. A.

Suez and its Consequences: The Israel View

THE theme of Israel-Arab relations is a very complex one, and this complexity comes very much to the fore in any discussion of events connected with the Suez crisis. The following article does not attempt to tell the full story of the crisis nor to give both sides of the picture. It is merely a brief account, based primarily on Israel sources, of Israel policy as it, apparently, appears to Israel. However, when viewing the recent developments, one is bound to bear in mind that background of years of bitter strife in the Middle East which expressed itself not only in Arab attacks across the borders of Israel but also in Israel counter-raids, in charges and counter-charges, and in the challenges of Israel actions in this matter and in that of the Arab refugees which were made in the United Nations. There are other factors, too, which, though impinging less immediately upon Israel, need to be borne in mind in order to see the situation in perspective: the decline of the West in the Middle East, the attempts at Soviet penetration and exploitation of latent forces of Arab nationalism, and finally now the emergence of the new American policy in the Middle East.

As far as Israel is concerned, one has to remember that her external policy has always been peculiarly egocentric, and it is this approach that has brought her into conflict with the Powers and with the United Nations as a whole. A small State surrounded by hostile neighbours, she lacks firm allies, and thus hers is a foreign policy of often open defiance motivated by her own *raison d'être*. In the days before the State of Israel came into being,

Zionism presupposed reliance on one Power for the achievement of its aims, and this view found expression in the Weizmann line of close collaboration with Great Britain. Since 1948 there developed a far-reaching reliance on the benevolent friendship of the United States, and a certain hope in the United Nations—neither of them policies that stood up well to the strain of recent months.

In general, Israel has never placed excessive hopes in United Nations machinery for the preservation of peace on her borders. The Israelis have evolved a philosophy of their own concerning external security, a morality they argue suitable for their particular problem of international relations. Some years ago, when he was out of office, Mr Ben Gurion asked in a newspaper article:

> . . Is it possible to rely on the U.N. to safeguard the Israel citizen against wholesale or isolated murderous attacks perpetrated by the neighbouring Arab countries, who proclaim incessantly that their determined policy concerning Israel is its complete destruction?

He himself provided the answer:

> We must free ourselves from the unfounded illusion that outside Israel there exists anywhere in the world an effective force concerned with the security of our citizens. The ability to defend ourselves is the only firm factor in our security.[1]

The trouble on the borders was kept in check by the United Nations truce observation machinery, and by the effects of the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950 under which Britain, France, and the United States guaranteed the armistice terms. The appearance of Soviet arms in the Middle East heralded a change. In addition to border warfare, Israel was faced with another problem in her relationship with the Arab States. Their hostility found expression in economic boycott, the most serious and most bitterly felt effect of which was the denial of passage to Israel-bound ships through the Suez Canal and the sealing off of the Gulf of Aqaba, decreed by Egypt and endorsed by the Arab League. In 1951 the matter was successfully challenged in the Security Council, which called on Egypt to terminate her restrictions on Israel shipping. The Egyptians rejected the ruling on the ground that they were justified in their actions by the existing state of belligerency with Israel. Although the matter was again

[1] *Davar*, 26 March 1954, quoted in *Israel and the United Nations* (Report by a Study Group set up by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), New York, 1956, pp. 217–18.

brought before the Council in 1954, nothing was done to enforce compliance, and so the matter rested until Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal.

REACTIONS TO NATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL

Nationalization of the Canal meant of course that Israel's chances of having the shipping ban waived by Cairo completely faded away. While there was criticism in Israel of the Western Powers for their appeasement of Egypt in the past (the Israel press argued that the boycott of Israel shipping had been the first step to the complete domination of the Canal), it was becoming evident that possibilities of an international challenge of Egyptian actions might include the question of Israel shipping. As the influential Labour newspaper *Davar* bluntly put it, freedom of navigation for Israel was the test of every international arrangement for the settlement of the Suez dispute.[1] The implications were even wider: Israel's shipping rights, it was now claimed, should not be separated from the general problem of Israel-Egypt relations.[2]

While diplomatic machinery throughout the world was being geared to deal with the Suez problem, two points began to emerge First, the two principally affected Western Powers—Britain and France—were clearly determined not to allow the Suez crisis to be mixed up in any way with the Israel-Arab dispute;[3] and secondly, although Israel envoys in the capitals of the maritime nations were seeking support for her rights (and were reported to have found understanding among twenty-one nations—excluding India), the Israel policy was one of restraint, preferring to view the whole Suez complex as primarily a Western predicament. In the background there was bitterness about the past, for, as Mr Ben Gurion told the annual conference of his party on 26 August, the United Kingdom remembered Israel's case for shipping rights in the Canal only when British interests were affected. It would be wrong to assume, he added, that these rights would be automatically safeguarded both in the Canal and in the Red Sea.

During August, Egypt allowed some ships under Israel charter to pass through the Canal. Perhaps it was true that 'the admirable restraint' on Israel's part, as the *Manchester Guardian* called it, had

[1] *Davar*, 2 August 1956.

[2] A commentator over Israel Army Radio, 10 August 1956.

[3] There was some force in the argument that to invite Israel to the London conference would have provided President Nasser with a ready-made reason not to attend (cf. *Daily Telegraph*, 4 August 1956).

erved her interests well.[1] But in the context of negotiations between Egypt and the maritime nations there were other potential angers: there was the danger that if Colonel Nasser were to be ustrated in his Canal coup he would strike at Israel to cover the ss of face, or conversely, that if he should become even more ware of lack of unity among his adversaries he would decide to ttack Israel, being assured of impunity.[2]

The danger of war was beginning to loom larger. Mr Begin, the ight-wing Opposition leader, openly called on the Israel Government to seize the opportunity and launch a preventive war.[3] The srael Prime Minister was more realistic in his approach. Although e would not place too much hope in the United Nations, the 'ripartite Declaration, and 'peace offensives', he would also not art a preventive war, because, he said, there was no certainty at war started by Israel would end in victory: there were great rces 'outside the Arab world' which would deploy their power gainst Israel, while her armies were not designed to measure their rength against world forces.[4] The principal danger came from ussia, but Israel was also suspicious of British intentions, as some the subsequent events seem indeed to have proved.[5] The nited States, with the approach of the Presidential election, could ot be relied upon to any great extent. There remained one more nong the tripartite Powers: France—the France of the summer of 956 which saw Nasser as the prime mover in her Algerian troubles, nd which had apparently started some private negotiations with srael in June. She had indeed stopped her arms supplies to Egypt, nd she stepped up her shipments to Israel. It was last summer at Mr Ben Gurion said after the return from leave of the French mbassador that Israel would soon be able to rely on 'a true ally'.[6] n September it was announced with satisfaction that Canada had greed to supply twenty-four jet aircraft: Canada, like France, id *Davar*, was helping Israel to fill the gap created by incessant oviet-block shipments to the area.[7]

The news from London and Paris and the movement of military

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 29 September 1956.
[2] cf *Davar*, 16 August 1956. [3] *Daily Telegraph*, 14 August 1956.
[4] In his speech to the Mapai congress, 26 August 1956
[5] When Israel objected to the introduction of Iraqi forces into Jordan in ctober she also looked with suspicion on Nuri-es-Said's suggestions for a settleent with Israel, on the basis of the United Nations resolutions of 1947, which, *Davar* (10 October) said, were welcomed by the Foreign Office in London with mazing spontaneity'.
[6] cf *The Times*, 4 November 1956. [7] *Davar*, 23 September 1956.

forces into the Mediterranean were watched with great interest, though at first some doubts were expressed as to whether Britain would indeed use force.[1] However, as was stated much later and much more authoritatively by the Israel Chief of Staff, General Dayan, when charges of collusion were bandied to and fro: 'We were not just sitting here with our eyes shut to what was going on in the world. We saw the Anglo-French build-up in Cyprus and we could read their public declarations about who it was aimed at.'[2]

Meanwhile throughout August and September the international situation remained confused. The Suez Canal Users' Association was established, the Suez question was debated in the Security Council, and agreement was reached there on the six principles essential for any settlement; but no one could predict which way affairs would turn, and a virtual stalemate seemed imminent. This stalemate was broken when at 4.30 p.m. on 29 October Israel forces crossed in strength into the Sinai Desert.

THE SINAI THRUST—THE MILITARY PHASE

Barely two months had passed since Mr Ben Gurion's speech of 26 August in which he promised not to engage in preventive war, but recent weeks had brought more aggressive acts on the borders and the Israel press was full of cries of vengeance,[3] while Jordan, instead of continuing to be a neighbour protected by her alliance with Britain, was beginning to move out from the British sphere into the Egyptian camp. When the project arose to move Iraqi troops into Jordan during the elections (held on 21 October), apprehension reached its climax. It was recognized that while this move was in theory directed against Israel it was in fact a move against Nasser,[4] but nevertheless it was threatening. Whatever the motives, Mr Ben Gurion flatly announced on 15 October that should Iraqi troops move in, Israel would oppose this violation of the armistice agreement and would be free to act as she thought fit The threat was withdrawn.[5] But renewal of *fedayeen* (i.e. Egyptian-

[1] cf. Israel Army Radio, 10 August 1956

[2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 16 November 1956

[3] e g. 'Punishment for an act of murder cannot be called an act of retaliation' (*Jerusalem Post*, 13 September 1956).

[4] cf. *Ha'aretz*, and *Jerusalem Post*, 17 September 1956

[5] But anxiety remained. On 17 October the Independent *Ha'aretz* stated that although the project had been shelved, no assurances existed that Britain, whom the paper described as the instigator of the plan, had completely abandoned it. It seems that there were some fears of imposition of a peace settlement, at Britain's initiative, based on the 1947 resolutions (cf. dispatch from Tel-Aviv correspondent of *The Times*, dated 28 October 1956).

sponsored commando) raids, the pro-Egyptian result of the Jordanian elections, and the establishment of a joint anti-Israel Command by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria brought the situation to a climax.

As far as Israel was concerned, the dangers of a military adventure appeared small. Britain and France would be unlikely to disapprove of action against Egypt, and their troops were near by. (It is impossible on the basis of evidence available to obtain a proper appreciation of the alleged collusion with France or with Britain.[1]) The United States was in the grip of election fever: she did not like the Israel mobilization orders, but she was more likely now than at any other time to be preoccupied with domestic issues; and Russia's empire, having just experienced revolutionary manifestations in Poland, was in the throes of an even more positive uprising in Hungary. The new Arab Command would still need some time to become fully efficient. In the meantime, however, its member countries appeared, in the Israel view, to have decided to intensify their *fedayeen* activities. In Washington Mr Eban was telling Mr Dulles on 28 October that a *fedayeen* attack was no different from an attack by a bomber.[2] What the Israel Ambassador did not tell the Secretary of State was that a day later the invasion of Egypt would start.

The first operational communiqué, as if emphasizing the timing of the attack for the benefit of the startled world, spoke of occupation of Egyptian positions 'in the vicinity of the Suez Canal'. Then came the next development: the Anglo-French ultimatum of 30 October to Israel and Egypt, requesting both sides to cease hostilities and withdraw their forces: this the Israelis accepted and Egypt rejected. Typical was the comment of *Davar*: even the British Government understood at last that the dangerous tension caused by the Egyptian dictator 'justified the defensive measures of Israel'.[3] But, on the whole, a correct assessment of the general feeling in Israel was that quoted by a British correspondent, that Britain, barely a fortnight ago almost Israel's enemy, was now acclaimed as her ally and friend.[4] In the Security Council, on the evening of 30 October Britain and France used their veto for the first time to block a United States resolution censuring Israel.

The attitude of the United States—the outspokenness of the condemnation, the unanimity with the Russians, the charges of

[1] cf. a report by the Associated Press, *Manchester Guardian*, 23 November 1956, Paul Johnson, *The Suez War*, London, 1957

[2] cf *New York Times*, 31 October 1956. [3] *Davar*, 31 October 1956.

[4] *News Chronicle*, 1 November 1956.

sinister plots—came as a shock to Israel public opinion.[1] And Independent and Left-wing circles were also beginning to be worried about accusations that Israel was becoming a tool of alien 'colonial' interests.[2]

But events were moving on. On 2 November the U.N. Assembly arraigned Israel together with Britain and France as aggressors, and urged an immediate cease-fire; two days later the scheme for a United Nations force was initiated; while on 5 November came the Soviet proposal to send 'volunteers' to Egypt, and Mr Bulganin sent a threatening letter to Mr Ben Gurion.

As far as Israel was concerned, the situation was as follows. First, whatever may have been the original objectives of Israel's thrust into the Sinai peninsula—whether planned as a powerful reprisal raid or a full-scale offensive— by the morning of 5 November all resistance there had ended, and hence in a way the decision whether or not to stop the fighting because of Mr Bulganin's recent letters was far more academic than in London and Paris. Secondly, the main achievement seemed to be the end of the armistice regime. Thirdly, as to the possibility of Soviet intervention, this was viewed as propaganda.[3]

One storm had been weathered: victory appeared complete. Mr Ben Gurion told his Parliament on 7 November that this was 'the greatest and the most glorious military operation in the annals of our people, and one of the most remarkable military operations in world history'. He was speaking as the holder of roughly three times the territory controlled by Israel a week earlier. With confidence, he was ready to defy the world: to defy the United Nations who planned the dispatch of international police (Israel would not agree to the stationing of a foreign force—whatever it might be called—on any territory in her possession); to defy the Russians who were withdrawing their Ambassador and threatening Britain and France with rocket warfare; and to defy the Arab States (the armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried). No pressure, Mr Ben Gurion confidently predicted, would make Israel move from acquired ground till a permanent peace settlement was reached.

[1] cf. *Davar*, 1 and 2 November 1956.

[2] The Left-wing *Al Hamishmar* spoke of Britain's and France's 'colonial objectives of their own' (1 November) The Independent *Ha'aretz* was worried about Allied bombings, especially the reported air attacks on Cairo and Alexandria (1 November).

[3] cf. *Ha'aretz*, 6 November 1956.

About twenty-four hours later there came a sudden reappraisal. More than one reason could be given for this change: there were threats from Jordan, and in Syria there seemed to be portents of a Soviet base, while Mr Bulganin's note of protest to Israel also looked more menacing at closer scrutiny. Might there not be a danger that the Russians might 'go it alone', since they were accusing Israel of 'criminally and irresponsibly playing with the fate of the world'? Russia, the *Jerusalem Post* wrote (9 November), in spite of Hungary could spare bombers, 'and she would not go about it in the velvet-gloved manner of the British in the Canal Zone'. Finally, a note arrived from President Eisenhower, and apparently some oral clarifications as well. There was also the realization that no help was likely to be forthcoming from Britain and France. Israel was completely on her own. Mr Ben Gurion informed President Eisenhower that the United Nations Force would be welcome: 'We have never planned to annex the Sinai desert . . . we will, upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with this international force . . ., willingly withdraw our forces.'[1] When in an after-midnight broadcast the Prime Minister told the people of Israel of the decision, the feeling was said to be almost of betrayal,[2] but—as the press noted—here was an attempt to prevent world-wide conflagration.[3]

WITHDRAWAL AND NEGOTIATIONS

This was an enforced settlement—a settlement by the great Powers. All the Israelis could do now was to fight a diplomatic rearguard action concerning the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations. However, withdrawals had to begin; they started in fact in November, but it was not till 22 January—a month after the last British and French troops left Egypt—that the last Israeli soldier was withdrawn behind the armistice line, except from two vital areas.

These areas were (i) the Gaza strip, which, according to the Israel argument, was the centre of Egyptian-organized *fedayeen* activity, and not strictly speaking 'Egyptian territory'; and (ii) the Sharm el-Sheikh area, the narrow strip running down from Eilat along the Gulf of Aqaba, where Egyptian gun emplacements

[1] *New York Times*, 9 November 1956.
[2] cf. *The Times*, 10 November 1956.
[3] *Hatzofe*, 10 November 1956. But it was also realistically noted (*Haboker*) that an important trump card had been lost.

commanding the Straits of Tiran at Ras Nasrani on the mainlan and on the islands of Tiran and Sanafi, had dominated this sc outlet from the Israel port. It was not until early in March that t Israelis yielded these territories and handed them over to tl United Nations Emergency Force.

In a sense they were compelled to do so by the opinion of tl overwhelming majority in the United Nations, and even more by the attitude of the great Powers. Some strong views were e pressed outside Israel as to the advisability of insisting on certa guarantees in return for withdrawal, but the withdrawal, tl physical handing over of the disputed territories, had to come fir:

The unfavourable climate of opinion, from Israel's point view, was conditioned by two circumstances: the stiffening of tl Egyptian attitude concerning salvage operations in the Canal, ar the more active entry of the United States into the area with tl Eisenhower Doctrine. The latter of course found little favour Israel, for in her view Arab-Israel relations were the basic con ponent of any Middle East settlement. The *Jerusalem Po* (3 January) pointed to the danger that the United States migl regard hatred of Israel as the only factor of Arab unity, and migl ignore the fact that it formed only a part of a general anti-Wester attitude. Resentment was also caused by the rigid attitude adopte towards Israel by the United States Government, an attitude th was based on the 'no reward for aggression' principle.

Israel had based her case on refusal to withdraw unconditionall A United Nations resolution of 18 January once more urged he immediate compliance with the previous resolution on witl drawal. But Mr Ben Gurion, replying on 23 January, laid down th following conditions: Israel troops would leave Gaza but wishe to retain civil administration there; as to the Gulf of Aqab effective guarantees were required. There would be no mor retreats, wrote *Davar* (24 January). The deadlock was complete delegates from the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs were urging sanc tions, and another attempt was made early in February when nev resolutions were passed coupling the withdrawals with the enforce ment of the armistice agreement. But Israel would not yield, for it was asked, could the United Nations 'in the hesitant personalit of its Secretary-General' provide effective guarantees?[1]

The matter had once more to be taken outside the Unite Nations, and the United States now strove to find a solution. I

[1] *Jerusalem Post*, 7 February 1957.

bilateral negotiations the U.S.A. proposed guarantees which tl Israelis still found inadequate, and President Eisenhower, in spi of opposition from both sides of Congress, came out in suppc of enforcement of the United Nations decisions. He urged Isra to rely 'on the resoluteness of all the friends of justice': she h: been provided, he said, with 'the maximum assurances she c: reasonably expect at this juncture, or that can be reconciled wi fairness to others'.[1] But Israel still maintained her stand: sl wanted free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and no return to tl *status quo ante* in the Gaza strip, Mr Ben Gurion told Parliame on 21 February. Then came further American pressure, mo secret talks, and possibly some clearer assurances, and at last (1 March Mrs Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, told the Unit(Nations General Assembly that her country would fully aı promptly withdraw from the two disputed areas provided tl United Nations Emergency Force moved in. But some more stri gent qualifications were added: should conditions in the Gaza stı again deteriorate to the same state as before, Israel would reser her freedom to act to defend her rights; and she received wi satisfaction the assurances of leading maritime powers that th foresaw a normal and regular flow of traffic through the Gulf Aqaba.

President Eisenhower, while not shedding much light on t reasons for which Israel, under American pressure, had decided yield ground, welcomed this decision. In a letter to Mr Ben Guri(on 2 March he said: 'I know that this decision was not an ea one. I believe, however, that Israel will have no cause to regı having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the world coı munity as expressed in the various United Nations resolutio relating to withdrawal.'

And what since? The following conclusion of *The Times* pro ably best sums up the situation: 'Events have moved back neaı to the old and familiar dangers and uncertainties, with only a f(hundred U.N. soldiers as a screen—for how long?'[2]

G. L.

[1] U S memorandum to Israel, 17 February 1957 (*New York Times*, February 1957).

[2] *The Times*, 12 March 1957.

The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic

THE word China means in Chinese 'the middle country'. Ui recent times the ordinary Chinese fully believed that his coun lay at the centre of the terrestrial universe. His knowledge of special relationship existing between his Emperor and the pow of heaven, a relationship not conceded (as was the divine right Europe) to other rulers of the world, encouraged him in this be in the pre-eminence of his own nation. At the same time, sii almost his only contacts with the outside world were the incursi made against his country's territory by the warlike and uncivili peoples on his borders, he came to assume that all peoples otl than his own were barbarians: in the Chinese language, as in cient Greek, the word formerly used for foreigner had the mean 'barbarian'. The Chinese were, partly for these reasons, until co paratively recently fundamentally uninterested in the world l yond their borders; just as they were scientifically incurious cept where some functional end was to be served, so they show no desire to know more about other parts of the earth or to en contacts with their peoples unless for some specific purpose. Th while in Europe and in other parts of the world the dispatch representatives from one ruler to another was normal from ea classical times and the accrediting of permanent envoys comm from the Middle Ages, the Chinese Court only very rarely se special ambassadors, and no permanent representatives w appointed until 1877. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs was establish only in 1900 at the demand of the Western Powers. These at tudes have penetrated very deep into the Chinese mind and still some extent influence their thinking.

When finally China was forced into relations with the outsi world by the wars fought against her (primarily for that purpo by the European Powers between 1839 and 1860, it was to d cover parts of her territory invaded and occupied by forei nations, which assumed special rights and privileges even with her own borders. From that time until the present day—as lor therefore, as the Chinese can be said to have had a foreign policy the overriding aim of that policy, both under the Emperors a under all succeeding Governments, has been the recovery Chinese territorial integrity. For many years no Chinese Gover

ment possessed the military power to make such a policy effective. Indeed, before its fall the empire was to suffer even greater indignities than before. Later Governments, crippled by civil war, were no better equipped to impose their will on the foreign Powers with which they dealt. Finally, however, during the last war, the Western Powers agreed to relinquish their concessions, leases, and extraterritorial and other rights in China. A year or two later the presence of Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference with Mr Churchill, Mr Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin marked the acceptance of China as a first-class Power, while the grant of a permanent seat on the Security Council in 1945 signified her admission as one of the Big Five.

After the war therefore China, for the first time since she emerged from isolation, found herself in a position to deal with the great Powers on a basis approaching equality. But the Nationalist Government was once again too preoccupied by its struggle against the Communists to make any effective use of this newly won position. Within four years of the defeat of Japan it had been displaced from control of the Chinese mainland and the conduct of China's foreign relations had passed into other hands.

FOREIGN POLICY AIMS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The principles regulating the foreign policy of the present Government of China were laid down in Article 54 of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949. This Article provides that:

> The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory, and sovereignty of the country, the upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

This is of course merely a statement of potential foreign policy aims of the Government, drawn up for public presentation in the light of the accepted norms not only of its own ideology but also of the international community to which its country aspired to belong; it does not therefore necessarily give any indication of the true objectives underlying that policy. It is the advertisement for a policy rather than the policy itself.

Recovery of Territorial Integrity

The most immediate aim of the present Government in the field

of foreign affairs was the same as that of its predecessors: the re covery of Chinese territorial integrity. The main areas traditionall regarded by China as Chinese (though some of them have been s for only two hundred years and bear little racial affinity wit China) and where her sovereignty was still disputed or insecur were Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macac and Formosa.

In Sinkiang, where, as a result of bad communications, unres among the local population, and Russian penetration, the contrc of the Chinese Government had, as often in the past, become tenu ous, the new Government immediately sent strong military force to occupy the area, and these have remained there ever since. The have taken vigorous action to improve communications with Chin proper, an essential step to ensuring effective Chinese control; th Soviet monopoly of the airlines, conceded by Chiang Kai-shek and the effective Soviet control of oil and mineral resources wer replaced by joint Chinese-Soviet companies, which were late taken over entirely by the Chinese; widespread economic anc agricultural development of the province was undertaken; and in tensive political propaganda was disseminated among the loca peoples to consolidate Chinese control of the territory.

Over Outer Mongolia the Government has been less successful But although it did not obtain the return of the area to China (a task which it could scarcely have hoped to achieve while the Soviet Union could point to a Mongolian Government expressing the wish to remain 'independent') it secured the exchange of ambassadors—which, despite mutual recognition, had been denied to the Nationalist Government—and in 1952 concluded a ten-year agreement on economic, cultural, and educational co-operation The Government has assiduously cultivated relations by exchanges of delegations, by facilitating contacts with the Mongols of China (two-thirds of the Mongol people live in China), and by other similar means; and it may be assumed that it will continue to seek to extend its influence in the country so that, if it can never return to Chinese sovereignty, China may at least become the predominant power in the area.

In Manchuria the Government secured the relinquishment by the Soviet Union, under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, of many of the rights and facilities acquired by Russia under the 1946 agreement with Chiang Kai-shek: the Soviet share in the joint administration of the Manchurian railways was returned to China;

the question of Dairen was to be considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, while in the meantime the civil administration was to be Chinese; and Russian control of Port Arthur and joint rule of the base in time of peace were to be given up on the signing of a Japanese peace treaty or at least by the end of 1952 (in 1952 it was announced, however, that at Chinese 'request' the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur was to be delayed: it was finally completed by May 1955). In 1950 Chinese forces invaded Tibet and Chinese statesmen, while stating that Tibet's autonomy would be respected, have declared the country to be an integral part of China. This annexation has not so far been seriously resisted by international opinion.

Despite these efforts during the first years of the new Government's existence, there remain three territories traditionally regarded by the Chinese as parts of China which nevertheless are not yet under the control of the Chinese Government. These are Hong Kong, Macao, and Formosa. For the moment the Government appears to be making no effort to secure the return of Hong Kong and Macao. If it did wish to achieve this it would probably seek to do so by subversion from within rather than by more violent means. That until now no serious attempt has been made in this direction may be because the Government is at present unable to dispense with the important supplies of foreign currency which it obtains through its exports to the two colonies, or because it values the use it is able to make of the colonies as a venue for contacts with those, e.g. especially Chinese from Formosa, from whom it might otherwise be almost completely cut off.

The Government has now recognized that it has no chance of securing Formosa by military force. This would be a difficult enough military feat under any circumstances; but with the U.S. Seventh Fleet committed to the defence of the island, and with United Nations procedures certain to be invoked against such an attack, it is now out of the question. For the last year and a half therefore the Government has been concentrating its intensive propaganda on the possibility of the 'peaceful liberation' of Formosa (though never specifically excluding recourse to military force). A welcome to the mainland and a 'suitable position' in the new China have been promised to any Kuomintang leaders who will further the cause of 'peaceful liberation' either in Formosa or elsewhere. The Government's aim from now on will almost certainly be to play on the patriotic and family feelings of the Chinese

in Formosa so that eventually (even if only after Chiang Kai-shek's death) these may help to bring about reunion with the mainland.

Frontier Security

The next immediate aim of the foreign policy of the present Government has been to strengthen the security of China's frontiers. At present China is faced by potentially hostile forces in Formosa, within bombing and blockading distance of many of her most important ports and industrial towns; in South Korea, within close reach of her industrial heart; and in Japan, also within bombing distance of the mainland. The retention of these areas in hostile hands means that in the event of war China would start off at an almost overwhelming strategic disadvantage. Chinese aims within this field are therefore: the elimination of the hostile power of the Nationalist forces in Formosa, or at least the withdrawal of the American aid and alliance which alone make this power a menace, the withdrawal of American power from South Korea, and if possible the replacement of the present Government there by one friendly to China; and the removal of American power and influence from Japan

The simplest method of achieving the first of these aims would be to secure the reunion of Formosa with the mainland. This objective therefore gives an additional urgency to the Chinese Government's efforts to obtain the return of the island. If this cannot be achieved, the next best alternative would be the termination of the Nationalists' alliance with the U.S. and the emergence of a friendly or submissive government in Formosa With this in view Chinese propaganda has been particularly vehement on the subject of the 'American occupation' of Formosa, and during negotiations with the Americans at Geneva over the last eighteen months the Chinese have consistently rejected U.S. claims to have an interest in the defence of the island.

In Korea the position has worsened for China since the present Government came into power. At that time United States forces had withdrawn from South Korea, and although there were also no longer Soviet forces in North Korea, the balance of military advantage clearly lay with the North. But as a result of the North Korean Government's attempt to exploit this advantage to acquire control of the whole country, China is now faced with U.S. ground and air forces within close striking distance of the principal centre

of her industrial power. The decision of the Chinese to interve in the Korean war may have been partly due to genuine doul about General MacArthur's intentions when he arrived at t Chinese frontier, and to the need to preserve control of the No Korean power resources on which part of their Manchurian dustry depended; but their primary aim was probably to drive t U.N. forces as far as possible from their own borders, and doubt, if they could, to secure control of the entire Korean pen sula. Though the cost to China was heavy, especially at a time wh she needed all her available resources for the development of l backward economy, the Government may have calculated that advantage of securing the withdrawal of potentially hostile for from her frontier and the interposition of a friendly buffer St made the expense worth while. Since that time the Chinese h expended considerable resources in rebuilding North Kore economy and strengthening her defences. They have indeed vir ally taken over from the Soviet Union responsibility for the cou try: thus when, immediately after the war, North Korean de gates travelled to both countries to ask for help for their countr shattered economy, the Chinese despite their own difficulties o bid the Soviet offer of £90 million-worth of aid with an ev larger one of £112 million. At the same time they have sought virulent propaganda to achieve the overthrow of President Sy man Rhee in the South, and by arousing discontent among South Koreans to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. and ot United Nations troops.

In Japan the Chinese have maintained a vigorous propagan offensive both against the presence of U.S. troops in that coun and against the revision of the Constitution necessary for establishment of Japanese armed forces (other than a purely p tective force). But since their prime fear is not the revival of Jap ese armed strength, against which the modern Chinese for would have little to fear, but American air power, their m efforts have been directed to securing a friendly or neutra Japanese Government which might bring about the withdrawa U.S. forces and if possible even deny facilities to them in case war. They have not hesitated to barter the return of Japan civilians remaining in China against more extensive trading c tacts, and in turn have sought to exchange increased trade diplomatic recognition. With the formation of the new Gove ment in Japan, these efforts are likely to be intensified.

Expansion of Chinese Influence

The third main aim of Chinese foreign policy has been the expansion of Chinese influence among her neighbours in Asia, and especially in South-East Asia. Some of these countries were in former times tributaries of China.

The Government's policies towards Japan and Korea have already been outlined. While primarily directed towards the preservation of China's strategic interests, these activities have also been designed to secure on a more permanent basis a powerful Chinese influence over both countries—the strategic and political aims are indeed complementary. Similarly, in South-East Asia the intense propaganda directed against S.E.A.T.O. and against all military agreements with the U.S. may, if successful, also contribute to the establishment of a strong Chinese influence in the area.

In Indo-China the Chinese Government may consider that its strategic interests have been satisfactorily assured by the defeat (with some assistance from China herself) of French attempts to resume control over the whole country, and by the establishment of a friendly buffer State in North Vietnam. The readiness of the Chinese not to insist on the holding of elections for a united Vietnam last year, as stipulated in the Geneva agreements, perhaps indicates that they consider that the assets they already possess in North Vietnam are too valuable to be worth risking in a gamble which might bring a hostile government to their borders and deprive them of the valuable southern outlet of Haiphong; but there is little doubt that their ultimate aim is a united Vietnam under predominant Chinese influence. A policy of conciliation towards the non-Communist Governments of Cambodia and Laos has been repaid by a marked softening of the attitude of those two Governments towards China.

In Burma, despite the presence of Communist forces in rebellion against the authorities, the Chinese have assiduously cultivated the friendship of the Government; but they have shown themselves sufficiently confident in their relationship to press their demands for the re-establishment of earlier frontier lines with Burma, even to the point of dispatching troops on to Burmese territory as an inducement.

Towards Siam, a leading member of S.E.A.T.O., an outspoken opponent of Communism, an ally of Japan during the war, and a severe ruler of a large Chinese minority, the Chinese Government at first maintained the traditionally hostile policy of its predeces-

sors; but the recent softening of Siam's attitude and the prospect of the resumption of trade relations may bring about some relaxation of strict ideological principle. In Malaya, too, the policy of support for the Communist insurgents and for extreme Left-wing dissidents in Singapore may now come to be modified by the emergence of an indigenous Government in Malaya and the prospect of Chinese control of Singapore. Everywhere the object has been to bring into existence friendly or, even better, anti-Western Governments which may come more and more to be dominated by the weight of Chinese power in the area.

When they first came into power, the present rulers of China, while professing friendship for the people of India, frequently attacked her rulers and Mr Nehru personally, describing them, for example, as 'running-dogs of imperialism'. Soon after the Korean war broke out, however, as the Indians became increasingly valuable to them as spokesmen for the Chinese case in international forums, the Chinese adopted an attitude of greater friendliness, appealing to them in particular as fellow Asians *vis-à-vis* the West, an approach calculated to arouse some sympathy in India. In 1954, when Chou En-lai was visiting New Delhi, he and Mr Nehru issued their declaration of adherence to the 'five principles' to which other Asian Governments later also subscribed and which the Chinese have continued to uphold in subsequent foreign policy declarations. The five principles (which are in fact already so universally accepted that they would scarcely seem to require reaffirming) are: mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. While therefore Chinese-Indian relations have so far been fairly cordial, it is probable that as China increasingly expands her power over South-East Asia (an area where in earlier times India had wielded an important influence), as she more and more develops from being a backward fellow-victim of colonialism into a dynamic modern industrial State, and, above all, as she emerges as a powerful rival for the leadership of the Arab-Asian world, the relations between the two Powers may be considerably modified. The first examples of this development were seen in the considerable resentment aroused in India by the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the subsequent eviction of Indian power from that country, and by the recent agreement for Chinese aid to Nepal, another former tributary State of China's but one which in

later times has been largely dominated by Indian influence.

In the wider field, the Chinese in 1952 called a Conference of Asian and Pacific Nations, largely with the object of mobilizing support for their case in Korea and against the rearming of Japan. A Peace Liaison Committee for the Asian and Pacific Region was set up, which it has been suggested was intended to become a kind of Asian Comintern. In April 1955 Chou En-lai attended the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries and by the apparently reasonable and conciliatory attitude he adopted did much to raise Chinese prestige and influence in the area. As a result of a speech which he made at this Conference, direct negotiations between China and the United States on outstanding issues between the two countries were started at Geneva in September of that year. These negotiations have however made little progress, largely as a result of the refusal of the Chinese to make a specific repudiation of the use of force in the Formosa area, a matter which they claim is not an issue between themselves and the United States. Despite the efforts made on its behalf by India and other nations the new Government has still not been admitted to the United Nations, and until this happens, or at least until many other nations agree to enter into diplomatic relations with it, its opportunities for increasing its influence in the international field are to some extent limited.

The Extension of the Practice of Communism

The fourth and most remote aim of Chinese foreign policy is the extension of the practice of Communism over as wide an area as possible. The Chinese Government leaders are at present as orthodox and as fervent in their attachment to Marxist dogma as the Russian leaders (in some ways possibly more so) and probably possess at least as much evangelistic zeal. They appear at present, however, to be to a larger extent preoccupied by their more immediate aims, both domestic and foreign, than are the Russians, and these without doubt take priority in their scale of thinking. There are therefore cases in the field of foreign relations where the desire to bring about a more widespread acceptance and application of their faith must sometimes be subordinated, at least temporarily, to the need to cultivate relations with an existing Government or to give support to some non-Communist opposition party. Perhaps for this reason China does not appear so far to have devoted as much energy and enthusiasm to the organization and leadership of

Communist movements in other countries, or to the dissemination of propaganda designed to bring about Communist revolutions, as has the Soviet Union in Europe. Her ultimate objectives at present are no doubt still ideological ones; but it remains to be seen how far, as the growth and development of Chinese power increasingly preoccupy the energies and enthusiasm of her Government and people, and as Chinese empiricism gradually reasserts itself over dogmatic fanaticism (an attitude of mind thoroughly alien to the Chinese mentality), the Chinese leaders will remain willing to exert themselves for these ends.

THE MEANS TOWARDS THE ENDS

These then are the main objects of Chinese foreign policy. The principal instrument, other than Chinese power and Chinese diplomacy, for achieving these objects is the alliance with the Soviet Union. This can be expected, within limits, to assist the Chinese towards the accomplishment of each of their aims. Indeed the common ideological beliefs of the two Powers, their diplomatic isolation, which for each effectively precludes any worthwhile alternative alliance, their common fear of and hostility towards the United States, taken in conjunction with the purely strategic considerations which had led the two countries into alliance even when the ideologies professed by their Governments were opposed, made such an alignment inevitable; and the alliance is, even more perhaps than is the alliance with the United States for Great Britain, an essential premise of Chinese foreign policy. It is indeed explicitly provided for in the Common Programme (Article 11 of which states: 'The People's Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples throughout the world, first of all with the U.S.S.R., all People's Democracies and all oppressed nations. . .'). The alliance was sealed in the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which provides for co-operation on important international problems of mutual interest, although it makes no provision for military alliance in time of war except in the case of aggression by Japan.

The Chinese Government has devoted an increasing flow of propaganda to proclaiming the advantages of the Soviet alliance to its own people. Russia-China Friendship Weeks have been celebrated annually, and Russia-China Friendship Societies, claiming a membership of 40 million, have been set up throughout

China. While on the whole Russia has supported China on matters concerning the Far East, such as the Korean war, the Korean armistice negotiations, and Formosa, China has in return on European and Middle Eastern matters been content to echo the Soviet line, and it seems that at the moment she has renounced any pretensions to playing an active role on her own account in these areas, or, indeed, anywhere other than in Asia. Similarly China appears to have made no effort to play a leading part in the councils of the Communist States in Eastern Europe, being content to regard this as a Soviet sphere of influence and the status of such smaller Communist nations as irrelevant to her own relationship with the Soviet Union. Recently indeed she has given firm and loyal support to Russian efforts to halt the movement towards greater independence in these countries.

For the rest, the means used by the Chinese Government to attain its ends have been, and will probably continue to be, the methods of propaganda and diplomacy normally used by Governments today in seeking to make their influence felt. The Chinese are likely to persist in trying by these methods to encourage other Far Eastern Governments to move towards greater independence of the United States and towards more friendly relations with China. They will probably use the offer of increased trade contacts as a first step in this direction, and may (as they have done in the past) accept unfavourable terms in such agreements if this can help them towards achieving their diplomatic ends. They will seek to make use of the witch-cry of imperialism to arouse hostility towards the United States, Britain, and other Western nations among all under-developed countries. At the same time they will try to exploit as far as possible any differences which may emerge or which may be stimulated between countries hostile to them or to their ideology. Finally they will be conscious that in the long run their country's influence in the world is likely to be closely dependent on their success in raising the standard of living among their own people, and they will make the maximum use of any successes they may achieve in this sphere to increase China's standing among her neighbours.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The effectiveness of any foreign policy depends ultimately on the power that is available to sustain it. One of the reasons why the strength and energy of Chinese foreign policy during the last few

years have created such an impact in the West is that many there have continued to judge Chinese actions in this sphere in relation to the deficiencies in physical power with which they have been accustomed to associate China over the last century and to the backwardness which is known still to characterize the Chinese economy today. The overwhelming confidence of the present Chinese leaders, on the other hand, derives not only from the self-assurance natural to the Chinese in their dealings with foreign peoples but also from their consciousness of the power with which Chinese intelligence and industry, the strength and flexibility of their own leadership, and above all the overwhelming weight of Chinese numbers must inevitably, within a comparatively short time, endue their nation. As this, at present potential, power becomes more and more a reality, the assurance, and at the same time the independence, of Chinese foreign policy will probably increase. In the meantime the Chinese Government is likely to continue to pursue its present policies with undiminished vigour.

D. E. T. L.

Greenland Today

Progress and Reforms in the World's Largest Island

GREENLAND, whose northernmost airfield, Thule, is situated midway between the United States and the Soviet Union, is, in the atomic and air age, of the greatest strategic importance. The island belongs to Denmark. In April 1951 three bases—Narsassuak in the south, Sönderströmfjord in central Greenland, and Thule in the far north—were leased to the Americans as N.A.T.O. trustees. By agreement between Denmark and the United States no contact is permitted between these three bases and Greenland settlements. The Danes believe that this measure best serves the interests of the natives.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Greenland came under Danish sovereignty by accident. The Danish missionary Hans Egede landed in Greenland in 1721 to

establish contact between the church and the descendants of the lost Vikings, who had followed Erik the Red to the island in 984. It is said that in order to persuade larger numbers of his subjects to immigrate there, Erik invented the name Greenland (Grønland), instead of calling it more appropriately 'Land of the Eternal Ice'. During the fifteenth century all traffic between Greenland and the mother country broke down and the Vikings were left to themselves. Only tombs and ruins (of considerable archaeological value) remain, while all trace of the people themselves has vanished. Instead of the Norsemen, Egede found nomadic Eskimo tribes, who had wandered from the north across the frozen sea. With the help of his wife and two sons, Egede converted them to Christianity. During his fifteen-year stay he founded the settlement of Godthaab and various trading stations. Egede and his son Paul also created the orthography of the Greenlandic language, which is not related to Danish. Danish belongs to the Germanic group of languages, while the various Greenlandic dialects are akin to the Ural-Althaic families. Gradually the Danes opened more trading posts, and in 1782 they proclaimed a basic law for the island. But until 1917 Danish sovereignty extended solely from Cape Farewell, on the southernmost tip, to the 74th degree of latitude. Subsequently, the whole island, including Thule, on the 76th degree of latitude, and the east coast, became a Danish colony.

Norway objected to this status. In 1931 she temporarily occupied the east coast, but loyally abided by the decision of the International Court at The Hague, which in 1933 confirmed Danish sovereignty over the whole territory.

Since the time of Egede and the Moravian (Herrenhuter) missionaries, who followed later, important social changes have taken place. In order to gain a closer hold on the population, these church emissaries encouraged the growth of communities around the newly built churches. In later times Fridtjof Nansen and other Arctic explorers were to deplore these measures, as in their opinion a nomadic dispersal would have been more advantageous from the economic point of view. Concentration of population led to more rapid exploitation of the hunting-grounds. Egede fought a hard battle against polygamy—in former days it was usual for a good hunter to have more than one wife—and he even deported some of the stubborn 'sinners' in chains to Denmark. The Moravians painted red the hair of girls with easy morals.

On the whole, the Danes ruled the island with gentleness and understanding. Until its emancipation after the Second World War, they were regarded by the native population as their natural leaders and were frequently elected to the Greenland Parliament. There was no racial discrimination, as is proved by the great number of mixed marriages. Knud Rasmussen, the Danish humanitarian and Arctic explorer, became the guardian angel of the Pol-Eskimos in the far north, where he travelled by dog-sledge. By establishing the Thule trading station and creating better economic conditions, he saved the natives living there from extinction.

While it was a colony, Greenland was a closed country, to which practically only civil servants, skilled labourers, and scientific expeditions (including many from Scandinavia, Britain, and Germany) were admitted. The population lived on the natural economy, based primarily on seal-hunting, and sold superfluous skins to the Kongelige Grønland Handel (the Royal Danish company for trade with Greenland), which paid low prices but in return sold essential goods, such as coffee, sugar, salt, tobacco, and arms and ammunition, for next to nothing. At the end of the 1920s, by a curious climatic change, the water became too warm for the seals. They migrated from southern Greenland and can now be hunted only in the far north and on the east coast. Thus the whole economic structure had to change. As, however, at the same time shoals of cod and shrimps were discovered, the majority of the hunters became fishermen and, in the deep south, sheep-breeders, and thus they found the way to a more modern form of economy.

But in a modern community political and humanitarian considerations had also to be taken into account. The late Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft visited Greenland in 1949 and found that social and hygienic conditions there left, in his opinion, much to be desired. He summoned to Copenhagen the Greenland Commission, composed of Greenlanders and of Danes who had long been resident in the island. After lengthy discussions they devised those reforms on which the life of modern Greenland is based today.

Theoretically, Greenland is now open to visitors, and a special permit from the Danish Government is no longer required. An entry visa for Denmark entitles its holder also to visit Greenland, and those nationals who are free to enter Denmark without a visa

enjoy the same privilege with regard to Greenland. In practice, however, the matter is not quite so simple. S.A.S. aircraft bound for the United States habitually land in Sönderströmfjord, where N.A.T.O. has an air base manned by Americans. But those who wish to see genuine Greenland settlements must be prepared to make the journey by boat. The trip from Copenhagen to Godthaab, the capital in the south of Greenland, takes seven to eight days under favourable weather conditions. For those who wish to continue up to the extreme north the travelling time is doubled. Even more difficult is a journey to the east coast which is blocked by ice for all except two months in the year. The northern part of west Greenland, too, is cut off from the outside world during the whole long winter. Tourist lines are not yet in existence, and bookings on the few ships of the Kongelige Grønland Handel are hard to get. Scientists, doctors, teachers, government officials, experts, and construction workers still receive priority, which puts the available space at a premium. If the tourist has succeeded in securing a berth, he faces a further problem—there are no hotels in Greenland, and the few lodging-houses which do exist are even more crowded than the boats.

THE END OF COLONIAL STATUS

In 1953, when Denmark acquired a new Constitution, the colony of Greenland became a province of Denmark with rights and obligations equal to those of the other provinces, and with two representatives in the Copenhagen Parliament. They speak on behalf of the world's largest island, fifty times the size of the Danish mother country and fourteen times that of England. But 96 per cent of Greenland's surface is covered by eternal ice, the so-called inland ice. So the population of Greenland numbers only 25,000, of whom 1,500 are Danes, 1,300 pure Eskimos (east coast and Thule area), and the rest are Greenlanders—a mixed race of Eskimos and Scandinavians, primarily Danes.

The *Landsraad*, Greenland's Parliament, is presided over by the *Landshøvding* (Governor), assisted by a skilled interpreter. Discussions are conducted in Danish and Greenlandic. Formerly the members of this Parliament were predominantly Danish, but it now consists exclusively of Greenlanders. Women can both vote and be elected to the *Landsraad*, and the interpreter of the Supreme Court is a woman delegate, Gulborg Christophersen.

The less easily accessible regions of Greenland—the east coast

and Thule areas—are governed by councils comprising four elected Eskimos and three appointed Danes—the District Commissioner, the doctor, and the clergyman.

The *Landsraad* assembles in the capital, Godthaab, during the summer, for a period which depends on the length of the agenda but which never exceeds one month. The authority of the *Landsraad* covers a wide field. Its deliberations concern fishing and hunting legislation, and the modernization of public health and education; it revoked the earlier prohibition laws—a highly contested decision which the regional councils rejected—and, last but not least, it disposes of the indirect taxes which are used for social purposes. Direct taxes have not been introduced so far, a fact which, strangely enough, arouses resentment in many Greenlanders. They are very serious not only about equality of rights but also in demanding equality in all civic duties.

More general political problems are hardly ever debated in the *Landsraad*. The interest of Greenlanders is still focused predominantly on practical everyday matters, such as hunting, fishing, or sheep-breeding, according to the season. But signs of certain changes in this attitude are beginning to appear. Two liberal groups and a social-democrat one have recently been founded, the chairman of the latter being a member of the *Landsraad*, as well as of the board of the Greenland Trade Union Association.

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

In labour relations, too, there have been changes. Till recently all salaries and wages were fixed by the State. Now there is a tendency to follow the example of modern countries by negotiating with trade unions as the representatives of salaried workers and wage earners.

Until 1950, there was virtually only one employer, the Kongelige Grønland Handel, a Government monopoly which controlled all industrial activities. This had the disadvantages attendant on any monopoly, but it did give the Greenlanders, until recently completely isolated, a reassuring sense of security. The local representative of the Kongelige Grønland Handel wielded more power than any administration official. The organization looked after the supply of all essential commodities, and owing to State subsidies prices were unaffected by the high transport costs. In fact, prices in Greenland were more stable than in Denmark. They are fixed for a whole year in advance and during that period are

not subject to the inflationary tendencies which are now painfull noticeable in Denmark.

The Greenland Trade Organization takes all products of th Greenlanders, who regard this—justifiably—as a purchasin guarantee. The rates for skins from the most easily depresse hunting areas are rather low, but the difference between these an the world market price is paid into welfare funds for use i emergencies. The Organization is also in charge of all local ship ping. This is of the utmost importance in view of the fact that o the west coast only a narrow strip of land 2,000 kilometres long i habitable, while east Greenland boasts a lead mine, two villages and several semi-nomadic outposts.

The easing of the monopoly in 1950 has paved the way fo private enterprise. Greenlanders and Danes who have been resi dents for at least six months may start their own businesses, re cently with the help of Government credits which cover 90 pe cent of the investment and are repayable within fifteen to twenty years.

With the exception of a laundry, which in view of the scarcity of water had to be closed, all the new private enterprises have already made fabulous profits, by European standards. They include grocery stores, small restaurants, a hairdressing salon for ladies (even the Danish women used to do their hair at home), a butcher's shop, a store specializing in radios, gramophones, and records (which is patronized also by tourists since it is the only one of its kind), a hot-dog stand with a view of the icebergs, and a snack bar.

Numerous factors help to support these small businesses, which are still on a very modest scale owing to the Greenlanders' lack of capital and initiative, but are already organized in a retailers' association. Greenland's business men are not compelled to concentrate on essential but unprofitable commodities like their Government competitor, whose list of goods, published each year, they study in order to supplement their own stocks accordingly. Private shopkeepers have improved service to customers. They have introduced the instalment plan, and in Godthaab orders are even taken by telephone and delivered free of charge. The absence of all direct taxes is, of course, a great advantage. The Government levies indirect taxes through the monopolized sale of alcohol and tobacco, enabling the stores of the Kongelige Grønland Handel to make greater profits in these commodities.

Industry is trying to keep pace with the advance of trade. Modern fish-canning factories and cold-storage plants can stand comparison with their European models. At the whaling station of Tovqussaq the red whale meat is heaped in mountainous piles to await processing. A typical whale (a total of twenty-two were caught during the two-month season last year) yields the following products: 7,125 kg. of blubber, 400 kg. of salted meat, 370 kg. of Mattack (the Greenlanders' 'ham', eaten raw), 9,600 kg. of dog's food, and 832 kg. of lard.

Technical difficulties and the high cost of transport render the exploitation of Greenland's mineral resources frequently unprofitable. The frozen soil defies the efforts of humans and machines to extract its treasures. For the past hundred years or so, cryolite, so important for the production of aluminium, has been mined in Greenland. No other deposits of this valuable mineral have so far been discovered anywhere else. Cryolite has always been Greenland's most important export commodity. Since the Ivigtut quarry where it is mined lies close to a harbour which is free of ice throughout the year, there are no transport difficulties. The miners, all Danes, are highly paid, at rates about double those prevailing in Denmark. Since they also receive free board and lodging and pay no taxes, they are even better off in regard to net earnings and the opportunity to save money. Mining directors and engineers receive a special production bonus in addition to their salaries. Workers who are willing to stay on for a second year may invite their families to join them for three months, during which time they are housed free of charge in attractive holiday villas in the seaside area which is known as 'Greenland's Riviera'. Far less favourable conditions exist in the coal mine of Qutdligssat, on the beautiful Disko Bay, much further north. Its annual output amounts to 10,000 tons and is consumed entirely in Greenland.

The Danish Government has never tried to exploit Greenland. Until 1950, however, it endeavoured to maintain a sound balance between income and expenditure. The new development programme is costing some 40 million Danish kroner a year—a large sum for a nation of only 4 million.

The difficulties of bringing modern civilization to Greenland must not be underestimated. There are no large centres which could be used as bases. Even Godthaab, the capital and seat of the Government, has only 2,000 inhabitants, including 500 Danes. Settlements with 900–1,200 people are regarded as large towns in

Greenland. The 2,000-kilometre stretch of the west coast has no more than 200 settlements which are widely scattered between the south and the extreme north (extending from the 60th to the 77th degree of latitude), and the greater part of the island remains isolated from the outside world for six months of the year, except for telegraphic communication. Thus it is clear that the introduction of a modern economy, the improvement of the public health service, and the development of a satisfactory educational system can only be effected gradually. In addition, the vicissitudes of the climate must be reckoned with—the storms and hurricanes and the paralysing cold. In the northern regions the temperature may drop to 45 degrees below zero. Nor does the long dark winter help to boost people's energies. If day is turned into night for weeks on end, the effect is comparable to the fatigue caused by excessive heat in southern spheres. Winter starts early and lasts long. Before his district is plunged into complete isolation, each shopkeeper must see that his supplies are well stocked to last out the coming months.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

There are schools, or at least some instruction centres, in 176 out of Greenland's 200 settlements, with a total budget for education of 3 million kroner per year. Instruction in Danish has become compulsory at the request of the Greenlanders, who wish in this way to smooth the path of their young generation to the outer world. Even the smallest village schools observe the principle of 'at least 3,000 words of Danish'.

There are several continuation schools—at Godthaab, at Egedesminde up north, and at Julianehaab in the south—where the instruction is on a high level. They are boarding schools, so as to offer the advantages of higher education to gifted children from all over the island. The secondary school of Godthaab, too, has residential facilities. Eighteen months ago this institution added classes in English and German to its curriculum. The average age of the students is higher than is customary elsewhere, probably as a result of the rather late selection of the gifted. Incidentally, practically all grown-up Greenlanders can read and write.

In former years, young Greenlanders studying in Denmark used to choose mostly practical occupations, such as ship-building, midwifery, nursing, radiology, etc. But now there are at least two lawyers and one clergyman with academic training.

Public health expenditure forms one-third of Greenland's total budget. There is a large and beautifully equipped T.B. sanatorium with 200 beds (built at a cost of 20 million Danish kroner) which represents Greenland's answer to Davos, as well as smaller hospitals and infirmaries.

There are at present twenty-two doctors on the huge island, including a woman who practises in the progressive sheep-breeding area of Julianehaab in southern Greenland. In addition, there are a number of so-called public health nurses, working mainly in the outposts. The absence of the title is the principal difference between them and the doctors. Particularly in the winter, when communications are cut, they have to rely on their own resources and sometimes even carry out surgical operations.

The public health services are at the disposal of all Greenlanders free of charge. One of the consequences is the steadily rising birthrate. Tuberculosis, however, is still the number one enemy of national health, though every effort is made to combat this scourge. Nation-wide inoculations have had a beneficial effect, and the ship *Missigsut* brings modern X-ray equipment to the remotest outposts. X-rays of the entire population have been carried out repeatedly in order to obtain comparative material. All microfilms are carefully indexed in the lung archives of Godthaab. In 1951 T.B. was still responsible for 31 per cent of the total mortality, but the figure had fallen to 25 per cent in 1953 and has probably been reduced still further by now.

The very progress of civilization in Greenland breeds the danger of epidemics. Whereas formerly venereal disease was practically unknown, gonorrhoea now afflicts an average of 1,000 persons a year, due partly to a rather free moral code. Greenland indeed represents virgin soil for most diseases. Minor illnesses of the white man may assume catastrophic dimensions among the native population with their hypersensitive respiratory organs. Time and again the threat of polio has kept schools closed for weeks on end. Just recently, the authorities succeeded in vaccinating the entire population against polio from the oldest to the youngest. No other country in the world can boast a more comprehensive treatment. In 1951 a measles epidemic broke out suddenly and without any warning in the township of Julianehaab. In the absence of any resistance to this illness—a resistance which in European countries is handed down from generation to generation—there were forty fatalities among the 1,200 inhabitants, practically all of whom were

taken ill. Thirty per cent of the patients, moreover, developed complications, such as pneumonia, T.B., or a recurrence of T.B. Today, of course, people are better prepared to cope with outbreaks of this kind, which now afflict settlement after settlement. But only last year the present writer witnessed a measles epidemic in Holsteinsborg when half of the 1,200 inhabitants were lying on their *briks*, a sort of bunk which serves as bedstead for the whole family. The filth and misery in many of the huts defied description—the feverish patients all coughed and spat freely upon the floor. Trade and commerce were at a standstill. The fish factories and the small wharf were closed, and schools were turned into emergency hospitals.

A little later an unusual plebiscite took place in the rather progressive town of Sukkertoppen with its lucrative fishing industry. A small boy had caught measles on the voyage from Denmark to Greenland, but was kept in complete isolation. A vote was then taken on whether the other children should be allowed to visit him. Although this would condemn Sukkertoppen to a widespread measles epidemic, the proposal was accepted by 566 votes to 93. It was realized that the outbreak of the disease could not be prevented indefinitely, and the short summer was judged especially favourable, since during the winter the provision of emergency beds and mattresses, medical supplies, doctors, and nurses would have been impossible, and the rigorous climate would have caused far more complications.

This decision illustrates the common sense and realistic attitude of the Greenlanders. They possess an inborn intelligence without which reforms would remain without substance.

A. J. F.

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 5 *May* 1957

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Notes of the Month

N.A.T.O. and the British Strategic Reappraisal

THE aim of the N.A.T.O. Powers was at one time the creation of a force of ninety divisions in Western Europe to form an absolute shield against Soviet aggression. Such a force was never achieved, and by 1954, when the Paris Agreements were signed, the aim had been reduced to one of thirty divisions. But the forward strategy of the 'shield' as opposed to that of the 'trip-wire' or 'plate-glass window' was not abandoned. The reduced target was justified on the ground of the increased fire power which was becoming available in the shape of tactical atomic weapons. Britain pledged herself under the Paris Agreements, though with certain escape clauses, to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force on the Continent, and Western Germany undertook to raise twelve divisions.

Owing to the diversion of French divisions to North Africa, to the slow pace of German rearmament, and to other causes, it appears, however, that the force actually disposed by General Norstad at the beginning of this year amounted only to the equivalent of fifteen divisions.

Since assuming the Supreme Command, General Norstad has referred to the ability of Anglo-American strategic air power to 'annihilate' Russia, but he has also repeatedly stressed the importance of providing the minimum 'shield' force of thirty divisions in Western Europe. He has rejected the 'trip-wire' theory on the ground that it might permit the Soviet forces to cross the line, to dig in, and to leave the Western Powers with the agonizing decision as to whether a strategic nuclear exchange should be initiated.

This view is supported in the recent British White Paper on Defence, where it is stated that 'the possession of nuclear air power is not by itself a complete deterrent. The frontiers of the free world, particularly in Europe, must be firmly defended on the ground.

For only in this way can it be made clear that aggression will be resisted.'

Nevertheless, in the same statement, the British Government has declared its intention to reduce its military contribution to N.A.T.O. from, as far as B.A.O.R. is concerned, a strength of about 77,000 troops to one of about 64,000 within the next twelve months and, subject to allied consultations, to make further reductions thereafter. In addition, the present strength in aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force in Germany is to be approximately halved by the end of March 1958. Whether these cuts will stimulate a greater or a lesser military contribution to the N.A.T.O. 'shield' from the other allies remains to be seen, but the general expectation is that the latter eventuality is the more likely.

Economic motives have, of course, played a powerful part in prompting these cuts, but they are also an expression of the conditions of the strategic revolution which are made clearer by some of the other economies and measures which are proposed in the White Paper on Defence. Fighter Command, for example, will in future have the role of defending not Great Britain, but the bases of Bomber Command. This is an admission that there is no direct defence against strategic air attack. The development of the long-range supersonic bomber has been cancelled. This is a prediction that the operative, though not necessarily the exclusive, future of strategic air attack lies with the inter-continental missile. The two divisions of the Territorial Army, which are at present earmarked for the reinforcement of N.A.T.O., are, if allied agreement can be reached, to be diverted to 'home defence' on the assumption that they could not be ready for action on the Continent within less than three months, 'which in nuclear war would be of little value'. This amounts to the assumption that the nuclear exchange would prove to be decisive within a period of three months.

Thus, it is clear that the adjustments now being negotiated between Britain and her partners in N.A.T.O. do not arise only from the need of Britain to reduce her expenditure on armaments The whole basis of the strategy of linear defence is also at issue.

Independence for Ghana

BENEATH the bitter conflict between the Convention People's Party of Dr Nkrumah and the National Liberation Movement led by Dr Busia and the Ashanti,[1] which at one time threatened to

[1] See 'Gold Coast Independence', in *The World Today*, February 1957.

delay the grant of self-government by the United Kingdom to Gold Coast, lay a common determination that there must be such delay. This, coupled with the fact that the differences betw the party leaders were as much personal as political, made possible for Mr Lennox Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, with great official and personal prestige, to pay a last-minute visit to Gold Coast and successfully mediate between them. The G Coast therefore became self-governing Ghana on 6 March planned, and the celebrations and ceremonies were duly carr out with great rejoicing and much goodwill towards the Uni Kingdom. On the same day, too, it was announced that Governments of the Commonwealth, including South Afri had unanimously agreed to welcome Ghana into their company a full member nation, and a few days later she was, with eq unanimity, admitted to membership of the United Nations.

In the world as a whole, and to the coloured races in particu the chief importance of these historic events lies in the fact t Ghana is the first purely African country south of the Sahara emerge from colonial to independent status. For the Comm wealth, and especially the United Kingdom, there is the additio satisfaction that its emergence should have taken place peacefu and with goodwill, as yet another example of the long process emancipation which began with Canada and will only end wh there are no more dependencies left in the Commonwealth wh are big enough to stand on their own feet. Nothing did more win Britain the confidence of the peoples of South-East Asia th the peaceful achievement of independence by India, Pakist Burma, and Ceylon. So now the example of Ghana will facilit the last difficult stages in the evolution of Malaya, Singapore, West Indies, and, not least, Nigeria.

For Africa the event is, perhaps, most significant of all. T prospect of it was in itself enough to evoke from South Afric declaration of willingness to recognize and co-operate with independent 'black' states in the Continent. Already the Fede Assembly of Nigeria has decided to seek independence for whole country in 1959, a compromise between the three Regi which was not in sight before, and which may greatly ease discussions on Nigerian constitutional development due to be in London next month. In East and Central Africa, on the ot hand, the repercussions of Ghana's independence may not entirely favourable because of the impetus which it has given

the new African nationalist movements. In Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland these movements aim at African political domination and are therefore in conflict with the policy of multi-racial rule to which both the United Kingdom and the territorial Governments are committed. In Uganda the policy is to develop a primarily African Government, and the effect of Ghanaian independence will merely be to strengthen existing pressure for speeding up this process.

Much, of course, depends on Dr Nkrumah. He has already proved himself to be one of the best agitators and politicians in the world, and he shows signs of statesmanship. He has already said that he is not interested in any Afro-Asian bloc but will work for the emergence of African states in their own right and to promote an 'African personality' in world affairs. He has said, too, that he will maintain friendly relations with South Africa and does not seek to interfere in the affairs of other countries. On the other hand he does see himself as the prophet of African emancipation, and he talks of building a powerful broadcasting transmitter in Accra. Dr Nkrumah, at forty-eight years, is at the crucial stage of his own development, and more than the future of Ghana depends on whether in him the agitator or the statesman will prevail.

Legal Aspects of the Suez Crisis

THE legal issues arising from the nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Nationalization Law of 26 July 1956 and the events which subsequently took place in Egypt are so diverse that any attempt to present them in logical sequence is virtually doomed to failure. It may be advisable, for this reason, to proceed in chronological order rather than evaluate the separate issues in their proper sequence within the framework of international law. These issues may be summarized as follows: the legality (or otherwise) of the nationalization of the Company; freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal; the hostilities in Egypt; the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations; and freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Subsidiary issues to be considered in this context are the extent of the right of self-defence, the legal nature of and the relationship between a general armistice agreement and the exercise of belligerent rights, and the limits of competence of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security. The material at present available on some of these issues is extremely vague and scanty, and such conclusions as may be arrived at on the basis of that material can be no more than tentative; they may well be proved false in the light of a later and more detailed inquiry into the events of the last few months. The present survey therefore cannot claim to be more than an extremely modest contribution to a problem the full implications of which may not become apparent for some time. The first event to be considered in the chronological sequence indicated above is the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY

The Egyptian Nationalization Law of 26 July 1956 provides for the nationalization of the Company, with immediate effect, and for the transfer of all its funds, rights, and obligations to the (Egyptian) State.[1] In making provision for the compensation of shareholders the Law states in article 1 that shareholders will be compensated on the basis of the value of their shares at the closing rate obtaining on the Paris Stock Exchange on 25 July 1956, and that payment of such compensation 'shall take place after comple-

[1] In the normal course of events the concession of the Company would have come to an end in 1968, viz. ninety-nine years from the date of the opening of the Canal (cf. article 3 of the Firman of Concession of 30 November 1854).

tion of the handover to the State of all the funds and property of the nationalized company'. Article 3 of the Law, which provides that 'all funds and rights of this nationalized company in the Republic of Egypt and abroad shall be frozen', makes clear the intention of the Egyptian Government not to pay compensation until such time as control has been obtained over the assets of the company wherever situate.

The first question which arises and is likely to cause a great deal of controversy is the precise status of the Company. It is almost universally recognized that the status of a company is governed by the law of the country of its incorporation, and for this reason it is essential first to determine the question as to whether the Company is an Egyptian company, a French company, or, as some have maintained, an 'international company' entitled to special treatment. Article 3 of the Statutes of the Company, of 5 January 1856, provides that 'the company has its seat at Alexandria and its administrative domicile in Paris', while article 16 of the Concession of 22 February 1866 provides that the Company, 'being Egyptian, is governed by the laws and customs of the country'. The latter provision further states that 'with respect to its status as a company and relations between its shareholders, it is, by special agreement, governed by the laws which, in France, govern joint-stock companies'.

Those who argue that the Company is French have always placed reliance on the fact that the memorandum and articles of association of the Company were entrusted to Maître Mocquard, a French notary, who subsequently kept them in safe custody in Paris. This circumstance, however, having regard to the express provision in article 16 of the Concession of 1866 that the Company is Egyptian, cannot be said to controvert the inference to be drawn from the latter provision, and it would seem to follow that the Company is Egyptian and not French. The fact that the status of the Company and the relations between its shareholders are to be governed by French law cannot invalidate this conclusion, because it may be assumed that it was considered convenient, almost a century ago, to provide for the application of a legal system which, more especially with regard to the constitution of companies, was more developed than Turkish law. Moreover, the administrative business of the Company has always been conducted from Paris, and it would have been not only inconvenient, but probably also fatal from the point of view of inducing prospective shareholders

to invest money in the new venture, to insist on the application of the law of a comparatively remote country. With regard to the third alternative occasionally suggested, that the Company is an international company entitled to a special status, there is nothing to indicate that any such novel conception was ever contemplated by those concerned in its formation. The legal conclusion, however unpalatable it may be, therefore is that the Company is Egyptian and accordingly primarily governed by Egyptian law.

It does not follow, however, that the nationalization of the Company as decreed in the Law of 26 July 1956 is, for that reason, lawful. It is extremely likely that the Egyptian Government, in framing the Law of 26 July 1956, deliberately chose the word 'nationalization'. Whether the nationalization so decreed constituted confiscation or expropriation in law can only be determined by reference to the relevant facts which even now cannot be fully ascertained. The rules of international law governing interference with private property—to use a neutral term—are still in a state of flux, but it may be said with some degree of confidence that confiscation, i.e. the taking of property without payment of compensation, is unlawful, while expropriation, viz. the taking of property against payment of compensation, is lawful in certain circumstances. It is widely recognized that property may be taken if compensation is paid promptly and if the amount paid is adequate. It is reasonably obvious that neither of these two requirements has been, or indeed can be, satisfied by the Egyptian Government, and it would seem to follow that the 'nationalization' of the Company in the circumstances in which it was decreed, and in the light of the events which followed, is contrary to international law.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL

Whichever view may be taken of the legality of the Law of 26 July 1956 and the premature termination of the Concession of the Company, it is quite clear that any such termination cannot affect the continued operation of the principle of free navigation. Article 14 of the Constantinople Convention of 29 October 1888 provides expressly that 'the engagements resulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession of the Company.' The engagements here referred to are those set out in article 1 of the Convention, namely that the Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

It is also provided that the Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade. It may be added that article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 19 October 1954 reaffirmed the determination of Egypt and the United Kingdom to uphold the Constantinople Convention.

For the avoidance of doubt, article 4 of the Convention makes it clear that no belligerent rights may be exercised in the Canal so as to obstruct its free navigation. The Convention thus prohibits the visit, search, and seizure of vessels of all nationalities in the purported exercise of belligerent rights. Egypt has claimed such rights not only as against all vessels sailing under the Israeli flag, but also as against vessels of other nationalities carrying goods, including foodstuffs, to Israel. There can be no doubt that such interference with shipping, which almost invariably resulted in the seizure and confiscation of goods destined for Israel, is contrary to international law even if—as Egypt asserts—the two countries are still at war. The Security Council accordingly, on 1 September 1951, called on Egypt 'to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force'. This call remained unanswered and was one of the contributory factors leading to the events of last October and November.

HOSTILITIES IN EGYPT, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1956

There is no need to recapitulate the sequence of events in any detail. Hostilities on a far larger and more comprehensive scale than had hitherto been customary on the frontiers between Egypt and Israel commenced at the end of October of last year when the Israeli army crossed the armistice line laid down in the Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. Some days later French and British forces landed at Port Said, whereupon the Egyptian authorities deliberately sank a number of ships in the Suez Canal so as to obstruct the freedom of navigation postulated in the Convention. The following questions arise in connection with these events: was Israel entitled to engage in hostilities against Egypt? Were France and the United Kingdom entitled to land troops on Egyptian territory? Finally, was Egypt entitled to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal?

The opening words of the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement of 1949 state that 'with a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine . . . the following principles are hereby affirmed', and article 1(4) provides that 'the establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine'. The General Armistice Agreement, as is well known, was never superseded by a formal peace treaty, and it is presumably for this reason that Egypt has always considered herself to be in a state of war with Israel.

Israel, on the other hand, has never recognized the continuance of a state of war between the two countries and has accordingly denied Egypt's right to interfere with vessels flying the Israeli flag and vessels of other nationalities carrying goods to Israel. Israel has adopted this attitude quite generally, and not only in relation to Egyptian interference with shipping passing through the Suez Canal which, in any event, is prohibited by the Constantinople Convention. In so far, therefore, as concerns interference with shipping in the Suez Canal, it is immaterial whether Israel and Egypt are legally still at war. It is important to note, however, that any such interference constitutes not only a violation of the Constantinople Convention but also a violation of the Armistice Agreement. This twofold illegality of the action taken by Egypt over a long period of time is of considerable importance in the present context because, whereas it may be doubtful whether a violation of the Convention as such confers any right upon an aggrieved party to take forcible retaliatory action, the violation of an armistice agreement by one party entitles the other to take certain action to which reference will be made presently.

Before this is done, however, mention should be made of other breaches of the Armistice Agreement by Egypt. In violation of article 1(2) of the Agreement, which provides that 'no aggressive action by the armed forces . . . of either Party shall be undertaken . . . against the people or the armed forces of the other', Egypt systematically ordered her armed forces and specially recruited personnel to make armed raids into the territory of Israel, more especially during the years 1955 and 1956. What action, if any, was Israel entitled to take in retaliation for these violations of the Armistice Agreement? No precise answer can be given to this question with any degree of confidence. Even the Hague Regula-

tions, to which neither Egypt nor Israel is a party, are vague and indecisive. They provide in article 40 that a serious violation of an armistice by one party gives the other the right to denounce it, and in case of urgency hostilities may be reopened without formal denunciation. On the assumption—which may or may not be justified—that article 40 of the Hague Regulations merely codified previously existing customary law, the position is still exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory. While according to the wording of article 40 an ordinary, as distinct from a serious, violation does not even confer the right to denounce an armistice, it can hardly be doubted that in practice only the aggrieved party can determine whether a violation is serious or not. The same applies to the determination of the question as to whether a case is one of urgency, so that initially the aggrieved party will have to determine the action to be taken. A true assessment by third parties can only be made at a later stage on a dispassionate view of the facts as they emerge when the dust of battle has settled. The questions of 'seriousness' and 'urgency', therefore, are ultimately questions of fact which, unfortunately, are not always divorced from propaganda. If we may hazard a guess, the accumulation of breaches of the Armistice Agreement and the greater frequency of such breaches during the years 1955 and 1956 were probably such as to entitle Israel to take forcible action in October 1956.

The action taken by France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, must be viewed in quite a different light. Whichever view may be taken of the legal nature of the Three-Power Declaration of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, of 25 May 1950, the landing of French and British troops in Egypt was not undertaken on the basis of that Declaration. The concluding sentence of the Declaration presupposes concerted action by the three Governments, and not action taken by only two of them. Moreover, it may well be argued that, as in the previous five years there were many occasions on which the signatory Governments failed to take action in accordance with the Declaration, the latter had been allowed to lapse, with the result that the signatories no longer considered it to be binding. The fact that it had been reaffirmed from time to time might well be regarded as immaterial, having regard to consistent failure to carry its provisions into effect. With regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the action taken by France and the United Kingdom clearly could not be said to have been taken

in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, as provided in article 51 of the Charter, and the conclusion is inescapable that the landing of British and French troops in Egypt was contrary to international law.

The further question then arises as to whether Egypt was justified in law in deliberately obstructing the free navigation of the Canal. Here again, it is difficult to express a concluded view in the absence of a full knowledge of all relevant facts. If the action taken by Egypt was indispensable to ward off the unlawful attack on Egyptian territory in the exercise of Egypt's legitimate right of self-defence, it would override any obligations under the Suez Canal Convention. If, on the other hand, the obstruction was deliberate in the sense that it was not a measure of necessary self-defence, it would constitute a breach of the Convention. If, however, such action was merely ill-judged, viz. taken without being necessary to enable Egypt to exercise her right of self-defence, it would not, for that reason alone, constitute a violation of the Convention.

THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

After the outbreak of active hostilities between Egypt and Israel on 29 October 1956 it soon became apparent that the Security Council would be unable to act. Both France and the United Kingdom exercised their veto under article 27 of the Charter, and the burden of dealing with a situation which had been complicated still further by the forcible action taken against Egypt by these two countries was thereupon cast on the General Assembly. No less than six resolutions were passed by the General Assembly in the course of the three months then following. The earlier resolutions called upon Israel to withdraw her forces beyond the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 and on France and the United Kingdom to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. When the French and British withdrawals had been completed further resolutions were passed reiterating the call upon Israel to withdraw her forces. Israel eventually complied, but not until after the General Assembly had been urged by some Member States to apply 'sanctions' against her.

It is essential, at this stage, to deal with a number of misconceptions voiced in the course of the debates in the General Assembly

when these issues were under consideration, and in the press of many countries. The first matter which calls for comment is the extent of the competence of the General Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 24(1) of the Charter provides that 'primary' responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the Security Council. Where the Security Council is unable to act, as was the case here, the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to any dispute which has arisen. This may be inferred *e contrario* from article 12(1) of the Charter. This inference, however, does not answer the question as to whether, if at all, the General Assembly is entitled to make binding decisions, and more especially recommendations to Member States for the taking of collective measures. On 3 November 1950 the General Assembly adopted the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution which provided (in part) as follows:

> If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security where there appears to be a . . . breach of the peace . . . , the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace . . . the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

This Resolution, the legality of which is by no means universally accepted, has never been interpreted as meaning that the General Assembly can make recommendations which are binding on Member States, as are the decisions of the Security Council. If, therefore, as was suggested at one time, economic sanctions had been voted against Israel, Member States would have been free to comply with or disregard such a vote, in the exercise of their own discretion.

It has also been argued that failure to comply with a recommendation of the General Assembly constitutes a breach of the obligations of membership of the United Nations provided for in article 4(1) of the Charter. This argument is based on an erroneous interpretation of the word 'decisions' in article 18(2) of the Charter, which provides that 'decisions of the General Assembly on important questions (including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security) shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.' The word 'decisions' is here used in the procedural sense only,

viz. as enumerating the exceptional cases in which a two-thirds majority is required, and not in the sense in which it is used, in relation to the Security Council, in article 25. This interpretation is fully in accordance with the basic principle of the Charter to confer responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the Security Council, and not on the General Assembly. No State is therefore bound in law to obey the recommendations of the General Assembly although it may, of course, incur moral—as distinct from legal—responsibility for its failure to do so. It may well be that the present tendency of conferring ever-increasing responsibility on the General Assembly will have to be reviewed dispassionately and *in abstracto* at an early date, so as to avoid a situation where this complete reversal of the respective fields of competence of the Security Council and the General Assembly may lead to dangerous illusions.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA

The last question which arises in connection with the events of the last few months is that concerning the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Gulf of Aqaba is one of the northern arms of the Red Sea, the other being the Gulf of Suez. Two islands are situated near its southern end, to the west the Island of Tiran and to the east the Island of Sanafir. The only navigable channel from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aqaba passes between Tiran and the coast of Sinai. In order to reach the Israeli port of Eilat at the northern end of the Gulf all ships have to negotiate this narrow channel. For several centuries the Gulf formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and for this reason, as well as for the reason that the port of Eilat is of comparatively recent origin, the question of free navigation in the Gulf has never been considered by writers on international law. Towards the end of 1949, however, Egypt erected gun emplacements at Ras Nasrani, on the Coast of Sinai opposite Tiran, thus controlling the entrance to the Gulf. Egypt herself stated in an *aide-mémoire* handed to the United States Ambassador on 28 January 1950 that 'this passage (between Ras Nasrani and Tiran) will remain free, as in the past, which is in conformity with international practice and with the recognized principles of international law'. Since then, however, she seems to have changed her ground, which is evident from the fact that she has consistently attempted to deny access to the Gulf to ships sailing under the Israeli flag and to ships of other nationalities

carrying goods to the port of Eilat. Her present position appears to be that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran form part of Egyptian territorial waters and that she is entitled to exercise unfettered sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf. At the time of writing the question is only of academic interest because Egypt no longer effectively controls the straits, but it is likely that she may soon reassert her claim to exercise full control over all shipping in the Gulf.

The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the *Corfu Channel* case is frequently quoted as authority for the proposition that the right of innocent passage through the Gulf must be fully respected in time of peace. The relevant passage of the judgment (which, incidentally, was concerned with the rights of warships, and not of merchant vessels) reads as follows: '. . . States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent.' That this dictum applies *a fortiori* to merchant vessels can hardly be open to doubt. On the other hand, the words 'straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas' require analysis. Whether or not straits are used for international navigation may sometimes be a question of degree. If a strait is regularly used by a considerable number of ships of different nationalities, the criterion of 'use for international navigation' will normally be satisfied. There is ample proof that in the course of the last few years ships of about a dozen nationalities have used the Gulf. This, however, is not all. Whereas in the *Corfu Channel* case there were only two riparian States, there are four riparian States along the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. The criterion of international navigation would therefore seem to be satisfied.

The matter may, however, also be looked at in a different way Instead of regarding the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba as a strait between two parts of the high seas, viz. two parts of the Red Sea, we may regard them as a non-territorial gulf, viz. a gulf enclosed by the land of several littoral States. Such gulfs are in law assimilated to the open sea and therefore open to the vessels of all nations. While, therefore, it can hardly be doubted that freedom of navigation cannot be denied to vessels of any nationality in the Gulf of Aqaba, Egypt may conceivably still argue that she is entitled to exercise belligerent rights against Israeli ships and ships

and cargoes destined for the port of Eilat. Article 1(2) of the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949, however, to which reference has already been made in a different context, clearly precludes Egypt from exercising any such rights. The prohibition of 'aggressive action' there postulated precludes the establishment of a blockade as well as the visit, search, and seizure of ships.

The tentative legal conclusions to be drawn from this somewhat rudimentary survey of the events following upon the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities in Egypt may now be summarized as follows:

1. The nationalization of the Company would not have been contrary to international law if prompt and adequate compensation had been paid. In the absence of such compensation it must be regarded as unlawful.

2. Egypt's interference with the freedom of passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal is contrary to international law.

3. Israel was entitled to take forcible action against Egypt in October 1956.

4. The action taken by France and the United Kingdom in landing troops on Egyptian territory was contrary to international law.

5 The simultaneous or subsequent obstruction of the Suez Canal by Egypt was (probably) contrary to international law unless it was required or genuinely believed to be necessary to enable Egypt effectively to exercise her right of self-defence.

6. The original refusal of Israel to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations to withdraw her forces behind the Armistice Line established by the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 was not contrary to international law.

7. Egypt's refusal to permit full freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, without distinction of flag, is contrary to international law.

F. H.

Yugoslavia Revisited

Change and Tradition in the Federal Republic

To someone familiar with Yugoslavia twenty or twenty-five years ago, Tito's country at first sight seems strangely unaltered. It is still a mosaic of nationalities, most of them very poor and therefore primitive. It is still a country where little or no opposition to the Government is possible, although most individuals are extremely critical of the regime and are not afraid to make this fairly plain. After the elation of South Slav union in 1918, in the 'thirties an acute sense of disillusionment prevailed: now, after the elation of liberation from the Germans and the enthusiastic support of many people, particularly the young, for the new Communist State, a feeling of general apathy has set in. Finally it is noteworthy that, whereas a strong Russophile sentiment in Serbia in those days ran counter to the Yugoslav monarchy's refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, even today there is a certain ambivalence felt towards Russia, from whom in the past the Pan-Slav notion derived, and later the Communist example.

This ambivalence, which is most marked in Serbia, helps to explain the Yugoslav reaction to the Hungarian rising. Certainly many Croats and Slovenes shared the general indignation of Europe against the Russians. On the other hand the Hungarian mood was an intensely nationalistic one: this meant that the frontiers of pre-1918 greater Hungary were spoken of, a threat to the rich autonomous Serbian province of the Voivodina with its big Hungarian minority of over half a million, the one substantial minority left in the Yugoslav Federal Republic. Nagy had to be sacrificed rather than this.

Has Tito achieved nothing towards the solution either of the problem of Yugoslavia's nationalities or of the problem of her poverty? His federal programme, first enunciated in 1943, was the thing that drew non-Communists to his side, and in theory it has been carried out. There is still a hiatus between the southern republics, Orthodox in religion and Cyrillic in their script, and the northern ones which are Roman Catholic and write as we do Today, however, it is not unknown to hear young people in Serbia itself discuss the un-Orthodox suggestion of dropping Cyrillic as an official script in return for a few concessions over Croatian spelling. The Croats still grumble over money invested in the

poorer republics, in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, rather than in the industry of Zagreb. They still discover that Serbs hold too many key positions in Croatia. If they do not like to be reminded by Hungarian patriots that their country, too, belonged to the Crown of St Stephen, their nostalgia for Vienna seems to have revived. Tito has had the statue of the 'counter-revolutionary' Jellačić removed from the central square of Zagreb, yet in a coffee-house facing on to that square a waitress will still in 1957 recommend a certain pastry as the favourite of Katharina Schratt, the actress who was so greatly devoted to the Emperor Francis Joseph in his old age.

So much for Serbs, Croats, and Magyars. The successful ebullience of the Montenegrins prevents them from becoming aggrieved, and the economic efforts which have been made to help Montenegro and Macedonia are considerable. As for the Slovenes, their language still separates them from the others. In the old days, through Korošec, they tended to dominate the Ministry of the Interior, a source of much power in a Balkan State. Today, since the death of Kidrić in 1953, they are influential through Eduard Kardelj; thanks to him they are strongly represented in the Foreign Office in Belgrade. Yet in Ljubljana they are apt to reproach the Yugoslav Foreign Office with a short memory for the Slovenes in and around Trieste, particularly since the London Agreement of October 1954 with Italy.

No one can tell what these feelings—like the sentiments of Welsh and Scottish nationalists—may bring about in unexpected circumstances. Inevitably there is interest in Slovenia and Croatia for the prestige and prosperity of neighbouring Austria since the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. But Austrian officials, with their new plans for Danubian integration, are too prone to believe that Tito's Yugoslavia is rapidly disintegrating. Among other things the Yugoslav Army of today is a unifying factor: Serbs no longer monopolize its highest posts as they did before the war, but while almost everything else has been decentralized (at least in theory) the Army is organized as a Yugoslav whole, and the officers' cadres are devoted to the Marshal. When all is said and done, even if he is no longer popular beyond the Party and the Army, Tito divides Yugoslavia less than the Karageorgević monarchy which was always Serbian in outlook.

As for the social achievements of Yugoslav Marxism, there is no doubt that disastrous mistakes have been made, and that Tito's

regime has been saved by American 'capitalism', in particular by coal imported from the United States. The attempt to collectivize agriculture has, of course, been abandoned for years, and only between thirty and forty State farms are kept going, mostly in the Voivodina: they specialize in stock-breeding and in growing fruit, but in spite of preferential treatment they suffer, like the State farms in other Communist countries, from being organized too much like factories. There are also a few collective farms left whose members are privileged in the use of equipment. But 80 per cent of the peasants are independent farmers, and although they may not own more than ten hectares, agricultural prices have been rising and they are no longer badly off on the whole. Peasant co-operatives, which are in any case traditional in Croatia, are encouraged by the authorities who help with marketing and by making available tractors and fertilizers. Local authorities have also initiated schemes for irrigation where it was necessary. It should be added that Yugoslavia, with three-quarters of her population still on the land, is still obliged to import food: this was not the case between the wars when, however, the percentage of agricultural population was slightly larger and the proportion of people who were underfed was undoubtedly higher. Concealed agrarian unemployment has been notably reduced but not abolished.

Investment in industry has been in part ill distributed because a conventional coal-and-steel programme was originally adopted in deference to a principle of Yugoslav autarchy. But Yugoslavia's important natural resources are water-power, timber, and non-ferrous metals like copper and bauxite, and after considerable delay and confusion the emphasis in planning is being shifted on to these. Hydro-electric plants have been constructed by the Federal authorities, especially along the Drava river, in Slovenia, and, in the summer when the Drava is high, Yugoslavia is now able to export water-power to Austria. Indeed, by way of emphasizing Yugoslav water-power consciousness, a World Power Congress is to be held in Belgrade this summer. The copper mines at Bor in Serbia continue to produce, while the chief bauxite deposits are in Dalmatia, Montenegro, and newly acquired Istria in Slovenia Before the squabble between Russia and Yugoslavia over Hungary, in August of last year the Yugoslavs signed an agreement with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Germany according to which the latter two undertook to provide a credit worth £62 million towards the construction of an aluminium factory near the bauxite mines at

Nikšić in Montenegro; the factory, with an annual capacity of 100,000 tons, was to be completed by 1961. In his statement to the Skupština on 26 February of this year, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koča Popović, announced that the Russians had now proposed 'an unacceptable delay'.

Hitherto the search for oil in Yugoslavia has borne little fruit outside Croatia, and the country is obliged to import about two-thirds of what it needs. Meanwhile, if coal and steel are today considered more realistically, the Yugoslav planners cannot put them out of mind. The country has plenty of lignite for what it is worth, and the railways manage to run punctually on it though ungrateful passengers lament the smell and dirt. Yugoslavia's most serious lack is coking coal, though the coking plants at Zenica and Lukavac have since 1952 been producing small amounts of coke. As for steel, production at Zenica and elsewhere is going steadily up so that by the end of 1956 Yugoslavia was producing steel on the scale of about one million tons per annum;[1] thus steel is beginning to be exported. But the country itself needs more high-quality steel for its own shipbuilding industry which, with world shipbuilding booming as it is, has rosy prospects if it can be supplied with the necessary materials. Already the port of Rijeka (formerly Fiume) is expanding into serious rivalry with Trieste. Early this year Yugoslavia supplied the fourth of an order for tramp steamers for Switzerland.

The figures for Yugoslavia's foreign trade during 1956 were recently published: during that period her exports amounted to 96,439 million dinars and her imports to 141,745 million. It is worth observing that her biggest suppliers were first the United States (to a value of 38,751 million dinars), then the U.S.S.R. (21,117 million dinars), then Western Germany (14,162 million dinars), followed closely by Italy (12,312 million dinars). Her best customer, on the other hand, was Western Germany, who took goods to a value of 14,712 million dinars, followed by Italy (13,703 million dinars); the U.S.S.R. only came in the third place (12,479 million dinars).[2] As for the satellite countries, Yugoslav trade with them in 1956 was inconsiderable: even with Czechoslovakia and Poland (from which she imported roughly a third of her coal) she exchanged less than with Austria or Switzerland. The United

[1] Her steel production in 1939 was 235,000 tons, and in 1946 only 202,000 tons

[2] In the first two months of 1957 Western Germany fell to fourth place, while the U.S.A. moved up to head the list.

Kingdom came fifth on the list both of Yugoslavia's suppliers and of her markets.

Yugoslav industrial development is critically hampered by the lack of technicians. There seems little prospect of a change for the better, for, while many students go in for medicine, few devote themselves to technical training. This is partly to be accounted for by a lack of instructors, and partly by the lack of incentives in industry; while an unskilled worker generally earns a minimum of 15,000 dinars per month, a skilled man is paid at most 30 per cent more than this.[1] The problem of incentives is much discussed, for instance by the Workers' Councils; these latter represent Yugoslavia's attempt to establish self-government in industry and constitute one of Marshal Tito's graver heresies in Russian eyes, for Moscow brands them as 'anarcho-syndicalist'. To the Yugoslav Communists the Workers' Councils constitute an important part of their effort to decentralize industry and perhaps their most valuable experiment in practical socialism: the Councils formed one feature of the Fundamental Law of 13 January 1953. In sceptical circles one hears the verdict that these councils only work well in backward areas where their members are too timid to speak, but there are sober judges who are far from pessimistic about their future development. Already they enable the ventilation of grievances and give their members, who are elected with relatively little pressure from the Party, a real sense of collaboration with the concern for which they work. This summer a Congress of Workers' Council members is to be held at which their election, their juridical position, and other points are to be discussed, such, no doubt, as the relationship between the Workers' Councils and the trade unions: the latter are mainly responsible for welfare and wages, and the former concerned with questions of management

Although the peasants are relatively free, and, if not prosperous, yet not badly off, they remain suspicious and hostile towards the regime: their hostility, indeed, condemns Marshal Tito to the active support today of only a small minority of his countrymen Even among the 25 per cent of the population which is urban, administrative, commercial, or industrial, some are hostile and few enthusiastic. As a group the industrial workers support the Government, but it is striking that the present generation of students in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, tends towards political in-

[1] Although the official exchange is about 1,000 dinars to the pound sterling, the latter is actually worth about 1,680 dinars.

difference, being primarily and prudently concerned with the prospects of earning a living.

On the other hand, the Government is becoming noticeably more liberal in the opinions it tolerates, and even consults, on matters, for instance, of economic policy. It was interesting that in March not only plays by the heretic Sartre and the not too orthodox Brecht were being performed in Belgrade, but also so 'decadent' a piece as *Waiting for Godot.* The general impression made upon the observer from abroad is of an authority which is being consolidated rather than disintegrating. The grandiose reconstruction of the centre of Belgrade which is now in progress adds to a sensation of stability and gives much satisfaction to the Marshal's admirers; they point fondly to the statue of Repose presented by him to ornament a courtyard between the huge new blocks of buildings. The development of Belgrade cuts in two directions, of course, for the Croats are apt to regard it sourly, and to complain that nothing comparable is done for Zagreb, to which the Serbs can reply that Zagreb suffered little enough in the war. It is at all events significant that there is no serious opposition to the regime from the leading Yugoslav writers as there was in Hungary and still is in Poland. As for Djilas, he enjoys little sympathy or even interest—there is, instead, a feeling that he sought persecution, not that he was a disinterested champion of the acceptance of political opposition as legitimate.

It has already been suggested that people in Yugoslavia grumble quite freely, and passive demonstration in favour of pre-Communist traditions, especially in favour of the Churches, seems to be on the increase. Dissident opinion complains of the lack of consumer goods or of their high cost: on the other hand visitors coming from Poland and other satellite countries are agreeably surprised by what the shops can offer. It is a standing Yugoslav joke that everyone is obliged to have two jobs because it is impossible to live from the wages of one. But this after all is reminiscent of a large part of Italy, which lends itself less well to a double wage-earning life than Yugoslavia, where office jobs can be squeezed into the first half of the day before a late lunch. There is no income tax in Yugoslavia, and social insurance contributions are paid only by the employing body, mostly some public corporation which requires profits only to plough them back. The high cost of insuring employees, some 43 per cent of the wage, helps to drive the small private shopkeeper or innkeeper off the market. But socially

the result is probably desirable. The employees in some big hotel, which is more or less officially organized, are better cared for, far better incidentally than they would have been in Yugoslavia years ago. When a young assistant-waiter in a railway restaurant car is found to be earning a mere 10,000 dinars a month and is obviously content, the visitor is at first bewildered. But although tips are officially abolished he receives a good many of them, he can travel gratis to his house in Montenegro (of which he speaks with pride), he has to pay no taxes except indirect ones, and, above all, he has three small children who almost double his wage.

For children's allowances are exceedingly generous, and may be continued, if the child is not earning, until he or she is twenty-five, i.e. has completed his or her university studies. Whether it is wise to encourage the birthrate in this way, and how the children's allowances are financed, are questions which rest in obscurity. Meanwhile one topic of the day, about which discussion is encouraged, is a plan to provide health insurance for the whole peasant population; being 'self-employed', it has not been insured hitherto. How this is to be paid for no one seems to know, the less so since insured persons receive medicaments etc. without any charge at all: it is somehow characteristic of intellectual Slovenia that national-health spectacles are much in evidence in Ljubljana

If Marshal Tito still has no designated heir, there is no practical alternative to the regime over which he presides. His ubiquitous photograph promises protection from Russia to those who incline to the right, while those on the left incline more naturally towards Tito. For the time being Belgrade and Moscow are on as bad terms as they have been since 1948, and Koča Popović on 26 February emphasized that Yugoslav relations with the West were satisfactory because the West does not attach political conditions to economic aid. His marked omission of any reference to either of the two Germanies was also interpreted as a rebuke to Russia for her insistence upon their division.

A fortnight before the Popović speech, the Albanian Government suddenly launched a bitter attack upon Yugoslavia for her alleged oppression of the Albanian minority in the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija contained in the Republic of Serbia. This was palpably a fresh Russian attack upon Tito to which a sharp reply came from the Kosovo-Metohija authorities towards the end of March. The controversy relates to one of the major issues which divide the Russians and the Yugoslavs, for it is clear

that Tito, like other Yugoslavs before him, dreams of a Balkan Federation independent of Moscow, while the Russians obstinately resist the creation of so impressive a political nucleus and centre of attraction as this. Albania, not Bulgaria, is their most convenient weapon in this fight, it seems; this suggests that the Russians still fear the notions of South Slav federation which Stambulisky attempted to implant in Bulgaria.

The other great issue between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. is 'What is true socialism?' Indeed, some good judges believe that the Yugoslav Communists long, above all, to establish their own messianic lead with such persuasion and success that the Russians accept it. Whenever there is talk of the decentralization of industry in the U.S.S.R. the Yugoslavs must dream of a Muscovite surrender, a dream all the sweeter to those who believed in the myth of the great Slav Mother. But they only wish to prove themselves not Western democrats but better Communists, and since that part of Yugoslav opinion which is not Communist is not sufficiently united to exert positive influence, it is as well to assume that the Yugoslav regime remains potentially anti-Western. The clash between Russian imperialism and the dream of southern Slav union, together with Yugoslavia's economic needs, may, however, preserve the pro-Western inclination of this essentially anti-Western State for many years.

C. N.

Soviet Russia and the Underdeveloped Countries

Trade and Aid

DURING the past few years the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and allies have dramatically stepped into the international economic arena, particularly in underdeveloped countries, in a modest but quite definite way. Soviet trade since just before the second World War has more than quadrupled. The formerly Western-oriented trade of Eastern Europe is now principally within the Soviet bloc. Bloc trade with the rest of the world increased by nearly 25 per cent in

1955. Bloc traders are travelling the length and breadth of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, showing their wares at fairs and exhibitions and promoting commercial relations. During the past three years the Soviet bloc has loaned more than £500 million in capital goods to underdeveloped countries, has concluded trade agreements with dozens of countries, and has expanded its trade with Latin America, the Middle East, and South-East Asia by small but significant amounts.

All this has caused concern in Western countries. After the second World War the average Western view of the Russians was that they were about three feet tall and had an irreparably war-damaged, basically agricultural economy which for decades would be involved with its own internal problems. But as the years went by the Russians seemed to become taller and the damage to their economy was repaired. After half a dozen countries had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain, the U.S.S.R. began seeking new lands to conquer, whether economically or politically. Now it is feared that the Russians may be at least ten feet tall and, despite troubles in Eastern Europe, are about to subvert economically a group of countries of great strategic importance.

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

Foreign trade has always been an integral part of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In order to achieve rapid industrialization the U.S.S.R. imported machinery and equipment and paid for these imports with food and raw materials. The purpose of Soviet policy was to reach the point where Soviet industry could provide all its own machinery and equipment. Before the last war the principal trading partners of the U.S.S.R. were in Western Europe. Trade with Eastern Europe was negligible. But after the war a drastic reorientation of trade took place. Eastern Europe replaced Western Europe as the chief Soviet trading partner. Trade within the bloc now constitutes about four-fifths of total Soviet foreign trade and as large a proportion of the trade of each of the bloc members. In 1954 the Soviet trade turnover was well over £2,000 million at official rates of exchange, thus ranking the U.S.S.R. as the sixth largest trader in the world. About £500 million of this trade was with the West; in 1955 Soviet trade with the West increased by 12 per cent.

Trade of the entire Soviet bloc with the rest of the world has also increased, hovering between £1,000 and £1,600 million a year. In

1947 it amounted to £1,200 million, in 1948 to £1,400 million. Trade in general declined between 1948 and 1952, when it was only £1,000 million. But since 1952 it has been increasing, reaching £1,300 million in 1954 and rising in 1955 by 24 per cent to nearly £1,600 million, with Eastern Europe in the lead with an increase of 35 per cent. The total volume of trade of Communist countries is now more than two and a half times greater than that of the same countries before the second World War. In 1956 the trend towards greater Soviet and Eastern Europe trade with the outside world continued.

The commodity composition of Soviet bloc trade with the rest of the world has changed significantly in recent years. Eastern Europe and Russia have in the past always been agricultural surplus areas. In 1938 grain accounted for more than 20 per cent of Soviet exports. In 1950 it still stood at nearly that percentage. But in 1955 grain had dropped to only 10 per cent of exports. In the early post-war years the bloc was a net importer of manufactured goods and a net exporter of food products. The growing population, emphasis on heavy industry, and difficulties in agriculture have now altered this position. In 1954 the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites became net importers of food, and the latter also became net exporters of manufactured goods. The U.S.S.R. remained a net importer of manufactured goods, although it doubled its exports in this category between 1952 and 1954. Between 1938 and 1955 the proportion of Soviet machinery and equipment exports to total exports more than quadrupled.

The change in commodity composition is producing a change in the geography of trade. The direction of Soviet bloc trade remained relatively stable in the post-war years, but it is now beginning to change. Trade with Western Europe traditionally represented a stable two-thirds of total trade outside the bloc. The principal change has been the growing relative importance of trade with many of the underdeveloped countries. The proportion of such trade rose from one-fourth to nearly a third in 1956. Trade with Latin America, for instance, increased from a negligible figure four years ago to nearly 8 per cent of Latin American trade in 1955. Large percentage increases, but small increases in volume, were also registered by many countries in the Middle East and Asia. Afghanistan, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Turkey, and Yugoslavia all did 10 per cent or more of their trade with the Soviet bloc.

The U.S.S.R. has made many of its transactions with under-

developed countries score far beyond their economic significance. Alert to the short-run economic embarrassment of underdeveloped countries, the U.S.S.R. has stepped in and bailed some of them out of their difficulties. The Burma rice barter agreement, the Icelandic sales of fish to the U.S.S.R., the Indonesian loan, the purchases of Lebanese goods not moving on world markets are just a few examples of Soviet use of relatively small amounts of trade as a device to enhance Soviet economic and political influence in excess of the value of the goods traded.

The economic significance of Soviet and Eastern European trade with underdeveloped countries is also exaggerated by such devices as lavish trade fairs and exhibits, trade delegations, advertising, and visits to and from Soviet bloc countries by high government officials. These activities were stepped up in 1955 and 1956 and made it appear that large quantities of goods were being and would be traded. In fact, despite recent increases, most countries of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America conduct only from 1 to 5 per cent of their trade with bloc countries.

CREDIT

During the past three years the Soviet bloc has embarked upon a credit and technical assistance programme in underdeveloped areas in which the U.S.S.R. has assumed the central role. While no strict organization is evident, it is obvious that some co-ordination and supervision are exercised, probably through the Council of Mutual Assistance, which co-ordinates Soviet-Eastern European economic affairs, and the new Soviet Chief Administration for Economic Relations. The most active countries other than the U.S.S.R. are Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

Since mid-1954 the Soviet bloc has made loans of more than £500 million. There have also been many other offers of loans, both specific and general. There is evidence that in many transactions bloc countries have charged high prices for their capital goods. Some accounting problems and differences between the offer and the contract and between the contract and deliveries are involved. To bloc countries their obsolete arms probably have little more than scrap value. To purchasers, however, these arms correspond to exports which could have been sold on world markets. Any valuation of arms as such is therefore arbitrary. Because of these difficulties, the estimate of bloc credits and technical assistance must be taken only as indicating an order of magnitude.

Repayment terms of Soviet bloc loans have generally been favourable to the underdeveloped countries. The main provisions are interest at 2 to 3 per cent, which is lower than the rates charged by Western countries and the World Bank; long repayment periods, ranging up to thirty years with no payment in the initial years; and bloc acceptance of local currencies. Balanced against these favourable terms, however, is the bloc's insistence on government-to-government transactions and on the use of bloc technicians to supervise the construction, installation, and sometimes even the use of the facilities purchased on credit from the bloc countries.

No small part of the attraction of the Soviet bloc credit and technical assistance programme derives from the methods by which the transactions were negotiated. Initial overtures have frequently come from high governmental levels in the U.S.S.R. or other bloc countries. Capable experts have been handling the negotiations. The negotiators have conducted themselves impeccably, have negotiated in a businesslike manner, and have treated the underdeveloped countries with dignity and equality. The effect has been strengthened by propaganda. The bloc has tried to identify itself with the nationalistic and anti-colonial feelings of the underdeveloped countries and has asserted that it is the mentor and prototype of developing countries. The U.S.S.R. has made much of the fact that the underdeveloped countries are in an economic position similar to that of Russia before the revolution. From the point of view of potential political benefits to the bloc, these offers of credit are highly advantageous. The principal recipients have been countries at the periphery of the bloc and newly independent countries who fiercely resent any hint of Western domination. Five strategically located and politically important countries have received most of the credit granted, to a total of about £480 million. They are Afghanistan, £54 million; Egypt, £125 million; India, £100 million; Indonesia, £36 million; and Yugoslavia, £165 million.

In Afghanistan the U.S.S.R. granted a £36 million, 2 per cent, thirty-year development loan for hydro-electric stations, industrial plants, and construction. In August 1956 the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia advanced another £10 million for arms. These two countries have also made a number of smaller loans to Afghanistan in the past three years.

The largest transaction with Egypt was the Soviet-Czechoslovakian arms deal, probably amounting to as much as £110

million. Nearly all bloc countries have made loans to Egypt. East Germany is building a power station and a shipyard, Hungary is bridging the Nile, Poland is building an enamelware factory, and the U.S.S.R. is building industrial plants and providing technical assistance. The U.S.S.R. had led Egyptians to believe that it would help on the Aswan High Dam. When Great Britain and the United States pulled out of this venture, the U.S.S.R. followed suit, but has since indicated that some assistance may be forthcoming at a later date.

The U.S.S.R. is providing a steel mill to India on a twelve-year, 2½ per cent, £40 million loan, as well as £6 million-worth of structural steel. India has also borrowed £45 million for machinery on another twelve-year loan. The latest loan, however, does not call for Soviet delivery of equipment to India until 1959. Many resource surveys of India are at present being conducted by the U.S.S.R., and when they are completed more loans will probably be forthcoming.

The loan of £36 million to Indonesia is an example of the way in which the U.S.S.R. has stepped in and helped an underdeveloped country out of financial difficulties. Despite Indonesia's wariness in dealings with the Soviet Union, she accepted the loan She stipulated, however, that at the end of three years Soviet projects should be evaluated, and it was indicated that a switch to Western credit might result if Indonesia were not satisfied with Soviet performance.

Yugoslavia has received the greatest amount of bloc credit—nearly £165 million, of which three-fourths is from the U.S S R In August 1956 she borrowed £63 million from the U.S.S.R. and East Germany for her aluminium industry. The U.S.S R had made an earlier loan totalling nearly £70 million, principally for development of extractive industries. Poland and Czechoslovakia have also made large loans to Yugoslavia. Pleading internal economic problems, but also rather obviously influenced by Yugoslavia's continued recalcitrant political stand, the U.S.S.R. has recently announced that deliveries on loans of about £100 million, including that for the aluminium combine, would be delayed until after 1960.

In addition to these five countries, many other countries have received loans from the Soviet bloc. Syria has bought arms on credit; Finland annually borrows more than £3 million to pay her bills to the West; and several Middle Eastern countries have re-

ceived bloc loans. Bloc trade negotiators are travelling throughout the world, expanding trade by small but significant amounts and offering credit where it will count the most.

Commercial transactions between the Soviet bloc and underdeveloped countries have strengthened economic and political ties considerably, and usually beyond the economic value of the goods and services traded. In some countries the bloc credit and technical assistance programme is now a significant element in the country's development programme. Afghanistan has a national income of only slightly more than £200 million and owes the U.S.S.R. one-fourth of that amount. Egypt's principal export, cotton, has a heavy burden to pay off the large debt to the bloc. In 1956 nearly 40 per cent of Egyptian cotton went to the bloc, which in 1954 took only 14 per cent of Egyptian exports. India has a foreign exchange gap of nearly £400 million in its Second Five-Year Plan and has already borrowed between a fourth and a third of that amount from the U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia now owes the bloc so much that its development programme is inextricably bound to that of the U.S.S.R.

In most cases where the Soviet bloc has provided assistance on credit, it has tried not only to obtain needed resources in return but also to relieve underdeveloped countries of their surplus products. In addition, the bloc countries are providing credit for projects which, when developed, will be helpful to the bloc itself. Yugoslav aluminium and Indian diamonds, which will be used in paying off loans, can be used advantageously to supplement the Soviet economy.

MOTIVES FOR TRADE PATTERN

The motives behind Soviet bloc foreign economic activities in underdeveloped countries are mixed. It cannot be doubted that for the most part they are political. The present activities are also an out-growth of the evolution of the Soviet economy over the past thirty years. They represent in part the coming of age of the productive forces of the U.S.S.R. without which it would be unable to undertake its present foreign economic policies except at a cost that could not be maintained for very long.

At the time of the revolution Russia was predominantly an agricultural country. When the Communists gained control, they determined that the U.S.S.R. would become a major industrial power and the predominant political force in the world. In pursuit

of these goals the U.S.S.R. has maintained a high rate of investment for a long period of time, concentrating on the construction of plant and equipment for heavy industry.

The process of industrial development in the U.S.S.R. has been similar to that in Great Britain, the United States, and other countries. The time span of Soviet industrialization may have been reduced by its ability to make use of technological changes already embodied in Western economies and by Soviet willingness to devote a fourth of the country's product to investment, at the cost of personal consumption. In about thirty years the U.S.S.R. has changed from an agriculturally-oriented, industrially impotent country to the second industrial power in the world.

Extractive industries, especially agricultural and food production, have progressed much more slowly than has industrial production, and they face increasingly serious resource limitations. For decades before 1953 agriculture had been relatively neglected and had received proportionately little investment. Increases in production have not always even kept pace with population growth. It is now becoming increasingly difficult to obtain additional output, since the U.S.S.R. must make up for a long period of neglect and overcome many natural barriers, such as unfavourable climate, limiting topographical characteristics, and a relatively small amount of arable land.

As industrial production has grown, it has become evident that the U.S.S.R. is not well endowed with all the requisite raw materials. In the metallurgical field, for example, many ores are of low grade, and it is becoming difficult to achieve production increases. The vast distances within the country itself aggravate the cost problem, and low productivity continues to hamper the extractive industries. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is totally lacking in some resources, such as natural rubber and industrial diamonds.

The sustained heavy industry investment programme is changing the relative costs of producing different items in the U.S.S.R. With expanded plant and equipment and greater experience in the manufacture of capital goods, costs of production have declined. On the other hand, because the U.S.S.R. has already exploited much of its low-cost output, it is now becoming increasingly costly to obtain additional output in the mineral and agricultural sectors. It is almost axiomatic that a shift in relative costs should take place, and it seems, based upon the limited statistical evidence available,

that the shift probably started during the Fifth Five-Year Plan period (1951–5).

The U.S.S.R. is now finding that its traditional pattern of foreign trade—that is, exporting raw materials and foodstuffs and importing capital goods—is not as advantageous as it once was. It can now export a relatively varied line of capital goods, such as trucks, tractors, agricultural, construction, and mining machinery, and structural shapes. In return, the Soviet economy obtains food and industrial raw materials, such as copper and quality foods, the domestic production of which would require a greater expenditure of resources than is needed for the capital goods which the country exports.

Thus the extension of credit and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries and the expansion of trade with these areas, instead of imposing a burden upon the Soviet economy, may well result in a small net economic gain. As the U.S.S.R. develops its industrial capacity further, resulting in increased demands for basic resources, and as these resources are gradually depleted, it will become increasingly advantageous for the country to export capital goods and to import raw materials. As the population continues to grow, it will also become more advantageous, and perhaps even essential, to import food. The economic and political implications of even a small shift in the foreign trade pattern are great, coming at a time when many underdeveloped nations need the kinds of capital goods which the U.S.S.R. is able to export, and when the U.S.S.R. can in many instances absorb their products. The use of economic measures to influence the policies of other countries is nothing new; the difference in the present situation is that whereas in the past costly efforts to exert influence by economic means had to be used sparingly, today the bloc finds that economic and political motives combine in recommending the same course of action.

ATTITUDE OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Underdeveloped countries may be said to have two principal aims: (i) the maintenance and strengthening of their independent status as nations, and (ii) rapid economic and industrial development. It is in the light of these basic goals that they judge the economic activities of the Soviet bloc. If these activities are thought not to threaten their political freedom while providing a source of capital goods for industrial development, they are welcomed. The

purchase of capital goods on credit from the bloc is regarded by many underdeveloped countries as an aid to rapid industrialization. In addition, in so far as the bloc represents a new customer, these countries feel that they will be able to pay for their expansion programmes without recourse to foreign-owned investment. But since they set a higher value on their political and economic freedom than on economic development, economic and political pressure will be anticipated and resisted by most of these countries.

The majority of the recipient countries are aware, in varying degrees, of the serious consequences of becoming dependent upon trade with the Soviet bloc. They realize that the bloc is not always a reliable trading partner, that it is susceptible to political motivation, that it might withdraw trade unexpectedly for political reasons or because of pressing internal economic problems, and that the economic and political stability of the bloc is still an open question. Bloc performance on its commercial agreements is not always predictable. Communist Eastern Europe failed to export as much to Indonesia as had been agreed. The U.S.S.R. has, in some instances, re-exported the products of an underdeveloped country to that country's own former customers. Bloc activity in the rubber market has been erratic. The Hungarian rising and subsequent economic difficulties will hamper the completion of projects already initiated.

Underdeveloped countries are not blind to the fact that their favour in international affairs is being sought by means of the Soviet bloc's economic programme. Despite Soviet protestations to the contrary, and even despite the economic sense that the new economic relationships make, these countries know that there are hazards in dealing with countries whose foreign trade is a State monopoly and whose economic leaders are also political leaders. They are wary of the influence of bloc technicians and are anxious to keep the number in their countries to a minimum. Administrative and bureaucratic frictions, an inevitable result of the nationals of another country working in and supervising workers in their own home country, can be foreseen by many of these nations.

To enlarge their trade with the Soviet bloc countries and accept loans from them is a calculated risk which many underdeveloped countries are willing to take in order to industrialize rapidly. There is increasing evidence, however, that they are taking a long and searching look into both the short-run and the long-run implications of economic dealings with the bloc before they

are willing to enter into any large-scale economic relationships.

THE SOVIET BLOC VIEW

The leaders of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries must be quite satisfied with their forays into the world. On balance their activities have paid, or will pay, economically, while politically they have perpetrated, almost successfully, one of the grandest hoaxes of all time. Many underdeveloped countries believe that the bloc group of economies can actually 'compete' economically with the Western world. Soviet trade and credit have bolstered the neutralist position of some underdeveloped countries, and others, repeating Soviet propaganda, have hailed the new Soviet posture as evidence of its friendly intentions and desire to help them to industrialize.

A great expansion of trade, especially with underdeveloped countries, is consistent with the Soviet Union's basic policy and its developing economic position. The Sixth Five-Year Plan, with its emphasis on heavy industry, will provide the base with which the U S S.R. can continue to increase its exports of capital goods. But even so, today and well into the future, there is a conflict of interest, first of all between the use of resources internally and externally; and, if externally, then between its own satellites and allies and other countries which have firm intentions to remain politically independent of the U.S.S.R. It must be a hard choice for Soviet planners to trade a steel mill now for jute, cotton, and tea to be delivered twelve years hence. After all, that Indian steel-mill would represent a welcome added boost to Soviet steel production. But even when the decision is made that the value of products received in return is greater than that of the mill, the problem arises of whether China or India should get the mill.

So far political factors, with perhaps some added impetus from the law of comparative advantage, have resulted in doing and contracting to do many things outside the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. has been helping China and Eastern Europe substantially during the past few years, and recent difficulties with its Eastern European satellites will probably result in more loans to them; but since no relationship can be established between Soviet activities in underdeveloped countries and satellite disaffection, the U.S.S.R. must feel its way along, helping the satellites a little more and at the same time continuing the credit and technical assistance programme in underdeveloped countries.

At present there seems no reason to believe that the U.S.S.R. and its satellites will diminish their efforts to befriend underdeveloped countries. The programme has been successful from their point of view. They are under compulsion to continue until it ceases to work. In all likelihood the size of the programme will gradually and steadily expand to the point where political gains are nil or the economic benefits have dried up and costs are so heavy as to outweigh the political benefits.

EVALUATION

It would be unwise either to underestimate or to exaggerate the importance of what has come to be known as the Soviet challenge. The West must take a searching look at the economy which purports to 'compete' with the West and the extent of its 'competition' so far. Competition here means economic competition. Certainly the Soviet bloc is competing in the larger and more important sense of striving to win the goodwill and allegiance of peoples and nations throughout the world. But the West is so far ahead of the bloc economically that to speak of 'competition' in the strictest economic sense does not signify realistic appraisal of world conditions. The only basic economic fact which can be established about the bloc economies is that totalitarian centrally planned economies can actually operate, given a police State and a stagnant standard of living. What appears as economic competition is rather the timely and strategically placed use of small amounts of resources designed specifically to enhance the Soviet economic and political power position.

The total programme is relatively small. So far, it amounts to only about £500 million, spread over five years. Deliveries, except of arms, are so far probably no more than 10 to 20 per cent of the total credits extended. The U.S.S.R. has delayed, procrastinated, and failed to make available the items recipient countries want and need to such an extent that many of the credits outstanding may well go the way of the unutilized loans to Argentina. By comparison, Great Britain has invested or granted £1,300 million in the last five years in underdeveloped countries. The United States foreign aid programme in the post-war period has amounted to more than £18,000 million, and each year U.S. foreign aid and credits total many times the amount to which the Soviet bloc has committed itself in the last three years. Bloc trade is minute compared with total world trade. The United States, for instance,

conducts as much foreign trade in two months as the bloc does with the rest of the world in a whole year.

Consider also the stature and growth of the Soviet economy. The economy is lopsided; agriculture is imperilled, service industries are very small, and consumer goods are at a premium. True, there is a substantial heavy industry, and Soviet economic growth in industry has been impressive. The announced drop in the rate of Soviet industrial growth from 11 to 7 per cent indicates, however, that the recent phenomenal growth of the Soviet economy is now waning. In addition, Soviet performance is considerably less impressive than the growth of industry in the United States when it was the size of the Soviet industry. While the U.S.A. was doing as well as or better than the U.S.S.R. in industry after industry, it was also developing the largest consumer goods and services industry in the world and the highest standard of living the world has even known.

There is acute controversy among economists about the rate of Soviet economic growth, and widely held beliefs about the exceptionally high rates of growth, past, present, and future, are being challenged. It is not certain what the outcome of the controversy will be, but when the dust settles perhaps a realistic view of the Soviet economy will emerge. It may then be recognized as basically poor in resources, still backward in its industrial operations, and able to command a voice only through its heavy industry and military prowess, built up at the expense of the Soviet consumer, his housing, his clothing, his diet, and the amenities of life. Certainly the reorganization of the planning system in late 1956 and the sweeping changes in the organization and management of the economy announced by Khrushchev on 30 March 1957 are indications of a deep-seated ferment which will influence Soviet industrial growth for generations and will have a direct bearing on Soviet foreign commitments.

The Russians are not three feet tall, nor are they ten feet tall. They have a poor, distorted, and arms-burdened economy. Because of their changing economic structure, centralized decision-making, alertness to the economic problems of underdeveloped countries, and adherence to the single principle of the primacy of their own power position, the Russians have made and probably will continue to make, in the short-run at least, their rubles stretch far beyond their economic significance in world commerce.

R. L. A.

The Siamese Elections of February 1957

LAST year the Siamese played host to the Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. For the occasion work was speeded up on Bangkok's newest Government-sponsored hotel with its kidney-shaped swimming-pool, and the conference was held in an air-conditioned hall specially opened for the occasion. Apart from its amenities, however, few people would have considered Bangkok as the obvious *venue* for such a conference. Not only was half the Assembly Government-nominated, but in 1952 less than a quarter of the electorate had bothered to vote in an election boycotted by the main Opposition group. But if the Government of Field-Marshal Pibul Songgram, Prime Minister since 1948, was frankly authoritarian in origin,[1] it had been surprisingly mild in enforcing its authority, particularly over the press. Shortly after his return last year from a visit to the United States the Prime Minister announced that political parties would be legalized and that the elections due in February 1957 would be free and honest.

As the election campaign warmed up a number of more-or-less Left-wing orators started to make rabble-rousing 'Hyde Park' speeches on the Phramane Ground in front of the Royal Palace. At first they attracted a good deal of attention and the Siamese public seemed to derive a vicarious thrill from wondering just how far the speakers could go. But the novelty soon began to wear off. Such prominent figures as Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, a former Prime Minister, and his brother Mom Rajawongse Kukrit, editor of the influential *Siam Rath*, both former M.P.s for Bangkok, announced that they would not re-enter politics until Second-category (i.e. Government-nominated) membership of the Assembly was abolished. The irrepressible Nai Khuang Aphaiwongse, however, re-formed the Democrat Party, though he, too, objected to the provisions of the Constitution which would maintain Second-category membership until 1962. Under the provisions of the first post-war Constitution, largely drawn up by M. R. Seni, the Assembly had been entirely elective but there had been a nominated Senate with limited powers. The Senators enjoyed a

[1] Pibul's supporters had organized a *coup d'état* which on 19 November 1947 overthrew the then Government, headed by Admiral Dhamrong and under the influence of Nai Pridi Nai Khuang, of the Democrat Party, then took office, and in elections held on 29 January 1948 his party won handsomely. The Government was then recognized by the Western Powers, and on 7 April 1948 Khuang, having served his turn, was ordered by the Army leaders to resign, which he did. Pibul became Prime Minister on 12 April 1948.

high reputation and showed considerable independence—a reputation and independence not shared by the present Second-category members of the Assembly.

As the elections approached few people thought that the Seri Manangasila Party was in much danger. Outside Bangkok and Chiengmai, the Northern capital, which greatly prizes its former independence under the Princes of Chiengmai, there is practically no Thai middle-class apart from Government administrators (the majority of shop-keepers, rice millers, etc. are Chinese). As the King's tour of the North-East demonstrated, the majority of peasants feel considerable loyalty to the monarchy but take little or no interest in the doings of Bangkok politicians. In the present stage of Siam's political evolution a few judicious words to village headmen and the suggestion that a new school or road would be built if the right man were elected can usually achieve the desired result.

The three chief Opposition parties were Nai Khuang's Democrat Party, which might be described as Right-wing Liberal; the Free Democratic Party, a loosely organized group with its chief support in the North-East; and the Left-wing 'Socialist Front' whose leader, Nai Thep Jotinuchit, had been released on bail after a recent unauthorized visit to mainland China. To confuse the issue still further there were two parties which supported the Prime Minister but were opposed to the Seri Manangasila Party. One of these was the Thammatipat ('Right is Might') Party, headed by Field-Marshal Pibul's secretary Nai Piem Bunyachote. The other was the National Democratic (democracy is a much-favoured word just now) Party of Colonel Mom Rajawongse Namphet Kasemsant, which was known to enjoy the covert sympathy of Field-Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Army Commander-in-Chief. The organization of the Seri Manangasila Party was chiefly in the hands of General Phao Sriyanond, the Chief of Police, who was considered Field-Marshal Sarit's most formidable rival. In all, there were over 900 candidates for 160 seats, including many Independents, but only the Democrat Party put up a national challenge to the Seri Manangasila. The Government faced its main challenge in the North-East, the South, and Bangkok itself.

The North-East is not only economically backward but has some grounds for feeling itself neglected by Bangkok. The majority of the population are Lao and immediately after the war there was considerable Lao separatist feeling, led by Nai Tiang Sirik-

hand, a war-time Free Thai leader who has since disappeared but may well be with the Pathet Lao. Many of the Socialist Front and Free Democratic leaders come from this region and polled very well, securing about a dozen seats each. Although the Seri Manangasila Party spent lavishly, both it and Nai Khuang's Democrats did less well. It was noticeable that one prominent North-Easterner and former Minister, Nai Liang Jayakal, who had always topped the poll when in Opposition, could only just scrape home when he went over to the Government.

The three Southern provinces with a large Malay Muslim majority also have a strong separatist tradition. Immediately after the war there was a determined movement, only suppressed by force, for union with Malaya. There have long been complaints that the Bangkok Government sends only second-rate administrators to the South without regard to the different customs and religion of the area. In the result the Government won about one-third of the seats in the South, the Thammatipat Party (pro-Pibul but anti-Manangasila) one-third, and the balance went to Nai Khuang's Democrats and Independents.

In Bangkok the election derived considerable excitement from the direct contest between Field-Marshal Pibul and Nai Khuang In every election except that of 1952, which he boycotted, Khuang has headed the poll in Bangkok. His fantasy-flavoured wit and reputation for personal incorruptibility—though he has been Prime Minister four times he lives very modestly—have so far endeared him to the Bangkok populace that they tend to forget that in so far as Nai Khuang can be said to have a political programme it is one of 'laissez faire'. Although supporting Siam's membership of S E.A.T.O., he was in favour of Siam's being less conspicuously on the side of the West. In fact, if not in words, he is no neutralist but merely wishes to revive Siam's traditional policy of 'not catching the tiger's eye.' It had originally been intended that the majority of Cabinet Ministers should seek election in the Provinces and that a rather scratch team should contest the nine-member constituency of Bangkok. It was suggested to Field-Marshal Pibul, however, not only that a Khuang triumph in Bangkok would have a bad effect on public and foreign opinion but that the Field-Marshal's personal popularity could retrieve the situation. A team of Cabinet Ministers was nominated, but it was noticeable that while most pro-Government meetings were either by invitation or with some additional lure in the shape of a

film or Siamese boxing show, Nai Khuang addressed up to 100,000 in open-air meetings. The Government pointed to the undeniable material progress achieved during its administration; Khuang alleged corruption and said that the achievements were due to American aid. The Government alleged that Khuang was secretly in favour of the royal power (he is himself a son of the last Prince of Battambang) and was hopelessly outdated; Khuang retorted that he was in fact one of the promoters of the 1932 *coup* which ended the absolute monarchy, and that at least he was too good a Siamese to support the Field-Marshal's eccentricities when war-time dictator, which included attempts to dictate the details of feminine dress.

The elections took place on 26 February. In the morning they were orderly enough. There was some indication that soldiers were voting *en bloc* for Government candidates, as in previous elections, and in some cases voters' names were said to have been left off the register. In the afternoon the position suddenly changed. There were repeated reports that Nai Khuang was leading over the Field-Marshal at almost every polling booth and that only two or three Seri Manangasila men were likely to be returned. Whether or not these reports were true, they were widely believed, and apparently produced a panic reaction on the part of certain elements in the Seri Manangasila Party organization. Not only were so-called 'paratroopers' said to be voting in the names of absentees but also 'fire-cards', or forged ballot-papers, were discovered in large quantities. Khuang supporters said that when they went to certain polling-stations to vote only Seri Manangasila numbers were made available to affix to their ballot papers. Even before counting had begun the Democrat Party was proclaiming that the elections had been rigged.

By early on the morning of 28 February tension had begun to relax. The Field-Marshal had a small lead over Nai Khuang and the Seri Manangasila seemed likely to win five of the nine seats. Those likely to lose their seats included General Mangkorn Promyothi, the Minister of Education and Lord Mayor of Bangkok, a favourite target of newspaper attacks. The counting (forty hours after the polling booths had closed) of votes at the last thirteen out of 224 booths produced an astonishing change of fortune and increased the Seri Manangasila representation to seven, including General Mangkorn. It was useless for the Government to explain that the late returns were from the military district of Dusit or to counter

that naval supporters of Nai Khuang had influenced the elections in Thonburi, the working-class district across the river from Bangkok, where Khuang's Democrats somewhat unexpectedly won two out of three seats.

For a people allegedly apathetic, the reaction was surprising. Royal Highnesses and pedal-cycle drivers seemed united. Mom Rajawongse Seni announced that he had reversed his previous intention not to re-enter politics and would not only give his services in the Democrat Party's court case that the elections be declared null and void but would also contest any new elections. Mom Rajawongse Kukrit published a signed editorial in which he compared Pibul and Phao to Stalin and Beria. Students announced that they would take part in a demonstration on the afternoon of Saturday, 2 March. Mom Rajawongse Namphet was also reported to be highly indignant and, although his party had done very poorly in the elections, this was important in view of his support within the Army.

The Government appears to have been surprised by the extent of the reaction it had provoked. Early in the morning of Saturday, 2 March, a State of Emergency was proclaimed and Marshal Sarit broadcast an address to the nation alleging that certain undefined foreign elements were trying to take advantage of the confused situation following the elections. All public meetings were forbidden and tanks and soldiers were stationed at strategic positions in Bangkok. When the students of Chulalongkorn University met that morning they hoisted the Siamese flag at half-mast 'because democracy was dead'. The Rector, Phra Vejjyant, who is also a Deputy Prime Minister and a successful Seri Manangasila candidate in Bangkok, failed to persuade them to raise it. A mass students' meeting which was planning a march on the Ministry of the Interior to present the students' demands for new elections was interrupted by the arrival of Field-Marshal Sarit. The Field-Marshal was at his most debonair, agreed that the elections had been 'dirty on both sides', and announced that although any public meetings were technically illegal students could go to the Ministry in twos and threes. The Field-Marshal was loudly applauded and the flag raised.

On arrival at the Ministry the students presented their demands and urged that students should be appointed to committees scrutinizing new elections—many students served as unofficial or party scrutineers at the last election. When told that they could

not see the Prime Minister the students marched in an orderly procession, augmented by onlookers until it numbered nearly 20,000, to Government House. Troops at first attempted, in a somewhat half-hearted way, to prevent the crowd from reaching Government House, but after a few not very lethal weapons had been thrown from the crowd Marshal Sarit gave orders that they should be admitted. The Prime Minister and Marshal Sarit then held a joint meeting with the demonstrators, whose demands now included Marshal Pibul's resignation. It was noticeable that only Field-Marshal Sarit was greeted with any enthusiasm and that it was he who persuaded the demonstrators to disperse peacefully.

Developments since the evening of 2 March can be interpreted in several different ways, and the situation is still somewhat obscure. Marshal Sarit, while still dissociating himself from the generally unpopular Seri Manangasila Party, has consistently refused to accept the office of Prime Minister himself. He has, however, suggested that the leaders of the armed forces should keep out of politics and that permanent officials should not be eligible for party political offices. This latter proviso would force General Phao to choose between being Director-General of the Police and Secretary-General (in practice organizer) of the Seri Manangasila Party. He also urged Field-Marshal Pibul to reorganize the Cabinet in conformity with popular opinion. Ministers under pressure to resign were reported to include not only General Phao and General Mangkorn but also two or three occupying important commercial ministries whose interests were supposed to be linked financially with those of General Phao. In any consideration of Siamese politics today an understanding of commercial rivalries is of prime importance.

At a meeting of the Seri Manangasila Party General Phao offered to resign his posts, and some military members of the November *coup* group hastily leaked this news to the press, presumably to prevent General Phao changing his mind. If this was their intention they were unsuccessful. Field-Marshal Pibul is an expert in the art of political balances and probably wishes to keep the services of General Phao not only as Siam's most efficient administrator but as a counterweight to the dominant Army influence. In the upshot a deputation of Assemblymen asked the General to stay on and the commanders of the Navy and Air Force also added their pleas. In fact, in the new Cabinet General

Phao not only retains his former office of Chief of Police but has moved up to become Minister of the Interior.

What, then, will be the results of this fine flurry? Immediately and tangibly very little. The state of emergency was lifted on 15 March, and Field-Marshal Pibul was reappointed Prime Minister on 21 March. The Cabinet he announced on 31 March differed little from its predecessor, though Marshal Sarit's position in it (he is now Minister of Defence) was notably strengthened. But whatever commercial interests, political ambitions, and desires to become a national hero may underlie present surface tensions in the ruling *coup* group, their common interests are still probably strong enough to hold them together.

Internationally speaking, however, the results may well be profound. The Americans, who may hitherto have been inadequately informed about the situation, have been surprised at the revelation of the full extent of the regime's unpopularity and perhaps alarmed at some of the latent anti-Americanism revealed in the pronouncements of both sides. Not only did the Democrat Party allege that some covert American support had been given to the Government in the elections but a Government spokesman even suggested that the students' demonstration had been provoked by a U.S. pamphlet on the Budapest rising. There is no doubt that what one observer has called 'the moonflower legend of Siamese political apathy' has begun to fade. From the long-term point of view this is good not only for Siam herself but also for the West. If any regime is to stand up to Communist pressures it must have a popular basis. At the same time it is only the Communists who can be deriving immediate comfort from the February elections and their aftermath. An authoritarian Government that shows signs of losing its nerve is desperately vulnerable to external as well as internal pressures.

L. M.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 No. 6 June 1957

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Notes of the Month

After Signor Segni: The Fate of Four-Power Coalition in Italy

WHEN President Coty arrived in Rome on 9 May for his long-prearranged State visit the Italian Government had already resigned, and Signor Segni and his colleagues only remained nominally in office for a few days longer in order to welcome the French President. Less than a fortnight later France too found herself without a Government, following the parliamentary defeat of M. Mollet on 21 May.

The relative stability of Italian post-war Governments, by comparison with the situation in France, has often been stressed: since the end of the war there have in fact been twenty-one French Governments, as against thirteen in Italy—and, of those thirteen, eight, between December 1945 and mid-1953, were under the premiership of Signor De Gasperi.

The De Gasperi Governments between the two Elections of 1948 and 1953 represent the heyday of the '*quadripartito*' formula—the formula of coalition between the four Centre democratic parties, with the (Catholic) Christian Democrat party as the major partner throughout, acting in collaboration with the three much smaller lay parties, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Republicans. It is the persistance of this coalition formula, which with some modifications has outlasted the De Gasperi period until today, that largely accounts for post-war governmental stability in Italy. But while Signor De Gasperi succeeded in strongly impressing his own view of the vital necessity, in Italy's particular conditions, of this Catholic-lay collaboration, since his death the impetus towards it has dwindled and the coalition, with all the difficulties of adjustment that it involves, has in many quarters come to be regarded more as a parliamentary necessity than as an end desirable in itself. The question therefore now arises, will the Segni Government be the last of its line, marking the end of this long-standing collaboration between the democratic Catholic and lay forces?

The circumstances in which this vital question has been posed

are generally agreed to be awkward. For a General Election is in any case due in the spring of 1958, and it had been hoped, and indeed till lately seemed likely, that the Segni Government would survive till then. By that time it was believed that the situation might have become clearer concerning the major new factor which during the past few months has entered into the political scene—the possibility of reunification of the two Socialist parties, that of Signor Nenni, till lately closely tied to the Communists, and the Social Democrat party of Signor Saragat, which till now has supported the Government coalition ever since it split from the Socialist Party in 1947.

It was Signor Saragat's announcement, on 12 May, of his party's intention to withdraw from the Government that caused the resignation of Signor Segni. The Social Democrats had hitherto resisted pressure to take this step, which Signor Nenni's Socialists regarded as a prerequisite for unification. But Signor Saragat, in a speech which lived up to his reputation as a hair-splitting philosopher, explained that conditions had now changed: four-party collaboration had already been weakened by the Republican Party's decision in February to go over to the Opposition; the illusion that Communism no longer constituted so great a danger had created apathy among the democratic parties; and his own party had recently received assurances that its withdrawal from the Government would not be misinterpreted in the world of international Socialism as an equivocal prelude to Socialist unification he therefore felt that at present his party's continuance in the Government constituted 'a useless sacrifice'—though at the same time he held out hopes of the Social Democrats' return to a revivified coalition.

Such a coalition proved impossible to reconstitute in view of the Republican Party's refusal to collaborate; and the depth of divisions on this whole question of the *quadripartito's* continued validity can be gauged from the intensity with which this tiny party (it has only five Deputies in the present Parliament) was alternately praised or blamed for its decision. For the Radical *Il Mondo*, the Republican Party had provided the 'sole example of dignity' in resisting all blandishments to help to revive a Centre coalition which had 'come to a bad end'; on the other hand the centre and independent press united in making the Republicans the scapegoats for the failure to revive a coalition which the *Corriere della Sera*, with somewhat belated enthusiasm, now

described as 'the only effective way of safeguarding certain values in the modern State'.

The fate of Signor Zoli's single-party Christian Democrat Government, formed on 19 May as the only way out of the present impasse, will be known by the time these notes appear. Its survival will depend on Signor Zoli's programme and on the sporadic support it may obtain, avoiding controversial issues, from other parties to its right or left.

The Eden Plans Reinterpreted

JUST over a year ago the Soviet Government presented new proposals to the United Nations Disarmament Committee, then, as now, meeting in London. They suggested *inter alia* a zone within which there should be limitation and inspection of armaments, an agreement on the maximum level of Soviet, British, United States, and French forces within this zone, and the exclusion of all atomically equipped military forces and all types of nuclear weapons. This proposal was described as a development of the Eden Plan. In a letter to President Eisenhower last November, Mr Bulganin developed these ideas further: there should be a withdrawal of all armed forces (to a given depth) behind a demilitarized zone in Central Europe, and the scheme was linked with President Eisenhower's 'open skies' suggestion and the earlier inspection suggestions. At the end of March 1957 the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Sub-Committee put forward yet another plan which included a zone for the limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe, including both parts of Germany and neighbouring States. In a letter to Mr Macmillan delivered on 20 April, Mr Bulganin told him that the Soviet Government was prepared to take up again the proposals which Sir Anthony Eden had put forward in general terms for the creation of a demilitarized zone in Europe.

President Eisenhower told a press conference in Washington on 8 May that 'proposals for setting up disarmament "test areas" would be studied very sympathetically and very earnestly.'[1] This statement produced a protest in Bonn on the ground that it implied the separation of the problem of security and disarmament from that of unity, and President Eisenhower's words were described as the third shock to German foreign policy in the last ten months.[2]

[1] *New York Times*, 9 May 1957.

[2] *Die Welt*, 18 May 1957. The previous shocks were said to have been the Radford Plan and the new British defence policy.

A few days later Mr Dulles held a press conference at which he declared that no demilitarized zone in Europe based on the continued partition of Germany would be acceptable to the United States. He said that the Eden Plan would not have involved the creation of a demilitarized zone in Europe but rather the inspection of the areas behind the East–West frontier which would still be militarized.[1]

During a press conference at the close of the C.D.U. Conference in Hamburg on 15 May, Dr Adenauer argued that the Soviet proposal for military inspection within a zone in Central Europe, without reunification, had nothing to do with disarmament, which could only come about at a later stage. The Federal German Government would agree to inspection so long as the area chosen was not limited to the Federal Republic alone. On reunification he said that, if the Russians feared that the setting free of East Germany would increase the defensive potential of the West, the Federal Government would agree to the stationing of N.A.T.O. Forces no further east than the present zonal border.

It seems obvious that during the period that has elapsed since the then British Prime Minister made the proposals at the Summit Conference at Geneva in July 1955 which have since been referred to as the Eden Plan or Plans, considerable confusion has arisen as to what he actually said. Documentary evidence as to what he in fact proposed is to be found in the British Government's official report of that Conference.[2] He put forward two plans. The first concerned German reunification: it suggested an approach to this problem through a mutual security pact and through the limitation and control of armaments in an agreed zone on either side of the border of a reunited Germany, with the eventual possibility of creating a demilitarized zone.[3] This plan was further developed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference, also at Geneva, in the following October.[4]

The second proposal was that an attempt should be made to try and reach agreement as to the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany and to join in a system of reciprocal control to supervise the arrangement effectively. 'To try and provide some further reassurance . . . we should be ready to examine the possibility of a

[1] *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, 15 May 1957.
[2] Cmd. 9543, pp. 16–18. [3] *ibid.*, pp. 16–18.
[4] Cmd. 9633, pp. 103–7.

demilitarized area between East and West.'[1] Among the directives given by the Heads of State at the conclusion of the July meeting to the Foreign Ministers for their meeting in October, the first fell under the heading 'European Security and Germany' and included:

> A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provision for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor;
> Limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments;
> Establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement;

But in fact this first item of these directives was not, for reasons never officially given, discussed by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting at Geneva in October, and the omission has since become the subject of much inspired speculation which alleged that the item was omitted at the direct request of the Federal German Government.

In answer to a question in the House of Commons on 13 May 1957, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, gave some further elucidation of Sir Anthony Eden's proposals.[2] He began with the categorical assertion: 'There is no Eden Plan for a neutral zone in Europe... It is alleged that Sir Anthony Eden supported the idea of a demilitarized zone on either side of the present dividing line in Germany. That is untrue. What Sir Anthony Eden in fact suggested at the Summit meeting was that in specified areas of agreed extent on either side of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe joint inspecting teams should operate by mutual consent. The idea of this proposal was to gain practical experience in the operation of disarmament control techniques. It was connected with disarmament and not with European security and has been superseded by subsequent discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee on problems of disarmament control. With regard to the other plans put forward by Sir Anthony Eden, they were on the assumption of a reunified Germany.' These proposals were for the reunification of Germany on the basis of freedom and there were also outline plans of a treaty of assurance on the reunification of Germany. 'By those proposals,' Mr Selwyn Lloyd added, 'we still stand.'

[1] *ibid.*, p. 18. [2] *Hansard* (Commons), 13 May 1957, vol. 107, col. 19.

India's Second General Election

Congress Receives a Warning

If one may judge from newspaper editorials, dinner-table conversation, and casual comment, the Indian public wanted two results from its General Election. It wanted a Congress victory sufficiently sweeping to ensure a Government with the authority to carry out the Second Five-Year Plan with boldness and decision; and it wanted an Opposition sufficiently powerful to keep the Congress constantly reminded that it is in office by the electorate's pleasure.

Most people felt that these two desires were incompatible. They were afraid that the Election would in fact give them either a Congress made arrogant and careless by the weakness of its opponents, or—if the Opposition should do well, which was generally considered unlikely—a dangerous instability in a number of States or a conflict between them and the Centre which would imperil the Plan. In the event, however, the public got both its wishes. The Congress came back in formidable force; and the Opposition vote was such that the Congress has been engaged since its victory, not in self-congratulation, but in self-criticism and soul-searching.

The Congress success was a very considerable one. The party has been in office for over ten years, and they have not been easy years. They included Partition, the migration to India of over 8 million people from Pakistan, a considerable rise in the cost of living, a large increase in taxation, and, recently, a renewal of the pre-war concern about unemployment. In such circumstances, in democratic countries, the party in office normally loses votes, however well affairs may be going otherwise. The Congress not only did not lose votes but it actually gained some. Its percentage of the total vote went up from 45 in 1952 to 46·5 in 1957 (allowing for readjustment due to the changes caused by the Reorganization of States in 1956). In certain States its increase was sharp. In Assam it went up from 43·9 to 56·6 per cent, in West Bengal from 38·4 to 46·3 per cent, in Madhya Pradesh from 45·2 to 47·9 per cent, and in the Punjab from 38·36 to 46 per cent. Moreover it wiped out the Communists' foothold in Tanjore, and it made deep inroads into their stronghold, South Telengana. Overall, it won 366 seats in Parliament (or three-quarters of the total), as against 354 in the 1952 Election, and obtained two-thirds of the total seats in

the State Assemblies. The final distribution of seats in Parliament is as follows (with the previous position given in brackets): Congress 366 (354); Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) 18 (20); Communist Party 29 (26).

The following table shows the present number of Congress Party seats, and its percentage of votes, in the different States:

State	*Congress percentage* 1952	1957[1]	*Total number of seats*	*Number won by Congress*
Assam	43·9	56·6	108	71
Bihar	42·1	43·1	318	210
Bombay	52·8	48·2	396	233
Kerala	42 3	38 2	126	43
Madhya Pradesh	45·2	47·9	288	231
Madras	35 5	42	205	151
Mysore	49	50·9	208	150
Orissa	38	38·5	140	56
Punjab	38·4	46	154	118
Rajasthan	39·8	44	176	119
Uttar Pradesh	47·9	42·7	430	286
West Bengal	38·4	46 3	252	152
Telengana[2]	37 5	46 5	105	68

Fundamentally, the Congress victory was a vote of confidence by the electorate in Congress policies. The public was showing its approval of land reform, the First Five-Year Plan, the socialist pattern, and Mr Nehru's foreign policy. It is true that one cannot usually say that in one particular constituency the battle was fought and won on land reform, or that in some other constituency a defender of non-alignment and the Panch Shila trounced a bitter opponent. In North Bombay, indeed, where Mr Krishna Menon was standing, Mr Nehru specifically made his foreign policy an issue, and the vote against India at the Security Council probably gave Mr Menon the seat—it certainly gave him his considerable majority. But that was the normal closing of the ranks under foreign attack; foreign policy was not a real issue, and Mr Menon's Praja Socialist opponent was equally non-aligned, and equally firm about Kashmir. Where the Congress gained was from the fact that its main policies were accepted even by the Opposition. The Election, therefore, had no issues. The Congress was able to go before the public on its record and its plans for the future, and the Opposition was reduced to local issues and criticism of detail. Nobody except a few Independents stood for free enterprise, and all but one of them were defeated. Nobody at all, not even the

[1] Adjusted to take into account the changes caused by the Reorganization of States in 1956.

[2] Only the Telengana area of Andhra went to the polls because the rest had been elected in 1956 when 196 seats were filled, of which Congress holds 146.

Communists, stood for an alliance with Russia or the United States. Nobody advocated the intervention of U.N. troops, or a plebiscite without preconditions, in Kashmir. Nobody, not even the Maharajahs who won as Independents, stood for the undoing of land reform. Nobody, equally, not even the Kerala Communists, stood for collective farming. The Communists and the Praja Socialists did, it is true, want even more nationalization than the Congress has already brought about; but whether or not banks or foreign-owned plantations should be nationalized was never treated by them or anybody else as more than marginal.

This universal acceptance of the main lines of their programme was a great advantage to the Congress. It was certainly not the result of political calculation on the part of their opponents. The effect on the public of Mr Jai Prakash Narain's criticism of Mr Nehru over Hungary showed that foreign policy, for example, could have been made an issue; had the Praja Socialists followed up their occasional criticism that India might be helping to solve the world's problems but was not gaining sympathy for her own difficulties in Kashmir and Ceylon and Goa and South Africa, they might have found it a vote-winner. Similarly, the natural difficulties of the Life Insurance Corporation's first year, or the small trader's fears of the State Trading Corporation, or the way in which estimates have been repeatedly exceeded in most of the Government's major projects, might have provided some very lively propaganda for any party which was prepared to campaign for private enterprise. The reason why non-alignment and the socialist pattern went so unscathed was neither that there was no material with which to attack them, nor that the public could not conceivably be convinced by any such attacks. It was that they have become so much part of the way of thought of the educated Indian that even the Opposition politician finds it difficult to think in any other terms.

On local issues the Congress had no such advantage. It is normal for there to be far more local grievances than local causes of satisfaction with the Government of the day. Nevertheless, even here the Congress did not do badly. The form of the Indian Five-Year Plan is such that the local Congress candidate can usually point to a good deal having been done in his constituency, especially if it happens to contain a successful community project. This village has a new school, that one has a new dispensary, a third has a new approach road; and all of them may have benefited from a new

variety of cotton, or from co-operative credit for fertilizers. As one goes round India, the achievements of the First Five-Year Plan are everywhere visible in dams and roads and new buildings; and inevitably these achievements have meant Congress votes.

In addition, the Congress has gained in certain areas from specific policies of great local effect. Sometimes this policy has been political. The Congress has been very successful in absorbing other parties of more or less—sometimes less rather than more—the same general outlook. In Andhra it has taken back its own splinter groups, the Krishikar Lok and the Praja Party. In Madras it has absorbed the Toilers' Party and the Commonweal Party. Above all, in the Punjab it has taken in the Akalis, the Sikh communal party, and has thus given itself an even more unquestionable position amongst the Sikhs than it already had amongst the Hindus. More rarely, the local policy which has mattered has been something a Congress Government has done. The defeat of the Communists in Tanjore undoubtedly owes a good deal to the legislation which has increased the tenant's share of the crop from 25 to 60 per cent; the inroads which have been made into Communist strength in Telengana are partly the result of the efforts which have been made there to reduce the tenant's rent and to distribute the large estates amongst the peasants; the solid success of the Congress in the West Bengal countryside is partly a reward for the way in which the party has consistently sacrificed the interests of Calcutta and its middle class for the countryside's advantage.

Against the massive Congress success, the Opposition may seem at first sight not to have done very well. No Opposition party has won enough seats in the central Parliament to be effective; the biggest Opposition party in Parliament, the Communists, has only 29 seats. Nor has any Opposition party done well in more than a fraction of the States.

The Communists have exulted greatly that they are now represented in every State Assembly; they do not add that, except in Bengal, they have not won more than half a dozen seats in any State north of the Vindhyas, that even in Bengal their victories were all concentrated in and around Calcutta, that in Bombay their success is deceptive, and that south of the Vindhyas they had hardly any victories in Madras or Mysore. Their strength is still concentrated in two States, Andhra and Kerala, which provided them with two-fifths of their Parliamentary votes; and, though they achieved a great triumph in Kerala, where they have won an

election for the first time in history, in Andhra they have lost way. Their percentage of the total vote has gone up from 5 to 9, largely because they have fought many more seats and they have established themselves as the most feared Opposition party. But they have a long way to go before they can be a real threat to the Congress. They must, to begin with, win some more seats in the States—numbering three-quarters of the total—where they have but a handful of representatives.

The Praja Socialists have had a disappointing Election. Last time their two constituents, the Socialists and the K.M.P. Party, between them obtained just over 16 per cent of the vote; this time they have got only 10 per cent. They remain the Opposition party with the largest vote, but in Parliament they have 11 fewer seats than the Communists, and 3 fewer in the combined State Assemblies. However, the Praja Socialists have greatly strengthened their position in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Bombay, in all of which States they now have enough members to be an effective Opposition. In Uttar Pradesh they have 44 seats as against 19 in 1952, in Bihar 31 as against 24, in Bombay 36 as against 9. Their failure has been in the south and the centre. The splitting-off of the Lohia Socialists has cost them their foothold in Andhra. Their failure to reach an electoral agreement such as they had last time with the Communists in Kerala lost them some of the seats they thought safest, and reduced them to 9 in a House of 126. They have never been strong in Madras. In Madhya Pradesh, though they now have 12 seats (as against 10 in 1952), most of their major leaders were defeated. Moreover, their very considerable success in Bombay, where they now have 36 seats as against 9 in 1952, was less a vote for them than a vote *for* a separate Marathi-speaking State and *against* the Congress refusal to hold a judicial inquiry into the incident of last year, when the police fired on crowds during protest riots.

This failure of the Praja Socialists has distressed many people in India. Of the three would-be national Opposition parties, the Jan Sangh, the Communists, and the Praja Socialists (other Opposition parties are specifically and deliberately local), the Praja Socialists offer the best hope for a stable democracy. They are opposed both to violence and to communalism, and they have enough in common with the Congress to make them an alternative whose success would not shake the foundations of the State. These merits are enough to give them a hold on the loyalties of a good part of the

electorate so that despite heavy defections they have managed to maintain themselves at around the 10 per cent of the votes which constituted the real core of their support last time. That they have not got many more votes is entirely their own fault. They have taken in far too many people whose only qualification is that they have quarrelled with the Congress. They have found it impossible to formulate a clear and united policy; they lost some of their most dynamic local workers when Dr Lohia broke away to found the Socialist Party—had they had the Socialist votes also, they would have had enough seats to be a truly formidable Opposition in Uttar Pradesh, for example. Their leaders have all too often acted as anything except leaders of an Opposition. Mr Jaya Prakash Narain, the only man in India with something of Mr Nehru's hold on the public's affection, has retired from politics. Mr Ashok Mehta has perhaps the most balanced and intelligent mind in Indian politics, but his perpetual search for areas of accommodation with the Congress blunts the enthusiasm of his party workers; he lost his own seat because his reasonableness in supporting a bi-lingual Bombay alienated his local supporters who were all for Samyukta Maharashtra (a unilingual Marathi-speaking State). Mrs Kripalani deserted to the Congress just before the Election, with no real reason given for her change of front except perhaps that it was the likeliest way to a ministership. The men who do lead, like Mr Pattom Thanu Pillai in Kerala or Mr S. M. Joshi in Bombay, are not yet really national figures, and are not even always in agreement with their own National Executive.

There are three Hindu communal parties in India, the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad. Of these, only the last really stands for orthodox Hinduism. The other two are fundamentally Hindu nationalist parties; they do not make the prohibition of cow-slaughter a main plank in their programme and they are as willing as anybody else to condemn untouchability. Of the three, moreover, only the Jan Sangh has survived this Election as a living political force. The Hindu Mahasabha has virtually disintegrated. It was defeated in its stronghold of Gwalior by the Congress success in persuading the Maharani to become a Congress M.P. In all India it won only 7 Assembly seats, and none in Parliament. The Ram Rajya Parishad never mattered much outside Rajasthan, but in Rajasthan they, in combination with the Rajput jagirdars, nearly beat the Congress in 1952. This time the R.R.P. won only 18 seats, the Congress has a safe majority, and

even the hope that the R.R.P. and the jagirdars could make a combination with the Jai Narain Vyas wing of the Congress has been frustrated by the refusal to give Mr Vyas an Assembly seat and the unanimous re-election of Mr Sukhadia as leader of the Rajasthan Congress Assembly party, and thus Chief Minister. The Jan Sangh, on the other hand, has got 46 Assembly seats and has come out as the real representative of parts of the Hindi-speaking Hindu middle class, especially in some of the towns of Uttar Pradesh and of the Jullundur division of the Punjab.

The true Congress defeats, however, apart from Kerala, have not been inflicted by any of the major Opposition parties. They are the result of the two Congress failures to keep contact, one with the tribal peoples, the other with the Maharashtrians of Maharashtra proper. The Congress ideal was always a mixture of Western liberalism and the austere morality of the Hindu middle class. Neither has ever appealed to the tribesmen, whose morality is not austere and whose middle class is too small for liberalism to penetrate; while in Maharashtra the memory of Shivaji and Tilak has always fought against the Congress insistence on non-violence. In addition, there are specific grievances. The tribals of the Assam hills do not like being run by politicians from the plains, they do not like being made to learn Assamese rather than Hindi, they do not like attacks on their missionaries. The tribals of the old Orissa States miss the intimacy of contact they used to have with their Maharajahs. The tribals of Chota Nagpur feel that Patna does not concern itself with their particular problems. In Maharashtra the grievance is bitterer still. The Centre has refused the public the Samyukta Maharashtra—the unilingual Marathi-speaking State—which they wanted; still worse, they have been denied the inquiry into the police firings in last year's riots which they have been so insistently demanding. Many people were killed in this incident, and it is a widespread Maharashtrian belief that much of the shooting was wanton.

The result is that both in the tribal areas and in Maharashtra proper the Congress was thoroughly beaten. In the Assam Hills it won only one seat. In Chota Nagpur it was overwhelmed by the Jarkhand Party. The tribal constituencies of Orissa voted almost solid for the Ganatantra Parishad. Hazaribagh gave all its seats to the Raja of Ramgarh and his Janata Party. The exception, Eastern Madhya Pradesh, where the tribals did vote Congress, was very much a case of the exception confirming the rule, for there the

Congress set up as its candidates the old Rajahs and their nominees; the Maharajah of Bastar alone brought with him 10 seats. More serious still was the Congress defeat in Maharashtra proper, where the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti—a combination comprising the Jan Sangh on the extreme right and the Communists on the extreme left, bound together by nothing except the desire for a unilingual Marathi State—won 3 seats out of every 4. Admittedly, Congress victories in Marathwada and Vidarbha give it a slight majority in Maharashtra proper; but that is a somewhat limited consolation, for in Maharashtra it is what Poona and Nasik and Satara do today that Amravati and Aurangabad do tomorrow, and not the other way round. Nor have Congress anxieties been lessened by the fact that the party suffered an almost equally crushing defeat in North Gujerat, also on the issue of a unilingual Gujerati State and out of resentment at last year's Ahmedabad shooting. Bombay is going to be a very difficult State to run, and it is fortunate that the new Chief Minister, Mr Chavan, is a man of accommodating temperament, who obviously intends to treat the public very respectfully indeed.

Finally, there is Kerala. The Communists' victory here should not be exaggerated. They polled 100,000 votes less than the Congress although they got 17 more seats. They are very definitely a minority of the electorate, of which they represent 36·5 per cent as against 38·2 per cent for the Congress. On the assumption that the Anglo-Indian member will vote with the Congress and that all the five Independents they supported will be loyal to them, they have a majority of only two in the House. The Congress on the whole held its own ground, and would have done better had it not been for its failure to keep the cashew-nut factories working, which lost it votes in Quilon, its foolishness in trying to deny Trivandrum a High Court Bench, which lost it many votes in that district, and its association with the Catholics, which probably lost it Hindu votes in Trichur. Moreover there had been recent bitter quarrels within the Congress leadership, the last Congress Chief Minister, Mr Govinda Menon, was widely suspected of misconduct (he was heavily defeated in his own constituency), and Congress was penalized for preferring to subject Kerala, India's most literate State, to the humiliation of a year of President's Rule rather than to get rid of Mr Menon's leadership. Nevertheless, most of the increase in the Communist vote—and they polled 36·5 per cent of the total this time as against 17·5 per cent last time—came from the other Left

parties with whom they were formerly in alliance. The Kerala Socialists did not stand, the Revolutionary Socialists were wiped out, and the Praja Socialists much reduced. Their leader, Mr Pattom Thanu Pillai, was defeated for the first time in his long political life in the contest for the Trivandrum Parliamentary seat.

To sum up. The Congress Party's worry is not that any party is even within sight of defeating it at the Centre. It is not even the Kerala Communists, to whom everybody is determined to give a fair run and to accord neither better nor worse treatment than to any other State Government. It is the uneasy feeling that the public has given the party a severe warning about what may happen next time if they do not behave. They have been patted on the back and returned to office because the public on the whole approves of the Five-Year Plans, of the reform of Hindu Law and the outlawing of untouchability, and of a better deal for tenants. But it has been made clear that the public does not approve of open quarrels within the leadership, of unseemly scrambles for seats, of interference with the administration by legislators, of tolerance of official delays or corruption, or of decisions by Delhi fiat regardless of local feeling. The Congress has always been a reasonably responsive and well-behaved party; it has now been warned that it must become more responsive and better behaved if it is to win again in 1962.

That is the major significance of the Election. The Congress has had its policies passed, but it has been told to carry them out better. The Congress has already learnt some of its lessons. The unseemly competition for the Chief Ministership, for example, such as has been not infrequent in the past, has this time occurred only in Bihar. Most of the new Cabinets are of limited size and reasonably homogeneous; the High Command has preferred to risk discontent without, which Congress majorities are sufficiently large to render harmless, rather than the scandals which follow from squabbles within.

The other conclusions which may be drawn from the results can be briefly summed up. First, elections have become part of the way of life of the Indian people. Fifteen million more votes were cast this year than in 1952, and the enormous administrative task this involves was discharged with perfect smoothness. There have been no serious allegations of unfairness, and perhaps only 500 election petitions. Secondly, there was no great difference in the way the different sections of the population voted, though Christians and Sikhs voted rather more heavily Congress than did Moslems, caste

Hindus, or Harijans. Indian politics no longer in the main followed communal lines; Dr B. C. Roy himself was nearly beaten by a Communist Moslem at a time when Bengali feeling has been much embittered by the steady drift into India of Hindus squeezed out of East Pakistan. Thirdly, every party has learnt the delicate art of balancing within itself local and community pressures. They know, for instance, that Thevars win most easily in Ramanathapuram, or Jat Sikhs in rural Ferozepore, or Marathas in Satara. They know that a successful Cabinet must give representation to every region and major community; the new Madras Cabinet, for example, has members from eight of the State's twelve districts, and includes everybody from Brahmins to women, from Harijans to Christians. Fourthly, there has been a great advance in the political importance of women; probably as many women have voted as men, and of the 387 women who contested the seats 222 have been elected, 27 of them to Parliament; Cabinets include a woman Minister wherever possible, and at the very least a woman Deputy Minister. This is largely the result of Mr Nehru's endless insistence that there is no better way of breaking the seclusion of women, which he regards as one of India's curses, than by bringing them into public life.

The biggest effect of all, however, has been the reminder the results have administered to India's politicians that one day, though probably not soon, some other party than the Congress will provide India with its Government. None of the other starters has got very far yet, but already the Praja Socialists and the Communists have emerged. An effective Communist Government in Kerala, an effective Praja Socialist Opposition in Uttar Pradesh, good leadership by Mr S. M. Joshi in Bombay—any of these—might produce results in 1962 very different from those of today.

T. Z.

A Year of Independence in Tunisia

As long as a country is subject to colonial government it is very hard to form any opinion as to its probable line of development as an independent State. There may exist detailed studies of many aspects of its life; but if the government which is administering the

region does not regard the independence of its ward as a permissible future development, all official studies are likely to be directed to ascertaining how difficulties arising out of the existing regime can be eliminated and to demonstrating the drawbacks rather than the potentialities of independence. Non-official studies, on the other hand, are equally inclined to partiality on one side or the other, with the result that no one is likely to make an objective study of the probable development of the country as an independent organism. Such a study could in any case only be highly speculative until there had been an opportunity to observe the new State in action.

These considerations are fully applicable to Tunisia. Until the moment when its independence was actually recognized by the former protecting Power just over a year ago, the idea of independence was being resisted by the French Government with all the powerful means at its disposal. Now we are, it is true, able to observe the functioning of the new State over a period of twelve months. During this time however the Tunisian Government has inevitably been concerned very largely with the mere implementation of its independence and the organization of a new regime. Only to a small extent has it yet been able to put into practice principles derived from its own history and experience rather than those which it inherited from an alien Power. If it is already possible to form an impression of the lines on which it is likely to develop, this is thanks to the remarkable degree of individuality which it has already shown.

This individuality must of course be the resultant of the geography and history which have given the Tunisian people their particular personality. It is therefore to these two factors that our attention must first be directed.

Tunisia occupies a central position on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and it is very much a Mediterranean State. In its earlier, Carthaginian, manifestation, it helped to create the pre-Roman Mediterranean civilization. In that capacity it exerted a considerable influence on the civilization of southern Spain and was the pioneer in the exploration of the West African coast. In the Middle Ages, the inland capital, Cairouan, was the base from which the Arabs carried out the occupation of the Maghrib as far as the Atlantic and so across into Spain. Tunisia was also the starting-point for the Arab conquest of Sicily and Malta. Later it was the base from which the Arabized North Africans who had adopted

a heretical form of Islam carried their faith into Egypt, conquering the Nile Valley and founding the city of Cairo. In the nineteenth century, Tunisia under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire rivalled Syria as the most advanced and progressive region of the Arab world and was the first Arab State to experiment with a constitution by which it was sought to impose limits on the arbitrary authority of the monarch.

This history suggests that Tunisia would probably be among the Arab States which have gone furthest in the assimilation of Western civilization, that it would have a good deal in common with other Mediterranean countries, Christian as well as Muslim, and that in general its outlook would extend a good way beyond the limits of its own small territory and indeed beyond those of the Arab world of which it is culturally and geographically a part. For while Tunisia faces Sicily, it is geographically most closely linked with the rest of the Maghrib, particularly Algeria. Its territory is simply the eastern prolongation and the final limit of the Atlas ranges which converge to form the Tunisian hill country. The Mejerda river, which is Tunisia's only permanent water-course, similarly has its source in Algeria. It is in fact the long eastern coastal plain, running from Bizerta in the north to the Libyan frontier in the south, which makes Tunisia a separate country with a special character of its own. The many cities and villages of this coastal plain are the home of Tunisian nationalism and the source of Tunisian individuality. It is no accident that the Tunisian leader, Habib Bourguiba, was born at Monastir, in the very centre of this coastal strip. Its influence radiates out into the hill districts of the interior, drawing them away from Algeria and so constituting the Tunisian State as we know it today.

The brief year of Tunisian independence has been sufficient to show that the characteristics of the State which has emerged from this geography, and from a history terminating in the three-quarters of a century of French rule, include a tendency towards social reform, a marked freedom from a narrow religious or linguistic nationalism, an awareness of forming part of a group of Mediterranean States, not exclusively Muslim, and an active interest in the problems of the greater world. On the social side, one of the most striking features of the new State is the attention given to youth. The population is growing very rapidly and now amounts to not far short of 4 million, of whom no less than half are under twenty years old. Making provision for the welfare and for the

future employment of these young people is the greatest natural, as opposed to political, problem of the young State.

The exceptionally high rate of increase in the population is not balanced by a corresponding increase of production. The natural resources of Tunisia, apart from the exploitation of the deposits of phosphates, are chiefly the cultivation of olives, dates, and cereals, and the economy of the country is at the mercy of the droughts which recur only too frequently. A big plan of development had been inaugurated by the Protectorate Government and it had accepted the task of covering any deficit in the Tunisian Budget as part of the return due for the privileges which it enjoyed. Unfortunately a number of matters affecting the relations of France and Tunisia were left unclear by the declaration of independence, particularly the question of the terms on which French troops would remain on Tunisian soil, and indeed whether they were to remain at all. The fighting in Algeria has complicated this issue. In the circumstances, France hesitates to contribute to Tunisian finances[1] and since the Tunisian economy is in fact still tied up with that of France it is a matter of extreme difficulty to readjust the economic life of the country, burdened as it is by a great deal of unemployment and the threat of drought. No doubt Tunisia will eventually settle its difficulties with France or will find help elsewhere, but that is something which requires much time. It is true that an American mission has been studying Tunisia's needs and that some help will no doubt be coming from the United States as well as from the various agencies which derive from the United Nations Organization. But even when these possibilities have been exploited to the full, there must long remain a gap which it will take all the skill of the Tunisian Minister of Finance to fill.

Meanwhile a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal male suffrage, on a basis of one member for every 40,000 electors, has prepared the draft of a Constitution. This would make the Tunisian monarchy constitutional in law as it already is in practice. Sovereignty would be declared to reside in the people. The religion of the State would be Islam and the official language Arabic. Within the framework of the law, freedom of the individual and of belief would be guaranteed, as well as the right of free speech, thought, and meeting. It is fair to assume that this draft represents the

[1] On 22 May 1957 the French Government decided to suspend financial aid to Tunisia, the official reason given being the Tunisian Government's attitude towards the Algerian problem.

aspirations of the thinking sections of the population. The Tunisians may in fact be thought of as desiring to hold within the Arab world the sort of position which the Scandinavian peoples hold within the world of Western Europe.

In order that such an aspiration may be fulfilled, the Tunisian State has of course still a very long and difficult path to travel, even by Arab standards, to reach an adequate level of health and economic wellbeing and to develop a sufficient sense of civic responsibility in its citizens. For the time being, authority is in fact the privilege of one party, the neo-Destour, which is really a national liberation movement rather than a political party in the Western sense of the word. The policy of this party, and therefore of the State, is greatly influenced by the ideas of its dynamic and powerful leader, Habib Bourguiba, who is also President of the Council. Since however he embodies very fully the ideals of the Tunisian bourgeoisie, who are the ruling and the thinking class in the State, it is not in general necessary to draw a distinction between the personal initiatives of the Prime Minister and the ideals of the people as a whole. The Executive is constituted by the office of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister; by ten Departments headed by Ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance, Public Works, Education, Agriculture, Economics, Social Affairs, Town Planning, Posts); and by four Secretariats of State (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Information, and Youth and Sport). The latter are in fact the equivalent of Departments but differ from them in that they are directly dependent on the Prime Minister's office.

The existence of State Secretariats for Information and for Youth and Sport denotes the great importance which the Government and the Prime Minister personally give to these matters. Both Departments make an impression of efficiency, and the development of youth activities is a remarkable and encouraging example of Tunisian political activity. Not only is a great further impulse being given to education of the normal type which had already been actively promoted during the last years of the Protectorate, but every kind of encouragement is being given to sport, scouting, holiday camps, and so on. Three thousand needy orphans, known as the 'Bourguiba children', are receiving education in youth villages. Here they are housed, fed, and clothed, receive a simplified form of elementary education, and acquire a handicraft or some knowledge of agriculture. No trouble or expense is spared in promoting their welfare, and while at first the

children feared to come to the villages, imagining them to be some kind of detention, they now clamour to be admitted. The equipment is rudimentary but sensible, the food excellent, and the teachers obviously keen and understanding. Other children of needy parents, for whom places cannot be found in the existing school system, are looked after during the day time, fed, and given simple instruction in suitable centres. Considerable importance seems to be given to the singing, with more heartiness than art, of songs with a patriotic or some other moral. While some of these might be described as a species of spiritual flag-wagging, they are not jingoistic or fanatical. One which the present writer heard being sung with great gusto can be translated as follows:

> I had a pretty nightingale within a golden cage,
> A lovely bird, with graceful tail and feathers;
> And all day long it sang its various songs to me.
> I never let it lack for food or drink,
> And yet one day it flew away, without the slightest cause,
> And said to me: *My liberty* is not for sale for gold.

Many of the songs are designed to encourage a devotion to football and other sports.

In the political field, the Government has been mainly concerned with establishing security and making the independence of the country a reality. A small national army has been formed, and the Tunisian authorities have assumed complete responsibility for internal security except in a limited area in the far south. In the coastal regions and throughout the country, except for certain areas close to the Algerian frontier, security in fact seems to be complete. The attempt of the ambitious and self-seeking former Secretary-General of the neo-Destour party, with some degree of Egyptian connivance, to overthrow the Government and set up an aggressively nationalist and fanatical regime in its place was suppressed without serious difficulty. It appears to have entirely collapsed after three rebel leaders had been publicly hanged in the suburbs of the capital.

Without doubt the Algerian problem is the most serious threat to the chances of a happy reconciliation of French and Tunisian interests. Under a Socialist Premier the French Government has been making an all-out attempt to keep Algeria as a part of France.[1] To some extent M. Mollet's action would seem to bear out the

[1] This article was written before the fall of M. Mollet's Government on 21 May.

Algerian claim that it is due to the Algerian rising that Morocco and Tunisia have gained their independence. France, they say, knew that it would be hopeless to attempt to fight on all three fronts and therefore jettisoned the two former Protectorates in order to devote all her energies to retaining the territory which was regarded as more essential. Understandable as the French determination about Algeria is, the attitude of Morocco and Tunisia is equally comprehensible. They claim that, whatever the legal position may be, when there are three houses in a row, inhabited by three brothers and their families, and the one in the centre is on fire, those on either side can hardly be expected to take no interest in what is going on in the centre.

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mr Bourguiba when he says that he would like to co-operate with France on a basis of political equality. Tunisians have been profoundly influenced by French thought and culture, and they have every material inducement to establish good relations. Yet they cannot be expected to take the French point of view, or even to feel neutral, about Algeria. Public opinion would rebel if they were to take strong action against Algerian refugees; and it is inevitable that local authorities should be inclined to look the other way when hard-pressed Algerian rebels slip across the frontier or try to smuggle arms. Any other action would at once provoke a recrudescence of the extremist agitation patronized by Salah ben Yusuf. At the same time, it is equally hard for the French military to remain passive in such circumstances. It was thus singularly unfortunate that the declaration of independence was made without any agreement having been reached about the future of the French troops in Tunisia. While in the coastal areas they keep very much out of the public eye, there have been a number of minor clashes near the Algerian border, and there is always the danger that some event connected with Algeria will bring about a major disaster. The diversion to Algiers of the plane bringing the five Algerian leaders to Tunis last October was a case of this sort. Fortunately the Tunisian Government retained control of the situation and no outbreak took place such as the Meknes massacres in Morocco. Yet diplomatic relations were broken off and discussion of various outstanding questions had to be postponed. Such occurrences harm Tunisia only a little less than they do France.

Tunisia needs French assistance both because of her economic insufficiency and because she is still largely dependent on the ser-

vices of French officials and technicians, of whom 3,500 are expected to remain in the service of the Tunisian Government for the time being. Mutual confidence between these officials and the Tunisian Government and people receives a severe blow each time that incidents or disputes arise. Nor is it only the officials who are affected; French settlers and residents are also rendered anxious. There has already been an emigration of between a twentieth and a tenth of the European population. This has undoubtedly had the effect of slowing down business activity in such a town as Sfax, the centre of the valuable olive industry. It is true that it is too soon to be sure whether this emigration is wise or necessary and whether the place of the emigrants may not be taken by other Europeans, Italians and others as well as French, who are willing to seek a livelihood in the country without enjoying the privileged position to which the emigrants had been accustomed. It is however safe to say that France cannot hope to enjoy the full profits of her liberal policy in the two former Protectorates while pursuing a policy of repression in Algeria, even if the latter is veiled under the name of pacification. What the final result will be on the position in Tunisia it is hard to say.

There is however some hope that the creditable record of the new Tunisian Government in its treatment of another minority may help to give confidence to foreign investors and to residents. The proclamation of the State of Israel naturally led to a substantial emigration thither from Tunisia, in the first burst of almost messianic enthusiasm which the event produced in the Jewish communities of North Africa and elsewhere and in the unsettled political situation which then prevailed. This emigration was however by no means on such a scale as that, for example, from the neighbouring Libya—certainly not more than a third of the total, as opposed to four-fiths. Since then, independent Tunisia has lived up to her old-established reputation for tolerance; and her Jewish citizens are treated on an absolute equality with all others. During the week in which the celebrations of the first anniversary of the independence were held, the new dispensary of O.S.E.[1] was opened in the presence of the Bey's eldest son, as representative of his father, and of the Minister of Health, who made a speech in which, in the presence of the British and American Ambassadors, he paid a tribute to the value of the work which this Jewish

[1] The Œuvres de Secours aux Enfants, the world-wide organization for child care, health, and hygiene among Jews.

body was doing. In these circumstances the Jewish community's numbers are remaining stable, though there is no obstacle in the way of Jews wishing to leave the country. The Minister for Housing and Reconstruction in the Government is himself Jewish.

Several reforms undertaken by the new Government also show its enlightened tendencies. The control of the religious foundations (known as Waqfs in the east, but as Habous in the Maghrib) has been put under the supervision of the civil administration. Plural marriage has been abolished and it has recently been announced that women will be entitled to vote in the forthcoming municipal elections. The extent to which the Government has public opinion with it in carrying out these quite striking measures is indicated by the small degree of opposition aroused.

In all this Mr Bourguiba's personality plays a considerable part. He is a man of great independence of judgement and has profited from his experiences during his period of exile. While a political refugee in Egypt he had the courage to stick to his belief in the advantages of compromise, and of an advance to independence by stages, although it was made quite clear to him by the authorities of the Arab League that they would have preferred a more intransigent line. The recent bestowal upon him of a high Egyptian order shows that Colonel Nasser's Government has at last recognized the strength of Bourguiba's position and the futility of giving underhand encouragement to his more extreme opponents. His journeys through the newly emancipated countries of the East as well as through a number of West European States, at a later stage of his exile, have given him a wide outlook. He is clearly to be classed with statesmen like Masaryk, Smuts, or Nehru who do not allow their devotion to their own country's interests to prevent them from trying to promote a better understanding among the nations of the world in general. This distinguishes him sharply from most of the Eastern Arab statesmen who seem to see nothing beyond the limits of their own lands or at least of the Arab world. In particular, he is clearly anxious to form a block of North African States which would co-operate closely with other West Mediterranean countries, Spain and Italy as well as France. It seems certain too that he would like the Algerian nationalists to negotiate with France the terms on which internationally supervised elections might be held, without first insisting on a definite promise of total independence. In the case of Tunisia, there can be little doubt that his willingness to win independence by instal-

ments strengthened the hands of French liberals and so set in motion the process which resulted in the surprisingly rapid achievement of independence first by Morocco and then by Tunisia.

All in all, there is much to create confidence in the future of the new Tunisian State. But until the problem of Algeria has been settled, the relations of Tunisia with France are bound to be imperilled; and until the problem of supporting the rapidly growing population can be solved, it cannot be said that the economic basis of the national life has been set on a firm foundation.

N. B.

Revolt of the Intellectuals in North Vietnam

It has been apparent for several months to all who could interpret the outward signs that the Communist regime in North Vietnam was encountering grave troubles and disorders. The first major indication that something was seriously amiss came with the announcement of Truong-Chinh's resignation from the post of Secretary-General of the Lao-dông Party. This Lao-dông Party is, in fact, the Communist Party of Vietnam, and Truong-Chinh, formerly known as Dang-xuân-Khu, has been a convinced Communist for a quarter of a century. His resignation was followed by a report of armed clashes in the coastal region of Quynh-luu, in Nghê-an province, where 'a group of reactionaries, exploiting the errors committed in the course of the agrarian reforms, disturbed the peace and public security by arresting the village cadres, attacking soldiers stationed in the area, seizing a quantity of firearms, and blocking free passage in a number of neighbouring villages'. This account was broadcast by Hanoi Radio on 16 November 1956, and on the same day the newspaper of the Lao-dông Party, *Nhân-Dân*, published a report of 'disorders in the region of Vinh in which a number of people were killed and wounded, the exact figures being still unknown. Among the casualties are soldiers of the People's Army. . .' This unaccustomed frankness on the part of the Vietnamese Communist-controlled press and radio

was probably induced by the fact that a number of the rebelling peasants escaped across the border into South Vietnam. Since that time, the Communists have spared no pains in their efforts to minimize the importance and size of these revolts.

Next in the train of unusual events in North Vietnam was the visit of Mr Chou En-lai to Hanoi. The most remarkable aspects of this visit were its timing and the manner in which it was announced, for it was only two days before Chou's arrival on 18 November that the news of his visit was disclosed, and the unfortunate Vietnamese were given no time to erect the customary triumphal arches and organize the usual spate of press articles in praise of Chou and China. *The Economist*[1] saw a similarity of purpose in the visits of Mr Chou to Hanoi and of Mr Khrushchev to Warsaw, thus suggesting that the revolts in North Vietnam were very much more serious than the small local mêlées reported by the Government, and also that they were not confined to the peasants.

Whatever the facts may be concerning the uprising of the peasants, it is possible to be specific about the revolt against the Communist regime which has taken place among the educated classes of North Vietnam. Ample documentation in the form of published newspapers has subsequently come to light, and it is possible to trace the course of events in some detail. The first indication from inside North Vietnam that the intellectuals were also dissatisfied with the regime reached the outside world in a report from Agence France Presse describing a meeting of the Central Committee of the Fatherland Front. In the course of this meeting Mr Dang-quan-Son, a member of the Democratic Party of North Vietnam, roundly criticized the attitude of the great majority of the Lao-dông Party cadres towards the intellectuals and the bourgeois classes. He went on to attack the agrarian reforms and the census, pointing out the pernicious effects these had produced on the 'state of mind, the behaviour, the living conditions, and the activities of the whole population, but most of all affecting the intellectual and bourgeois classes'. Mr Son then turned his attention to the economic situation which he described as 'poor, since goods are becoming progressively scarcer and the prices never cease to rise. Production (by industry and by artisans) has come to a complete standstill in some areas, while in others it is encountering very grave difficulties. The reasons for this are the regulations governing prices and taxes which have no rational

[1] 1 December 1956.

basis at all. The shortcomings in the economic plan have impeded the development of production and this, in turn, has resulted in an acute shortage of products in the countryside.'

News of this unexpected outburst was followed by reports of a still more surprising happening. During the months of September, October, and November 1956, a group of intellectuals in Hanoi published a fortnightly newspaper called *Nhân-Van* (Humanism, or The Humanities)[1] which is, without doubt, the frankest and most detailed criticism of a Communist regime ever to have emanated from a Communist State in Asia. Five issues of this paper were published in all before it was finally suppressed by the authorities, and these provide copious evidence about the state of affairs obtaining in North Vietnam. The contributors, many of whom have signed the articles with their own names, include men of very considerable standing in the Vietnamese world of letters. They purport to speak as good Communists anxious to correct the mistakes of their Communist Government but, one imagines, this is no more than a necessary subterfuge in a Communist State. The paper, unlike the dreary and cliché-ridden official newspapers, is well-written, informative, and frequently amusing. In addition to the more serious articles, it prints political cartoons and columns of funny stories. There can be no question of its popularity since, according to the figures which it prints itself, the first issue of 2,000 copies and the second issue of 6,000 copies were both sold out on the day of publication. This in spite of the risk which people knew was incurred in buying and reading the paper. The existence of this risk is made clear by reports of interference with the distribution[2] of the paper, and of the threatening of people found to possess a copy, which were printed in *Nhân-Van*. The following story appears in the issue of 5 November 1956:

A customer entered a bookshop at Hong Quang. 'Do you sell *Nhân-Van*?' he asked. 'No, sir,' replied the shopkeeper. 'But I hear it's most interesting. Why don't you stock it?' inquired the customer. The shop-

[1] Bernard Fall, in an article entitled 'Crisis in North Vietnam' (*Far Eastern Survey*, January 1957, Vol. 26, No. 1), states that he was informed by the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington that the meaning of Nhân-Vañ is 'The people asks'. This translation is incorrect, and one can only conclude that an official of the Embassy rashly undertook to translate this title after seeing the letters only, written without the necessary diacritical marks.

[2] Information concerning the loss of copies of *Nhân-Van* in the Central Post Office is printed in the issue of 5 November 1956. The report ends with the following lines: 'One friend said, "Perhaps the staff of the Central Post Office are so fond of *Nhân-Van* that they have kept these copies to read themselves." Another suggested: "Perhaps they dislike *Nhân-Van* and have destroyed all these copies".'

keeper stroked his moustache nervously and said, 'All the other papers but not *Nhân-Van*. If I sold *Nhân-Van*, well, er . . . er . . . premature death.'

Many more copies could obviously have been sold, but the Government controls all supplies of newsprint and, through this, the circulation of all publications. Reference is made in *Nhân-Van* (5 November 1956) to the way in which this control is exercised. An official from the Press Bureau, Nguyen van Tho, approached the poet Nguyên-Binh and offered him extra newsprint for his new paper *Tram-Hoa* (The Hundred Flowers) if he would agree to publish in it two prepared articles condemning *Nhân-Van*.

The principal criticisms in *Nhân-Van* are directed, not against wretched living conditions, but against the complete absence of freedom, the lack of civic rights, of a Constitution, and of any code of laws, and against the high-handed and dictatorial behaviour of senior officials. Sy-Ngoc writes (*Nhân-Van*, 15 October 1956): 'If somebody tells me to keep my mouth shut in case the Americans and Diem should make capital out of what I say, I reply: "Diem has a very good case when he refuses to hold joint consultations with us on the ground that there is no freedom in North Vietnam."' There could be no blunter statement of fact than that. Carrying criticism on to the wider international plane, one of the few contributors who do not sign their own name writes under the pseudonym 'Observer': 'Some would go even further and doubt the very nature of the democracy in a number of the countries in our bloc.'

The voicing of opinions such as these inside a Communist country was made possible by the so-called policy of the 'Hundred Flowers'[1] which originated in China. This policy, which is attributed to Mao Tse-tung himself, was designed to overcome the prevailing intellectual stagnation by encouraging discussion and diversity of opinion, but only within strict limits. North Vietnam, which appears to follow China slavishly in all things, began to apply this policy too, and so this group of Vietnamese intellectuals in Hanoi found itself able to publish the opposition newspaper *Nhân-Van* on newsprint sold to it by the Communist Government for the purpose. It is clear that the contributors to *Nhân-Van* were not prepared to accept limits on their freedom to criticize, and this

[1] The deliberate encouragement of divergent opinions is known as the 'Hundred Flowers' policy because of the quotation used by the Chinese Communists to describe it. The quotation may be roughly translated: 'Let the hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools [of thought] contend.'

placed the North Vietnamese Government and the Lao-dông (Communist) Party in an extremely delicate situation. To suppress *Nhân-Van* would be to run counter to the 'Hundred Flowers' policy seemingly imposed on them by China, while to permit it to continue publication would be to provide an organ for the expression of all the pent-up resentment against the regime which might become the nucleus of an opposition group. For this reason the authorities tried very hard to restrain the criticisms without suppressing the paper itself. We have already seen how they attempted to bribe editors to accept for publication articles attacking *Nhân-Van*, but they also assailed it viciously in the Government-controlled newspapers and even tried to close it down on the ground that its editor had failed to observe a legal technicality.[1] It was finally suspended on 15 December 1956 by a decree of the Administrative Council of Hanoi because 'it deformed the truth and endangered public order by sowing doubts about the regime' Appeals criticizing *Nhân-Van* and calling for its suppression were published and signed by such professional groupings as the doctors, the lawyers, and the printers, in an attempt to convey the impression that the suspension of *Nhân-Van* was carried out in response to public demands.

Among all the vaunted achievements of the Government of North Vietnam the agrarian reform occupies the highest place. The official press and radio have told how the rich landlords had been eliminated and the land distributed fairly among the peasants. It has been claimed as a glorious victory for the Lao-dông Party. *Nhân-Van* does not, however, share this view. In an article published on 5 November, Nguyên-huu-Dang writes of 'the arrests, the imprisonments, the interrogations (which included the use of cruel tortures), the killings, the shootings, and the confiscations of property, all of which were carried out in the most haphazard and arbitrary fashion, as well as the isolation until they should die of starvation of the children in the families of landlords (or rather of peasants who were incorrectly classified as landlords). . .' Elsewhere in the same article, he refers to 'the agrarian reforms which have proved such a disastrous failure'. Similar references to these reforms are found throughout the five copies of *Nhân-Van*. The language is strong and, if the facts stated were incorrect, equally strong denials would certainly have been published in the Govern-

[1] Full details of this attempt are printed in the fourth issue of *Nhân-Van* (20 November 1956).

ment and Party newspapers. In fact, these allegations have produced only grudging admissions in *Nhân-Dân* that 'some errors were committed in carrying out the agrarian reforms.' The evidence of *Nhân-Van* corroborates the statements made by refugees in South Vietnam that virtually all the landlords of North Vietnam had fled south before the takeover of the north by the Viet-Minh.

Another topic upon which *Nhân-Van* comments is the absence of a Constitution in North Vietnam. Now a Constitution was approved in 1946 by the National Assembly in Hanoi, but it was suspended almost immediately on account of the war. A leading article (*Nhân-Van*, 20 November 1956) demands that either the 1946 Constitution should be brought into force again or, alternatively, that a new Constitution should be promulgated. While admitting that the 1946 Constitution was a tactical concession to the Vietnam Quôc-Dân Dang (a non-Communist Vietnamese nationalist party) which enjoyed Chinese Kuomintang support at that time, the article maintains that those parts of the Constitution defining democratic liberties are basic and cannot be altered very much. In disposing of the widespread argument that the revolutionary level of Vietnam is now higher than it was in 1946 and therefore the new Constitution should be more authoritarian, it compares the 1946 Constitution with the new Chinese Constitution and concludes that, even though the revolutionary level of China today is higher than that of Vietnam in 1946, the present Chinese Constitution is more liberal than the Vietnamese one. The article continues: 'Dictatorial methods in dealing with the people need very careful consideration. If great care is not exercised in this respect then the consequences will be disastrous. The underlying cause of the events in Poland and Hungary was the absence of democracy, so why should we understand the cause to have been the absence of dictatorship?' It is interesting to note these reasons given for the uprisings in Eastern Europe since they are so much at variance with the official Communist line.

Closely linked with the need for a Constitution is the need for a legal code, and this provided the subject for another leading article (*Nhân-Van*, 5 November 1956). In arguing its case, the article says:

It is because we have no legal code that our agrarian reforms have proved such a disastrous failure. . . It is because we have no legal code that a public security agent can demand a marriage certificate from a

young couple sitting on the shore of Hanoi lake waiting for the moon to rise. It is for this same reason that an official from the Census Administration can watch continuously at the door of a house, making the occupants so uneasy that they can neither eat nor sleep; or a taxation official may search any house at any time he wants. People may be forced to leave their houses altogether or to hand over part of their houses to the various organizations. Because of the complete absence of any legal code, many of the organizations can open and read the letters of their members, and the important State organizations can correct beforehand any press article written about them. These practices lead people to believe that State organizations have powers of censorship. Because of the complete absence of a legal code, shameless slanders and threats may be uttered, people may be prevented from reading this paper, and acts of violence such as those perpetrated against the paper *Tram-Hoa* may occur. . . People want to live in a better ordered society where their rights to conduct their own affairs, as well as their other democratic liberties, cannot be violated.

Any further comment on the state of affairs described in this leading article would be superfluous.

After the publication of its first issue, *Nhân-Van* was bitterly attacked in the party newspaper *Nhân-Dân*.[1] The man chosen to launch this attack was the somewhat dull-witted Party stalwart Nguyên-Chuong. It is possible that consciousness of the support of the Party and the Government led him to be less cautious in his attack than was advisable. The second issue of *Nhân-Van* published a detailed reply to this attack signed by Hoang-Cam, Huu-Loan, and Trân-Duy. The reply is very cleverly argued and answers Nguyên-Chuong point by point, making each of his criticisms appear ridiculous. Indeed, its authors go so far as to taunt the luckless Nguyên-Chuong, concluding the refutation of each of his arguments with some such sentence as: 'Now calm down! Don't you see how over-dogmatic you've been?' The article ends with a sharp counter-attack launched against both Nguyên-Chuong and the paper *Nhân-Dân*. This is the first occasion that the Party spokesman and the Party newspaper have been publicly attacked and ridiculed in print in North Vietnam, and it must have caused a severe shock to both. The practice continued, however, and in its fourth issue *Nhân-Van* published a very blunt critique of an article on Humanism, also published in *Nhân-Dân*, written by the professor of philosophy Hoang-xuân-Nhi. The author of this critique, Bui-quang-Doai, heaps scorn upon Hoang-xuân-Nhi whom he accuses of assessing the art of Picasso on the evidence of

[1] *Nhân-Dân*, 25 September 1956.

is Peace Dove alone, and of dragging Lenin behind him since the rguments he puts forward are his own but are attributed by him ɔ Lenin. A note by the editor, printed at the head of this article, hanks all the other contributors who submitted articles criticizing Ioang-xuân-Nhi and apologizes for being unable to publish them.

Everyday life in North Vietnam is reflected in a number of the ghter articles and cartoons. A contribution from Thanh-Châu which appears in the fourth issue of *Nhân-Van* describes the ightmarish experience of going shopping at the Government Mâu-Dich stores. It tells of the struggling multitudes fighting to uy the pitifully small stocks of the inferior, and often wildly nprobable, goods which are on sale. There is the old lady who ame from Bac-ninh two days earlier to buy four metres of cloth. he complains that she has been eating and sleeping at the store, ut still hasn't been able to reach the counter and buy the cloth. 'he author recalls nostalgically the good old days when it was ossible to go into a well-stocked and uncrowded shop to buy whatever you wanted. Some of the incidental remarks in this ccount are most illuminating. They tell, for example, of the special nops, filled with superior goods, which are reserved for the imilies of the representatives of 'friendly countries' living in Iorth Vietnam. The system of payment by voucher is also worthy f comment. It appears that certain salaries are paid in the form of ouchers, valid only at the Government stores, which must be pent before a fixed date after which they become valueless. 'hange cannot be given if the goods bought amount to less than ie value of the voucher. In such cases, the shopper is given the lternative of buying unwanted articles or forfeiting the balance of ie voucher. The vouchers may be paid into a bank, but no money an be drawn against them for a period of six months. One of the artoons in the same issue of *Nhân-Van* depicts three smiling 'ietnamese, all wearing identical hats and identical boots, and all olding lengths of the same brightly patterned cloth and thermos-asks. The caption reads: 'No, not triplets, just three people who went shopping with vouchers.'

A story in the second issue of the paper furnishes a further lustration of the shortage of goods and the horrors of voucher-hopping. It concerns an official who was coughing very badly and wanted to buy some lung tonic. Having bought some goods with is voucher, he asked for a bottle of lung tonic. The assistant told im that there was no lung tonic, only kidney tonic, and that he

had better buy it if he did not wish to forfeit the balance of money due on his voucher. The unfortunate official bought the kidney tonic and went home reflecting that it might be useful if ever anything should go wrong with his kidneys.

A feature of the cartoons is the use made of Viet-Minh soldiers' hats with captions written across them. In one, for instance, a man is shown struggling to balance a pile of eleven of these hats. On the hats are written captions which read 'Reaction', 'Discontent', 'Smearing the Regime', etc. A passer-by asks the bearer of these hats: 'Where are you going? Selling hats?' 'No', comes the reply, 'I'm going to write an article criticizing *Nhân-Van*.' In another cartoon, a cheerful Vietnamese carrying two hats marked 'Discontent' and 'Negative Attitude' faces a very worried man sitting at a table upon which stands a pile of paper, or possibly an exercise book. On the head of this second figure is balanced a tall column of hats bearing captions such as 'Right-wing Deviationism', 'Left-wing Deviationism', 'Romanticism', 'Anxiety', etc. The cheerful man asks, 'Why is it that, in spite of the Hundred Flowers policy, you are still unable to produce anything?', and the worried one replies: 'Just take a look on my head.'

Who are these people whose forthright opinions are published in *Nhân-Van*? Some of them—people such as Dao-duy-Anh, the author of two standard dictionaries and of a three-volume history of Vietnam—are internationally known scholars. Others have scarcely been heard of outside North Vietnam and are, one presumes, younger men. All achieve a high standard in their writing. Perhaps the most interesting is Phan-Khôi, the editor, who is now in his seventies and is said to be the grandson of the Vietnamese hero, Hoang-Diêu, the Governor of Hanoi who hanged himself when Henri Rivière captured Hanoi citadel in 1882. He spent nine years on the French prison island of Poulo Condore for his uncompromising nationalism. He studied French in prison and became one of the first Vietnamese journalists in Saigon after his release. He enjoys a well-deserved reputation for bluntness and pungency in his writing. Phan-Khôi is the father of Phan-Thao, a high-ranking Communist who is now, ironically enough, in charge of the Party newspaper *Nhân-Dân*. This latter fact suggests that the decision to launch *Nhân-Van* as an opposition newspaper was taken by the Party and the Government: it would be an advantage for such a paper to have an editor who was widely known for his plain speaking and his integrity, and they might

reasonably have expected to control this old man through his son. Their assessment of him appears to have been faulty, and they seem to have found it extremely difficult to put this particular genie back in the bottle once they had let him out. He was sent to China by the Government in October 1956, ostensibly to attend the anniversary celebrations for the Chinese poet Lu-Shun, but more probably so that he might see how the 'Hundred Flowers' policy was being applied in China and himself follow the Chinese example on his return. Once more the hopes of the Government and Party were misplaced.

Two other opposition papers were also being published at the same time as *Nhân-Van*. These were *Tram-Hoa*, whose editor, the poet Nguyên-Binh, has already been mentioned, and *Giai-phâm Mua-thu* (Autumn Masterpieces); but the present writer has not been able to obtain copies of either. Both of these papers were severely criticized in the official newspapers. However, this unconcealed opposition to the regime was brought to an end by a new decree, passed in Hanoi on 14 December, which severely restricted the freedom of expression in the press. After that date newspapers were permitted to publish only articles which did not prejudice 'the struggle for peace, reunification, independence, and democracy'. Article 2 of this new decree states specifically that the duties of the press are 'to serve the interests of the State and people, protect the People's Democratic Regime, and support the Government of the People's Democratic Republic'. According to article 3, the press was to be an instrument for instructing the population and mobilizing them to carry out Government policy. Article 9 prohibits the press from conducting propaganda against the State, such as encouraging the people to disobey the Government regulations or to disregard Government policy. It must refrain from publishing articles opposing 'popular authority' or likely to promote a rift between the people and the Government or the Army. *Nhân-Van* was suppressed, but the two other opposition papers appear to have capitulated to Government demands and are still being published. The official newspapers seem to have found nothing in either of them since 14 December which called for criticism or complaint.

Such opposition to Communist Governments as has come to light in Hungary and Poland causes little surprise. In Eastern Europe, Communism is an ideology imposed from outside and maintained mainly by the guns and soldiers of the Red Army. Com-

munism in Asia has, in the past, been equated by the Asians themselves with anti-colonialism and movements of national liberation. It achieved power in China with the support of a Chinese people which had long been exasperated by the corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang regime. In Vietnam it was the Communists who led the Viet-Minh nationalist movement. The prestige of the Viet-Minh reached its zenith after the great battle of Diên-Biên-Phu in 1954, and there is no doubt that the Communist leaders enjoyed the lion's share of it. To underestimate the rapid and serious decline in the popular enthusiasm for, and approval of, the Vietnamese Communists, which has taken place in less than three years, would be a grave mistake. The publication of these opposition papers, coupled with the fact that all copies were so eagerly bought by the reading public, is proof of a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the present regime and of a burning resentment against the insufferable conditions of life in North Vietnam which exists among educated people there. Repressive measures taken by the authorities appear to have stifled all public expression of dissatisfaction for the moment, but they can only increase and aggravate the dissatisfaction itself. It is this factor which makes the revolt of the intellectuals in North Vietnam so significant.

P. J. H.

Elections in the Lebanese Republic

The Prospects Surveyed

IN 1946, just when the direct French control over Lebanon was coming to an end, the distinguished *arabisant* Robert Montagne described the little country in a telling phrase as 'an emulsion of peoples'. During the years of independence that have followed the sense of Lebanese nationhood has undoubtedly grown, in spite of the powerful counter-attraction of the Arab Unity movement orchestrated from Cairo and Damascus. But much of the particularity, to which the French writer then referred, persists and is enshrined, if not in the Lebanese Constitution itself, at least in constitutional practice. Thus a convention has been handed on from

the period of the French mandate that the President of the Republic should be a Christian (and normally a Maronite), the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and that other Cabinet Ministers should be not only heads of Departments of State but also representatives of the principal other religious sects which make up the Lebanese 'emulsion'. The Constitution itself requires that the allocation of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and of posts in the administration, shall pay due regard to equity as between the sects; and in the case of the Chamber, which is due for re-election in June, this is ensured by allotting seats in the various constituencies strictly to members of the various religious communities as such.

Experience has shown that this can be done with the minimum of disagreement in a Chamber whose total membership is a multiple of eleven. The actual size of the Chamber has varied according to the pressures of Lebanese political life. From 1950 to 1953 the 1½ million inhabitants of Lebanon were represented by as many as eighty-eight deputies; but after the bloodless revolution of September 1952 had displaced Bishara al-Khuri from the Presidency of the Republic in favour of President Kamil Sham'un (*gallice*, Camille Chamoun), the size of the Chamber was summarily halved. Now that that Chamber's four-year mandate is drawing to a close, there has recently been a good deal of political negotiation for a new electoral law. There were few politicians who were satisfied with a Chamber numbering as few as forty-four deputies, and some pundits were in favour of a membership as large as 132; but the decision finally fell on a Chamber of sixty-six, to be formed as follows: Maronites twenty, Sunni Muslims fourteen, Shi'i Muslims twelve, Orthodox seven, 'Greek Catholics'[1] four, Druze four, Armenian Orthodox three, Armenian Catholics one, minorities (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.) one. The electoral law lays down these sub-divisions in detail for each constituency. Thus the largest single constituency, Beirut No. 2, will return two Sunnis, one Shi'i, one Armenian Catholic, one Armenian Orthodox, and one representative of the minorities; Saida, formerly the ancient city of Sidon, will return one Sunni; Sur, formerly the ancient city of Tyre, two Shi'is; and so on.

The constituency in which an elector is registered is his or her

[1] In the Arabic-speaking world this conventional term is most misleading. The sect is the result of secessions from the Orthodox Church into communion with Rome. It is 'Greek' only in the sense that it continues to use the Byzantine liturgy of Constantinople, but its clergy in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine are all native Arabic-speakers.

place of origin, and not necessarily his present domicile; we a reminded of the Blessed Virgin and St Joseph travelling fro Nazareth to Bethlehem for the census 'because he was of the hous and lineage of David'. Though the individual elector's civil statu includes a record of his religious adherence (a professedly athei candidate some years ago could stand only as a Sunni, the com munity into which he had been born), he must vote to fill the sea or seats allotted to his constituency. Thus an Orthodox Christia registered in Saida will not find an Orthodox candidate there, bu can vote only to fill the Sunni seat allotted to that town. Takin the country as a whole, however, the electoral law ensures th return of a Chamber whose sectarian proportions broadly refle those of the population.

The younger generation of 'intellectuals' finds this 'confessiona ism' irritating, a survival of 'feudalism' which they would like t have done with. It may indeed be abolished within the next twent or thirty years; but meanwhile it is only one of the factors tha have delayed the emergence of political parties on a country wide basis. Small though the country is, the main Lebanes mountain-range lies so close to the sea that the small lateral valley form self-contained cantons whose names—Shuf, Matn, Kisruwan Kura, etc.—are practically unknown outside Lebanon; yet withi Lebanon they are the focuses of a local sentiment as strong as tha of the cantons of Switzerland or the clans of highland Scotland Some years ago it seemed that the Progressive Socialist Party le by Kamal Jumblat had a prospect of becoming a nation-wid party; but its leader's patent sincerity has not been matched by th toughness which is a requisite for the successful party 'boss'. Som of his ambitious young 'intellectuals' seceded last year, attracte by the pan-Arab *Ba'th* socialist party of Syria; and Jumblat' following today is practically reduced to the Druze of the Shu district among whom he is a hereditary *grand seigneur*.

Hence this General Election will not be contested by politica parties of the kind to which a British or American, or even French, student of politics is accustomed. In each constituenc two or more rival 'lists' are being formed, each comprising candi dates of the sects appropriate to that constituency, and these list are often no more than the outcome of local and tactical alliance made between the individual candidates or their families for th purpose of the Election. In some past elections in which large constituencies were in vogue (the '*régime de la grande liste*') some

powerful personalities were able to exercise patronage over a whole region. This was particularly true of 'feudal' southern Lebanon with its backward Shi'i peasantry dependent on their traditional landlords: there under the *grande liste* Ahmad al-As'ad (whom the French-language newspaper *L'Orient* delights to describe as *le Seigneur de Taybé*) personally controlled 'with the support of the authorities' all the fourteen seats allotted to that region. The reduction of the size of the constituencies has cramped his style, and that of the other traditional 'patrons'; but *L'Orient*'s special correspondent (on whose frank and genial reports of 26–30 April 1957 this article is largely based) foresees that in this Election also Ahmad al-As'ad will have a finger in the pie of the four southernmost constituencies, which together return six deputies out of the total of sixty-six.

Again and again one is reminded of the British political scene of the eighteenth century. Thus we read (still of southern Lebanon) that

> a close struggle is expected at Nabatiya, to which constituency two Shi'i seats have been allotted in place of a single one. Ahmad al-As'ad had tried in vain to get this second seat allotted instead to his own constituency of Bint Jubail. It is as a result of his failure that he has resolutely joined the ranks of the Opposition. . .
>
> This second seat considerably affects the position of Yusuf al-Zain, the present deputy and the oldest member of the Chamber. He is said, in fact, to have chosen as colleague on his list Muhammad al-Fadl, who was formerly on Ahmad al-As'ad's list. This choice is said to have aroused the wrath of Yusuf al-Zain's supporters among the Shahin family, who had always supported the 'Usayran/al-Zain group and had hoped that the second seat would be reserved for one of themselves, Rafiq Shahin. This family is said, consequently, to have decided to campaign against Muhammad al-Fadl and, in that case, against Yusuf al-Zain's clan.

Moreover, if *L'Orient*'s special correspondent is to be credited, the Lebanese Republic does not lack its party of 'King's Friends'. Thus he tells us that the constituency of Dair al-Qamar is considered as the 'electoral fief' of President Sham'un (whose six-year term of office does not expire until next year, when the Chamber of Deputies now being elected will have the task of electing a new President of the Republic). In the neighbouring constituency of Ba'aqlin 'President Sham'un has constantly enjoyed a preponderant influence but has not yet clarified his position.' At Ba'abda, a few miles further north, the drawing up of an 'official' list is said to be waiting on negotiations between the President and Kamal

Jumblat—negotiations which were complicated by the latter's objection to the candidature for the Greek Catholic seat of Naim Mughabghab who, it was said, might be compensated for his withdrawal by being made legal adviser to the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Co. In Jazzin, we are told, 'the task of designating the second Maronite candidate is likely to be left to President Sham'un'; and in Zahlé, where the main campaign is between two rival cousins of the (Orthodox) Skaf family, one of these is said to be 'reserving the Sunni seat for a candidate to be designated by President Sham'un'. The President, it will be seen, is hampered neither by the detachment of a constitutional monarch nor by the political impotence of a President of the French Republic, but displays the lively participation which was characteristic of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. In fact the analogy of Tammany Hall is never far from our thoughts as we read the conclusion of *L'Orient*'s correspondent—frank but not jaundiced—that 'the electoral campaign will in general be conducted according to the traditional procedure. Parties and programmes will be subordinated to electoral deals, family rivalries, local quarrels, and the cash nexus (*l'emprise de l'argent*).'

Yet, as this correspondent is clear, in some constituencies at least there is a major issue arising out of the change of government in mid-November last, when Prime Minister Abdullah al-Yafi was displaced by his fellow-Sunni rival, Sami as-Sulh. al-Yafi, the days of whose government had for some time seemed numbered, had sought to use the Suez Canal crisis to prolong his tenure of office by espousing the Egyptian cause as warmly, if platonically, as the Syrian Government itself; but he had resigned when the President, holding a conference in Beirut of the heads of the Arab States which demonstrated their lack of unanimity, repelled (it is said) his suggestion of breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain as Iraq and Jordan had done with France. Since then Abdullah al-Yafi and other politicians (both Muslim and Christian) opposed to the moderately pro-Western policy of the President, Prime Minister Sami as-Sulh, and the Foreign Minister, Dr Charles Malik, have been making frequent visits to fellow-travelling Damascus (where President Shukri al-Quwwatli seems to have an uncomfortable role not unlike that of the ill-fated Edward Beneš of Czechoslovakia before 1948); and in Beirut in particular, returning one-sixth of the entire Chamber, the Election will be fought largely on the issue For or Against the Egyptian military dictator,

whose portrait with its shining teeth is freely displayed on shop-windows and windscreens in the principal Muslim quarter of the city. The sudden prostration with pneumonia, at the end of April, of the seventy-seven-year-old Prime Minister gave a dramatic turn to the electoral campaign. But his return home from hospital two weeks later in a procession of automobiles headed by six ceremonial camels was timed to coincide exactly with the Opposition's first mass meeting, and he has persisted in his decision to abandon a safe seat in Beirut No. 2 and instead to stand against two of his principal adversaries in Beirut No. 1, where the presence of a substantial Christian electorate gives him a sporting chance of a spectacular personal victory.

The *aperçu* which has here been attempted may seem despairing, or cynical, or both. However, most Lebanese share a healthy scepticism about the possibility of political disinterestedness (the proprietor of *L'Orient* wrote recently, in an article in praise of Dr Charles Malik, that 'that student of Thomist philosophy would probably never have become a practical politician if he had not had a profound faith in Charles Malik'), and they frankly interpret the motives of the rank-and-file politicians in the material terms of the *assiette au beurre* or its American equivalent, the 'pork-barrel'. And yet, with all its shortcomings of parochialism, jobbery, and inefficiency, the 'system' does roughly what it has been designed to do. It represents fairly faithfully the 'emulsion' of religious communities which make up Lebanon and maintains more or less a balance between them: the liveliest Cabinet meetings are said to be those at which promotions and appointments in the civil service are discussed, with each Minister—Maronite, Sunni, Orthodox, Druze, Armenian, and the rest—jealously watching the interests of his respective community. The system does not provide *strong* government, because it is not expected to do so. The individualist Lebanese prefers government interference to be kept to a minimum; and if public services are inadequate even by neighbouring standards, there is a personal 'freedom from fear' which is almost unique in the Arab Middle East today, where the internment-camp and the organized treason-trial are extending their shadow of barbed wire and ranting loudspeaker over one country after another. Beyond the Anti-Lebanon range and beyond Sinai 'Big Brother is watching you'; but the Lebanese remains free to caricature and criticize.

G. E. K.

Soviet Writing about India

WHILE Russia's role in international affairs receives its due shar of notice in the world's press, not nearly as much is known abou her attitude to other countries as reflected in the output of Sovie literature for internal consumption. Yet some understanding c the latter subject is of great value in the proper comprehension c the former, especially when one takes into account the shifts i Soviet standards which make what is right and proper at one tim completely wrong and evil at another. Thus any attempt to analys the course of Soviet writing about neighbouring countries over th past decade or two is to be welcomed; and the Central Asia Research Centre in London, working in association with the Sovie Affairs Study Group of St Antony's College, Oxford, is in th process of publishing a series of such studies relating to the border lands of Russian Central Asia.

The latest issue of the *Central Asian Review*[1] carries the firs part of a detailed analysis of Russian writing on India which is c great significance for several reasons. There is, first, India's nev role in international relations and especially *vis-à-vis* the Com munist Powers and the Far East. Then there is the Marxist Leninist interpretation of Indian history, particularly where i covers the period of British 'imperialist exploitation', but nc without interest for what it makes of the earlier periods, especiall in accounting for the caste system. Also important is the doubl reappraisal that has been necessitated by the end of the Stalinis era in the first place, and by the realization, brought home t Russia's present leaders after their exchange of visits with th Indian Prime Minister in 1955, that India is really a free countr and that the Indian National Congress is not a reactionary bour geois force.

Until 1941 no national of the Soviet Union had overtly visite India, and Russia's main sources of information on India wer foreign publications and the reports of Indians visiting or livin in the U.S.S.R. The most notable of these was M. N. Roy. Ther was no lack of Soviet interest in India, as the Communists looke to the East from the earliest days of the Revolution and India wa in their eyes destined to play an important part in the struggle o the oppressed peoples of the East. The first edition of the Sovie

[1] Vol. V, No. 1, April 1957. Published by the Central Asian Research Centre 66B King's Road, London, S.W.3, price 7*s.* 6*d.*

Encyclopaedia carried an article of nearly 200 pages on India (in Vol. 28, published in 1937) and the article in the second edition (in Vol. 18, published in 1953) is nearly as long. In addition, India is the subject of a number of books and of an increasing number of articles and studies. So far no comprehensive history of India has been attempted in Russia, although the Mogul period has had much attention from Soviet writers, and Soviet Orientalists were asked in 1955 to devote some time to the study of Eastern countries before their conquest, which promises to furnish interesting material for future analysis.

Looking at India through Marxist-Leninist spectacles, certain rigid doctrines have to be accepted as axiomatic. There is the belief in the intrinsic harmfulness of British rule and in the unimportance of religion. Then the communal problem, which has hung over India like a spectre since the Muslim invasion, is seen chiefly as a conflict deliberately fostered by the British.

Soviet materialism makes it impossible for the complex character and boundless influence of Mahatma Gandhi to be seen in proper perspective. It is true that a change in the attitude to Indian 'bourgeois nationalists' and to Gandhi became apparent in the latter part of 1955. Till then Gandhi was only 'an agent of British imperialism and the Indian exploiting classes' who 'did not want full independence for India'. This not only misinterprets Gandhi's political aims but also ignores his essential goodness and spiritual qualities as well as the fact that he was the most important figure in winning independence for India. The Soviet misunderstanding was due to their inability to account for Gandhi's being left at large for so long except on the theory that he was in some way in league with the British. They themselves dealt with Central Asian 'bourgeois nationalists' of far inferior status to Gandhi by the simple process of execution.

The change of policy which came at the end of 1955 was defined at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. Contemptuous references to Gandhi have ceased, and he is now given some credit for the national liberation struggle, but there is still criticism of some of his ideas (e.g. on handicrafts), and his personal qualities and influence on the life and thought of India are almost completely missed. (It might be mentioned in parenthesis that the *Central Asian Review*'s picture of the reappraisal of the Mahatma and of the Indian National Congress tallies with that suggested in an article by V. Semyonov published early this year in *Kommunist*.

Semyonov credits Gandhi with 'a tireless and self-sacrificing struggle against colonialism, racialism, and national inequality, an instinctive feeling for Socialism, which he interpreted in his own way, the desire to merge his own life with the life of the ordinary people—the impoverished peasantry and workers—and to improve their lot'.)

In looking at the social structure of India, and especially in relation to caste, the Soviet writers have tried to ignore all religious factors and to build up their own theories of class struggle dating back to almost prehistoric times. Slavery was the one definitely known economic fact about all early societies and in the absence of more precise data it was felt that caste and untouchability could be represented as springing from serfdom and feudalism.

On the political plane in more recent times one finds Soviet interpreters identifying the struggle for freedom from British rule as far as possible with the Indian Communist Party's activities and seeking to credit Russian inspiration with more than its due. Thus the disturbances that took place after 1905 are given more than their fair emphasis in trying to show India's masses as taking their lead from the Russian revolution of that year. So also the declaration of E. S. Montagu (Secretary of State for India at the time) promising self-government to India, made in August 1917, is ascribed to the influence of the major upheaval of that year in Russia.

Without endeavouring to summarize the whole analysis presented by the *Central Asian Review*, a few notes on the Soviet presentation of certain topics which might be of interest to the reader are given below. The most important source of material is the Soviet Encyclopaedia, the latest edition of which carries a long article on India as well as others on Caste (Vol. 20), on the Aryans (Vol. 3), on the Vedas (Vol. 7), and on numerous other subjects related to India. In addition a number of studies prepared for the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, a work on India by V. I. Pavlov and A. M. Ryabchikov, a study on Indian economic development by M. I. Rubinshteyn, and other works have been examined. Comments on the analysis made by Dr T. G. P. Spear, Fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge, and an authority on Indian history and affairs in general, add considerably to the value of the compilation.

Population

A feature of the treatment of the population question by Soviet

writers is their insistence on calling various linguistic groups in India and Pakistan 'nations'. Thus the Soviet Encyclopaedia and other works refer to the 'Bengali nation' and to the Oriya, Maratha, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu, and other groups as nations, the latest addition being the 'Kashmiri nation'. India, it is stressed, is a multi-racial country, and this view is adhered to in post-Stalinist writing.

There is a tendency to regard the growth of the population in India as small, with a high birth-rate offset by high mortality. For this the Encyclopaedia blames 'cruel exploitation and the epidemics caused by the ruin and poverty of the masses'. In an article produced in 1950 for the Institute of Oriental Studies, G. Shmidt admits, however, to a considerable increase from 1921 to 1941, but he will not concede that the population is too large to support on the country's natural resources. He blames defects in the capitalist system, and particularly in the agrarian system, for India's misfortunes. The approach of post-Stalinist writers seems more realistic, as for example in the study on economic development by Rubinshteyn (1956) where population increases are found to be outstripping the increased scope for employment provided by the Five-Year Plan.

Religion

There is a remarkable scarcity of Soviet writing on Indian religions. Hinduism, according to the Soviet Encyclopaedia, is 'the name of a religious system which embraces the most diverse beliefs of the majority of the population of India from religions with complicated theological teachings to primitive beliefs handed down from primitive-communal social orders. . . The religious system of Hinduism was formed in the early Indian Middle Ages as the most important element in the feudal ideological superstructure called upon to defend and strengthen the feudal base.' Hinduism is found to be basically very primitive, with idolatry inherent in it. The idea that it is a weapon of the ruling class persists into the late British period and is applied to the organizations which arose in the nineteenth century, like the Hindu Mahasabha.

Less political and more indulgent is the modern post-Stalinist attitude to religions of India. Pavlov and Ryabchikov say: 'There are very strong religious convictions and traditions among the population of India, particularly in the villages, where a peasant will not take a single important step in life without consulting the local priest.'

Generally speaking all Soviet writers tend to treat Hinduism as a fairly narrowly defined religious system and to ignore its philosophical and social aspects. Caste is regarded as a purely social phenomenon, independent of Hinduism, and which developed out of the slave-owning and feudal social orders, but which is used by Hinduism for its own ends. 'The caste order,' says the Soviet Encyclopaedia, 'was devised to strengthen the domination of the feudal class. By the late Middle Ages caste began to stand in the way of the social-economic development of the country. . . In modern India there is not one caste whose members work only at their caste profession. However, as a relic of feudal society castes continue to exist. . . Acknowledgement of caste divisions in society is a component part of Gandhism.'

It follows that untouchability is also ascribed to feudalism and slave societies in its origins. G. G. Kotovskiy, writing for the Institute of Oriental Studies in 1953, traces it to the feudal landlord's monopoly of the village land. The British are accused of preserving caste and untouchability through local administrations and even missions, by the creation of special schools for the untouchables. The Congress Party is also shown as trying to exploit the struggle of the untouchables for their own ends. Only the Communist Party is credited with seeing the liberation of the untouchables as a question of the social liberation of tens of millions of the agricultural proletariat and semi-proletariat.

A more realistic and sympathetic line is taken in post-Stalinist writing, where the role of the intelligentsia in trying to improve matters is admitted. Dr Spear, in his comment on this section, finds the Stalinist treatment designed on propagandist lines for home consumption; the later treatment shows more detachment and perhaps a consciousness that readers may even be Indians.

History

Soviet writers oppose the Aryan theory of ancient Indian history. The Soviet Encyclopaedia defines 'Aryans' as 'the unscientific name of peoples of the Indo-European system of languages'; elsewhere the term Arya is referred to as the name of the 'slave-owning aristocracy of the tribes who inhabited areas of north-west India'. The theme of slave-owning societies in which the oppressed found comfort in religion is used to account for the rise of Buddhism. Very little notice at all seems to be taken of the great developments of thought and culture, even in the peak periods of the Mauryas and the Guptas.

The emphasis on the feudal and class aspects of Indian society persists throughout the account of Indian history through the Middle Ages and on to British times. The Mogul period has had some attention from such writers as K. A. Antonova and I. M. Reysner, and Bernier's writings have been translated into Russian.

In the British period there is more material for propagandist treatment, and while no notice is taken of the chaotic state of affairs that the British had to straighten out, much is made of the undoubted acts of misrule and mismanagement in Bengal; and the *ryotwari* settlement (designed to give peasants some security of tenure) is made to seem as oppressive as the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, which did in fact create a landed aristocracy.

The Mutiny is regarded by the Soviet Encyclopaedia as a rising of peasants and artisans who, lacking organization and leadership, allowed feudal lords to lead them. The military nature of the rising is much underemphasized. The results of the Mutiny are more correctly stated.

Towards Independence

Throughout the record of development in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Soviet Encyclopaedia contrives to bypass such matters as the response of educated India to the challenge of the West, as well as the progress made in such matters as irrigation, social reform, famine relief, public health, and communications. Organizations like the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj are either overlooked or, if they are mentioned at all, are represented as the creations of bourgeois nationalism, a label also applied to the Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress.

'The British,' says the Soviet Encyclopaedia, 'tried to gain control of the bourgeois-landowner political organizations. With the direct support of the British administration, the first All-Indian political party—the All-Indian National Congress—was formed. . . In the statutes of Congress was the demand for self-government for India. It was proposed to achieve this by "peaceful, constitutional methods".' Congress in this Stalinist version was an upper-class organization, and its agrarian programme led to the extension of the *zamindari* (landlord) system all over India. At the same time Congress secured the beginnings of representative institutions and started to form a moderate opposition to the colonial regime. 'The British tried to split the All-Indian national movement. They openly started to instigate the Muslim reaction-

ary, Said Ahmad Khan, to oppose the National Congress. .

Henceforward the fight for freedom is the fight of the Com munists, and Russia is the inspiration. Reference has already bee made to the supposed relation of two Russian revolutions t events in India. After the first World War the Soviet Encyclo paedia sees two movements—that of the bourgeois Congress an that of the workers and peasants. The Gandhian tactic of non violence was intended to maintain bourgeois control. In the Com munist interpretation of Indian history of the period one find little or no mention of certain aspects—notably the Cripps Missio and the record of economic and cultural progress.

Free India

Reluctant to believe that India became really free in 1947, th Soviet Encyclopaedia says: 'British imperialism could no longe rule India with its former methods, but it retained importan positions in India.' British overlordship was to continue throug business interests, by weakening the country by partition, b inflaming differences, and by holding key posts in the army. Th British are accused of provoking the communal blood-bath in th Punjab.

In his comment Dr Spear points to the absence of any referenc to the whole range of national development and to the integratio of the princely States. He also points to a Soviet deviation from th Marxist interpretation in the writers' anxiety to maintain an anti British attitude. Marx regarded the British as both destroyers an regenerators in India, the regenerative aspect being the introduc tion of the West into India. Soviet writers saw only the destructiv and exploiting aspects and ran into difficulties in trying to convic Britain of sin on every occasion and to present Congress as bourgeois organization. It was difficult to condemn both con vincingly.

The writings of A. M. D'yakov are not covered in the *Centra Asian Review*'s initial study and will presumably figure in the nex issue, which is to be largely devoted to Pakistan. In view of th consistent hostility shown by Soviet writers to the concept o Pakistan and Pakistan's membership of both the Baghdad Pac and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, the analysis is likel to be an equally valuable document for the student of internationa affairs.

B. E. H. F.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

***Volume* 13 *No.* 7 *July* 1957**

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Note of the Month

An Authoritarian Monarchy for Spain?

VIEWS on the monarchy expressed in influential quarters, coupled with the arrests that followed on recent attempts to form a new political party, have focused attention on what form of government is to succeed the present regime in Spain.

An article which lately appeared in the Spanish monarchist paper *ABC*, written by the Count of Ruiseñada, is of particular interest because of the views it puts forward on the monarchy. The Count, a wealthy business man and one of the largest land-owners in Spain, has gone further than many of his fellow-monarchists in achieving a reconciliation of loyalties towards General Franco and towards Don Juan, Pretender to the Spanish Throne. It was the Count who in December 1954 was responsible for the meeting between Franco and Don Juan which resulted in arrangements being made for Prince Juan Carlos, Don Juan's heir, to be trained in Spain, ostensibly as Franco's successor. The point of particular interest in the Count's article is that his conception of the role of a monarchy in Spain appears to coincide closely with that known to be held by prominent members of Opus Dei.

Now Opus Dei is a lay order, approved by the Pope, which has rapidly increased its influence in Spain during the last few years. Although it is claimed that members of the order have complete freedom of choice in political matters, it is nevertheless a fact that among its members there appears to be a unanimity of view that Spain's government should take the form of a monarchy. (There are, of course, many other categories of monarchists in the country apart from Opus Dei, just as there are other groups of Catholics, for example the Jesuits and Acción Católica.) Opus Dei was founded with the object of gaining influence in intellectual circles, particularly in the universities, and its aim is to penetrate every profession and aspect of the life of the country. This it has done with such success that in the new Government, appointed

last February, there is one known member of Opus Dei, Seño Ullastres, the Minister of Commerce, as well as several know sympathizers who may also be members. Opus Dei has been calle a freemasonry of the Church, since its membership is not mad public, although some individuals have let it be known that the are members. But perhaps of more importance than its representa tion in the Government is the fact that the key post of right-han man to Franco's right-hand man is held by a member of Opus De This is Professor Laureano Lopez Rodó, who is chief assistant t Admiral Carrero Blanco, one of Franco's closest friends an advisers, and who occupies a position in the new Governmen which amounts to that of deputy Premier, Franco himself bein Prime Minister. Lopez Rodó is said to have been largely respon sible for the representation of Opus Dei in the present Govern ment. In view of the influence which it will be seen that Opus De is now in a position to wield in affairs of state, the conception hel by its members of the constitutional form that Spain's govern ment should take is clearly of some importance.

As was mentioned earlier, this conception closely resemble that put forward by Count Ruiseñada in the *ABC* article. In it th Count claims that wide sections of Spanish opinion do not wish fo a monarchy based on liberal parliamentarianism, a decaden monarchy of courtiers, a regime of 'privileges and oligarchies'. Th monarchy they wish to see should be both 'traditional and popular' The king should personify the independence of power in relatio to all pressure groups and privileged classes and should reflect th rights of man and the rights of authority in accordance with th requirements of Christian public law. He will govern in conjunc tion with representative institutions such as the Cortes. Th Government will be appointed 'not by the passions of politica parties' but with the sober guidance of the Council of the Realm

As early as 1952 Rafael Calvo Serer, who appears to be the chie mouthpiece of Opus Dei, in an article on the Third Force in Spain, published in the *Ecrits de Paris*, described as one of its principal aims a popular and representative monarchy; but it has since become clear that the Opus Dei conception of monarchy is an authoritarian one approximating closely to that put forward by Count Ruiseñada. Calvo Serer, in various articles and interviews (e.g. in *ABC*, *France Soir*, and the *Catholic Herald*), has filled in some of the details of this conception. The gist of these views is that the monarchy would consist of three elements: the king, the

Government, and the Cortes. The king would not have absolute power, but would rule with the advice of a Council. The Council would be appointed by responsible bodies such as the Church, the Cortes, and municipal bodies. The king would appoint the Prime Minister (who would not be dependent on the votes of a parliamentary majority). The Prime Minister would appoint the Ministers with the approval of the king. The Cortes would not be elected by universal suffrage, but it would nevertheless be alive to the views of the people and act as a brake on the Government. (In Calvo Serer's view, general elections in Spain would be a catastrophe.) Should a conflict arise between the Government and the Cortes, the king would act as arbiter. It is, incidentally, of interest that Opus Dei is said to be thinking in terms of Don Juan as king and not Don Carlos.

Franco himself has on more than one occasion made it clear that his views on the form which a monarchy in Spain should take closely resemble those just described.

Why then is the monarchy not introduced forthwith? The short answer would seem to be because of the Falange, the only authorized political party, of which Franco is the nominal head and which has a radical, anti-monarchical, and anti-clerical tradition. During 1955 Franco did his best, by means of statements in various speeches and interviews, to convince the Falange that their interests would be safeguarded under the type of monarchy which he had in mind for Spain. There were signs that the Falange leaders, or some of them, were prepared to be won over, but it became apparent in the autumn of that year, and subsequently, that the rank and file were very far from acceptance of a monarchy. This knowledge, combined with some doubts that may have arisen in Franco's mind as to whether Juan Carlos was entirely suitable for the responsible position he would have to occupy—after a fatal accident to his royal brother had proved a severe shock to the young prince—caused the monarchy to be soft-pedalled in official circles. In unofficial circles, namely the monarchist *ABC* and the Falangist *Arriba*, the subject has been kept alive in a ding-dong battle of editorials and articles.

The Falangists have recently lost ground in the political field. In 1956 they were asked by Franco to draft a constitutional law for the country which would have their support. The text was not officially made public, but it nevertheless circulated widely during January of this year. The reactions to it in circles other than the

Falange were so unfavourable that nothing more has since been heard of these draft 'Fundamental Laws'. The Falange lost further ground in the appointments made in February to the new Government. The Opus Dei, through their ministerial supporters, can be said to control both the Falange's purse-strings and also the police, and are therefore in a position to outmanœuvre their Falange opponents, who of late have been taking a livelier interest in social reform.

Meanwhile opposition to the regime has steadily increased from a growing number of quarters. The rapid inflation has affected all classes, while dwindling gold reserves and a chronic economic crisis have alarmed business circles. But perhaps the greatest long-term danger to the regime is a new freedom of spirit and impatience with such controls as the press censorship which is blowing not only through the universities (as witness the student riots) but through wider circles as well. The wave of arrests which took place towards the end of May was remarkable both for the standing of those arrested and for the evidence of the extent of the forces now in active opposition to the regime. The particular group involved were monarchists and included, among other prominent people, the brother of the Bishop of Malaga who is well known for his social work and opposition to the press censorship They appear to have wished to start in Spain a Christian Democratic party on the lines of the French *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* and to have been in sympathy with a policy of closer union in Europe. They are said to have established links with Spaniards in exile in Paris. In April a former Falangist, now an outspoken critic of the regime, Dionisio Ridruejo, had been arrested. It was known that he wished to start a 'Social Democratic Action' party in which he hoped to unite all those who wished to see a liberalization of the regime.

Franco has thus served notice that he is not prepared to tolerate opposition of any sort, no matter from what quarter, and there is evidence from the nature of recent appointments to key security positions that these iron-hand methods are a deliberate policy, the fruit perhaps of a realization of the extent of the opposition. But in fact the danger to the regime may possibly be less than would appear at first sight. The opposition is hamstrung by its inability to sink its differences, since in characteristic Spanish fashion each individual has a different solution to the problem. Moreover such is the efficiency of Franco's Nazi-trained secret police that it is

virtually impossible to organize any opposition. Meanwhile, ironical though it may seem to many, the best hope of a liberalization of the regime would appear to lie with the Opus Dei, whose members claim to be opposed to dictatorship and to wish for a return to more popular control but within a framework of traditional authority.

ERRATUM

In the June 1957 issue of *The World Today*, in the Note of the Month on 'The Eden Plans Reinterpreted', on p. 231, line 13, for 'his first item of these directives' read 'the last item of the directives just quoted'.

France's Search for a Government

Problems Facing M. Mollet's Successor

ON 21 May M. Mollet's Government was defeated by 37 votes, after having held office for almost sixteen months, a record unsurpassed since 1928 by any French Government in peace-time. After an interregnum of three weeks, during which MM. Pleven, Pinay, Pflimlin, Billières, and Mollet in turn either explored the possibilities of forming a Government or refused even to try, M. Bourgès-Maunoury, who had been Defence Minister throughout M. Mollet's Government, succeeded in forming a Government and obtaining a majority of 46 in the National Assembly. This somewhat muted expression of Parliamentary confidence, accompanied by almost unanimously discouraging press comment, suggests that M. Bourgès-Maunoury, who has already established one record—that of being, at forty-two, France's youngest Prime Minister—may well establish a second, that of heading the shortest-lived of the Governments of the Fourth Republic that survived their first meeting with the Assembly.[1]

Indeed, the success of M Bourgès-Maunoury, together with the composition of his Government, ten of whose fourteen Ministers held office in the previous Government (five, including M Lacoste, occupying the same posts), raises the query as to why the change was necessary. True, M. Mollet himself is not a member of the new Government, though at one stage he was asked by the President to try to form a Government. But, more than anyone else, M. Bourgès-Maunoury has been associated with the least successful parts of M. Mollet's policy—the Suez operation and the 'tough' policy in Algeria. The Minister of Finance, M. Ramadier, whose proposals for new taxes were the immediate cause of the Government's defeat, is not included in the new Government either, but the new Prime Minister's investiture speech already made it plain that he would include most of M. Ramadier's economies, as well as his proposed taxes, in the financial measures to be submitted to the Assembly towards the end of June. No less than M. Mollet, the new Prime Minister is committed to obtaining the ratification of the Common Market and Euratom treaties.

Why, then, was M. Mollet defeated? Was it merely an expression of the dissatisfaction that Deputies feel with any Government after the first six months? Was it a demonstration of their dis-

[1] This article went to press before the Government faced a vote of confidence

illusionment at his failure to bring the Algerian problem any nearer to a solution, a sectional and irresponsible gesture by right-wing Deputies who approve of the use of force in Algeria but object to paying the bill, or an expression of their conviction that France cannot afford both an expensive campaign in Algeria and expensive social reforms? M. Gazier's Bill to reform the rates of remuneration of doctors under the health service and M. Billières' reform of the educational system were both likely to prove very expensive and were unacceptable to the Right for other reasons as well.

Perhaps all of the above suggested explanations for M. Mollet's defeat played a part. But whatever the reasons, and however brief M. Mollet's absence may turn out to be, the new situation and the reactions of the parties to it do throw into relief some of the more intractable elements of the problems that French Ministers are trying to grapple with, or to escape from. To begin with, the crisis has revealed once again the essential conservatism of both French party struggles and French party structures. *Mutatis mutandis*, the Socialists, the Right, and the M.R.P. continue to fight the same battles through all changes of situation. There is a high chance that the M.R.P. could have either formed a Government or been represented in that of M. Bourgès-Maunoury were it not for the long-standing grudge of the Socialists against the M.R.P., first because of their support for the 1951 Barangé Bill, providing for a small amount of State aid for Catholic schools, and second for their alliance in the elections with the Right. Yet the first is only a very minor breach of the principle of State neutrality in religious matters, while the second was largely forced on the M.R.P. against their will. But to Socialists, a Radical, and as such, traditionally, an anti-clerical, is still more acceptable as Prime Minister than a member of the M.R.P., even though on matters of both economic and overseas policy most M.R.P. Deputies are well to the left of the majority of the Radicals.

The same conservatism is seen in the parties' attitudes towards Algeria. The Right continue to cling to the *status quo*, maintaining that Algeria is French; Socialists and M.R.P. continue to urge a progressive policy, though without apparently withdrawing support from the policy outlined by M. Mollet eighteen months ago and reaffirmed since both by him and by the new Prime Minister, and without ceasing to acquiesce in, if not to support, the continued policy of 'pacification'; so that every new offer, such as, for instance, both M. Mollet's and M. Bourgès-Maunoury's offer of

'provisional institutions', comes too grudgingly and too late. There is the same opposition on economic and social matters between the Right, which insists on the need for economies in Government spending (though not on the need to withdraw subsidies to uneconomic concerns) and prefers loans to taxes as a source of revenue, and the Left, which is mainly conscious of the need to keep down the cost of living if new waves of strikes and social unrest are to be avoided, and which maintains that the present incidence of taxation unduly favours the rich.

The most spectacular demonstration of French political conservatism, however, is provided by the failure of M. Mendès-France's two-year attempt to modernize the Radical Party. Between May 1955, when he became its effective leader, and the end of 1956, the party split into three or more sections. At the time of the dissolution of the last Parliament, M. Edgar Faure and his supporters were expelled, forming an independent group of a dozen or so Deputies in this Assembly; at the party's Congress in October 1956 the so-called 'Dissidents', led by MM. Queuille and Morice, broke away and now form a separate group, also of a dozen or so. The remaining forty-five 'orthodox' Radicals, officially led by M. Mendès-France, are also divided; since the Suez operation, Radical Ministers have voted for the Government, a dozen or so Radical Deputies, led by M. Mendès-France, have voted against, and the rest have done what Radicals have always done—pleased themselves. And this in spite of a new ruling obtained by M. Mendès-France at the extraordinary Congress in May of this year that, in future, members of the Radical group must obey the party whip. On 21 May, four Radical Deputies voted for M. Mollet in defiance of this ruling, and the party '*bureau*' refused to expel two of them at M. Mendès-France's request. M. Mendès-France himself then resigned from the vice-presidency. The inclusion in M. Bourgès-Maunoury's Government of both 'orthodox' and 'dissident' Radicals indicates that, if unity is to be restored, it is likely to be without M. Mendès-France. And he himself must bear some responsibility for the failure to give the party a programme. He successively fought the elections as a member of the Socialist-cum-Radical *Front Républicain*, took office in M. Mollet's Government, resigned from it on 23 May 1956, criticized it from the back benches (though he had advised his Radical colleagues to stay in office), and, finally, after the Suez intervention, voted against it.

Where he stands now, no one knows. He has certainly lost ground in the country, partly because he was, to many young people in particular, a symbol of dynamism and success, and now seems to have lost his dynamism and to have no chance of repeating his spectacular success of 1954. He has been unpopular in Parliament since his Premiership and is now highly unpopular with his own group.

Nor does another attempt to break with traditional political attitudes and structures seem to have had any more success. M. Pierre Poujade's *Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans* seems well on the way towards oblivion. In 1955, the movement boasted a membership of half a million. In the 1956 elections, 2½ million electors voted for Poujadist candidates. Today, the number of Poujadists in the Assembly has fallen from fifty-two to thirty-seven, partly owing to the invalidation of a number of their Deputies, partly owing to internal dissensions, which exist in the country as well as in the Assembly. It is generally believed that, if elections were held now, support for the movement would slump as support for the R.P.F. did in 1956. Both appealed, though in different ways, to the discontented. But Poujadism is essentially negative and reactionary. Its so-called programme consists of little more than aggressive hostility to Parliamentary government. For it is impossible to take seriously the call for a States-General, whose composition and functions have never been worked out. There have been signs during the past few months of a revival of interest both in the personality of General de Gaulle and in his proposals for a Presidential system, the latter having found support in one or two rather surprising left-wing quarters. But there is little sign of a revival of Gaullism itself. The *mystique*, as also in the case of *Mendésisme*, seems to have been lost.

The losses of Poujadism have been in the main the gain of the orthodox conservatives, whose position, to judge by some recent by-election results, is becoming steadily stronger. The essential conservatism of French political attitudes can be judged by the fact that, today, three-quarters of the Assembly is made up of members of the four traditional schools of French political thought and action: the Right, the Radicals and their associates, the Socialists, and the Communists.

Yet in the present Assembly, the permanent opposition of 287 extremists (Communists and Poujadists) makes the achievement of the bare majorities necessary for Parliamentary government to be

carried on dependent on some degree of co-operation between al the non-Communist tendencies, since the total defection of an one of them can create an opposition majority.

M. Bourgès-Maunoury begins his period of office with th support of both Right and Socialist groups, for reasons describe by *Le Monde*'s commentator as '*lumineusement contradictoires*' Failing a radical change of attitude by a number of Deputies on number of issues, this situation inevitably creates the dange either of a series of deadlocks, followed by Governmental crises or of a return to the '*immobilisme*' of 1949, or of a grave emergency such as that following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, whicl brought M. Mendès-France to power in 1954.

A great deal will depend on what happens in Algeria, which M Bourgès-Maunoury has declared to be the Government's firs preoccupation. His programme seems at first sight imprecise unrealistic, and contradictory. He has reaffirmed his solidarit with M. Mollet, as well he might, since he was co-architect (and some say the leading spirit) in the formulation and application o M. Mollet's policy. He has affirmed the need to recognize 'th Algerian personality' and political equality, both of which, i interpreted in any sense acceptable to the Algerian nationalists mean the acceptance of independence, or the organization o elections which could only result in a massive vote for inde pendence. Yet no party in the Assembly (except the Communists is prepared to concede Algerian independence. He has promised a *loi-cadre* for Algeria, setting up provisional institutions designed to lead to autonomous *départements* and provinces and, ultimately to the suppression of the Government-General and to the de centralization of executive power. M. Mollet also tried to set up provisional institutions, and the attempt has largely failed, owing to the nationalist campaign of terrorism which has already resulted in the murder or intimidation of a number of courageous Moslems who were prepared to co-operate in the application of this policy Nor is Moslem confidence in the French Government's intentions to suppress the Government-General likely to be encouraged by the retention of M. Lacoste as Governor-General.

It is difficult, then, to see how M. Bourgès-Maunoury's policy could succeed where M. Mollet's failed, unless, at long last, M. Lacoste's 'last quarter of an hour', so long predicted, is now at hand, and Algerian war-weariness is about to produce a less in-transigent Moslem frame of mind. To say this is not to under-

estimate the appalling difficulties that any French Government must confront if fighting, terrorism, banditry, and intimidation are to be ended in Algeria and both Europeans and Moslems persuaded to try to find some method of coexistence. It is far easier to see what is not likely to work than to suggest what will. A number of plans have recently been put forward by French politicians or political groups, most of them suggesting the division of the country into two or more autonomous provinces in such a way that one, at least, would have a clear majority of Europeans. But it is not easy to see how, in the present atmosphere, European (or predominantly European) units could long survive, hemmed in all round by Moslem territories. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how Moslem units could be either politically or economically viable without the co-operation of the French community. For there are as yet no stable parties or trade unions, very few administrative and technical personnel, there is little experience of local Government, and there is no national leadership, the two rival nationalist movements being as ready to murder each other's members as they are to murder Europeans and pro-French Moslems. Already, in the more peaceable territories of Morocco and Tunisia, French residents are leaving at an alarming rate. About 35,000 left Morocco in 1956, and double that number are expected to leave in 1957. Not only would a large-scale exodus from Algeria be expected, but some French people have now reached the point where they feel that this might perhaps be the least of the available evils.

It is significant that a writer like M. Raymond Aron has now categorically proposed that France should cease pouring money into an apparently endless military adventure and use the funds to repatriate the European residents of Algeria, leaving the country to get on as best it can without France.[1] He disputes the truth of the common assumption that the loss of Algeria would be economically serious for France, and here a number of economists would support him. Even while military operations are going on, France is still spending some £100 million a year on Algerian services. In 1953–4, Algeria took less than 12 per cent of French exports, mainly machines, textiles, and dairy products, for which there is a market elsewhere, while France imports from Algeria mainly wine, iron, and tobacco, none of them essential. Indeed, since the south of France suffers from overproduction of wine,

[1] See M. Aron's recently published book, *La Tragédie Algérienne* (Plon, 1957).

the diminution or cessation of Algerian imports might help solve one of the problems now being evaded at considera expense to the taxpayer. The loss of Algerian manpower would compensated for by the release of men from the forces, though t remittances sent home by Algerians would be a serious loss to tl poverty-stricken and unemployment-ridden Moslem populatio

If this solution is rejected, and there is no doubt that in the present mood most Frenchmen would still reject it in spite of thei war-weariness, then what is to be done? There is much talk a present in France about the possibility of federalism, a solutio known to be favoured by M. Bourguiba, and thought to be ap proved of by General de Gaulle. But here again there are formid able hurdles to be surmounted. France has no tradition of a Com monwealth relationship, and no experience of federation. All he experience and all her instincts favour explicitly defined relation ships, inscribed in written constitutions. The first step would seen to be, therefore, a revision of the provisions of the French Con stitution dealing with overseas territories (*Titre VIII*). This ha already been proposed, but a number of other articles are al ready in process of revision, and progress on these, as also on th reform of *Titre VIII*, has been held up because there are know to be serious divergencies of opinion between the parties on wha ought to be done.

Yet in spite of all these difficulties, to defer a settlement i Algeria brings its own, perhaps graver, difficulties. The Frenc Assembly voted at the end of last year a law providing for a large scale plan for the development of the newly discovered minera wealth of the Saharan region. It is difficult to imagine that this ca even begin to be applied without the goodwill not only of th Algerians, but also of Tunisia and Morocco, through whos territory pipeline or railways may also have to pass, or whose port may be needed. Moreover, there is still criticism of the territoria framework within which the development is to take place, as wel as ignorance of the terms upon which European technicians, or European capital (for France has appealed for investment by he prospective partners in the Common Market), will be acceptable. The decision to set up an organization covering a vast area cutting across the frontiers of West and Equatorial African territories has aroused some opposition in some quarters of 'black Africa', whose twelve territories are beginning to consider themselves as embryo States.

Failure to solve the Algerian problem could jeopardize not only the Saharan experiment but also the new Franco-African relationship now being established with the application of the *loi-cadre*, voted by the Mollet Government a year ago. This provides for the progressive Africanization of the administration of the territories of West and Equatorial Africa and for African participation in governmental functions, designed to lead gradually to self-administration. There are already signs of disagreement among African political leaders concerning the form that African political evolution ought to take. Some favour the grouping of the present territories in large Federations; others see the territories as future nation-States. If confidence in France is shaken by a continuation of war in Algeria, or, worse, by the loss of Algeria, then the impact on Dakar and Brazzaville may well destroy the political climate in which these problems can be satisfactorily solved.

There would also, inevitably, be an even more serious impact on Franco-North African relations. In spite of friction over a number of matters, and, in particular, over the status of French troops, there is at present in both Tunisia and Morocco a genuine fund of goodwill towards France. But both these territories urgently need economic aid if they are to make their regimes secure and withstand the appeals of Cairo to their more fanatical elements. Already France has suspended payment of a subsidy to Tunisia, owing to open support by the Tunis authorities for the Algerian rebel movement.

Algeria, then, remains the key problem, but the possible stages towards any solution seem to be strewn with grounds for fresh controversy in an Assembly which finds it difficult to muster a majority on any major issue. Dissolution is for the time being ruled out by the provisions of the Constitution. If and when it becomes possible, Deputies will be confronted once again with the dilemma of 1955. Is a dissolution likely to produce a clear-cut result, if the electoral law is not first revised? And is there any more likelihood of this being achieved than there was in 1955?

Although the economic crisis is also bound up with events in Algeria, it is, in itself, perhaps the least serious of the problems that the French Government has to deal with in the immediate future. For since 1953 France's basic economic situation has been both sound and prosperous. The 1956 frosts, the Suez operation and the consequent oil shortage, the military burden of 'pacification' have all combined to produce a serious unbalance in the

foreign trade situation. The shortage of manpower entailed by mobilization has helped to increase wages and home spending, while France's high price level discourages exporters from seeking foreign markets. But, as one commentator remarked recently, all that is needed to remedy the situation is 'a little political courage'.

It is permissible to wonder whether the present Prime Minister, who is a Radical and, as such, suspect of tendencies towards '*immobilisme*', is the man to call it forth, and, indeed, whether he *can* call it forth in the present Assembly. For what the recent crisis has shown up with depressing vividness is the extent to which the French Assembly seems, as in 1954 at the time of the prolonged deadlock over E.D.C., to be prevented from moving in any direction by a series of Gordian knots, no one of which it seems capable of cutting.

D. M. P.

Tibet under Communist Occupation

DURING the past few hundred years Sino-Tibetan relations have been characterized by Chinese attempts to establish or extend their control and influence over Tibet, and by Tibetan efforts to resist this attempted Chinese domination. Before 1911 there were close personal and religious bonds between successive Chinese Emperors and Dalai Lamas, but the Tibetans have never accepted, then or since, the Chinese definition of suzerainty, i.e. with Tibet in the position of a vassal State. Since 1911 at least, with the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, the Tibetans have, in fact, had virtual independence. Following the establishment of the new republic in China, in 1911, the Chinese continued to lay claim to Tibet, but the Tibetans were able to maintain themselves against more than one attempted invasion. After the second World War, in 1947, the new Chinese Constitution named Tibet as a part of China, but the Tibetans refused to accept it.

CHINA 'LIBERATES' TIBET

The rapid advance of the Communist armies in China in 1949 caused considerable concern in Tibet, and in September 1949 the

Tibetan Government in Lhasa resolved that any invasion must be resisted. At that time the Dalai Lama, Tibet's traditional spiritual and temporal ruler, was still a minor, and the country was ruled by a Regent, assisted by a Cabinet of monks and lay officials. Tibet's second great spiritual leader, the Panchen Lama, had died in China in 1937 and the new incarnation had not yet been installed. There were two candidates, one in Lhasa and the other in the Chinese province of Chinghai. The latter had already been proclaimed the new Panchen Lama by the Chinese Nationalists, but in the view of Lhasa both remained candidates.

By the end of 1949 the Chinese Communist armies had overrun Chinghai—taking over the Nationalist-sponsored Panchen Lama—and had reached the north-eastern and eastern borders of Tibet. Meanwhile, in China, the newly established Communist Government had announced its intention of 'liberating' all the territories of China, including Tibet.

On 24 November 1949, the Nationalist-nominated Panchen Lama announced his adherence to the Peking regime and promised his support in 'liberating' Tibet. On 4 August 1950, General Liu Po-cheng outlined the 'Tibetan Liberation Programme' to the South-West China Military and Administrative Committee. He said the Army 'must launch an attack on Tibet . . . to enable the Tibetan people to return to the great family of the Chinese People's Republic'.[1]

Tibet attempted to negotiate with the Communists, but while preparations for negotiation were still on foot the invasion of the country began on 7 October 1950, and the important outpost of Chamdo in Eastern Tibet was captured on 19 October. But it was not until 24 October that the New China News Agency even reported that a 'political mobilization directive to People's Army units which had been ordered to advance into Tibet to free 3 million Tibetans from imperialist aggression and consolidate the national defences of China's western borders' had been issued. Only on 1 November did the Agency announce that the invasion had begun and that Chamdo had been 'liberated'.

Along the eastern frontier Tibetan troops, supported by local levies, put up stout resistance against overwhelming odds. At the same time, in early November, the Government in Lhasa appealed to the United Nations, setting out the Tibetan case and protesting against the 'sneak invasion' and 'disruption of our State

[1] Peking Radio, 4 August 1950.

by methods reminiscent of the jungle'.[1] An Indian Note denounced the action as 'startling and regrettable'.[2] It was during this critical period that the sixteen-year-old Dalai Lama assumed full powers from the Regent. In early December the Tibetan Government made a further appeal to the United Nations, restating determination to resist and adding that 'it would be the height of cowardice to bow to superior force' and they 'would rather be overpowered by its blind rage than accept it with a show of reverence'.[3]

Following the invasion of his country, the Dalai Lama, in December 1950, fled with his Cabinet to Southern Tibet. From there, after Tibet's appeal to the United Nations had been shelved, he attempted to make the best of a bad situation by sending, in April 1951, a delegation via India to Peking in response to the Communist demand, issued simultaneously with the entry of troops into Tibet, that representatives be sent to China to negotiate a 'peaceful liberation'. At the same time the Panchen Lama and other Tibetan officials who had already signified their adherence to the Communists after their capture at Chamdo arrived in Peking.

After a month of negotiations an 'Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet' was forced on the Tibetans. It provided that:

(*a*) The Tibetan Army should be incorporated into the Chinese Liberation Army.
(*b*) Tibet's foreign relations should be handled by the Peking Government.
(*c*) The Peking Government should establish a Military and Administrative Committee with military headquarters in Tibet.
(*d*) The roles of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas should continue unchanged.
(*e*) No reform should be introduced without consultation with the Tibetan Government.
(*f*) The Tibetan Government and 'patriotic elements' of the major monasteries should rank merely as members of the Military and Administrative Committee.
(*g*) The names of all Tibetan members of this Committee should be submitted to the Peking Government for appointment; a Chinese Resident would be appointed by Peking.

While the political seizure of Tibet was effected through the conclusion of this agreement, the Chinese military occupation continued. Meanwhile the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa after

[1] United Nations Document A/1549, 24 November 1950.
[2] New China News Agency Bulletin, Supplement No. 59, 21 November 1950
[3] United Nations Document A/1658, 11 December 1950.

seven months' absence and was followed two days later by the Chinese Communist Resident, Chang Ching-wu. Communist troops reached Lhasa in early September 1951, and on 24 October the Dalai Lama, under duress, pledged his support to the Sino-Tibetan Agreement. Other towns and provinces were soon occupied, and in 1952 an 'advisory committee' under the Dalai Lama was formed to replace the Tibetan Government. In May of that year the Panchen Lama returned to Tibet with a Communist escort.

The small Tibetan Army had been disbanded before the end of 1951 and a tiny force of specially trained youths was raised, but its incorporation into the Chinese Army was not carried out. The same process of replacement was carried out with the police. Since then Chinese Communist activities in Tibet have been characterized not only by the gradual extension of military control to the more inaccessible areas but also by a persistent campaign of undermining the Government, weakening the Buddhist Church, intensifying economic penetration, and mass indoctrination.

METHODS OF PENETRATION

But the Communists greatly underestimated the time required for subjugating the Tibetans. In fact, the military and administrative committee mentioned in the Agreement was never effectively set up: instead the Chinese at first maintained the fabric of the Tibetan administration, attaching a Chinese 'adviser' to each official.

As they consolidated their control of the country, the Chinese proceeded to get rid of openly hostile Ministers by accusing them of being implicated in diverse disturbances. They were forced to resign, or encouraged to 'retire' or go on 'long leave of absence'. But at the same time, realizing that except through the Dalai Lama and his officials, both laity and monks, nothing could be done, the Communists, contrary to all Marxist theory, redoubled their efforts to woo the ruling circles and through them dominate the country.

Meanwhile hundreds of Tibetan cadres are being trained, both on the spot and at the Central Nationalities Institute in China, and a few are also in Moscow. Thus in time, although the members of 'autonomous government' organs will have Tibetan names, they will be in effect merely Communist-indoctrinated nominees.

The Sino-Tibetan Agreement provided that the policy of

'freedom of religious belief' would be respected in Tibet; but, while not openly attacking the Buddhist Church, the Communists have attempted to propagate their materialistic creed and at the same time are slowly but completely depriving the clergy, from the Dalai Lama downwards, of their temporal power. They have taken care to give political reasons for their anti-religious activities, arrests of monks, etc., but according to travellers' reports Chinese officers supervise every monastery.

In this connection the following Moscow broadcast (25 October 1950) in the 'Map of the World' series was very significant:

> The clique of clerical feudal leaders (who exploit Tibetan peasants, livestock breeders, and agricultural workers mercilessly) is headed by the Dalai Lama. . . Doping the class consciousness of the masses with the poison of Buddhism, the most reactionary religious teaching, and supported by an army of Lamas many thousands strong and completely subordinate to the Dalai Lama, the clerical feudal leaders hold the population of Tibet in subjection.

The best-publicized achievement of the Chinese colonization of Tibet is the construction of the Sikang and Chinghai roads, completed in December 1954 largely by conscripted and often unpaid labour, and described by the pro-Communist Tibetan leader Ngabö Shape as 'an indispensable factor in strengthening our national defence and in connecting Tibet with the rest of the interior of our Motherland' (i.e. China).[1]

Apart from this, however, 'people's banks' and trading companies are being set up in Lhasa and other major cities, and Shigatse, the seat of the Panchen Lama, is taking on the aspect of a boom-town with the influx of Chinese merchants. At a reception given for a visiting Tibetan delegation in Peking in 1952, Mao Tse-tung declared that Tibet's population of 2–3 million people should be increased to 5 or 6 million, and later to 10 million. This, of course, means Chinese immigration, and soon the Tibetans will be outnumbered in their own country.

The speech by Ngabö Shape mentioned above revealed that the Chinese have set up 'many primary schools, cadre schools, political training classes, and associations for patriotic youths and women' (these have high-ranking Chinese members). Furthermore, 'Tibetan newspapers and broadcasts . . . are being provided . . .' on a vast scale.[2]

[1] *New China News Agency Bulletin*, 12 March 1955.
[2] ibid.

Other reports indicate that Chinese influence on Tibetan social and cultural life in the towns has already reached serious proportions.

THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF TIBET

The 'advisory committee' set up to replace the normal Tibetan Government began work early in 1953. An 'office of Foreign Affairs' was opened under the Chinese Fang Kung-su, assisted by a Chinese and a Tibetan.

Once the consolidation of their hold over internal and foreign affairs and communications with China had been established, the Chinese Communists were ready to summon the two high Lamas to Peking, ostensibly to attend the National People's Congress. They arrived on 4 September 1954, and were in fact detained until mid-1955. Throughout this period the youthful Dalai Lama, accompanied by his Communist colleague, was subjected to all sorts of psychological pressure. Both were present at the seventh meeting in Peking of the Chinese State Council or Cabinet on 9 March 1955 at which it was decided to form a 'Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet'.

Four other important documents were approved at this meeting of the State Council; they concerned the decisions on communications and transport in Tibet, aid for economic development, the remuneration of Government officials in Tibet, and approval of an agreement between the Government of Tibet (i.e. the Dalai Lama) and the Bureau of the Panchen Lama on 'lingering historical problems' which were now soluble 'under the guidance of the Central Government'.[1] Only the first three of these documents were published in full.

But the Tibetans once again succeeded in delaying events, and it was not until 22 April 1956 that the inauguration of the Committee took place in Lhasa. The importance attached to the event by the Chinese Communist authorities in Peking was indicated by the dispatch of a special Central Government delegation, headed by Vice-Premier Chen Yi, to take part in the inaugural ceremony.

The Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Administration of Tibet has fifty-one members: fifteen from the Tibetan Government, ten from the Panchen Lama's Bureau, ten from the Chamdo area of Eastern Tibet, five from among the Chinese

[1] ibid., 13 March 1955.

Central Government officials in Tibet, and eleven others chos from Tibetan aristocracy. The Peking Cabinet appointed t Dalai Lama as Chairman, the Panchen Lama as first Vice-Cha man, and the Chinese Commander in Tibet, General Chang Ku hua, as second Vice-Chairman. Peking also nominates all oth members of the Committee and the heads and deputy heads of tl thirteen sub-committees and departments established under

A highly significant clause in this State Council decisio specifies that all affairs relating to the whole country's administr tion shall come under the direct guidance of Peking, and that tl Peking State Council itself will establish the organs for tl economic direction of Tibet.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OPPOSITION TO THE CHINESE OCCUPATION

Unrest had been brewing for some time, but it was not unt February 1956 that the Tibetans turned to open revolt against tl Chinese. News of the rising did not reach the outside world unt May, but by then the uprising had spread far beyond the areas fir mentioned.

The uprising started among the Golok tribesmen of the North Eastern Frontier region and quickly spread southwards to Kham the Tibetan-inhabited areas astride the Upper Yangtse. By Jur Tibetan sources claimed that a full-scale war of independence wa raging throughout Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet, a territor ideally suited to guerrilla warfare.

The Khambas (the name by which the turbulent Tibetan ir habitants of Kham are called) took to the mountains, descendin only to harass the Chinese Communist forces. Traffic on the Sikang Tibet highway was disrupted owing to the repeated attacks o convoys and destruction of bridges by the insurgents. To the south in Batang, at least one major success was reported: there th Tibetans overpowered the local Chinese garrison and captured large quantity of arms and ammunition. Tibetan sources state that the revolt was provoked by Chinese attempts to introduce lan reforms and disarm the local population. Chinese counter measures necessitated a large redeployment of troops from Szechwan and the use of aircraft, including the bombing of Litang

Peking remained silent until, in August, a senior Chines official issued a categorical denial of rebellion in Tibet. Since in October 1955 the Chinese had incorporated the Tibetan-inhabite

areas east of the Upper Yangtse within the province of Szechwan, he was able to announce that there had been a 'limited' rebellion in the Batang-Litang area of Szechwan which was allegedly the work of 'a few feudal landlords'. But reports from Tibet indicate that the rebellion in the east was not just an isolated tribal uprising; although largely spontaneous, it was led by a national resistance movement, the Mimang Tsongdu (Village People's Councils), which, ironically, had originally been organized by the Chinese Communists with the aim of strengthening their hold over the countryside. There was popular pressure on the Mimang Tsongdu to extend the uprisings to the west, to Central and Southern Tibet, where non-co-operation had been the main form of opposition, but it was feared that should this happen the Chinese would retaliate with large-scale repressive measures.

At the National People's Congress held in Peking in June 1956 there were other cautious references to trouble amongst the Tibetans. A delegate from the Apha Tibetan Autonomous District (in North Szechwan, about 200 miles north-east of Litang) similarly spoke of 'difficulties due to remnant Kuomintang gangs inciting riots by a few feudal lords'.[1] The speech of the Tibetan Vice-Chairman of Chinghai, Sherab Galtso, was more revealing.[2] He referred to an 'unpleasant situation' in 'certain Tibetan areas of Szechwan' and condemned improper measures of land reform, the commercial tax on monasteries, the registration of farmland and cattle, and the collection of arms from the Tibetans. He advocated the more subtle policy of 'education and propaganda', a method of 'slow beginning and quick results', which in itself was a tacit admission of the partial success, at least, of the Tibetan tactics of delay and non-co-operation. More recently, at the session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee in Peking in March 1957, Pangda Yampel, a high-ranking Tibetan official, disclosed that 'deviations' in the introduction last year of 'reforms' in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of the Upper Yangtse had led to a 'general panic' and the flight of many Tibetan families to the west, causing disquiet throughout Tibet.[3]

Since the uprisings of 1956 the Communists have been treading even more warily, and the Tibetans have now wrested further concessions from their 'liberators'. Although 'experimental social changes'[4] had already been announced for the spring of this year,

[1] *New China News Agency Bulletin*, 29 June 1956. [2] ibid., 27 June 1956.
[3] *Peking People's Daily*, 19 March 1957. [4] ibid., 29 June 1956.

Mao Tse-tung has now felt it necessary to reassure the Tibetans that 'social reforms' will not be carried out during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, i.e. 1958–62.

Meanwhile, Chinese Communist propaganda continues to make much of the alleged 'unity' of the Chinese and Tibetan peoples; and to underline this claim great publicity was given to the recent visits to India by the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, and other Tibetan dignitaries for the Buddhist celebrations there.

The Chinese have the power to devour Tibet whenever they consider it digestible, and they will undoubtedly continue to pursue a relatively moderate policy in order to woo the nobility and allay the suspicions of the monks and people in general, thus reducing the tasks of the remote garrison force and facilitating long-term indoctrination. Viewed against the background of the Chinese Communist peace offensive in Asia, it is important for them that their policy should succeed.

R. F.

Political Change in Canada

The Conservatives Take Over

THE extent to which ordinarily well-informed Canadians were surprised by the result of the Federal Elections is best indicated by the sad fate of *Maclean's Magazine*. This periodical, with a high reputation in Canada and abroad, and of which the Ottawa editor is one of Canada's most distinguished journalists, found itself caught astride the Election date—that is to say, it was due to go to press before polling day but to be published after polling day. The predicament, not an uncommon one in periodical journalism, is conventionally solved by some such cliché as 'as we go to press the country is deciding on its future Government' but without any unnecessary forecast of what that Government will be. *Maclean's*, however, was so sure of the continuance of a Government which had come to seem as permanent as the Rocky Mountains that it came out immediately after the Election with an article commenting on the Liberals' resounding victory. The issue is likely to acquire a collectors' value in years to come.

Even now the situation remains so fluid that the writer of the present article finds it none too easy to avoid a similar fate.[1] Before polling day, and indeed for more than a year before that date, all the indications were that the Liberal Party was losing some ground, and that the Conservatives were likely to pick up most of the transferred Liberal votes. The surprise—and it was a surprise as much to the Conservatives as to the other parties—was the extent of the transfer. Even the more pessimistic of Liberals did not expect that the swing would be enough to put them out of office, though they expected and forecast some reduction in their apparently impregnable majority. Looking back at the facts, and considering the position as it was on the eve of the poll, this still stands up as an entirely reasonable forecast. The extent of the Liberal grip on Federal politics is best understood by looking at the dates of the six Ministries since the beginning of the Mackenzie King era.

Lib.	Mackenzie King	29 Dec. 1921 – 28 June 1926
Cons.	Arthur Meighen	29 June 1926 – 25 Sept. 1926
Lib.	Mackenzie King	25 Sept. 1926 – 6 Aug. 1930
Cons.	R. B. Bennett	7 Aug. 1930 – 23 Oct. 1935
Lib.	Mackenzie King	23 Oct. 1935 – 15 Nov. 1948
Lib.	Louis St Laurent	15 Nov. 1948 – 17 June 1957

Of the thirty-five and a half years from December 1921 to Mr St Laurent's resignation, all except five and a half were under Liberal administration; and the party had enjoyed uninterrupted rule for nearly twenty-two years. Moreover the last few years of Mr St Laurent's Government have been shadowed neither by war nor by recession. Canadian voters when they went to the poll this summer were enjoying a prosperity which increased with each succeeding year—whether measured by gross national product or by money in the ordinary man's pocket—and which showed every sign of continuing to increase for the next decade. Not without reason Mr C. D. Howe, the Liberal Minister for Trade and Commerce, was able to say during the election campaign: 'You never had it so good—so don't shoot Santa.'

What, then, were the factors which enabled the Progressive Conservatives to win? Most important, without doubt, was a general feeling that the Liberals had been in power too long. That feeling had been banked on by Conservatives at previous Elections

[1] This article went to press before the Cabinet was announced.

but had produced no results. This time the cry of 'time for change' was effective partly because the impact of such an appe: must be cumulative and partly because Mr Diefenbaker succeedec where Mr Drew had failed, in persuading the electorate that th Conservatives had an alternative to offer. To a great extent, there fore, the Conservatives' victory is a personal triumph for M Diefenbaker as a new leader. He has already been likened in som sections of the Canadian press to Eisenhower in his capacity fo dragging his party to victory at his coat-tails. In fact there are fe grounds for the analogy, and within the Canadian scale Diefen baker's is the more difficult achievement. He appeared on th political scene not as a ready-made national hero but as a successfu criminal lawyer from Saskatchewan, untried at Cabinet rank (lik almost all his Conservative colleagues he has never held Federa office before) but with a gift for using television and the other con temporary media of political communication—a gift which marke him out among his fellow Conservatives and which was unques tionably one of the factors that won the Election. Because of thes personal qualities—and given luck—Canada may well be no merely at the end of the Mackenzie King era but at the beginnin of the Diefenbaker era. It will require more than television mag netism to put Mr Diefenbaker in the class of Canada's great Prim Ministers—a class that includes John A. Macdonald and Wilfrec Laurier as well as Mackenzie King—but that alone will go a lon way. If a modern Canadian leader has to be able, in Toynbee's simile, to draw the people behind him like a Pied Piper, then tele vision cameras are the pipes on which he must play.

It had been said many times that the Conservatives would neve win a Federal Election unless they could win back some of the seats in Quebec—a 'lost province' to Federal Conservatism eve since the conscription issue—and this is still partly true. Of the 75 seats allotted to Quebec in the Federal Lower House the as- tonishing total of 61 have remained loyal to the Liberals, and it is the lack of a normal proportion of the Quebec seats which has robbed Diefenbaker of an absolute majority. Where the prophets failed was in not realizing how many seats would turn from Liberal to Tory in Ontario, on the Prairies, and on both coasts. The swing in Ontario was, of them all, the most widely expected, Ontario being the Inner Keep of Federal Conservatism to which the party retreated in its bad days and from which it always hoped to sally out again sooner or later. On the Prairies and in the Maritimes the

swing should perhaps have been foreseen. While most other Canadians have been growing rich, the farmers have not; in predominantly agricultural areas an appeal not to shoot Santa must have sent many a struggling farmer to the polling booth with an itching trigger finger. Quite what the Conservatives can do with a wheat surplus which has not already been tried by the Liberals remains to be seen; but at least Diefenbaker was able to go to the farmers with an agricultural programme which sounded both new and sensible at the same time. The Liberals promised price support for eggs and dried milk and further protection for domestic cheese; but the farmer is the sick man of the Canadian economy, and it might have been foreseen that he would make the best of the opportunity to call in another doctor.

How seriously the grain farmer is discontented is little understood outside Canada and, as events have shown, was underestimated by the outgoing Liberal Government. What has made the farmers particularly angry is not only their depressed condition compared with other Canadians in industry and commerce; it is that their financial difficulties are due to their own success as producers. Overproduction of wheat has led to the setting up of a quota system which allowed growers to deliver to the elevators not more than a fixed number of bushels per certified acre. Farmers who hoped to do better with oats were not pleased to learn from the Liberal Government that to discourage spring sowing of oats there would be a reduction in the guaranteed price of oats as from the end of the present crop year. This means that any farmer who cannot sell all his oats this year—and stocks are already high—will have to keep them and take the lower price later on. This proved to be an ill-timed announcement for the Liberals with only a matter of weeks to go before a General Election.

The anger of the farmers burst upon the head of the unfortunate Mr C. D. Howe when he went west on an electoral campaign during May. And it was Mr Howe who bore the brunt of the storm over the natural gas pipe-line in the early summer of 1956. The pipe-line is a scheme to bring the natural petroleum gas of Alberta across the continent so that it can supply cheap and convenient fuel for industrial and domestic use. It is a Federal and not a Provincial matter because it involves crossing a number of Provinces. When Mr Howe as Minister for Trade and Commerce announced that there were definite plans for putting the scheme, long cherished by Canadians, into effect, he surprised the country

and enraged the Opposition by adding that the capital would b found largely from American sources. Mr Drew, then Leader o the Opposition, implored Mr Howe to allow the financing of thi major national project to remain in Canadian hands. Mr Howe however, was determined not only to get his pipe-line Bill throug but to get it through by a predetermined date; his treatment of th Opposition on this occasion led not only to his being accused o favouring American interests unduly, but at the same time t charges of high-handed action and the suppression of the rights o the Opposition in the House. Feeling in the country ran high eve among those not normally much concerned with politics, an Ottawa saw the unusual spectacle of crowds late in the evenin waiting their turn to get into the Strangers' Gallery. Mr Drew le the attack with courage and determination far beyond the strengt of his forces in the House; some part of Mr Diefenbaker's succes at the General Election should properly be credited to Mr Drew' leadership of the Conservatives during the pipe-line debate.

It has been suggested by some British papers that anti-American ism was one of the forces which led to the Liberals' landslid defeat. Anti-Americanism is in fact far too strong a word to describ the feelings of the average Canadian voter. America as a neighbou remains admired, respected, and liked; but it is easy for a Canadia to feel all those things and at the same time to be worried about th extent of American investment in Canadian natural resources There is no doubt that the average Canadian would prefer to se more Canadian capital, and failing that more British capital, in vested in the primary industries of his country to offset the grea weight of investment from the United States. No doubt it is tru that the unfortunate handling by the Liberal Government of th Norman case damaged the Liberal Party in the eyes of som voters. The Government had originally repudiated Washington' charge that the late Herbert Norman, Canadian Ambassador i Cairo, had Communist associations. It was only on the last day o the Session that Mr Lester Pearson, the Liberal Minister fo External Affairs, said that the late Mr Norman had in fact been a member of a Marxist study group in his University days. M Diefenbaker reasonably criticized Mr Pearson for not having mad some such statement in the first place. It is probably true that th suicide of Mr Norman caused bitterness among some Canadian towards the American authorities concerned, but that in itself i unlikely to have had a significant effect on the swing of votes

In this context it should be added that many Canadians were uneasy about the position taken up by their country during the Suez crisis.

Anyone not familiar with the detailed working of Canada's system of Federal government must have wondered not only what enabled the Conservatives to win their electoral victory but, more fundamentally, what it was that kept the party from dying out altogether during the long years of adversity. If the Canadian Federal system were a close political parallel to the British Parliamentary system—which of course it is not—then such a question would become an enigma, particularly when one considers the many similarities in policy shared by Liberals and Progressive Conservatives, and the fact that two alternative parties came into existence during the Mackenzie King era, one to the left of the Liberals (the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, or C.C.F.) and one to the right of the Tories (the Social Credit Party). To understand what has happened in Ottawa, however, it is necessary to look right across the country at the political scene in each of the Provinces. This can most conveniently be done by setting out the representation of parties in the Provincial Legislatures (the dates of the respective Provincial elections are given in brackets).

Newfoundland (1956)	
Liberals	32
Prog. Cons.	4

Prince Edward Island (1955)	
Liberals	27
Prog. Cons.	3

Nova Scotia (*October* 1956)	
Old House	
Liberals	23
Prog. Cons.	12
C.C.F.	2
New House[1]	
Prog. Cons.	24
Liberals	18
C.C.F.	1

Quebec (1956)	
Union Nationale	72
Liberals	20
Independent	1

Ontario (1955)	
Prog. Cons.	84
Liberals	10
Liberal-Labour	1
C.C.F.	3

Manitoba (*January* 1956)	
Liberal Progressive	35
Conservative	12
C.C.F.	5
Social Credit	2
Labour Progressive	1
Independent	2

[1] Six new seats were added in a redistribution in 1955.

New Brunswick (1956)	
Prog. Cons.	37
Liberals	15

Alberta (1955)	
Social Credit	37
C.C.F.	2
Liberals	15
Prog. Cons.	3
Coalition	1
Independent	1
Liberal-Conservative	1

Saskatchewan (1956)	
C.C.F.	36
Liberals	14
Prog. Cons.	0
Social Credit	3

British Columbia (*September* 1956)	
Social Credit	39
C.C.F.	10
Liberals	2
Independent Labour	1
Prog. Cons.	0

An examination of the figures set out above will not only explain why it was possible to keep the Federal Progressive Conservative Party in being as a fighting force during its years out of office, but will also throw some light on the way in which Federal politics may develop in the future.

When Mr Diefenbaker opened his campaign for the General Election this year his party held only 50 seats out of a House of 265. The Liberals held 168. And yet looking at the figures for the Provincial Legislatures he had no reason whatever for supposing that Conservatism was a dying force in Canada, quite apart from all the factors set out earlier in this article. In Nova Scotia, the most significant of all, the Progressive Conservatives led by Robert Stanfield had in the provincial election of last October roundly defeated the Liberals who had been in office for twenty-three years. This event alone might well have been taken as the writing on the wall for the Liberals in Ottawa.

In New Brunswick the Conservatives had a comfortable majority. In Quebec the Union Nationale held office as a government of strongly conservative complexion, though the intricacies of the Canadian scene caused the same voters to vote Liberal in Federal affairs. In Ontario the Progressive Conservatives were well entrenched; and moreover Mr Frost, the Premier, had announced that he would put his electoral organization and considerable personal prestige behind Mr Diefenbaker's campaign. In Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia alone was the situation really alarming from the point of view of the Progressive Conservative Party as a whole; for in those three provinces the Progressive Conservatives have been virtually driven out of existence as the party of the Right by the younger party of Social Credit.

Indeed it may well be said that there have been for the past twenty-five years, and still remain, two principal dangers to the future of the Progressive Conservative Party in Canada. One danger is that the Conservatives will be replaced Federally as the party of the Right by the 'Socreds', as they are colloquially known. Mr Diefenbaker's success has greatly diminished that risk, and there may now be some revival of the Conservative Party in provincial politics in the two western provinces. The other danger is that the Conservatives will be replaced as the party of the Right by the Liberals, who will in turn be driven over to the right by the growth of the Commonwealth Co-operative Federation (a socialist party) to the left of them. For many years that seemed a very possible development in Canadian Federal politics; Liberals and Conservatives share many planks in their platforms, and neither can claim the exclusive allegiance of commercial and industrial interests. The possibility must still be considered as a threat to the Progressive Conservative Party which cannot be ignored; but the same arguments looked at in a different way might be considered as pointing to the eventual whittling away of the Liberals, leaving the Conservatives on the right and the C.C.F. on the left. Canadians who look at the fate of the Liberal Party in England, caught between conservatism and socialism, are by no means unaware that the same thing might happen in Canada if there were (*a*) a long period of Conservative government; (*b*) personal dissensions within the Liberal Party; (*c*) an economic setback serious enough to cause a considerable swing to the C.C.F.

If in fact there is another General Election in Canada within a year it is highly probable that many more voters will 'swing with the swing' and that the Progressive Conservatives will pick up enough seats to give them an absolute majority. If that happens, then the next ten years in Canada may produce a major struggle for the position of leading party in opposition to the Conservatives. The result of such a struggle would depend on many internal factors which cannot be forecast, and to some extent on the success of the Labour Party in Great Britain. The prestige of the C.C.F. in Canada has been considerably weakened by the failure of the British Labour Party's nationalization policy since the war, and like the British Labour Party the C.C.F. is still looking for something to replace nationalization as a battle cry. It has moreover an additional difficulty in that it cannot very well preach Social Equality (as distinct from Economic Equality) because

in Canada there is already more genuine social equality than any other country, except perhaps in Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand. It is significant that, in spite of the immense tra ference of votes away from the Liberals this June, the C.C.F. o increased its representation by one seat, from 23 to 24.

At the time of writing this article it is too early to make any u ful forecast of the immediate future. The general direction policy already declared by Mr Diefenbaker is well known: econo in government; the fostering of Canadian development by priv enterprise; a strengthening of ties, and probably of trade, with United Kingdom; and possibly, though less certainly, some t dency to decentralization of Federal administration. The pos bility of implementing the latter proposal is very much doubted the present writer, whatever the Government's theoretical wish if only because the development of communications in Canada, in every other country, tends to increase rather than decrease pressures towards centralization. If in fact Mr Diefenbaker is s cessful in establishing and maintaining a strong Administratior presumably after another General Election—an interesting pos bility is that he may emerge as a strong leader for the Comm wealth as a whole. Canada's growing strength in the world many times in recent years created a situation where the lead Commonwealth affairs could have been taken by Mr St Laur if he had been so minded. The emergence of a strong Canad leader believing deeply in the importance of the Commonwealt role might prove of immense significance in international affai

On the domestic front much will depend on the Conservati themselves and what they make of their opportunities. Much v depend too on the tide of economic events—a tide that may well far beyond the control of any one government in any one count There is a distinct disadvantage in being the successor to an A ministration which held office for twenty-two years and whi during that time, brought Canada unparalleled prestige and pr perity. Any serious setback to that prosperity would send some the voters over to the C.C.F. But many would be quick to bla failure on the Conservatives and to look back with longing on golden reign of Uncle Louis.

G. G. W.

Planning Crisis in the Soviet Union

THE Soviet Union is at present involved in a domestic crisis more serious than any she has met since the end of the last war. The apparatus which served the country through twenty-five years when Stalin was at the helm of a highly centralized and tightly controlled economy seems to have reached the limits of its effectiveness. Some Soviet leaders have come to the conclusion that without its drastic overhaul the Soviet Union may not be able to maintain her past record of economic growth. She may thus lose the momentum without which the declared target of surpassing the United States in industrial production would be unattainable. This is not to say that output is falling. On the contrary, the Soviet economy continues to grow, but lately at a slower rate than in the past, and slower than that foreseen when the Sixth Five-Year Plan was drawn up. Industrial production is planned to rise by 7 per cent only this year, as compared with 11 per cent in 1956.

The Fifth Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in most important sectors of the economy, and although the targets laid down for agriculture, housing, and industrial consumer goods were not fully reached, progress was by no means limited to capital goods. The consumers had some share in the country's achievements, mainly in the form of larger supplies of durable goods. At the same time commitments have increased not only at home but also in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe and in the under-developed countries of the Middle and Far East.

Some unforeseen events have seriously affected the Soviet economy, which always operates on a narrow margin and thus tends to show signs of strain whenever the unexpected happens. Soviet publicists like to present their country as a model of stability by comparison with capitalist countries, which they visualize as being nearly always on the brink of a crisis. No portrait could be less accurate. In fact, the Soviet planners have not yet succeeded in eliminating the factors which have led their economy through alternating periods of boom and depression. Although setbacks have been partially mitigated since the war by a generally upward economic trend, the Soviet economy is far from stable.

FAULTY PLANNING

Major setbacks in Soviet production are invariably due to faults in planning, which never allows a large enough margin for

contingencies. In the early years of industrialization it was mostly the lack of equipment which caused undue delays and necessitated major revisions; more recently basic materials have been the main bottlenecks. As the price mechanism is not allowed to operate freely in the Soviet Union as a result of price fixing and distribution controls, a system of widespread evasion of Government rules tends to regulate the supply and demand of scarce commodities, thus diverting precious resources into unwanted channels.

Plan targets fixed in terms of physical units, value, or volume frequently come into conflict with the price mechanism. If the target is fixed in quantitative or financial terms, quality suffers; if fixed by weight, managers discriminate against certain types of products. Moreover, the old belief that overfulfilment of the Plan is a sign of success has not been abandoned. In fact, if the Plan is not faulty, overfulfilment must be as disturbing as underfulfilment. When, during the first of the post-war Plans, the target of industrial labour was 'overfulfilled' by some 6 million workers, it upset all sectors of the planned economy to such an extent that post-war recovery was delayed by several years. The social pressures of the 'fifties may indeed have been caused largely by the faults of planning in the 'forties.

The Fifth Five-Year Plan marked the end of an era. By 1955 the Soviet Union had ceased to be an under-developed country Previously labour was never in short supply; it was always the raw materials and equipment factors that limited industrial output and national income. But by the end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan agriculture had ceased to be an inexhaustible reserve of industrial labour. Men rather than matter began to put the brake on Soviet economic growth. Seen in this light, the anachronism of Stalin's regime of regimentation becomes obvious, and the relaxations introduced by his successors appear as necessary expedients to meet the new situation. Be that as it may, they were unable to maintain and operate his apparatus of control and terror. What they did not foresee was the extent to which even limited relaxations would upset the precarious balance of internal power and social forces whose strength was bound to remain unknown as long as they were hamstrung.

CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

In Eastern Europe, where the memory of democratic institutions had not been completely extinguished, Khrushchev's revelations

during the secret session of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 set in motion political trends the end of which is not yet in sight. A move which frequently started as an economic demand turned into a political demonstration against the Communist rulers and their Soviet masters. This was so in June 1953, in East Berlin, and it repeated itself three years later in June 1956 at Poznan. Before the year had ended, miscalculations in Soviet policy had led to the October revolutions in Poland and Hungary, which shook the very foundations of the Soviet Union's European empire.

In their own country the Soviet leaders may have been fully equipped to estimate the likely effects of the denunciation of monolithic leadership and to control any political excesses caused by Khrushchev's indiscretions. But even here centrifugal tendencies were probably stronger than could be foreseen. Once the power of the secret police had been cut, the Party lost much of its status. In these circumstances, groups which had previously been dragooned into silence made themselves heard. Twenty-five years of planning had created a working class of close on 50 million people; though lacking all genuine political or industrial representation, they had become a powerful social factor. The managerial class which created and implemented the Plan, whilst not necessarily identifying itself with the interests of the industrial working class, represented a strong pressure group of its own.

Even if these forces had not come into play, the economy was bound to reveal contradictions as soon as the all-pervading power of the secret police was reduced and controls were relaxed. No Western observer could have provided so full a dossier of economic failures and maladjustments as the Soviet leaders have published since 1953. Shortly after Stalin's death Khrushchev revealed shortcomings in the agricultural sector which went beyond what the most outspoken Western critics might have said. Since then no branch of the economy, from mining to housing, has been spared similar revelations. Planning and control had obviously reached a stage where there was little room left for individual initiative and responsibility, and public waste had reached stupendous dimensions.

Criticism was followed by decisions which were meant to remedy the situation. At first technical devices were tried. Maize was introduced into agriculture and prefabricated cement blocks into building. Tax reductions were granted to farmers and wage

and price concessions to workers and their wives. By 1955 the need for institutional changes was recognized. Since then the machinery of planning has undergone several drastic revisions, and some of the powers of central government agencies have been delegated to regional authorities and individual enterprises, whilst the question of workers' participation in management was raised, although it did not get any further than the stage of theoretical discussion.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

In May 1955 the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was restricted to long-term planning, whilst current economic affairs were entrusted to a new agency, the State Economic Commission (Gosekonomkomissiya). In December 1956 Pervukhin replaced Saburov as Chairman of the State Economic Commission, and his position was enhanced by the appointment of a powerful team of specialists as his deputies. In February 1957, however, when Pervukhin had probably just completed the reorganization of the State Economic Commission, there were signs that further organizational changes were afoot.

It is now known that it was then decided to regard as inexpedient the continued existence of the State Economic Commission, and to combine once again short- and long-term planning in Gosplan. The organizational changes have been accompanied by the rapid turnover of leading personalities. In May 1955, when the planning of current economic affairs was separated from long-term planning, Saburov was transferred from his post as Chairman of Gosplan to the newly created State Economic Commission. His place was taken by Baibakov. In December 1956 Saburov was replaced by Pervukhin at the State Economic Commission, whilst Baibakov maintained his post as Chairman of Gosplan. Since then these two have also come to the end of their term of high office in the central planning administration.

Khrushchev, the most dynamic and most restless of the present Soviet leaders, must be regarded as the *spiritus rector* of the organization. He has shown himself unwilling to accept the meagre harvest of the recent organizational changes and impatient with men who failed to produce solutions to the Soviet Union's most burning problems. Relentlessly he has thought up new devices, technical, organizational, or political, and brought in new men to put matters right. Hence his theses on the 'Further Organizational

Improvement of the Management of Industry and Construction',[1] released at the end of March, which have since been the subject of intensive exchanges in the leading publications of the Soviet Union, and have been considered and adopted, with certain important amendments, by the Supreme Soviet.

KHRUSHCHEV'S THESES

Although it has been altered in important respects, Khrushchev's original thesis, contained in a statement of over 20,000 words and filling four pages of *Pravda*, merits brief consideration. The revision of the Sixth Five-Year Plan foreshadowed at the plenary session of the Central Committee in December last forms no part of the document. It is devoted entirely to questions of organizational changes designed to eliminate waste in planning. Between twenty and thirty Ministries of the central Government concerned with economic affairs were to be disbanded and their functions transferred to heads of departments of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), greatly strengthened in this way as the main central planning authority. It was Khrushchev's original contention that 'there will be no further need to have Union and Republican Ministers directing industry and construction.'[2] Gosplan was to be not only responsible for short- and long-term planning but was also to be given considerable executive powers. At the regional level it was to operate through economic councils.

In this way control of important industrial developments was to be kept in the hands of the All-Union Government in Moscow, whilst matters of day-to-day routine were to be delegated to the lower echelons. The central departments formerly concerned with extracting and primary production were to be replaced by republican Ministries, e.g. for coal and iron and steel in the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine, and for oil in the Azerbaijan Republic, and some of these agencies were eventually to be placed in the main industrial centres rather than in the capitals of the republics.

After prolonged discussion in public and in the Praesidium, the Supreme Soviet on 10 May passed a law 'On the further Improvement of the Organization of Industry and Construction'. Like the theses, the law fails to relate administrative reorganization to the revised Plan targets. Similarly, agriculture is excluded from the reorganization; it will remain under the control of the relevant Ministries at Union and Republic level, but the Ministry of State

[1] *Pravda*, 30 March 1957. [2] *ibid.*

Farms has been abolished. Eleven of the Ministries destined by Khrushchev to disappear are to be retained. This appears to be a concession he was compelled to make to those members of the Praesidium who were unwilling to accept his original idea of wholesale abolition of Ministries. Those retained are largely connected with matters of military importance, such as defence industry and general machinery, i.e. armaments; medium machine building, another name for nuclear development; electric power and power construction; aircraft, shipping and shipbuilding, railways and transport construction, chemicals, and radio-technology. Internal trade also remains under the control of an all-Union Minister.

REORGANIZATION IN PRACTICE

In most cases the responsibilities of these all-Union Ministries will be limited to matters of planning and technical development The execution of plans will be delegated to regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozi*), of which there will be approximately a hundred in all. The economic regions in which the councils will operate in future will exist side by side with the thirteen regions of the past, which were mere planning units. Whereas in the smaller republics the boundaries of the economic regions are to coincide with those of the republics (except in Uzbekistan, where there will be four regions), the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine will be subdivided into some seventy and eleven economic regions respectively. Industrial enterprises formerly under the sole supervision of economic Ministries at Union or republic level will in future be controlled by the economic councils which will combine enterprises of certain types into trusts and combines. Technical-economic councils will serve at all-Union and republic levels as agencies concerned with technical matters of planning and research. The chairman of a newly created Scientific-Technical Committee will have the rank of a Minister with a seat in the Council of Ministers. The same applies, incidentally, to the head of the Central Statistical Administration. Like agriculture, small local industries will not be affected by the new arrangements; they will remain under the supervision of the local Soviets.

The economic councils are to be subordinated to the Councils of Ministers of the various republics. This puts the Governments of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine in a strong position *vis-à-vis* the economic councils. These will nevertheless possess wide powers in

the sphere of planning and in the allocation of physical and financial resources. It is worth noting that the delegation of power to the republics, like the retention of some all-Union Ministries, represents a change in the original plan, probably wrung from Khrushchev by those who were opposed to certain of his all too sweeping ideas.

In the final analysis, economic policy will of course continue to be directed from the centre, but the Council of Ministers, representing Government and Party, will act through the republics rather than directly as in the past. The centre will be strengthened by the co-option of the Prime Ministers of the republics to membership of the all-Union Council of Ministers. Its powers thus remain essentially unimpaired, although they are bound to be employed with discretion in future. If a certain degree of financial autonomy is granted to the republics, the bulk of public finance will continue to be handled by the all-Union Ministers responsible for the Budget, the investment programme, and for price and wage policies.

As the position of the Council of Ministers of the republics is strengthened, so that of the central planning authority is supposed to be weakened. Instead of becoming the all-powerful organ of control which Khrushchev originally contemplated, Gosplan is in future merely to act as the central planning agency, co-ordinating at the national level the short-term plans submitted by the respective regional planning organs. There will be departments within Gosplan charged with long-term planning and with individual sectors of industry, such as fuel, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, etc. No provision is made, however, for any control over the execution of the plans. This is clearly reserved to the economic councils whose decisions can be overriden only by the Council of Ministers. The State Economic Commission (Gosekonomkomissiya), endowed as recently as last December with the operational powers of a super-Ministry, ceases to exist.

DECENTRALIZATION VERSUS CENTRALIZATION

This reorganization has been interpreted by some Western observers as a new move in the direction of decentralization of government and administration. Khrushchev rejects this interpretation. In fact, the necessity for strict control is emphasized throughout. The importance of centralization in the management of the national economy was underlined in a leading article pub-

lished in *Party Life* after the plenary session of the Central (mittee in February: 'Any weakening in the principles of ce ism would be contrary to the vital interests of the people might give rise to tendencies towards local patriotism, a strivi transform each economic region into a closed area. This v have a disorganizing effect on the development of the econo the country as a whole. Experience shows that centralized ma ment is the foundation of the foundations of the socialist econ system.'[1]

A month later the Party's theoretical journal *Kommunist* endorsed this view: 'The necessity for centralism is objec dictated by the social nature of modern large-scale enginee which consists of a highly developed system of branches o economy closely inter-connected throughout the country.'[2]

The Communist Party thus clearly visualizes regional and initiative within the limits of central control which 'will nip i bud any attempt to use funds to the detriment of the intere the State as a whole'.[3] The allocation of the investment i directed centrally through the State Bank, can always be us check any deviationist tendencies of this kind. Moreover the l will be represented on the regional economic councils, an Party, of course, remains the most centralized of all S organizations.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

Some observers have emphasized the predominantly econ intent underlying the reorganization plan, while others have se merely as another opportunity for the enhancement of Party trol. The true meaning of the reform is likely to lie somewher tween these extremes. No doubt the Soviet leaders are seri concerned with the lack of flexibility of the planning apparatu the same time, as political men, they cannot be expecte approach the solution of economic problems without consid political implications. Khrushchev's warning that 'the imple tation of these measures demands immense organizational wo Party, soviet, economic, trade union, and Komsomol orga tions'[4] is a clear indication of the role the Party organization to play in the reform project. If they do play their full centralized control may in fact be achieved to a greater de

[1] *Party Life*, No. 4, February 1957. [2] *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1
[3] *Pravda*, 30 March 1957. [4] *ibid.*

than has been possible for some years past, and decentralization may become a mere by-product of the operation.

A number of questions remain unanswered. Why, one may wonder, was so drastic a change considered necessary at a time when the Soviet leaders may well have decided in favour of continuity rather than change in order to overcome certain recent setbacks at home and abroad? Although there must have been some economic reasons for deciding in favour of a change, political considerations and personal motives no doubt played their full part. While the final analysis cannot be anticipated in the absence of detailed information on the discussions which led to the reorganization, there can be little doubt that Khrushchev has been personally engaged in this as in other grandiose designs of recent years. Impatient with the hesitations characteristic of professional men, bureaucrats, planners, and technicians, he tends to present the country with dynamic, bold, unconventional solutions of seemingly insoluble problems.

It would be wrong, however, to see the changes as the work of one man. Although the discussion of the theses was perhaps not as genuine and as public as the newspaper publicity seemed to imply, the amendments to the original concept embodied in the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet suggest that ideological differences were overcome by compromise within the Praesidium rather than by the arbitrary rule of one man. As senior appointments in Gosplan and the economic councils have yet to be announced, it would be premature to speculate on any changes in the balance of power among possible factions within the Praesidium; nor would it be profitable to speculate on any ideological clash between Party and Government.

It is notable, however, that planners, technicians, and managers seem to have lost somewhat in status. Three senior professional men have disappeared from prominent positions within the planning hierarchy. The post held by Pervukhin, perhaps the most powerful of economic Ministers, has been abolished. Y. Y. Kuzmin, the man appointed to the important post of chairman of the reformed Gosplan, is a newcomer who as recently as the Twentieth Congress was known merely as a 'Party worker', holding junior political posts. Rising rapidly from the ranks, he has now been made chief planning expert and First Deputy Chairman with a seat in the Council of Ministers. Pervukhin and Malenkov continue to hold ministerial posts, the one concerned

with atomic energy, the other in charge of hydro-electric development. Baibakov moves from the Gosplan of the U.S.S.R. to that of the R.S.F.S.R. None of the more prominent economic Ministers of recent years has yet disappeared from the limelight, but some seem to have suffered a loss of political status.

OUTLOOK INTO THE FUTURE

In assessing the likelihood of the success of the new organizational plan, it has to be borne in mind that no reorganization of similar severity has been made since the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan. Substantial changes were of course introduced from time to time. Immediately after Stalin's death, the number of Union Ministries was reduced from about fifty to twenty-five and that of economic departments from forty to fifteen; yet two years later the numbers had returned to what they had been at the end of Stalin's reign. As Khrushchev put it, 'there are too many Russians supervising other Russians at work.' But the bureaucracy shows an amazing staying power. Reports from Georgia suggest that the Ministries to be abolished are likely to reappear in the guise of 'administrations'. Similar forms of evasion may be expected elsewhere. At the same time new vested interests will grow in the place of the old. Reports from many areas show that Party secretaries and economic planners try to enlarge their sphere of influence at the expense of neighbouring territories. This applies to industrial sectors such as Moscow and Leningrad as much as to such regions as Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Although the drafters of the theses and the law were not unaware of the dangers inherent in this type of delegation of power, they do not seem to have provided sufficient safeguards against the growth of regional vested interests and local nepotism.

The question whether the plan will be crowned with success is not easily answered. The reorganization contemplated in the theses represents the most drastic experiment in planning and administration since the late 'twenties. Instead of resolving the inconsistencies of the current domestic scene, it may well add to existing dislocations and thus impair rather than enhance the rate of economic growth. The new administrative system is likely to create as many problems as it sets out to solve, and new strains and stresses may take the place of the old. On the whole Khrushchev tends to attack the symptoms rather than the causes of the contradictions which are inherent in the Soviet system. The recent

discussion by some Soviet economists on the place of the market mechanism in modern society seems to have been lost on the Secretary of the Party. Yet no solution will be found for the contradictions of Soviet planning until the underlying causes are tackled.

In the last resort, civil responsibility and industrial initiative are dependent on personal freedom and thus incompatible with autocracy and central control. Compared with these fundamental issues it is of secondary importance whether managers and workers will be guided in their work and leisure directly from the centre or by regional agencies still ultimately dependent upon decisions emanating from Moscow.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 8 *August* 1957

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Notes of the Month

The Kremlin Changes and the Soviet Press

THOSE practised in the art of reading between the lines of the Soviet press might have guessed, from the issue of *Pravda* of 3 July 1957, at a serious conflict within the Communist Party leadership. The front-page leading article carried the headline 'Unshakable Unity'; it boasted of the support given by the entire population to the Soviet Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee in their endeavours, inspired by unbreakable unity of thought, will, and action, to put into operation the decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress. This 'monolithic unity' was the product of decades of struggle against a variety of enemies. Lenin had taught the Party to fight mercilessly against those, whatever their positions and on whatever pretext, who impaired that unity. Unity was the guarantee of success.

An even longer article on the following page, entitled 'Leninist unity of the Party is the source of its unconquerable strength', elaborated the same theme. Unity demanded the submission of the minority to the majority, and this applied not only to the rank and file but also to the men at the top. The Party could not tolerate within its ranks any anti-Party groups opposing its policy. It was not a debating club but a militant political organization. Free discussion and criticism could not be allowed to go beyond the limits of *partiinost* (party-mindedness) and endanger unity of belief and action.

On the following day the newspapers carried a front-page communiqué reporting the Central Committee's decision of 29 June to expel from the Party Praesidium and the Central Committee 'the anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov', and to dismiss Shepilov from his post in the Party Secretariat and as candidate member of the Praesidium and expel him from the Central Committee. Shepilov's name is, however, omitted from the subsequent detailed charges.

The new and enlarged Party Praesidium of fifteen members

was announced: their photographs occupied half the front page. The only really surprising name among these is that of Kuusinen, the veteran Finnish Communist who has lived in the Soviet Union since 1918 and who was the titular head of the puppet Finnish Government set up by Moscow on the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939. Photographs of the nine candidate members of the Praesidium are given on the second page. The Central Committee resolution announcing these changes stated that while the Party, supported by the entire population, was doing its utmost to carry out the Twentieth Congress decisions, the anti-Party group had been trying to change the political line and, by using fractional methods, to alter the composition of the leading Party committees. This offence is said to have been prolonged over the last three or four years (this no doubt means since Stalin's death). The principal items in the charge were listed as opposition to the policy of peaceful coexistence and to the establishment of friendly relations with all countries, and hostility to the extension of the rights and powers of the Union Republics, to the decentralization of economic administration, and to the Party's efforts to eradicate the evils of bureaucracy. 'They were too remote from real life to understand its needs and possibilities.' They were the prisoners of old ideas and methods, sectarians and dogmatists cut off from the life of the Party and the country, and this was the origin of their deviations from the Party line. Unable to get their way openly, they resorted to intrigues and plots. The specific charge against Malenkov of complicity in the 'Leningrad plot', a still-obscure episode in post-war Soviet history for which, however, a number of death sentences were imposed and carried out, was made later in a speech by Khrushchev in Leningrad. It presents the Soviet leaders with a dilemma, for if one of the policies formulated at the Twentieth Congress was 'to strengthen Socialist legality', it should follow logically that Malenkov must at least be tried for an offence for which many have already paid the supreme penalty. Dialectics, however, is not logic.

The same issue of *Pravda*, 4 July, carried a report of a meeting of the Moscow Party organization, held on 2 July, which unanimously approved the Central Committee decisions, and briefer notes of similar meetings in Leningrad, Kiev, Alma Ata, Tashkent, Baku, and other centres; knowledge of the changes must therefore have been widespread, at least in the chief cities, before they were announced.

On 5 July *Pravda*'s leading article continued the 'unbreakable unity' theme, and carried extensive reports of the enthusiastic reception accorded to the Central Committee's resolution throughout the country, as well as brief notices of its echoes in the foreign press. By the 8th, *Pravda* claimed that approval was unanimous over the entire country, thus demonstrating the unity of the Party and the people.

For its foreign listeners, Moscow radio, after a survey of reactions in the foreign press, derided the suggestion that the upheaval at the top indicated weakness in the Party. 'From the western frontiers of the Soviet Union to the east, from the shores of the Arctic to the Pamirs, wherever Soviet people live and work, can be heard the voice of Communists and non-Communists alike, ardently approving the resolution of the June session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. on the anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov.' Equal emphasis was laid on the approval given by other Communist Parties to a decision which 'implemented the Leninist line of democratic centralism'. Subsequent broadcasts reiterated the charges of 'stagnation, rigidity, and conservatism' at home, and injury to the Soviet Union's international position. By 13 July comment had faded out.

It is, of course, useless to look for analysis or comment, in the usual sense of the word, in any Soviet paper or periodical. On questions of policy, *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* and all the others are interchangeable (on 4 July the front page of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* was an exact replica of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*), since in a one-party State the decisions of that one party, on any issue of importance, cannot be challenged or even questioned. To permit this would be tantamount to admitting the possibility of an alternative policy, and hence of an alternative party. The one party must therefore, in fact, represent both Government and Opposition. The protestations of unity and unanimity appear most emphatic when disagreements are most critical, and in the absence of institutional channels for the settlement of differences the course of what is necessarily a silent struggle emerges, in the manner of a subterranean upheaval breaking through to the surface, only when its outcome has been decided.

The Nigerian Constitutional Conference

When the recommendations of the May-June Nigerian Constitutional Conference held in London are given effect Nigeria

will have ten legislative houses, with almost a thousand members and over fifty Ministers. And if the commission which the conference agreed should be set up to examine 'the fears of minorities' recommends the division of existing Regions as the only way of satisfying smaller groups that, under self-government, they will not be unfairly treated by the major tribes on which existing Regions are based, there may be even more houses, members, and Ministers.

So complex have become the affairs of Africa's most populous State that the May-June conference, which was hailed by some before it started as the conference to end all conferences, only made a beginning; a resumed conference, which may not meet until next year, will have to consider the mass of unfinished business left on 26 June.

Nigerian leaders came to the conference with parliamentary and party mandates to demand Regional self-government for East and West this year and for the North in 1959, and independence for the whole Federation in 1959. Though discussion on Regional self-government was protracted, it was concerned not with the principle, conceded by Her Majesty's Government in 1953, but with arrangements to insulate from politics the Regional civil services and judiciaries, and with constitutional safeguards against abuse of power by self-governing Regions, to the injury of the Federal Government, which, because residual powers are vested in Regions, has no direct control over Regional matters.

In the end Regional self-government has been hedged about with enough safeguards to satisfy the most timid that this constitutional novelty need not rock the Federal boat, and very shortly the two Southern Regions of Nigeria will be self-governing—which means, for practical purposes, that in Regional matters Governor's powers are abolished. While the North will not be self-governing until 1959, the conference made a beginning by agreeing to the establishment of a Council of Chiefs to exercise the disciplinary powers over Chiefs which the Governor has hitherto exercised alone, and of 'Provincial Authorities', partly elected and partly bureaucratic, to which the Regional government will devolve some of its powers—a devolution administratively necessary in a Region which is over twice the size of Ghana, and politically essential in view of separatist demands in the non-Muslim riverain provinces. The Trust Territory of the Cameroons, too, is to become, for practical purposes, a fourth Region, though no decision

was made about its self-government, which depends on a final decision about its Trust Territory status.

What of Federal independence? The possibility of any precise commitment on that flew out of the windows of Lancaster House when the conference agreed on the minorities commission. Not only will its recommendations, which have to be submitted to a resumed conference, take a very long time to work out and put into effect, but the state of affairs revealed by the necessity of appointing it strengthened Mr Lennox-Boyd in his view that he could give no blank cheque to be filled in some years ahead, since nobody could now say what the face of Nigeria might be like in 1959, or in 1960, the date which the Nigerian leaders in the end agreed was more realistic than 1959. All the Secretary of State could offer was a remarkably, and perhaps unnecessarily, chilly statement promising that Her Majesty's Government would readily consider, but no more, a request for independence made in 1960 by the new Federal legislature which will then have been elected. Nigeria, in short, is on trial; her independence, Mr Lennox-Boyd maintains, depends on how she acquits herself in the next three years.

The three Nigerian Premiers countered with a threat that they would regard 2 April 1960 as the date of independence, the necessity of which they hoped in due course to impress on the British Government. But this threat was a damp squib; however much resentment and disappointment there might be in Nigeria about the conference's inconclusiveness, delegates in Lancaster House knew how much unfinished business must be gone through before the outlines of independent Nigeria are clear.

The resumed conference is to consider the report not only of the minorities commission but also of the revenue allocation commission which is likely, because it is to hear 'all points of view', to sit for a long time. The conference will consider, too, the procedure for amending the Constitution after independence, constitutional provisions to safeguard 'fundamental rights', important matters connected with the administration of Lagos, the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, and regional electoral regulations. In addition an *ad hoc* committee is to consider the reports of committees set up to consider proposals for a Federal electoral law and the functions of the Central Marketing Board.

Not only that; an independent Nigeria could not leave to the Governor-General the great powers he now exercises, while the

conference failed to reach a final conclusion on arrangements for the police, decision on which is postponed until the eve of independence.

Perhaps the lesson is that one and the same conference cannot both parade Nigeria's internal differences and negotiate self-government with the British Government. The resumed conference should concentrate on resolving the internal difficulties; only when they are much nearer solution will Nigeria's leaders be able to negotiate 'from strength' with the British Government.

ERRATUM

In the July 1957 issue of *The World Today*, in the Note of the Month on 'An Authoritarian Monarchy for Spain?', on p. 274, line 32, for 'As early as 1952', read 'As early as 1953', and on p. 275, line 14, for 'Don Carlos' read 'Juan Carlos'.

The Algerian Tragedy and Problems of Africa

This article is substantially the same as a lecture delivered in May at Chatham House by M. Jacques Soustelle, Governor of Algeria in 1955–6. *Its topical interest is such that, rather than delay its publication till it could appear in* International Affairs, *we have obtained M. Soustelle's permission to publish it in* The World Today.

In 1830, when the territory was first occupied by the French Army, there was no Algerian nation or state as we think of them today. The country was a mosaic of Arab or Berber tribes and villages: the Arab tribes generally lived as nomads; the Berber villages were composed of sedentary peoples living under a kind of traditional democracy. The Arabs and Berbers waged war against each other most of the time. In the city of Algiers itself, and in several small cities like Medea, there was what was called at the time the Beylik—a kind of Turkish colonial government whose principal activity consisted of piracy in the Mediterranean. On many occasions the fleets of Britain, France, Spain, and even the United States shelled and bombed Algiers in order to suppress piracy, until, in 1830, France succeeded in occupying Algiers. No objection to this was raised at the time by any Power, not excluding Turkey, despite the fact that, theoretically at least, Algiers was still a Turkish colony.

Thus for 127 years Algeria has been a French territory. The native population in 1830 was 1½ million; it is now 8½ million. Those figures are at the root of the whole Algerian problem. In spite of what is said to the contrary, Algeria is a poor country. The soil has been devastated by erosion for centuries; the climate is capricious; the production of crops is very irregular; and even when worked by very modern methods the land does not give produce which can be compared in quantity with that of the land in France or other Western European countries. The resources of the country, although vast investments have been and are being made, do not grow as fast as the population. During the years since the second World War the population has increased by 250,000 every year, which is one of the highest rates in the world, and it is quite evident that the natural resources of Algeria are absolutely unable to cope with that tremendous increase. In fact,

Algeria, which fed 1½ million people a century and a quarter ago, could today—if it were an independent and autonomous state from all points of view, including economically—feed possibly 3 or 4 million people at the most, and would be utterly incapable of feeding the present population.

The reason for that fact, which weighs so heavily on the Algerian problem, is that Algeria is in an intermediate stage of development between the under-developed countries and modern countries. In modern countries the rate of population increase is checked by the fact that families do not wish to increase beyond certain numbers because of economic and psychological considerations, and because parents want their children to have all the advantages of the local civilization. In under-developed countries many children are born because the rate of increase is practically equal to the biological possibilities, while the population is kept within bounds by a high death-rate. In Algeria, on the other hand, two-thirds of the country may still be considered as under-developed; but at the same time the methods of sanitation introduced by the French and the disappearance of endemic diseases have brought about such a change that most of the children survive. That is the reason that Algeria is at the same time a modern and an archaic country, which participates in the inconveniences of both situations. It may be said that France has brought to Algeria many things, including gifts which in the long run create new and more difficult problems.

The present very precarious economic equilibrium of Algeria can exist only because 400,000 Algerian workers, many of them of Berber stock, go each year to France to work in the French factories, which they can do, of course, because they are French citizens. If Algeria became an independent and separate country tomorrow, those 400,000 workers could not find employment in France, and the 35–40 billion francs a year that they send to their families, and which are a very important element in the Algerian economy, would disappear. The real problem is that Algeria is still in part an archaic society, an under-developed country which has been taken by France for better or for worse, and it is still in a state of evolution which cannot be checked and cannot be reversed. History cannot retrace its steps; Algeria today cannot be returned to the state she was in in 1830.

Such a situation has created a tragedy in the consciousness of the people. The real drama in Algeria is not the colonial problem;

the drama lies in the fact that many Algerians, especially young people, feel that the future of their country and of their families is in great danger, that there is very little hope of a solution; so that many of them are driven to a kind of despair because they do not feel that they are yet completely Westernized, and yet they do not feel they are still Arabs or Berbers and Muslims. They are between two worlds, and this creates a deep disequilibrium in their minds and makes them open to all kinds of foreign and external propaganda.

It is very easy to find a scapegoat for a problem like that of Algeria, and sometimes it seems that the French settler—the so-called *colon*—provides an almost ideal scapegoat. If it were only a question of finding such a scapegoat many problems would be very easily solved, but it is much more difficult than that. The French European population in Algeria is so numerous, and so important because of their economic contribution, that they form a part of the Algerian population which cannot be neglected or eradicated. There are 1,200,000 people of French descent in Algeria, of Christian or Jewish religion, and whose fathers, grandfathers, and sometimes great-grandfathers were born in Algeria, so that they are, to all intents and purposes, Algerians. They might be called *the Algerian people of French civilization.* They have every right to reside in Algeria because they were born there, and their grandparents too. They have worked and made Algeria what it is; and at least a great part of it today is a modern country of high standards. And there is no moral or political conception under which they could legitimately be put in the position of having to leave Algeria, which is their country.

If their state of mind were the same as that of the British settlers in North America in the eighteenth century and they wanted to form a new state for themselves, the problem would be quite different. But it is a fact that no Frenchman in France is more French than those 1,200,000 Frenchmen of Algeria. They have proved that in recent wars, especially in the second World War, when, out of a population of about 1 million at that time, they contributed more than 300,000 soldiers who fought in Italy, France, and Germany. Furthermore, they are not—contrary to what is sometimes believed—a population of rich exploiters, and the enormous majority of them do not work on the land but live in the cities. Out of the 1,200,000 French Europeans in Algeria only 22,000 are settlers, i.e. farm-owners living in the country, and

their properties are generally only small or medium-sized. Out of those 22,000 farms and estates only 3,700 have an area of more than 200 hectares, or about 500 acres. The enormous majority of them are small estates on the coast, generally only about six hectares, or fifteen acres. This means that the majority of the French European population of Algeria is made up of middle-class city dwellers: chauffeurs, garage owners, professors, teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc.; a kind of lower and upper middle-class which constitutes a very important element in the social structure of Algeria, but is not a kind of landed gentry. The greater part of the land is in the hands of Arabs or Berbers, who also control to an even greater extent the cattle and other agricultural activities of the country.

PHASES OF THE CONFLICT

The Algerian conflict has passed through various phases since it began in November 1954. During the first phase the so-called Nationalist leaders tried to prepare for the future by secretly implanting, by means of terrorism, an organization of their own, especially in the countryside. It would happen that in such-and-such a village the President of the local Council (a Muslim, of course) was killed. Then two or three notable persons in the village would be killed. It became known that a Nationalist secret cell had taken over the place, and that everybody who did not immediately obey all their orders, even the most absurd or cruel ones (for instance, an order given to a Muslim worker to kill his employer, with whom he had been on quite friendly terms), was killed at once.

In early 1955, after this process had been going on for four or five months, preparations began for a general uprising in one part of the country—the Constantine district, where the Muslim population is overwhelmingly numerous in proportion to the Europeans (some 3 million Muslims, as against 200,000 Europeans)—with the intention of forming a state which would have proclaimed its independence and brought its case before the United Nations. During May 1955 there were several sporadic outbursts, probably to probe the French defences, especially in a place called El Milia. Then, on 20 August 1955, an uprising occurred in a very large chunk of territory, from Phillippeville on the Mediterranean coast to the Tunisian border, including cities of importance like Constantine itself and a number of villages or small towns. This uprising had been very carefully planned. French military resources on hand at the time were very scanty, but after several hours of

ghting in the towns and villages the uprising was quelled. The eason for this was that, in spite of the enormous amount of propa- anda, and in spite of the threats to which they were submitted, he native population of that area did not follow the Nationalist eaders. That is a very important fact: up to this stage it must be oted that the Muslim population has not followed the Nationalist eaders. If the natives in Constantine had followed the Nationalists, here is no doubt that the whole of the French European popula- ion in that area would have been massacred. The scanty military orces the French had in that region would have been overwhelmed nd suppressed. It is a fact that it was the apathy and even the esistance of the Muslim population which turned the tide against he Nationalist leaders and in favour of the French authorities.

The Nationalists' next attempt, known as the 'Battle of Algiers', as to organize themselves in order to get the support of the United Nations General Assembly during the session which was due to pen in the autumn of 1956. The Nationalists did not try to over- helm the French Army or suppress the European population: hat they tried to do was to provoke a general collapse of all ivilized life by planting time-bombs in cafés or other public laces, bombs which killed or maimed many people each time, in- luding many women and children. The idea was to bring about a eneral state of insecurity and thus to claim that France was nable to maintain a minimum of order and civilized life in lgeria. This third method did not succeed either, and the Battle f Algiers was finally won by the paratroops of General Massu, ho succeeded in tracing the secret networks of the *Front de la ibération Nationale* (F.L.N.), the principal terrorist organization, nd also of the Communist Party. Finally the trouble in the city of lgiers subsided.

The present phase of the conflict is an entirely psychological ne. The leaders of the F.L.N. and of the Algerian Communist 'arty know that they are not in a position to overcome France by nilitary means; they cannot beat the French Army and throw it nto the sea. They also realize that they are not able to provoke a eneral and protracted state of complete insecurity, or even the ollapse of normal life, in the urban area of Algiers. So, finally, hey have resorted to a new method, which makes use of sporadic nd scattered crimes, bombings, and attacks in the countryside, in rder to help the psychological campaign not only in Algeria but n France herself. For this they count on the help of the Com-

munist and para-Communist organizations in France; they have launched a strong campaign to convince French opinion that it is no use going on in Algeria, and that every day there will be new outbursts of violence. That is the present situation.

OUTSIDE INFLUENCES

Foreign external influences and propaganda have played quite an important role in the Algerian conflict. The Egyptian Government has, from the beginning, given considerable help to the Algerian rebels. As a matter of fact, the first nucleus of the rebellion, the so-called C.R.U.A., or Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (which subsequently became known as the National Liberation Front, or F.L.N.), was headed by a man called Ben Bella who, in 1949, was arrested and sentenced to several years in gaol after holding up a post office in Oran and who, when he escaped, eventually found sanctuary in Egypt. Under the wing of Colonel Nasser's Government he began to build up a special organization for internal and clandestine action in Algeria. The attacks against the French in Algeria started with propaganda on the radio, the so-called 'Voice of the Arabs' in Cairo. About February 1955 a young man who was arrested during a fight with a small gang of rebels in Kabylia, near Algiers, stated that he was an officer of the Egyptian Army and gave many details of the way in which he had been trained in Cairo before being sent secretly to Algeria to take command of a group of rebels. His name was Hamadi el Riffi. Several other men have been captured in similar circumstances by the French, who have learnt in which special camps they had been trained and by whom, the names of the officers in charge of that work, and so on.

In a raid in November 1955, the French forces captured some files belonging to a rebel chieftain called Chihani Bachir. Among these was found a paper to be sent to Cairo by that chieftain, which was the acknowledgement of a shipment of weapons, particularly rifles and sub-machine-guns; this letter was addressed, with an expression of thanks, to Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. In October 1956 the French Navy seized off the coast of Algeria an Egyptian ship, the *Athos*, which was really a pirate ship, without papers, etc.; on board were found seventy-two tons of modern arms, including machine-guns and mortars, shells, and all kinds of ammunition, which were being sent to Algeria by the Government of Colonel Nasser. Other Arab countries have made contributions—

Syria· the use of its radio (Damascus Radio), for example, and money from Saudi Arabia—but there are grounds for believing that the crux of the whole plot is in Cairo and that its details have been organized by the General Staff of the Egyptian Army.

Tunisia and Morocco, since their independence was granted by France, have also played a certain role in the Algerian conflict, especially Tunisia. Facts and instances concerning the recruitment of rebel fighters, the dispatch of weapons, and the use of official trucks and lorries of the Tunisian Army to convey these weapons to the Algerian border have been cited in the National Assembly.[1] There have been instances of wounded rebel fighters who were cared for in Tunisian hospitals. There is a six-member committee in Tunis which is believed to be in charge of organizing rebellion in Algeria; it is composed of three Algerian rebels and three Tunisians, one of whom is said to have been the Director of the Cabinet of M. Bourguiba, head of the Tunisian Government.

ALGERIA'S PLACE IN AFRICA AND THE WORLD

What is the relation of Algeria to the other problems of Africa and the Middle East? First, concerning the African territories of France: in June 1956 the French National Assembly voted a framework law (*loi-cadre*), which permits the French territories of West and Equatorial Africa to develop a high degree of self-government, with their own local Assemblies and their own Councils of Government. This law was implemented this spring by the holding of elections in all those French African territories. There is no doubt that the elections, which were held without any discrimination between native and European voters, have demonstrated the fact that an enormous majority of the population in 'black' French Africa agrees with that development; new Assemblies and Government Councils containing an overwhelming majority of Africans have taken office, and they seem to be accepted with favour by the population. This is a very important development in the evolution of the French Union, the French Empire of yesterday, for it brings into effect a new formula of federation of metropolitan France with the African states.

Now Algeria represents a beach-head of France in Africa, and is also the central piece of the African framework, especially since the Sahara has yielded enormous resources in oil, iron, and other important minerals which promise to change the whole picture of

[1] On 21 March 1957. See *Journal Officiel*, 22 March 1957, p. 1780.

the African and French economies, particularly with regard to oil. Thus the role of Algeria in the whole French system is of the utmost importance, because so long as Algeria is not at peace, and so long as a new system cannot be applied to Algeria—a system which would be approximately similar to the one put into effect in 'black' Africa—the whole framework is tottering dangerously, and the situation remains precarious.

The French desire more than anything else to see the situation improve and a new Africa organized on democratic lines, and this would also be in the interests of the whole Western world. At the same time it is clearly not in the interests of some of the other forces in the world, such as, first of all, the so-called pan-Arab movement, which has its roots in Cairo and whose doctrine is to overwhelm the whole of the Arab world, including North Africa. Pan-Arab propaganda states that Algeria is an Arab country—which it is not, for Algeria is an Arab, Berber, and European country where three populations are mixed and form a kind of mosaic. The whole effort of the Arab League, and especially of Egypt, is opposed to the pacification of Algeria and to the success of the new formula of self-government in the French territories. Both propaganda and the tangible help mentioned above are directed against a peaceful solution.

The map, not only of Africa but also of the world, makes obvious the enormous strategic and geo-political importance of Algeria. The Power which controls Algeria is in a position to control Southern Europe. When Allied forces landed in Algeria in 1943 it became evident that Hitler's *Festung Europa* was doomed, and similarly, the Power which controls Algeria in the future will be in a position to invade or to threaten Italy, Spain, and the south of France. That is the reason why Algeria is among the territories included in the N.A.T.O. pact. Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran, is an enormous naval and air base of N.A.T.O. standard—not purely a French base but an international Allied base—and the Power which could control Mers-el-Kebir, or at least prevent France, Britain, and the United States from controlling it, would gain a very important point in the cold war.

All this points, of course, to one Power in the world, namely, the U.S.S.R. The role of the Soviet Union in the Algerian rebellion was at first very small: only by Budapest Radio broadcasts in Arabic did she try to inflame the situation. But in 1955, following certain orders, the Communist Party of Algeria began to display

a more lively interest in the situation and to play a more and more important rôle. Since then the part of the Communists in the Algerian rebellion has been increasing to such an extent that it may be said that in the present phase, particularly in the city of Algiers and in other urban areas, the Communists have taken the lead in the rebellion. When Guerroudj, the leader of the people who were setting time-bombs in Algiers, was arrested, it was learned that he was a Communist and had under his orders not only the purely Communist terrorist cells but also the F.L.N., the so-called Nationalist cells; in certain areas at least there has been a fusion of the two organizations, and this collaboration has been brought about under Communist leadership.

There are certain other considerations which could, of course, be expanded. First of all, in thinking about the Algerian problem a distinction must be made between the deeper and more real causes of that tragedy and the superficial and purely psychological manifestations. The real trouble is the impossibility for Algeria, by herself, to feed an ever-increasing population. In the writer's view that basic problem, and the social and psychological consequences that stem from it, cannot be solved except within the framework of a complete and intimate union between France and Algeria. This union is important to France for many reasons, but it is much more essential to Algeria. There are some people in France who think that France would be much better off from a financial and economic point of view if she let Algeria go. One of the reasons for a contrary view is the Sahara and the control of that part of Africa; but quite apart from that, from the human point of view France has no right to dissociate herself from Algeria. The separation of Algeria and France would be a disaster for France, but for Algeria it would mean death, because half of the population would find itself without any means of support.

The granting of independence to Algeria would seem, from a short-term point of view, to afford an easy solution. There are people who say: 'Why do not the French declare Algeria independent?' But that independence would mean two things: first, widespread hunger and ruin and a complete collapse of the economic and social life of Algeria; and secondly, internal strife, protracted civil war on a scale much greater than exists at present. For one of the factors which must be taken into account is that Algeria is not a unified country: it has a heterogeneous population who would immediately begin to fight among themselves. The fact must be

emphasized that the European population of 1,200,000 would not submit to a purely Muslim-Arab State. They would try to prevent it by destroying that state or by creating their own state as, for instance, the Israelis did in Palestine. So it would seem that there can be no solution outside a Franco-Algerian framework. The Arabs, the Berbers, and the Europeans are, as someone has said, sentenced to live together, and as a matter of fact there are many factors which justify such a life together—the inter-penetration of the spirit of both cultures, the fact that so many hundred thousand Algerian workers go each year to France, the fact that so many young Frenchmen have recently gone to Algeria—all these elements make for a greater understanding between the two peoples. There is also the fact that the enormous majority of the whole native/Muslim population of Algeria desire more than anything else to see peace return to Algeria.

The French have put into effect many political, economic, and social reforms. The recovery of Algeria after such a terrific crisis is quite possible, and probably possible much sooner than one would think, provided that external influences cease to kindle the fire, and provided also that France continues to act with resolution in two ways: first, to fight against rebel activities and terrorism, and secondly, to help the Muslim population by very deep and far-reaching reforms.

Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists' 'Rectification' Movement

ON 18 June the New China News Agency published the text of a speech originally made by Chairman Mao Tse-tung on 27 February 1957 before a closed session of the Supreme State Conference.[1]

[1] Mao also dealt with the topic on 12 March 1957 at a closed session of the National Conference of Propaganda Work convened by the Central Committee's propaganda department. The text of the speech of 27 February released from Peking is quite discreet. Quotations from it emanating from Polish sources, published in the *Daily Telegraph* of 14 June 1957, showed that Mao was extremely frank on Hungary, Stalin, and Chinese economic difficulties; he even gave the number of people—800,000—executed by the Communists in China since 1949 It seems extremely probable that it was this 'leakage' from Warsaw that made the Chinese publish a text four days later.

Entitled 'On the correct handling of contradictions among the people', the speech falls naturally into two parts. First comes a theoretical discussion of the two types of contradiction: Mao distinguishes between contradictions between the 'enemy' and the 'people' and contradictions among the people. The enemy are, of course, Chiang Kai-shek, the Americans and other imperialists, and any Chinese on the mainland prepared to oppose Communist rule by force; the people are defined as all those who 'approve, support, and work for the cause of socialist construction'.

The former contradiction is 'antagonistic' and may have to be solved by force; but contradictions among the people (this applies only to Communist countries) are 'non-antagonistic' and can be solved by discussion, persuasion, and education.[1] This is because the new social system, which promotes the development of the productive forces, has fostered a basic identity of aims among the people. Having affirmed this basic unity, Mao is prepared to admit that the Communist Party and its subjects do not always see eye to eye; that there can exist, even in a Communist State, contradictions between the Government and the masses. He says that the leaders, thinking more of national advance than individual welfare, are apt to enforce their policies; such 'bureaucratic' methods of leadership engender popular discontent. To rectify such abuses he is prepared to tolerate small-scale strikes.[2]

This first section of the speech is extremely important. It is clearly designed to provide the ideological underpinning for the moderate policies pursued by the regime since January 1956; only a major theoretical pronouncement of this kind could convince

[1] Mao originally took up the subject of contradictions in his essay 'On Contradiction', written in August 1937 and issued in revised form in his *Selected Works*, Vol 1 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1954) While not essentially original, Mao's essay provides a clear systematization of this basic Marxist concept and is readily applicable to actual situations.

The Chinese analysis of the East European crisis contained in the article 'A further discussion of the historical experience of the proletarian dictatorship' (*People's Daily*, 29 December 1956) was expounded in terms of contradictions; and with the Poles making increasing use of the term, Mao's original essay and the present speech are clearly the most important theoretical documents relevant to the study of contemporary Communism.

[2] The concession of the right to strike is an important novelty, as is the idea of contradictions between the leaders and the people from which it springs. Communists have always maintained that strikes are inappropriate in a socialist State; for since Party and Government are proletarian organs, the workers cannot be exploited by them and would in effect be striking against themselves. Mao has posited no economic reason for this contradiction. (Some students of Moscow's Lomonossov University have not hesitated to do so. See the letter from an anonymous student of that University, transmitted to the Austrian cultural monthly, *Forum*, and translated and reprinted in *Encounter*, June 1957.)

both Communists and non-Communists alike that these policies were not just a tactical shift—especially after China had supported the brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising.[1] And in the second half of his speech, devoted to particular contradictions, Mao reaffirmed that moderate policies, like that exemplified by the slogan 'Let the hundred flowers bloom together, let the hundred schools contend', aimed at increasing intellectual freedom, would not be thrown overboard.

In return for Communist moderation, Mao expects people to rally to the regime, exert all their efforts in the task of economic development, and put up with the hardships that current shortages have brought about. But it is clear that he has realized that, to achieve the kind of unity which he claims already exists, it is essential to overcome the estrangement between leaders and led, which is, though he does not admit it, the fundamental contradiction in any Communist State.

The main responsibility for the solution of this contradiction must lie with the Communists; where before they dictated they must now persuade, where before they solved problems by the text-book they must now use their heads and adapt policies to local conditions. To achieve the kind of flexible attitude that this new approach demands, Mao has launched within the ranks of his party a 'rectification', or *cheng-feng*, movement based on his two speeches on contradictions. It is this movement that the present article seeks to examine.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND[2]

The term *cheng-feng* is an abbreviation of *cheng-tun tso-feng*, or 'rectifying the work style'. To a Chinese Communist it conveys two things: it refers to an actual *cheng-feng* movement which took place in 1942–3, and also to the methods adopted in that movement by which the Party's work style was rectified.[3] It is necessary to examine the 1942–3 movement because it is clear that the present campaign is to be modelled closely on it.

[1] Mao suggests in his speech that in Hungary non-antagonistic contradictions changed into antagonistic ones as a result of the presence of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionaries; the Polish version of the speech suggests that Mao's appraisal was actually far more realistic than appears from the Peking text

[2] Boyd Compton's book *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942–44* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952) contains translations of the main documents used during the first *cheng-feng* movement, with an excellent analysis of the latter's significance.

[3] There were two other movements of the *cheng-feng* type, in 1947–8 and 1950, but these were not full-blown affairs.

The original *cheng-feng* movement was launched on 1 February 1942 by Mao Tse-tung in the Communist war-time capital, Yenan. It went through three stages: first, a period of study during which twenty-two set documents were discussed throughout the Party; then a period of examination when the work of Party groups was measured against the standards laid down in the documents; finally, each person wrote a critical summary of his own style of work and submitted it for group examination. Similarly, the lower organs submitted overall reports for examination by the senior Party bodies.

As far as can be gathered, the movement was not a purge in the Stalinist sense of large numbers of Party members being expelled and executed. The size of the Party doubled during the period of the movement, and Wang Ming, whose method of Party leadership during the years 1931–4 was a major object of attack, is alive today and a member of the Central Committee. The aim was to conduct the campaign on the principle of 'treat the disease to save the man.' However, the fact that Liu Shao-ch'i (now the Party's first Deputy-Chairman and Mao's heir-apparent) warned against excessive 'struggle' indicates that the criticism and self-criticism sessions could be very unpleasant experiences. Some Party members were inclined to employ such measures as 'surveillance, arrest, trial, and imprisonment'; they were reprimanded, but it is doubtful whether these methods were entirely eradicated.

A prime aim of the campaign was to get Party members to combine theory and practice; in Mao's expressive analogy, 'the arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese revolution.' Since Mao is often described as an empiricist, it is necessary to point out that his emphasis on theory is quite genuine. Correct theoretical analysis is for him a vital and practical task; he has even described Marx and Engels as 'great men of action'! But though Mao places an equal emphasis on theory and practice, the *cheng-feng* movement was essentially an attack on the excessive use of theory, and consequently it promoted a practical approach to problems.

This is hardly surprising. A Communist Party is a small élite organization designed to lead the rest of the population; its right to do so is based on the superiority conveyed by its possession of Marxist-Leninist doctrine by which it is enabled to predict the course that society will inevitably take. Consequently when a Communist is faced with a situation in which theory and practice

cannot be easily welded together, the tendency is to impose the theory at all costs. To Mao this is 'mechanical' as opposed to 'dialectical' materialism. His *bête-noire* is the rigid doctrinaire. The attack on 'subjectivism', one of the three major evils against which the campaign was directed, was designed specifically to correct 'dogmatism', the tendency to apply theory blindly—to reform the glib parrots of Marxist phraseology who were unable to apply their knowledge to, say, the solution of a land reform problem in the neighbouring village. Mao also attacked the opposite facet of 'subjectivism', which is 'empiricism', or the tendency to neglect theory altogether. But he pointed out that the main danger did not lie in this quarter.

The second evil attacked was 'bureaucratism', the practice of writing long and pretentious reports, of using obscure words, of never moving from one's office, and of issuing orders without checking on their feasibility—in fact all the things which Westerners associate with red tape. In practice, it was simply the dogmatic attitude as evidenced in the administrative sphere; the bureaucrats, like the theorists, were refusing to face up to the objective situation.

The third evil was 'sectarianism'. Within the Party there was a tendency for members from the same province to band together in a clique, for the older cadres to rely on their seniority when dealing with the new recruits. Important too was the dislike, evidenced by all Party members, of working with non-Party men; in official phraseology, there was a tendency to emphasize the latter's 'negative aspects'—to regard a landlord solely as an exploiter and forget that he was also an ally in the anti-Japanese war. The attack on sectarianism within the Party was designed to eradicate the factionalism which had weakened it throughout the twenty years of its existence. Sectarianism towards outsiders was, of course, another manifestation of the feeling of superiority with which the possessors of Marxism-Leninism were imbued; but it was also a consequence of the 'leftist' policies pursued by Mao's predecessors.[1]

The effectiveness of the *cheng-feng* movement in instilling a more flexible, pragmatic attitude has always been rated high by the Communists themselves. The movement ranks with the Long

[1] Subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism were dealt with in three articles by Mao Tse-tung originally delivered as speeches. They are 'Reform our study', 'Rectify the Party's style in work', and 'Oppose the Party "eight-legged essay"'. (Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol 4, Lawrence and Wishart, 1956).

March and the defeat of the Nationalists as one of the milestones in the history of the Party. A non-Communist observer gives some support to these Communist claims concerning the movement: Lord Lindsay said it had a 'very considerable influence on the rational and intelligent cadres of the Party . . . on the whole it failed to make any real impression on the more doctrinaire cadres who were cases for psychiatry rather than education.'[1]

Apart from flexibility, the movement aimed to instil discipline. Twenty years of shifting 'lines', changing leaders, and military defeats had greatly weakened the cohesion of the Party; it was essential for its new leader, Mao, to weld it together and at the same time consolidate his own control. Party members scattered over widely dispersed war bases with little contact with Yenan had to realize that ultimately they were responsible to him.

THE CURRENT CHENG-FENG MOVEMENT

In the current movement, the three evils of 'subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism' are again the main objects of attack; this is sufficient proof that the prime aim is again to encourage a flexible, pragmatic approach to problems. According to the directive issued by the Party's Central Committee on 27 April 1957,[2] it was necessary to 'launch within the Party once again an extensive, thorough-going rectification campaign against bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism, and to raise the Marxist ideological level of the whole Party and improve the working style so as to conform to the needs of socialist construction'.

The directive prescribed for study Mao Tse-tung's two speeches on the correct handling of contradictions and suggested 'reference to a number of other relevant documents'. The evidence suggests that these latter documents will include the three articles by Mao already mentioned,[3] together with the Chinese pronouncements on the cult of the individual[4] and on the East European crisis.

On receiving the directive, provincial Party committees called conferences to discuss its implementation. Most of them are conducting the campaign in two stages, as suggested in the directive. The first one will vary in length from three to eight months accord-

[1] *Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China 1941/47*, by Michael Lindsay (New York, I P.R International Secretariat, 1950), p. 44.

[2] Released by the New China News Agency in English on 30 April 1957.

[3] See above p. 334, footnote.

[4] The pronouncement on the cult of the individual, entitled 'On the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship', was published in the *People's Daily*, 5 April 1956.

ing to the province. It will be devoted to reforming the work style of the higher officials down to the level of *hsien* (county) secretary. Special teams led by the provincial secretary are being set up to direct the campaign. The second stage, which in many cases will not start till next year, will embrace the lower echelons. For the moment the rank and file are being shown Mao's reports and have been told to concentrate on how best to serve the people.

Emphasis is again being laid on keeping criticism within bounds. The directive states: 'This *cheng-feng* movement should be a movement of ideological education carried out extremely seriously but yet as gently as a breeze or a fine rain.' Large 'struggle' meetings are specifically forbidden: 'comradely heart-to-heart talks' are prescribed, and critics are again told to 'treat the disease to save the man.'

There are however two novel features about the present campaign. In the first place, non-Party people wishing to participate are welcomed. The reason for this is fairly clear. In 1942 the Communists controlled limited areas of the country and operated only skeleton administrations. Most of the tasks were in the hands of Party members. Now, with the whole of China under their control, they have, of course, to employ vast numbers of non-Party men in administrative posts. These are just as likely to be afflicted with 'bureaucratism', although the Communists, rendered more immune to criticism by the prestige of Party membership, are likely to be the more serious cases.

The other novelty is the order to office-workers right up to the highest level to get closer to the masses by joining them in physical labour. Stories have come in of dozens of generals enthusiastically planting vegetables, weeding, and collecting manure on State farms. Even portly P'eng Chen, Mayor of Peking and a member of the Politburo, has been seen sweating profusely, carrying heavy stones with a road-building team. In Yenan days there was less need to adopt this particular device to improve public relations and to bring bureaucrats literally down to earth. In those primitive conditions, Party officials lived cheek by jowl with the peasants and were often responsible for the production of their own food supplies. Now 'one can open the way to bureaucracy by constantly staying in Peking. The walls of Peking are high and could separate the leaders from the masses.'[1]

[1] Chou En-lai, in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to China at Hangchow airport on 25 April 1957 (reported in *People's Daily*, 26 April 1957).

In the present *cheng-feng* movement there is less need to emphasize organizational discipline; it is presumably well enough established and not likely to be undermined by the measure of decentralization envisaged under the new Party constitution passed at the eighth Congress last September. But there is a need for ideological discipline in view of the present ferment of the intellectuals in the Communist world; the Chinese leaders are presumably anxious to ensure that their Party cadres do not deviate from the correct 'line' on Stalin and Hungary. This would seem to be their reason for prescribing the two articles on the historical experience of the proletarian dictatorship.

THE MOTIVES FOR THE CAMPAIGN

Why is a *cheng-feng* movement being launched at this time? The head of the Communist Party propaganda bureau, Lu Ting-yi, has cited figures to show that the majority of Party members, about 11 million out of 12 million, have joined since the 1942–3 movement, while 60 per cent of them became members after the Communists took over the country in 1949. As a result, 'generally speaking, they are incapable of thoroughly understanding what subjectivism is. Many of them still preserve the undesirable ideology of the old society and have not given up the standpoint of the petty bourgeois to make way for the standpoint of the proletariat.'[1] As for the Party veterans who did participate in the 1942–3 movement, their years in office since 1949 have contaminated them with bureaucratism: 'The growth among them of a style of work divorced from the masses and reality has thus become serious.'

This analysis is valid enough, but it does not explain the timing of the movement. Why should it have been launched this year and not any other? Cadres are quite often warned against the three evils; why is the situation now so serious that a Party-wide *cheng-feng* movement is necessary?

The answer is suggested in the directive: 'Social relations have undergone a fundamental change and a change in the people's ideology is also developing. If our Party and the working class are to further and, even better, lead the transformation of the whole of society and the construction of a new society, and more effectively to mobilize all positive forces and unite with all possible people, and turn passive forces into positive forces in order to strive to

[1] Article by Lu Ting-yi, 'In Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the Party's Work Style Rectification Movement' (*People's Daily*, 5 March 1957).

fulfil the target of building a great socialist State—if all this is to be done, our Party and the working class must at the same time remould themselves.'

The great social change referred to is the basic socialization of the means of production—the collectivization of agriculture and handicrafts and the virtual nationalization of industry and commerce. The advent of this change, which marked the completion of the regime's ideological tasks, was recognized by Mao as early as January last year.[1] He said that the main task from then on was the economic development of the country. He apparently decided that this task would be accomplished more efficiently if the Communist Party worked with the people and provided them with incentives. The capitalists, the non-Communist intellectuals, and the rich peasants were the prime beneficiaries of the resultant slackening of pressure. They had till then been vilified as potential enemies of socialism; now that socialism had been basically established, the regime felt strong enough to relax its grip in order to get the most out of groups whose skills were particularly vital to economic development. Economic concessions were granted and tolerant ideological policies were adopted: for instance, 'Let the hundred flowers bloom together, let the hundred schools contend' in the intellectual sphere, and the policy of long-term coexistence with the non-Communist parties in the political.[2]

But Communists were slow to acclimatize themselves to these new policies; Party intellectuals, for instance, claimed that the 'hundred flowers' policy could only lead to the growth of 'weeds'. During six years of unfettered supremacy, the Party cadres had imposed ideological policies to the detriment of other aims; doctrine had taken precedence over economic development, theory had been exalted at the expense of practice. Furthermore, because policies like the campaign against the counter-revolutionaries, the 'remoulding' of the intellectuals, the 'five-anti' movement directed

[1] In a preface to *The High Tide of Socialism in China's Villages*, a 3-volume work published in January 1956 It should be emphasized that the Chinese domestic 'thaw' started before the Khrushchev denunciation of Stalinism in February 1956. For instance, the moderate policy towards the intellectuals was initiated by Chou En-lai in January, though later developments received more publicity.

[2] The continued existence of bourgeois parties in a socialist State is extremely odd; a political party, in Marxist terms, must be the organ of a class, and with the achievement of socialism there are no classes in China. (The only exceptions to this are the business men who receive fixed interest payments on their nationalized assets, but their party is only one of many 'democratic' parties.) The situation is justified by a most un-materialist argument—the democratic parties are there because bourgeois *ideas* still persist.

against the capitalists (the five sins attacked were bribery, tax evasion, theft of State property, cheating on Government contracts, and the theft of State economic secrets), and finally collectivization and nationalization had had to be imposed, the Communist Party had alienated itself from the rest of the population. The directive that launched this *cheng-feng* movement hinted at the Party's ruthlessness: 'At the same time, because the Party is in a ruling position throughout the nation and has won the support of the masses of the people, many comrades are liable to use purely administrative measures as a method of solving problems; some wavering elements are liable to be contaminated with remnants of the Kuomintang style of work from the old society, to think of themselves as privileged and even resort to attacks of oppression when dealing with the masses.'

Essentially, the *cheng-feng* movement is designed to condition the Communist cadre member to a new 'united front' period. He has to examine problems on their merits and not through the distorting mirror of the class struggle. He will have to learn how to dangle the carrot as well as he previously brandished the stick.

It is no coincidence that the last *cheng-feng* movement was also launched at a time of 'united front' policies. Then, too, the main aim of the Party, the winning away of popular support from the Kuomintang, required a realistic approach to problems. The Party could not afford to forfeit popular support, and doctrinal aims had to be put in the background. Though the Party's position is stronger now, it is evident that its leaders reckon that they will get into serious difficulties if they continue to work against rather than with the people. In his article already quoted, Lu Ting-yi said that the Party might even commit mistakes in the economic field as serious as the mistakes made in the political field by Mao's predecessors; and that is saying a lot by Chinese Communist standards.

This feeling was probably reinforced by events in Eastern Europe. The evidence suggests that the present *cheng-feng* movement was in the planning stage before the extent of anti-Communist feeling in the satellite countries had been appreciated. Party cadres were ordered to study *cheng-feng* documents as far back as June 1956. Then at the second Plenum of the eighth Central Committee, held from 10 to 15 November 1956, Mao Tse-tung called for 'the use of *cheng-feng* methods in order to combat the tendency towards subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism'. The fact that provincial Party meetings held to

implement the recommendations of the second Plenum did nothing about Mao's exhortation might indicate that they had been told that the matter was being attended to on a nation-wide basis.

This seems to be confirmed by an article that appeared in the fortnightly *China Youth* (16 January 1957). The author, one Chi Lu, stated that 'the Central Committee of the Party recently decided that as from 1958 there will commence a rectification of work style throughout the Party.' He turned out to be wrong when the campaign was launched this year; but since a leading magazine like *China Youth* would not be likely to make a mistake on an important matter like this, one can conclude that the timing of the campaign was advanced after the article was written.

If this is the case, it was presumably events in Eastern Europe that hastened matters. On his return to Peking Chou En-lai would have reported on the immense reservoir of discontent that had been built up in the satellite countries; the importance of a new attitude towards the people on the part of the Communist cadres was clearly revealed. China's current economic difficulties, which have included shortages of consumer goods, would have served to underline the situation.

THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE MOVEMENT

It is hazardous to predict how successful the *cheng-feng* movement is likely to be. The task is certainly more difficult than it was in 1942. The Party is much larger—it numbers 12 million now as compared with less than a million then; and its position as administrator of an enormous country makes bureaucracy inevitable. The task of economic development for which the new methods are needed cannot appear as urgent to Party cadres as did the need to survive in the struggle against the Kuomintang; in effect, Mao is attempting to imbue his Party members with a revolutionary élan in a non-revolutionary situation.

Another factor will be the reaction of the people to the new methods. What Mao now wants is dictatorship by consent; but after the experience of six years of dictatorship without consent, the people may not want any kind of dictatorship. If they choose to 'abuse' the limited freedoms that the regime is now prepared to grant them, the Communist Party will no doubt revert to harsher methods.[1]

The vigour and resourcefulness of the present Chinese Com-

[1] To help the Communists to rectify their methods, Mao has encouraged

munist leaders should not be underrated; and they are clearly determined to make a success of the *cheng-feng* movement. The latter will certainly have an appreciable effect at first; the senior Party members who are more accustomed to thinking for themselves will probably benefit considerably; and the junior cadres will set about their tasks with a new zest and open-mindedness. But the odds appear to be against any long-term success. Apart from the considerations already mentioned, it must be remembered that the Chinese Communist Party is to retain its status as an élite organization. It has still to be shown that such an organization, responsible ultimately only to itself, believing in its superiority, can for long avoid 'sectarianism'. And once the cadres begin again to discriminate against people who are not members of the Party, they will naturally stop listening to their opinions. Increasingly they will feel that their own views are the only ones that can be correct; and this in turn will lead to that departure from reality that is denoted by 'subjectivism' and 'bureaucratism'.[1]

R. L. MACF.

Gomulka's Road to Socialism

The May Meeting of the Polish United Workers' Party

POLAND and Hungary have been in the forefront of public interest since last year's Poznan riots sparked off two revolutions. Although the Hungarian revolt was more spectacular, it is the developments

people to criticize them, tempering their criticism by six criteria laid down in the speech of 27 February. Of these six, he declared the most important were that the leadership of the Communist Party and the validity for China of the 'socialist path' should not be disputed. In fact, many non-Communist notables ignored the six criteria and incurred strong counter-criticism as 'rightists'. It seems possible that the six criteria were added to the original text on publication when the boldness of critics had become apparent It seems unlikely that non-Communists would have knowingly infringed them after the mental batterings they had suffered over the past seven years

[1] This conclusion has also been voiced in China by Chen Hsin-kuei at a meeting of the Democratic League on 10 June 1957, according to a New China News Agency dispatch of that date He said 'The Communist Party mainly trusts its members. . . For this reason it is inconceivable that the Communist Party could abolish sectarianism, which contributes to the growth of bureaucratism and subjectivism, and for the Communist Party members to repudiate the "Party Kingdom" ideology.'

in Poland which, in the long run, may prove to be of far greater significance. Today Hungary is as much a Soviet satellite as in the days of Stalin and Rákosi. Poland, on the other hand, has freed herself to a great extent from Soviet domination and is continuing to evolve her specific road to socialism.

Polish intellectuals reacted with considerable vigour to the death of the Stalin myth and to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. They found it easier to express their suddenly remembered distaste for the negative aspects of ten years of Communist rule because the death of Bierut in 1956 had removed Poland's little Stalin at a convenient time. The intellectual debate about the state of the nation was not limited to a clique of writers or poets but soon spilled over into the press, including the Party dailies. The Poznan events showed that the opposition to the men in charge and their methods embraced all sections of the community, and the decisions of the eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party in October of last year were the regime's answer.

Seven months had passed when the ninth Plenum of the Central Committee met in Warsaw in May to determine whether Gomulka's policies were to be continued. It must not be assumed that Gomulka's rise to power and the implementation of his policies were free from complications. Even when he again became First Secretary of the Central Committee he had to contend with opposition from the discredited advocates of Stalinism and to protect his policy from the over-enthusiastic supporters of accelerated liberalization. The strength of the Stalinists—or, as Gomulka calls them, the champions of conservatism and dogmatism—lies only inside the Party. As far as the nation as a whole is concerned, their influence is negligible. Their only importance as a political factor is their ability to obstruct and sometimes even to challenge the 'October line' and Gomulka's leadership. Gomulka must retain his control over the Party, the only political instrument of power at his disposal. He knows that at this stage the Polish people accept him, but as long as socialism remains his goal he cannot step outside the Party and rely entirely on the support of the nation. By doing that he would risk putting himself in the hands of the Church, the sole voice which commands the attention of the great majority of Poles. He would also have to go much further than he wants in meeting both the economic demands of the workers and the liberalizers' clamour for more freedom. Neither *vox dei* nor *vox populi* can be

allowed to guide his decisions, though they might well influence them.

Those who press for more democratization include some Party members, but their main strength lies outside the Party. They would appear to represent the greater danger for Gomulka because of their numbers and the popularity of their demands. But the diversity of their ideas makes it difficult for them to develop into a cohesive political force, even should they be allowed to do so. They realize that in the last analysis Gomulka is their only chance. On the other hand, the Stalinists, who of course can exist only within the Party, think they can prevent Gomulka from going too far by their ability to produce a Polish Kádár from their midst should Moscow decide to put an end to the Polish experiment. As the trade union daily *Glos Pracy* said on the eve of the ninth Plenum, 'The Polish October was born in the struggle against these elements [i.e. the Stalinists] and it is in this struggle that the October line is being carried out.'[1] The presence of men like Zenon Nowak in the Polish Government, and the fact that at the ninth Plenum the Natolin group[2] was able to voice its dissatisfaction and to propose amendments to the Party resolutions, shows their strength inside the Party. Indeed, had their position within the Party been comparable to their standing in the country, there is little doubt that Gomulka would have been able to exclude them from the higher Party councils and the Government. It might, of course, be possible that he is using them as bogeymen to frighten the eager enthusiasts on his left. But the resolutions passed by the Party's Central Committee last May fully endorsed Gomulka's stand and repudiated the Stalinist faction by the expulsion from the Party of two men closely identified with the immediate past—Berman, the *éminence grise* of the Bierut regime, and Radkiewicz, its Minister of Security. In his report to the ninth Plenum which preceded the resolutions,[3] Gomulka was less concerned with their ideological influence in the Party than with the inertia which their views were encouraging among many Party officials. He said: 'Conservatism, which exists in our Party, has its origins not so much in the ideological sources of dogmatism as in the lack of

[1] *Glos Pracy*, 15 May 1957.

[2] The anti-Gomulka faction is sometimes described as the Natolin group, as it used to meet in the Villa Natolin near Warsaw.

[3] Gomulka's political report was made on 15 May and published in *Trybuna Ludu* on 16 May 1957, from which all the quotations from it in this article are taken.

knowledge how to work in a new way, in ignorance of the decisions of the eighth Plenum, and in the insufficient political training of Party cadres in new methods of work.'

Unlike the conservative faction, the so-called revisionists inside the Party do not live in a vacuum; their views bear some relation to the feelings of the masses. While they want to deviate more in the direction of greater liberalization than Gomulka, he has made it clear to them that he is not prepared to abandon his middle-of-the-road policy. He may well be sincere in his continuous affirmation of his fundamental Marxist beliefs. He also cannot give them their head, because to do so would strengthen the hand of the Stalinists and invite increasing interference from Moscow. At the ninth Plenum Gomulka attacked the revisionists in far stronger terms than he used towards their opponents on the right. To give substance to his charges he picked on an article by a comparatively unknown Party member, Kolakowski, in *Zycie Warszawy* (3 February 1957), whom he accused of wanting to 'throw the classics of Marxism on the rubbish heap'. According to Gomulka, it is Kolakowski's contention that the people cannot be expected to wait for the fruits of socialism indefinitely. He particularly objected to Kolakowski's statement that 'democracy is a risk, but a risk worth taking.'

In replying to Kolakowski, Gomulka was answering all those who share his views. He argued that Kolakowski would have to admit that in present-day circumstances the emergence of bourgeois political parties would 'create a threat of the revival of capitalism and of civil war'. He asked him: 'Can you believe that this would consolidate our Western frontier?. . . One may risk a few *zloty* on a lottery, but no responsible Pole could subject the fate of Poland to a lottery called . . . the free play of political forces.' In opposing these views Gomulka propounded the conclusion that if Kolakowski were right in his contention that political maturity could result only from 'conditions of broad democracy' then 'the majority of peoples who have entered the road to socialism are on a low level of political enlightenment' and 'Communists are rabid advocates of social illiteracy.' Quite apart from the controversy between Kolakowski and Gomulka and its application to Polish conditions today, Gomulka's line of reasoning unwittingly exposes the basic weakness of Marxist theory.

Gomulka summed up his attitude to factional differences among Communists in the following words: 'The Party cannot agree to

the creation within its ranks of any kind of reactionary groups, regardless of their label. It would be political nonsense to divide the Party into left, centre, and right... The Party must be monolithic if it is to be equal to its historic role.'

While ideological intra-Party disputes are interesting and may well provide pointers to the future, the main problems facing Poland are her economic situation and her international position, particularly her relations with the U.S.S.R. In his speech to the ninth Plenum Gomulka did not deny that the economic grievances, which had helped to bring him to power, had not yet been eliminated. Furthermore, both in this speech and on many other occasions, he told the workers that they would have to wait for a marked improvement in their precarious living standards. The main trouble is that since last October the disproportion between wages and production in Polish industry, already marked in the past, has increased still further. In the first quarter of 1957 the wages fund was 26 per cent higher than in the corresponding quarter of 1956, and the cash earnings of peasants from the State alone rose by 28·6 per cent. At the ninth Plenum Gomulka gave statistics illustrating the rising consumer demand caused by this disproportionate increase in wages, and said that to satisfy the requirement of butter imports an additional 6–8 million dollars would have to be found. By 1960, the end of the current Five-Year Plan, real wages should have been raised by some 30 per cent. Gomulka explained that this was a lot in relation to the country's economic potential, but admitted that it was not enough to provide the standard of living desired by the people. As he saw it, too much had already been done since last October in the direction of raising wages. 'In the present state of our economy,' he said, 'nothing more can be squeezed out of it to increase wages...' He added that wages could only be increased if overall production were raised.

The regime is trying to stimulate industrial production by setting up Workers' Councils. Although inspired by the Yugoslav example, the Workers' Councils in Poland do not follow it very closely, and they enjoy less autonomy. It was made quite clear at the ninth Plenum that they were not to be confused with some form of collective ownership of the means of production, which Gomulka equated with capitalism. He explained that these councils were necessary because the workers had lost faith in their trade unions, which they rightly considered to have been an instrument of coercion in the past. Their primary functions are to prevent

wage demands and encourage increased production. They are still in a stage of evolution and have not yet been introduced everywhere. The establishment of Workers' Councils was opposed by the conservative element in the Polish United Workers' Party as an anarcho-syndicalist step, but in this controversy, too, Gomulka's point of view prevailed.

At the ninth Plenum Gomulka claimed that his advent to power last October had brought about a radical turning-point in Poland's agricultural policy by giving the peasants a greater degree of freedom in the choice of their methods and the organization of their production. The Polish Communists have never been as ruthless in the forcible collectivization of the countryside as their comrades elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and the part played in Polish agriculture by producer co-operatives and State farms was never outstandingly significant.[1] In fact Polish peasants have been allowed to leave co-operatives for some years now, and the impetus of the events of last October led to the disintegration of the great majority of Polish collective farms. Co-operation continues to be the officially supported policy. Gomulka regards it as the best way of introducing socialism in the countryside He says he is not prepared to force the peasant into a co-operative against his will, because in the past co-operatives formed in this way had proved inefficient. He hopes to achieve his aim by giving incentives, such as tax concessions and special credit facilities, to co-operative farms. At the ninth Plenum he stated that the regime was allowing peasants to return to a form of capitalist production for the time being, and that the idea of co-operation was being fostered by organizations such as marketing and savings co-operatives. He silenced the critics of this approach, who had expressed their fear of a fundamental return to peasant capitalism, by telling them that in the final instance the power of the proletariat, represented by the State, would always be strong enough to prevent this from happening.

One of the methods adopted by the eighth Plenum to overcome the prevalent unrest was to revive some of the influence of the nominally independent parties, particularly the United Peasant Party.[2] At the ninth Plenum Gomulka put the relationship between the Peasant Party and the Communists on a firm basis. He said:

[1] At the end of 1955 there were nearly 10,000 co-operative farms in Poland, tilling about 9 per cent of the national total of agricultural land. By the summer of 1957 their number had fallen by some 8,000 co-operatives.

[2] The other main independent party is the Democratic Party.

'We consider the Peasant Party to be an independent party . . . and we do not wish to violate its party sovereignty. We consider it to be a firm element in our political life.' But he warned its leaders against allowing their party to become an instrument of elements hostile to socialism.

In a speech of nearly 30,000 words Gomulka devoted only about three hundred to the supremely vital question of relations between the State and the Catholic Church. The temporary solution of this problem is his biggest achievement on the home front. In his explanation to the Plenum of his Concordat of 7 December 1956 with Cardinal Wyszynski, Gomulka gave proof of his qualities as a political realist, one of the few produced by Marxism. 'Our Party cannot close its eyes to reality,' he said, and went on to condemn past methods of exerting pressure on Catholics, which had alienated millions of Poles. The Party, according to Gomulka, will have to coexist with the Church for a long time. The Communists would continue to fight the Church in the field of ideology, but not on political grounds. In exchange the Church must recognize the fact that Poland had chosen the path to socialism and not interfere with it. 'In matters concerning the vital interests of Poland and her people,' he added, 'we would like to see the Church follow the Polish road together with us.'

At present both the Party and the Church stand to gain more from a state of comparative truce than from the kind of relationship which existed under Bierut. The agreement concluded between Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski provides for voluntary religious instruction in schools and the release of all bishops and priests under arrest. In return Gomulka believes that the millions of Catholics who were previously hostile to the Government will now make a more wholehearted contribution to Poland's economic and political revival. The elections to the Polish Sejm last January showed how important Church support was for Gomulka. By encouraging Catholics not to oppose his programme, the Church greatly contributed to the consolidation of his position among the people, if not within his Party.

Gomulka's hardest internal problem was to put relations with the U.S.S.R. on a new footing. The history of Russo-Polish relations is not a happy one, and the Polish people's experience with their Soviet neighbours since 1939 can have done nothing to improve matters. The Poles have become accustomed to equate their hatred of Communism with their dislike of all things Russian. On assum-

ing control Gomulka had first of all to contain the widespread and potentially violent anti-Soviet feeling of the Polish people, while preventing the Russians from using force to retain their position. As far as he is concerned there never seems to have been any question of a complete break with Moscow. His problem was to put an end to Soviet economic exploitation and political domination. Yet the Polish-Soviet alliance had to be continued, not only because the U.S.S.R. is the only great Power to guarantee the Oder-Neisse frontier, but also because the repudiation of this alliance and Poland's secession from the Warsaw Pact is the one thing the Kremlin would not tolerate. For the Russians it was more risky and more difficult to relax their ideological hold over Poland than to surrender some of their economic privileges. But in fact Moscow has retreated both on the ideological and on the economic front, and although this retreat may be only temporary, it remains true that Soviet-Polish relations today correspond much more nearly to the numerous Soviet statements on dealings with socialist countries made at and since the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party than does Russia's attitude toward the other East European countries. This in itself is a vindication of Gomulka's policy. His report to the ninth Plenum was a confident reaffirmation of his hitherto successful approach to this difficult problem. In stressing the Polish Communists' newly found ideological independence he went further than ever before. In general, throughout Eastern Europe those past shortcomings which have been admitted are being attributed almost exclusively to the consequences of the Stalin cult. Gomulka, however, told his Central Committee that, irrespective of the excesses of the personality cult, the Soviet path to socialism was not necessarily acceptable to other countries. He said: 'The road to socialism pursued by the U.S.S.R. under specific . . . conditions is neither fully necessary nor entirely suitable for other nations.'

Nevertheless, he was firm in refuting the idea that the Polish road to socialism implied hostility towards the U.S.S.R. or even a neutral attitude towards the camp of socialism. Addressing 'certain Party members whose lack of revolutionary orientation . . . had found expression in unsubstantiated public attacks against the U.S.S.R.', he remarked: 'Our Party most resolutely condemns everything directed against the unity of the socialist camp, everything that undermines Polish-Soviet friendship.'

Although he denies that the fountainhead of all Marxist know-

edge is in Moscow, Gomulka, unlike Tito, shows no sign of wanting to put forward his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as necessarily applicable to other socialist countries. On the contrary, he is quite prepared to go on an official visit to East Germany and to be the guest of one of the Communist world's most unregenerate Stalinists, Ulbricht, even though he must know that this may discourage the more liberal elements in the East German Socialist Unity Party. Gomulka's position inside the world Communist movement is made more secure by the fact that Peking appears to be showing great understanding of his aims and problems. In his turn Gomulka finds the current Chinese insistence on the slogan 'Let all flowers blossom, let diverse schools of thought contend' a very useful argument in support of his own internal policies. At the ninth Plenum he went out of his way to describe it as 'a bold step, unprecedented in the building of socialism in other countries', and his own speech echoes many of the views voiced by Mao Tse-tung in his speech on 'contradictions among the people' last February.

The term 'national Communism' is universally condemned by Communist leaders, including Tito—though this does not invalidate the argument that developments in Yugoslavia and Poland can best be described by this particular term. At the ninth Plenum Gomulka rejected 'all the absurd attempts to look for national Communism in our Party'. In the same speech, however, he repeatedly used the definition 'Poland's national road to socialism' to describe his policy. According to him his Party subscribes to all the generally accepted principles of socialism. Its specifically Polish way is best served, at this particular stage, by the following three lines of development: Workers' Councils; increased administrative autonomy on the local level; and greater freedom for the peasants to manage their own affairs, with an emphasis on encouraging co-operation. This is the definition of the Polish national road to socialism which Gomulka provided in his report to the ninth Plenum, and although it may meet the case as far as it goes, it obviously makes no attempt to penetrate to the root of the matter. To begin with, Gomulka's definition excludes the most important and specifically Polish deviation from accepted practice in Eastern Europe—his agreement with the Church. Nor did he mention some of the other salient features in which Poland differs radically from the U.S.S.R. and the satellites. The Polish Parliament has come alive. Non-Communist parties have regained some

of their independence. The press reflects the mood of the country to an extent unknown elsewhere in the Communist world. Restrictions on travel to and from Poland have been eased. These basic differences are the ones that matter, rather than superficial peculiarities in the field of labour relations or local government. As far as the concessions to the peasants are concerned, they are less important than they appear because of the relative insignificance of the socialist sector in Polish agriculture. Gomulka's farm policy is little but a recognition of the existing state of affairs.

Whatever his motives, Gomulka has already departed considerably from the current Moscow interpretation of Leninism. The most likely explanation is that he is acting under pressures which he cannot fully resist; that he is a prisoner of the discontents and demands of the Polish people and the exigencies of the international situation. This does not exclude the possibility that he genuinely believes that his way is the best means of achieving socialism in Poland. On the other hand he may be only applying the classic Leninist principle of temporary tactical retreat in order to bring about the ultimate and complete annihilation of the foes of Communism. If that is his plan, he will not succeed without a civil war. Since October the Poles have enjoyed too many freedoms previously denied to them to allow anyone to restore the *status quo ante* Gomulka. Regardless of the struggle of ideologies and of Gomulka's intentions, the economic problem might yet prove to be the decisive factor. If hunger and misery are not allayed, the Polish workers, disappointed in the hopes raised by their successful incursion into politics last October, might well stage another Poznan throughout the country. In that case repression would have to be the regime's answer and the advances made since Gomulka came to power, and confirmed by the ninth Plenum, would be obliterated.

J. F. A. W.

The Changing Fate of the American Indian

THE American Indian has become part of European as well as American consciousness. From Portugal to Russia, boys play at Cowboys and Indians, read Indian stories, and watch Western films in cinemas or on television. (The Iron Curtain has not made as much difference in this respect as might be expected: only the other day the author received a letter from Poland telling him that his nephew, a precocious boy of eight, was devouring the Indian novels of Karl May.) For all that, the Indian remains a mysterious creature not only to most Europeans but also to most Americans.

There is hardly a factual statement about the American Indian that cannot be, equally factually, contradicted. The Indian, we are told, is vanishing from the American scene. Indeed, the Indian population of the United States, once numbering about a million, is now around 400,000. This is not only the result of massacres, expulsions, starvation, or disease but also of some of the best-meant efforts made by white men on the Indian's behalf. Nobody doubts the good intentions of the Spanish Franciscans, yet the fact remains that the Indian mortality rate at their California missions was 72 per cent.[1] Yet this present figure has risen from a low of 300,000, and the main problem of the Navajo tribe is that their numbers have increased from some 10,000 in 1865 to some 65,000 today, which their land cannot feed.

Again, poverty is unquestionably endemic with most of the United States Indians. A member of an Arab diplomatic mission, who was taken to some Indian reservations in connection with the Point Four scheme, expressed himself as appalled at the misery he saw and which, he said, reached depths unparalleled in his own country. But the American Indians also include the Osage tribe of Oklahoma, whose 2,000 members received a total of $265 million in the years 1915–30 because oil happened to be discovered on their territory.[2] Recently very promising oil discoveries have been made in the Four Corners area, on Navajo lands, and may do much to solve that tribe's problems; their reservation is also in the uranium country.

[1] American Friends Service Committee, *Indians of California, Past and Present*, San Francisco 1955, p. 3.
[2] John Collier, *The Indians of the Americas*, New York 1947, p. 244.

The Indians are said, even by their friends, to be slow in adapting themselves to modern economic techniques. Soil erosion is as much a plague on most reservations as it is in most parts of Africa. But Indians from the Mohawk tribe in the state of New York are among America's most highly paid skilled workers, specializing in 'high steel', i.e. handling steel in building work at high altitudes. It all began when a bridge was to be built across a river in Mohawk territory, and the Mohawks gave their consent only on condition that members of their tribe received the specialized training required for the job.

The Indian enjoys, in point of law, full political equality. All Indians were made American citizens by the Snyder Act of 1924; Arizona and New Mexico, the last two states to withhold the right to vote from them, yielded in 1948. But what can the law do in the case of Ira Hayes, a Pima Indian from Arizona, American war hero and one of the six men who raised the Stars and Stripes on Iwo Jima, driven to an alcoholic's death by a discrimination which denied him a job during the post-war boom? Or with the storekeeper in the neighbouring state of New Mexico who charges 5 cents for a bottle of Coca-Cola to his white customers and 10 cents to the Indians, and who answers inquiries with 'That's the way we do things around here'?

Books about the American Indian run into thousands if not tens of thousands. But they are almost all of specialized interest, and it is exceedingly difficult to find a connected account of the influence that the Indian had on America, past and present. Standard works on the United States tend either to ignore the Indian completely or else to dismiss him with a few quite inadequate mentions. John Collier, whose chapters on the American Indian in his *Indians of the Americas* are far and away the best introduction to the subject, quotes the case of Charles and Mary Beard's *Basic History of the United States*, which concedes the Indian seven references on three pages out of five hundred.

Of course, the Indian cannot be so cavalierly dismissed. The United States was created out of the struggle with him. This struggle took almost four hundred years, and was not completed until 1892, when the last Apache resistance collapsed. Nor was it always an unequal struggle. Before the invention of the revolver the Indian's weapons were not less efficient than the white man's. The average gun took a minute to re-load; in that time the Indian could shoot six arrows, each of them capable of inflicting death.

From 1835 to 1842 the Seminoles of Florida held at bay American armed forces numbering more than three times their whole population and, after a war which cost the United States 1,500 lives and $20 million, they were left to inhabit the Everglades in peace, as they still do.[1] In the 1860s it was estimated that the killing of a single Indian cost the U.S. Army 1 million dollars (of that time).

It is only to be expected that a struggle of this kind affected American national character to a considerable extent—quite apart from the material contributions of the Indian to American culture, beginning with the cultivation of maize which made all the difference between life and death to the Pilgrim Fathers. America's relations with the outside world cannot be understood if the Indian is left out of the account. The generosity of the American foreign aid programme is rooted in an attitude of mind which made Americans who never saw an Indian in their lives send mountains of food and clothes to the Navajo Indians overwhelmed by a starvation winter a few years ago. The other side of the story can best be told in the remark of a French professor to the author: 'Ils nous traitent en Indiens'—they treat us like Indians! When the editorial writer of the *New York Times* wanted to castigate the Formosa Government after the recent riots he called President Chiang Kai-shek 'the Taiwan chief',[2] thus unconsciously lapsing into an idiom which reduced the Generalissimo to the status of Chief Sitting Bull or Flying Cloud.

Whether from a feeling of guilt or from awareness of distance, the Indian occupies a much larger and more prominent place in the American's subconscious than in his conscious life. A young literary critic, Leslie A. Fiedler, recently examined the literary expression of this repression in a thoughtful essay.[3] He found that classical American literature centres on the relations between a white American man and a man of another race, the pattern being set by Cooper's Nathanial Bumppo and Chingashgook and continuing all the way down to Faulkner's *Intruder in the Dust*.

Of all Americans, the Indian is perhaps the least standardized, and it is much easier to identify the typical American than the typical Indian. Of the 600 tribes that existed when the white man came, some 200 have survived in one form or another, many of them with a very definite and intensely felt character. But that is

[1] John Collier, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–11. [2] *New York Times*, 25 May 1957.
[3] Leslie A. Fiedler, *An End to Innocence*, Boston 1955, pp. 142–52.

not all. Thomas Wildcat Alford thus describes his people, the Shawnees: 'Each person was his own judge... We lived according to our own standards and principles, not for what others might think of us.'[1] So much for all the theories of the primitive mind which deny it any kind of individuality, this being sometimes held to be the exclusive preserve of the culture to which the theorizers belong.

The Indian tribes fall nevertheless into a number of main groupings, of which the following may be mentioned:

(i) *The Forest Indians*, inhabiting the East of the United States. These are the classical Indians of the tales of James Fenimore Cooper and of the historical epic of the great Boston historian Francis Parkman whose fame has, unfortunately, not crossed the Atlantic on the same scale as that of his fellow-countryman. In addition to their bravery, these Indians exhibited considerable political talent, if not genius. Tecumsee, who attempted to unite all Indians against the whites around 1800, was a Forest Indian. But the greatest political monument of the Forest Indian is undoubtedly the Iroquois Federation of the 'Six Nations'—Mohawks, Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras. The federation was formed before the white man's arrival and developed remarkably successful institutions assuring internal peace, success in war, democratic control of power, and equality of women. It has survived until our day, and the Six Nations declared war on the Axis in 1942.

(ii) *The Plains Indians*, inhabiting, roughly, the Mississippi-Missouri basin. These are the feather-bonneted Indians of the Western film, who bite the dust in the last reel, but not until they have made themselves a considerable nuisance to their white opponents by their military prowess. What the films invariably ignore are the remarkable religious and moral creeds that the Plains Indians have produced. They aim at achieving a cosmic harmony between man and nature and breathe an ethical spirit as remarkable as that of any of the 'great religions'. Readers of Professor Toynbee's *Study of History* may remember the pages which he devoted to the religious prophets of the Sioux. A fuller account of them is given by Sinclair Lewis in his novel *The God-seeker.*

(iii) *The Pueblo Indians*, of the South-West. They produced the only Indian culture in North America which, though far less

[1] Quoted in John Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

spectacular, can bear comparison with those of Mexico and Peru. Its ruined villages have become tourist showpieces, yet it has had enough vitality to survive centuries of Spanish and American attempts to assimilate it, backed by superior force. It produced men and women of a calibre such as to inspire Theodore Roosevelt, no great friend of the Indian, to call the Hopi Pueblos, whom he had visited, 'as precious as anything existing in the United States'. Of all the American Indians the Pueblos have been the most pacifist, and it was an irony of fate that placed Los Alamos in their territory. This did not stop the Pueblos from sending a delegation to Washington to protest against atomic warfare. Their religious ceremonies attracted D. H. Lawrence to settle among them, and Jacquetta Hawkes has presented fascinating glimpses of Pueblo life in the *Journey to the End of the Rainbow.*

The last thirty years or so have produced, in many ways, changes in the Indian's position that can be described as revolutionary, since they reversed century-old trends. Yet it would not be entirely true to say that history made a 180-degree turn: it was rather a change of emphasis, though a revolutionary one.

The two best-known and most-quoted tags about Indian history in the United States are 'the Pilgrim Fathers fell upon their knees and then fell upon the Indians' and 'the only good Indian is a dead Indian.' These are half-truths or, at best, three-quarter truths; but not the whole truth. At no time in his history did the American Indian lack white American defenders and champions. While Cotton Mather wrote gloatingly of the Pequot massacre: 'It was supposed that no less than six hundred Pequot souls were brought down to hell that day', his contemporary John Eliot was trying to get Indian souls into heaven by translating the Bible into their language. Though Benjamin Franklin proclaimed with a solemnity equalled only by his hypocrisy that 'it is the design of Providence to exterminate these savages to make room for the cultivators of the soil', his Philadelphia contemporaries were justly prouder of the Quaker tradition of fair dealings with the Indians, inaugurated by William Penn and continued in our day by such bodies as the American Friends Service Committee and the Friends' Committee on National Legislation. America's great leaders, from Washington and Jefferson onwards, have approached Indian problems with a good deal of torment of heart and searching of conscience, and Lincoln's greatness acquires a new dimension when it is recalled that he was a Southerner, a frontiersman from Kentucky, whose

father was killed by Indians almost within sight of his family. All this does not make the Indian story any less grim, but it does reduce it to its right proportions.

The first fifty years of the Republic were comparatively easy for the Indian. Official policy was based on the British Act of 1754 which made the tribes independent nations under the protection of the Crown, whose lands could not be alienated except through Crown consent. This Act had been passed partly as a reward for services of the Iroquois Confederation to the British cause in the French Wars; also as a measure to protect the Indians against the ever-increasing pressure of the colonists. Altogether, a situation and a solution not unparalleled today—one need only think of Africa. The United States made the Indians wards of the union, a position which they still retain except for a few tribes, mostly in the states of New York and Maine, who have treaties with state governments. The first Presidents tried to develop the system of reservations so as to give the Indians some stability and a measure of protection.

But pressure from white settlers, especially from the frontiersmen eager to occupy Indian lands, increased continuously as America expanded westwards, and when Andrew Jackson became President in 1829 as a nominee of these interests the federal Government ceased to act as a barrier. The issue was dramatized in 1832 when the Cherokees won a decision of the Supreme Court, led by John Marshall as Chief Justice. Jackson, who had campaigned against the Creek and Seminole Indians, retorted: 'John Marshall has rendered his decision; let him now enforce it.'

Jackson's cynicism opened the way to the thirty or so saddest years of American-Indian history. The line then adopted was officially called the 'policy of removal'. This meant in practice removing the Indians by force from their ancestral lands to a faraway territory centring around the present-day Oklahoma (once called Indian Territory). The two most brutal episodes were the Cherokee March of Tears, in which 4,000 men, women, and children perished out of a total of 14,000, and General Kit Carson's equally revolting treatment of the Navajos—he cut down 3,000 fruit trees to starve the Indians into submission.

The sixty to seventy years between the American Civil War and the coming of the New Deal were not much better for the Indians. These were the years of the closing of the frontier. Armed resistance ceased in the 1890s, and so did the policy of massacring—the

last Indian massacre was at Wounded Knee in 1890, when the followers of the Ghost Dance religion were butchered by the Army. With the extermination of the buffalo, the Plains Indians lost the economic basis of their existence.

The official policy of that time was called 'Indian liquidation'. But this phrase is misleading because Hitler and Stalin have given the word 'liquidation' a meaning and overtones that it did not possess at the time. Not that the policy was particularly gentle towards the Indians. Its two main purposes were to deprive the Indians of their lands by undermining the legal basis of their tribal tenure so as to throw the land open to white settlers, and to effect cultural assimilation of the Indian by eliminating, by force if necessary, all manifestations of his separate culture and by putting his children into boarding schools to educate them away from ancestral traditions. Care of the Indians was transferred from the War Department to the Department of the Interior, under a Commissioner for Indian Affairs; but that did not improve matters—at first. It was Commissioner Francis C. Walker who made the classic statement in 1871: 'When dealing with savage men, as with savage beasts, no question of national honour can arise. Whether to fight, to run away, or to employ a ruse, is solely a question of expediency.'

The Indians resisted in the only way they could: passively, though not entirely unsuccessfully. They lost a good deal, especially by way of land and other worldly goods; but they kept their self-respect and their will to survive as Indians. Nor were their white friends silent for long. The Indian Rights Association was formed as early as 1882. The Indian service began to attract a better type of civil servant, who purged its corruptions and abuses and made the Department of the Interior a protector rather than a despoiler of the Indian. The nadir had been reached in the 1890s; after that things were definitely on the mend.

By the 1920s it became obvious that a new spirit was on the way. There were many straws in the wind. The Pueblos resumed their representative institutions after a lapse of over two centuries and, aided by such white friends as the American Indian Defense Association and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, defeated an attempt by Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall, later jailed for corruption, to deprive them of oil-bearing lands. Other Indians, notably in California and Montana, also put up successful fights for their lands. All Indians were granted American citizenship. The stage was set for the New Deal.

The Indian New Deal is associated with two names. Felix S Cohen reduced the maze of legislation relating to the Indian to th manageable proportions of his *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (Since the federal Government has to deal individually with eac of the hundreds of tribes with which it has treaties, its legislativ channels are clogged up to an extent unrealized in Europe and— because of the silence of the press—in America itself. It has bee said, for example, that two-thirds of the bills presented to the 84t Congress dealt with Indian business, which must surely hav slowed up all other business.) The other name is that of Joh Collier, professor of anthropology at New York University, whor President Roosevelt appointed Indian Commissioner unde Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, a post which he occu pied until 1945.

These two men and Ickes produced the Indian Reorganizatio Act of 1934, the Magna Carta of the American Indian. Its tw main achievements were the recognition of tribal self-governmen and of tribal land tenure. The Indian could now develop in peace In practice, this meant that the Indian, helped by Governmen agents, began to restore laboriously his institutions of self government. New techniques of government were evolved to mee the changed relationship between Indian and White.[1]

Indian economics were fundamentally changed by a system o agricultural and industrial credit, the cessation of land allotments t individuals, restoration of some lost lands, and the application o modern agricultural techniques. Reservations gradually ceased t be islands of economic backwardness, though a good deal of worl still remains to be done.

Also the Indians began to set up their own organizations, o which the two most important are the National Congress of th American Indian and the Native American Church. The forme groups some fifty tribes and is the foremost active political forc of the Indian. The Native American Church is a considerabl more controversial matter. It has become by far the largest India religious denomination, with some 25,000 communicants. It creed combines the tenets of Christianity with ritual consumptio of the peyote cactus, which contains a drug that produces ex hilarating visions. Havelock Ellis, who discovered the peyot

[1] A personal account of the changeover is given by Robert Bunker, one o Collier's 'young men', in his book *Other Men's Skies*, Indiana University Press 1956.

many years before its more spectacular re-discovery by Aldous Huxley, called it 'the most intellectual of drugs'. Alfred Wilson, the Cheyenne Indian who headed the Native American Church until his death in 1945, repeatedly challenged scientists to make a full scientific investigation of his creed, to clear it from the accusations made by white political and religious leaders. His challenge was not answered, and the subject remains under a cloud.

At the same time Indian cultural values began to be recognized as part of the American cultural heritage. American painters flocked to Taos, everybody started wearing Pueblo jewelry, and Navajo rugs decorated American homes thousands of miles away. As was only to be expected, there was a good deal of naiveté in that admiration. While the Indians' virtues and qualities were enthusiastically re-discovered, their undoubted faults and shortcomings were equally enthusiastically glossed over. Also, a good many officials tended, and still tend, to work *for* the Indian rather than *with* him. But in spite of all this it was felt, and rightly so, that a new day had dawned for the American Indian. World War II, in which 25,000 Indians fought in the U.S. armed forces and many more worked in war industries, seemed to afford justification to those who believed that the Indian had at last found his place in American society and that his troubles were over.

Post-war developments put question marks behind a number of confident assertions. They are still controversial; but most of the American friends of the Indian feel that there has been a change for the worse. This change is associated with the replacement of John Collier by Dillon S. Myer as Indian Commissioner and with the adoption of what is called 'termination' as the basis of Indian policy by both Democratic and Republican administrations.

'Termination' means primarily putting an end to the position of the Indian as federal ward. He is to move from the reservation to live as a citizen with other citizens. His peculiar system of collective land tenure is to disappear. He is to become an American among other Americans. Opinions on 'termination' are sharply divided. Its friends, who include some Indians, say that it is a liberation of the Indian from political and economic tutelage. Its enemies call it a return to the policy of assimilation and 'liquidation' as described above. The Indian is to be finished as an Indian.

The chief practical results of the new policy are threefold. A

system of 're-location' is intended to draw the Indian from over-crowded reservations to industrial work in the big cities. Posters offer him 'a safe job for *you*' in towns like Chicago and Los Angeles, and he is given a chance to adapt himself to new conditions and train himself for new employment. Next is Public Law 280, which undercuts the whole structure of tribal self-government by making the states responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the reservations, against the wishes of the population if necessary. President Eisenhower called this the most un-Christian piece of legislation placed for his signature; but he signed it. Finally, and most controversially, are the 'termination' bills for individual tribes, especially for the Mennominees of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon. Great resources of timber are involved, and opponents of the bills accuse the Republicans of yet another 'give-away' to big business. The Klamath case, which has dragged on for years, has certainly influenced the results of Congressional elections in Oregon.[1]

The last few years have been marked by yet another change which may seem trivial on the surface, and yet may be anything but that. The films and television have discovered the 'good' Indian, and their influence on the mind of the growing generation of Americans cannot be gainsaid. The break came with *Broken Arrow*, starring James Stewart, and made entirely on an Apache reservation. It had its world première in a reservation hall, and it was discovered when the film was due to start that the white reservation officials, film makers, critics, etc. had so filled the hall that there was no room left for the Indians! This was soon remedied, and a 100 per cent Apache audience was so enthralled with the film that it had to be shown over and over again until dawn put an end to Indian powers of endurance. Another significant and more recent film is *Walk the Proud Land*, in which Audie Murphy plays the part of John Clum, an Indian Agent of the last century who tried to obtain justice for the Apaches. The film ends with a note that justice has been done at last and that the San Cristobal Apaches, for whom Clum had fought, were granted self-government in November 1955.

The fate of the Indian is changing again, and once more hope is mingled with despair.

I. A. L.

[1] For an account of this, see article on 'The Unfinished Indian War', in *The Nation*, 25 May 1957.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 No. 9 September 1957

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Notes of the Month

The French Currency Devaluation

THE French Government's announcement, on 10 August, of a partial, or selective, devaluation of the franc and, two days later, the raising of the discount rate from 4 to 5 per cent—the highest rate since 1937—brought to an end the long struggle of French Governments to peg the official cost-of-living index just below the level at which the provisions of the 1952 sliding-wage scale would automatically be brought into operation. On 2 August it was announced that the national minimum wage would be increased by about 5 per cent, and there are already ominous signs that the rise cannot for long be restricted to the million or million and a half less-well-paid workers to whom the law applies. The expensive devices employed over the past eighteen months have been costing £100m. a year, without really deceiving anyone. For the index itself was a highly artificial creation, and prices of some articles not included among the 213 items which went to make it up have increased considerably. With the announcement by the Finance Minister of the removal of some subsidies or controls, a number of prices have gone up, or are shortly to go up—in particular those of wine, gas, and milk. The immediate result was a threat by the railway unions to put in a claim for increased wages before the end of August.

If this happens, and if other wage demands follow, as many people fear they will, then the experiment of devaluation will fail and France may be faced with a return to the inflationary spiral from which she has managed to escape since 1952. What M. Gaillard is trying to do is precisely to avoid this. He hopes to obtain the advantages of devaluation without having to award compensatory wage increases, which would cancel them out, and also without slowing down French industrial production. Hence his 20 per cent export subsidy, his discouragement of speculative accumulations of stocks by increased interest rates, his limitation to foreign tourists and certain other categories of the special

concessionary exchange rate, and his exoneration of essential raw materials from the 20 per cent import tax. A wage level which has at least kept pace with increasing prices has stimulated internal demand and the demand for imports to a point at which France's reserves of foreign exchange are almost exhausted, while high prices have discouraged would-be foreign buyers of French goods.

Whether this partial devaluation is sufficient to reverse the trend, and whether the feared wage demands can be avoided, are questions that will probably be answered in the autumn. At present M. Gaillard is endeavouring to compensate for some inevitable price increases by keeping other prices down, and so to lessen the impact of the new 'austerity'. He hopes to enforce the new measures by tightening up controls. Encouraging factors are this year's good harvest, which may enable him to keep the price of bread down, and the existence of considerable stocks of imported goods. Discouraging factors are France's long memories of inflation, which are likely to create an unhelpful psychological atmosphere (some shopkeepers are already reported to be raising prices and blaming the Government), the obvious short-run interests of the Communist Party in stimulating social unrest and discontent, and the Socialist Party's apparently adamant decision not to give up an iota of M. Gazier's expensive health service reforms.

There are also external difficulties. France's co-signatories of the newly voted Common Market Treaty are unlikely to welcome discrimination against their imports, even if France can convince them that the measures are intended to be temporary (and so far M. Gaillard has been careful not to commit himself clearly on this point), and unless the franc recovers quickly it is not likely to be easy to persuade Germany to agree to currency adjustments in the interests of a weaker partner.

Whether or not the Government succeeds must depend on political factors as much as, or perhaps more than, on economic conditions. And it is the French political machine which is weak. The great danger is that, in the autumn, M. Bourgès-Maunoury's Government will find itself in the familiar sandwich—between a right wing which objects to increased taxes and a left wing which objects to decreased expenditure, particularly on social services. To go back to the alternation between deadlock and Governmental instability which has characterized so much of French post-war political life would be the quickest way to ruin France as well as to destroy European co-operation.

The British Guiana Elections

Dr Jagan's clear victory has come as no surprise. He won 9 seats out of 14, three of the remainder going to the Burnhamite faction of the People's Progressive Party and one each to the United Democratic Party and the National Labour Front. In the April 1953 Election, held under the liberal Constitution introduced as a result of the Waddington Commission's recommendations, the still unified P.P.P. won 18 seats out of 24 and thus gained effective control of a Legislative Council which contained only three officials and no nominated members. At present the Renison Constitution is in force, and in addition to the fourteen elected members and three officials, up to eleven nominees may be introduced by the Governor. It will be interesting to see how Sir Patrick Renison exercises this discretion; if Dr Jagan is denied a working majority in the Council he may reject the offer made to him to join the Government. In no case of course will he have the status of a Prime Minister; the Governor still sits on the Executive Council with a casting vote, and five of its other ten members will be nominees or officials.

That Dr Jagan should consider co-operating in these circumstances indicates the considerable chastening which he has undergone. He may have realized that the country would not be behind him in taking an extıeme line. There was greater apathy at this Election than four years ago; only 55 per cent of those eligible voted, compared with 75 per cent in 1953. There has also been the split in his party. When this split occurred it was overrated by some sections of the British press; the February 1955 party meeting which turned Dr Jagan out and elected Mr Forbes Burnham as leader in his place was a relatively small gathering in Georgetown, where the Jaganite forces are weakest. An unhappy racial division underlies these facts. Mr Burnham is an African, and predominantly negro Georgetown supplies his main support and his three current victories. Dr Jagan, an Indian dentist, and his American-born wife (who has also won her seat) are supported by the Indian plantation labourers. During this century Indians have overtaken Africans in numbers in British Guiana and now represent practically half the population of 500,000. The explosive population increase there, which at 3 per cent per annum is one of the highest rates of growth in the world, is accounted for chiefly by the Indians; due to the post-war conquest of malaria, it is probably the main social factor underlying the present political instability.

Before the war British Guiana had a partly elected legislature but a very narrow franchise. The combination of adult franchise with the relatively advanced Waddington Constitution of 1953 gave Dr Jagan's Marxist propensities so much tether that by October of that year troops had to be sent out, Governor's rule was introduced, and Mr Lyttelton declared that the organization of a Communist State within the British Commonwealth could not be allowed. No doubt this declaration still stands. In 1954, when the Robertson Commission of Inquiry was sent out, P.P.P. boycotted it and organized the civil disobedience campaign which landed the Jagans in prison. The Robertson Commission recommended a period of political 'marking time'; but economic reform was pressed on, the World Bank's development plan being broadly endorsed and diversification accepted as an aim for an economy heavily dependent on sugar and bauxite. Local government was overhauled, and trade union resistance to the Jaganite steam-roller received encouragement. By the end of 1955 emergency regulations could be relaxed, and in December 1956 the Order in Council was introduced on which the present Constitution rests. This was at first rejected by both branches of the P.P.P., but both have now agreed to give it a trial.

It remains to be seen whether the winning faction will prove able to put nationalist interests before Marxism and to transcend racial divisions. British rule will face (as it does in several parts of Africa) a genuine need to go slow in order to hold the balance between Africans and an ebullient intermediate race; it will also be tempted to use this situation as an excuse for shelving other challenges. The economic problem is similar to that of the other over-populated, under-productive West Indian territories, federation with which is still open to Guiana although she has for the time being rejected it. Extreme left-wing economic doctrines seem to have little to offer by way of solution, and are unpopular both with the Caribbean leaders and on the Latin-American continent. Perhaps the force of these practical considerations will gradually alter the cast of Dr Jagan's mind.

Elections in the German Federal Republic

THE third Federal Election to be held in the German Federal Republic since its foundation in 1949 will take place on 15 September. Since 1949 Dr Adenauer has been Chancellor, at the head of a Coalition Government, and his party—the C.D.U./C.S.U.[1]—has been the largest in the Bundestag. In the second Federal Election in 1953 this party obtained an absolute majority of one seat over all other parties in the Bundestag and won 45·2 per cent of the votes cast, as against 31 per cent in 1949.

Dr Adenauer and his Government have been the architects of West Germany's economic recovery. For example, while as recently as the winter of 1953–4, six months after the second Federal Election, unemployment still reached the 2 million mark, on 31 July 1957 it was down to 390,250, the lowest level since the end of the war. Exports in 1957 are expected to reach a record value of DM.36,000 million (1954, DM.22,000 million). Gold and foreign exchange reserves now amount to DM.21,000 million, and it is, indeed, the very strength of the Deutsche Mark which is a source of concern. As the *Manchester Guardian* recently wrote,[2] 'It may sound strange to English ears that the principal economic problem of the Federal Republic is not creeping or galloping inflation, the falling purchasing power of the currency, or even the narrow and insufficient scope of the capital market. It is the oppressively and embarrassingly successful position which the Federal Republic now holds in the European Payments Union, caused by the persistent success of a vigorous export drive.' The Government has indeed been successful in keeping prices remarkably stable, though there has recently been a certain upward trend, keenly watched by a public which remembers two great inflations, in the early 'twenties and immediately after the second World War between 1945 and 1948. But the Federal Republic's economic position is today fundamentally sound and the majority of her citizens can certainly say that they have 'never had it so good'.

Between 1953 and 1957, during Dr Adenauer's Chancellorship,

[1] Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the latter being the name given to the Christian Democrat party in South Germany.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 August 1957.

the Federal Republic attained independence and became a member of N.A.T.O. and W.E.U. If the Chancellor's 'policy of strength' has not yet achieved reunification, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have, yet once again, shown that they stand firmly behind him in his efforts. In the Berlin Declaration signed on 29 July 1957—the outcome of a working party on reunification, composed of representatives of the three Western Powers and of the Federal Republic—they reiterated their recognition of the right of the German people to re-establish their national unity, and emphasized that any measures for disarmament applicable to Europe must take into account the link between European security and reunification.

At eighty-one, the Federal Chancellor is not only the architect of success but also the dominating political figure in the Federal Republic. No matter how theoretically desirable a change of government might be in the interests of future parliamentary democracy in Western Germany, there seems no overwhelming reason why the 'floating' voter (who tends in the last analysis to determine the result of general elections) should feel it in his own interest to vote against Dr Adenauer.

If during the past two years pressure from the workers for a more rapid increase in the standard of living has begun to make itself felt, the Government has in the last six months passed legislation designed to improve working conditions and retirement prospects. From 1 April 1957 wages were increased by from 7 to 10 per cent in certain of the public services; the hourly rate of pay for builders went up 10 per cent, as did that of employees in the shoe trade and the chemical and paper industries. By the end of May, when the first steps towards a forty-five-hour week were introduced, these increases—taken in conjunction with improvements in old-age pensions and social insurance payments—gave a purchasing power 15 per cent greater than in the second quarter of 1956. A far-reaching pensions scheme, introduced in June, linked old-age and invalid pensions to the current level of wages and salaries and was said to be likely to cost the Government £315 million in the first year of operation. Another scheme recently announced, presumably with the intention of 'stealing the thunder' of the Social Democrats, is the so-called People's Capitalism Bill, which was intended to be passed through Parliament by September, denationalizing the Volkswagen works (of which the present ownership remains doubtful) by turning it from a limited

liability into a joint stock company and offering the shares for sale in small amounts. All this pre-election social welfare legislation was perhaps not uninfluenced by last winter's strike in Schleswig-Holstein (which continued, despite mediation attempts, from November to March, affecting thirty-eight firms and involving approximately 42,000 workers). In that strike it was better conditions—full pay on sick-leave up to six weeks, a shorter working period before sickness benefit payments begin, and longer holidays—that the strikers were demanding, rather than higher wages, despite the fact that average wages in Germany are still not so high as in other European countries.

The average voter in most countries is primarily concerned with prosperity—with the size of the national 'cake' and the size of his own slice—and this is, of course, true in the Federal Republic. By and large, only a relatively small section of the electorate is, normally, interested in problems of foreign relations. But there are still memories of war and occupation and the fear that a divided Germany might become a pawn between East and West or, worse still, a cockpit in a European nuclear war. These fears and memories have made Germans particularly sensitive to questions of defence and disarmament. The fear that the United States and the Soviet Union might come to terms at the expense of a divided Germany has probably not been totally exorcized even by the Four-Power Declaration of 29 July. Point xii of the Declaration stated that any measures of disarmament applicable to Europe must have the consent of the European nations concerned and must take account of the link between European security and German reunification; some German commentators have argued that insistence on a link between disarmament and reunification will make achievement of the former more difficult.

There has also been considerable anxiety and discussion during the last few months about the effect on Germany of the storing of nuclear weapons on Federal territory by her allies, and the necessity for their manufacture in the Federal Republic for the use of the *Bundeswehr*. This was touched off in April by the British White Paper on Defence and by the Göttingen manifesto of nineteen German atomic scientists[1] against the equipment of the Federal forces with tactical atomic weapons and the stockpiling of atomic weapons on German soil. In May the Bundestag voted in favour of a temporary ban on atomic tests and passed a resolution

[1] Issued on 10 April 1957.

stating that any decision on the arming of German forces with atomic weapons should be regarded as closely bound up with the current London disarmament talks and that lasting peace was insecure without reunification. The Federal Government rejected the part of the resolution concerned with atomic weapons and disarmament but promised to set up a committee of scientists, politicians, and soldiers to discuss the problems raised by the possession by the Federal Republic of atomic weapons. No action has so far been taken towards implementing this promise.

Differences between Government and Parliament on atomic problems were once again emphasized when, on 2 July, a resolution to make an amendment to the Constitution, required to enable legislation to be enacted for the production of atomic energy for peaceful industrial uses, failed by only two votes to get the necessary two-thirds majority,[1] because a number of Government supporters voted against it. This unexpected action apparently resulted from belated realization on the part of these members that defence measures, and in particular co-operation with N.A.T.O. and W.E.U. on atomic armaments, might be adversely affected. Since no further legislation on the subject is likely to be passed till the autumn, there have been complaints that the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Federal Republic has received an unnecessary set-back: German atomic scientists were reported to be uncertain, in consequence, whether they would be eligible to receive a quantity of fissile material which the United States Government had offered to make available to those of its allies not already engaged in the production of atomic energy.[2]

In all these discussions the argument is occasionally heard that so long as nuclear weapons are regarded as the 'great deterrent' they are not likely to be used by the Great Powers, and therefore the possession of conventional armies and weapons may yet prove decisive in the event of a small local war in Europe. Federal Germany, according to this argument, must be able, because of her geographical position, to defend herself in such conditions, and should quietly and steadily build up at a pace dictated by her own interests a small, well-trained force armed with conventional weapons, without paying too much regard to existing commitments. This argument is used not only in certain military circles but also by some politicians who believe that the possession of

[1] Necessary for any alteration in the Constitution.
[2] *Die Gegenwart*, 13 July 1957.

atomic weapons would both prejudice reunification and also make less likely the achievement of a measure of disarmament, or, at least, of control of armaments.

The disaster at Iller, in Bavaria, on 3 June, when fifteen young soldiers were drowned while fording a river in spate as part of a military training exercise, strengthened the convictions of those who believe that military training of recruits has been pushed on too fast without an adequate cadre of experienced officers, as well as of those who dislike the Conscription Law.

It is not intended to suggest that the average citizen is primarily preoccupied with problems of defence, nuclear weapons, and reunification. But such problems are discussed in the press; they are, as well, to be seen directly or indirectly reflected in party programmes and in the conduct of the electoral campaign. German journalists, foreign journalists, and public opinion experts, within and without Germany, have in addition closely followed and variously assessed the effects on the electorate of the London disarmament talks, with their 'open skies' and inspection zones proposals and their seemingly bewildering changes of alignment and jockeying for position. From America there now come confident predictions that the promised return by the United States Government of German assets, confiscated during the war, will greatly increase support for Dr Adenauer among industrialists and the business community. An American skilled in the assessment of public opinion, who spent some weeks in Germany in the late autumn of 1956 and the early summer of 1957, came to the conclusion that the majority of West Germans do not believe that reunification can come in the near future, have no desire to sacrifice prosperity or security to bring it about, but are anxious to obtain assurances that no international action will be taken by the Great Powers which might make the division of Germany irrevocable.[1]

At the time of the 1953 Federal Election it was generally agreed by those in contact with them that a high proportion of the younger generation were concerned first and foremost with material prosperity and disliked the idea of military service, primarily as an unnecessary interference with their careers. In 1957, however, there may well be an increasing reaction among young people against the older generation—not merely, perhaps not even chiefly, in Ger-

[1] The Berlin Declaration of 29 July 1957 has been criticized on the ground that its publication date and terms suggest that it was intended to influence the West German elector; see, for example, *Die Gegenwart*, 10 August 1957.

many—which preaches disarmament and security but seems to be in danger of achieving 'nuclear anarchy'. But neither this attitude, nor a certain restiveness on some aspects of home policy, will necessarily mean a vote against Dr Adenauer.

THE PARTIES AND THEIR PROGRAMMES

There have been some comments in the German press to the effect that party programmes are lacking in clarity and forcefulness. The Chancellor's party, the C.D.U./C.S.U., has taken 'welfare for all' as a slogan both of past achievement and of future policy. The aims set out in its manifesto include reunification, the release of German prisoners in Communist countries, and the achievement of general disarmament, including nuclear weapons. In foreign policy the party stands for the N.A.T.O. alliance, European unity, and the Common Market; and at home for individual freedom, enlightened private enterprise, and general social welfare, promising to have special regard for the interests of the farmers and of the middle classes.

The Social Democrat party (S.P.D.) campaigns under the slogan 'security for all, and an end to the one-party rule of the C.D.U.'. Its programme includes by implication support for the free market economy, since it makes no mention of nationalization It demands a more vigorous programme of atomic energy for peaceful uses, an anti-cyclic Budget, and the reorganization of social insurance. It also promises anti-cartel legislation and, like all other parties, stands for stabilization of prices. In foreign policy it seeks the end of test explosions and the nuclear arms race, and is against the possession of atomic weapons by the Federal Republic. It will work for disarmament, the relaxation of tension, and German reunification through the creation of a European security system which would replace the military pacts of East and West. Challenged on Point x of the Berlin Declaration which described the existence of N.A.T.O. as not constituting 'a subject for negotiation', the party declared that it had never demanded that the continuance of N.A.T.O. should be 'negotiated': N.A.T.O. had existed before the Federal Republic had joined it and could continue to exist after a German withdrawal from it. As an interim arrangement there might, in the S.P.D.'s view, be a similar security system guaranteed by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the members of which (a reunited Germany and its neighbours, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) might withdraw from N.A.T.O.

and the Warsaw Pact, while these two organizations would continue until such time as it might be possible or convenient for them to merge with the European security system.[1] The Social Democrat leader, Herr Ollenhauer, has summed up his party's foreign policy as the substitution of a policy of understanding for a policy of strength.[2]

The programme of the Free Democrat Party (F.D.P.) has a special interest in the 1957 Elections. In April 1956 the party, which had till then formed part of Dr Adenauer's coalition Government, split following the formation of a new *Land* Government in North Rhine-Westphalia which did not conform to the pattern of the Federal Coalition but was composed of Free Democrats and Social Democrats. Seventeen of its members formed themselves into the Free People's Party (F.V.P.) and remained in the Federal coalition Government. The Free Democrats are believed to have been slowly gaining in strength during the past five or six years and, if no party were to gain an overall majority in the coming Election, might well find themselves as the third strongest party, the '*Zünglein an der Waage*',[3] or decisive element, and thus a necessary factor in coalition-building. In its election manifesto the party declares itself to be liberal and non-Marxist, in favour of a free economy and private enterprise. But its liberalism is a positive creed and not merely a middle way between right and left. Its leaders assert that they will seek no electoral alliances and will take no part in any coalitions. Their aim is to free the Federal Republic from one-party domination, whether by the C.D.U. or the S.P.D. They are against 'confessionalism' in politics and regard it as an acute danger for the Federal Republic. More positively, they aim at creating German unity 'at long last' and declare that reunification must be achieved by Germans themselves and is not a matter for the former Allies. They hold that atomic weapons should not be manufactured in the Federal Republic (though they are prepared to approve of the possession of atomic weapons by the forces of other N.A.T.O. Powers on German soil) because to do so would make the achievement of reunification more difficult. The Free Democrats also proclaim the need for a bi-partisan foreign policy in the Federal Republic.

The following table shows the present party positions.

[1] *The Times*, 31 July 1957.
[2] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1 July 1957.
[3] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 July 1957.

FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1953

Party	Constituency Votes	Per cent	List Votes	Per cent	Seats in Bundestag 1953	Seats in Bundestag April 1957[8]
C.D.U./C.S.U.	12,027,945	43·7	12,443,981	45·2	244	253
S.P.D.	8,131,257	29·5	7,944,943	28·8	151	153
F.D P.	2,967,566	10·8	2,629,163	9·5	47	37
G.B /B.H.E.	1,613,215	5 9	1,616,953	5·9	28	19
D.P.	1,073,031	3·9	896,228	3·2	15	—[9]
K.P D[1]	611,317	2 2	607,760	2·2	—	—
B.P.[2]	399,070	1·5	465,641	1·7	—	—
G.V.P.[3]	286,465	1·0	318,475	1·1	—	—
D.R P.[4]	204,725	0·7	295,739	1·1	—	—
D.Z.P[5]	55,835	0·2	217,078	0·8	—	—
D.N.S.[6]	78,356	0·3	70,726	0·3	—	—
S.S.W.[7]	44,339	0 2	44,585	0·2	—	—
Others		0·1				
F V.P /D P.[9]					—	32
Independents					2	3
					487	497[8]

[1] Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—banned in 1956.
[2] Bayernpartei [3] Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei
[4] Deutsche Reichspartei [5] Deutsche Zentrumspartei.
[6] Deutsche Nationale Sammlung. [7] Südschleswigscher Wählerverband.
[8] After the return of the Saarland to Germany in 1956, the number of members in the Bundestag increased by ten The total figure given excludes non-voting representatives of Berlin
[9] Freie Volkspartei/Deutsche Partei, e g. fusion of D.P with a new party formed in April 1956 after a split in the F.D.P.

It will be recalled that before the last Federal Election in September 1953, a new electoral law had been passed[1] under which every elector has two votes, a direct constituency vote for a candidate and a second, or list, vote for a party. No party can obtain seats from the list unless it both gets a candidate directly elected in a constituency and also obtains at least 5 per cent of the valid votes cast in the whole of the Federal Republic. This 5 per cent clause had the effect in 1953 of eliminating splinter parties;[2] in 1957 its shadow is causing party fusions and electoral alliances. Thus among parties which support Dr Adenauer and form part of his coalition, the Free People's Party (F.V.P.) in April fused with the German Party (D.P.): these two parties—the former 'liberal', the latter 'conservative' and standing furthest to the right of the parties in the coalition—are united perhaps only by their belief in the necessity for a continuance of the Chancellor's foreign policy In the parts of the Federal Republic in which the German Party

[1] See *The World Today*, September 1953, pp. 369–71.
[2] See table.

has most support (its stronghold of Lower Saxony, and Hamburg, Bremen, and Schleswig-Holstein) the party will campaign as the *Land* Association of the German Party. In North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saar, Baden-Wurttemburg, and Bavaria, it will be called the *Land* Association of the Free People's Party.

A very small party which failed to obtain the necessary 5 per cent of votes in 1953, the All-German People's Party (G.V.P.), has recently fused with, or been absorbed by, the Social Democrats. The party is Christian and Evangelical; its leader, Dr Heinemann, differs from the S.P.D. on reunification policy in that he advocates direct contact between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic as the best hope of achieving a united Germany. The S.P.D. are also reported as hoping to negotiate an electoral alliance with the Federalist Union (composed of the Zentrum Party, the Bavarian Party, the German Hanoverian Party, and the Schleswig-Holstein Provincial Party) and arranging to give support, for example, to the Bavarian Party by agreeing not to stand against it in three constituencies.[1]

The All-German Bloc/B.H.E. (*Gesamtdeutsche Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*) appears not to have sought to make an electoral alliance. In 1953 the party, which gained 27 seats in the Federal Election, formed part of the Chancellor's coalition Government. It later suffered a split, when a group of seven of its members under the leadership of Herr Kraft and Herr Oberländer (both Ministers) joined the Christian Democrat Party.[2] In the last Federal Election the B.H.E. only just achieved the required 5 per cent of the total vote, its actual percentage being 5·9; and it may not reach that figure in 1957, since the successful absorption of expellees from the Eastern Territories may have reduced the number of its active supporters.[3] The party has promised support to candidates of other parties which will pledge themselves to demand the recognition of Germany's 1937 frontiers.

Whether or no party programmes may properly be described as lacking in clarity and forcefulness, the electoral campaign itself has been marked by unusual, and even unparliamentary, virulence.

[1] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20–1 July 1957.
[2] Two other members joined the F.D.P.
[3] The party, largely composed of expellees from the former Eastern Territories, in 1953 formed 17·1 per cent of the population of the Federal Republic, according to the *Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages, 2 Wahlperiode, 1957*.

In speeches at Bamberg (to 30,000 Catholics), Nuremberg, Kiel, Bonn, and elsewhere, Dr Adenauer has made a number of attacks on his chief political opponents which are likely to have electoral reverberations till 15 September. He declared that the forthcoming Election would decide whether Germany and Europe remained Christian or became Communist, that a Social Democrat victory would result in the ruin (*Untergang*) of Germany, and that his party would do its best to see that the S.P.D. never came to power ('*Wir sorgen dafür dass die S.P.D. niemals an die Macht kommt*'). Another of Dr Adenauer's assertions was that if Germany were to choose a Socialist Government she would become a Soviet satellite instead of staying in the Atlantic Community under the leadership of the United States, and N.A.T.O. would be destroyed. These speeches unfortunately stung the Social Democrats into making invidious comparisons between the Chancellor and Hitler —which did nothing to raise these pre-electoral exchanges to the level proper to a country with a parliamentary regime.[1]

The Chancellor's Bamberg speech, in particular, not unnaturally provoked controversy. Various organizations within the Evangelical Church[2] reacted by declaring that this Church did not ask from any individual on grounds of conscience that he or she should vote for a given party; they demanded a party political neutrality from their members, and urged all political parties to refrain from using terms such as 'Christian', 'Evangelical', or 'Catholic' for purposes of a 'false election propaganda'. A paper with left-wing sympathies accused German Catholics of putting the seal of ultramontanism on the C.D.U. and making of it a party which will represent the interests of the Church instead of those of the German people.[3] In fact, the Chancellor has been careful always to speak of Christianity rather than of Catholicism. The C.D.U. draws much of its support from the Evangelical Church. Christian Democrat leaders have, for example, underlined the fact that in North Germany Evangelical votes can to a large extent determine the Election result; the C.D.U. campaign in Niedersachsen shows recognition of this fact; the Chancellor himself planned to make a number of speeches in this *Land*.[4] In support of their campaign against con-

[1] It has been suggested that the Chancellor's speeches may have done something to heal differences among S.P.D. leaders on economic policy.

[2] e.g. a committee of the Evangelical Church in the Rhineland and the Evangelical Action Association, cited in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 July 1957.

[3] *Der Spiegel*, No. 29, 17 July 1957.

[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 July 1957.

fessionalism, Rheinhold Maier, the leader of the Free Democrats, has written to twenty-two Catholic Archbishops and Bishops and to twenty-two Evangelical Bishops and Church Presidents urging them to disown any political propaganda which sought to draw Christianity into the Election campaign or to identify it with any one party.[1]

Public opinion polls, on the one hand, and the daily and periodical press, on the other, have been recording during the past few months a number of estimates as to how the voting may go. The Allenbach Institute of Demoskopie believes that each party has a hard core, perhaps 70–75 per cent of the total vote it receives, of supporters who have 'always' voted for it.[2]

But it seems reasonably clear that, even if the majority of West German voters remain constant to their chosen party or have already decided for which party they will vote, the Election will be decided by the 'floating' vote, variously estimated at between one-eighth and one-tenth of the electors going to the poll. In *Länder* elections between 1953 and 1957, it has been pointed out, the C.D.U. vote was reduced by a percentage which varied from 20 to 33, while the S.P.D. vote did indeed increase, but only by between 10 and 25 per cent.[3] In other words, when a smaller number of electors went to the polls the S.P.D. did not 'gain' all the votes lost by the C.D.U. There is a conviction, on which C.D.U. hopes are being built, that a high proportion of these 'floating' voters who do not bother to vote in *Land* elections are women; in the 1953 Federal Election it was calculated that approximately half the women who voted did so for the C.D.U./C.S.U.[4] A further deduction is also made, which may or may not be valid, that German women voters like to see a strong man at the head of the State and that, for this reason among others, Dr Adenauer is likely to secure at least a sizeable percentage of the 'floating' vote. Nevertheless, few prophets in the Federal Republic have so far expressed the conviction that the C.D.U./C.S.U. will win a sufficient majority over all other parties to enable them to form a Government alone.

On the other hand, it is suggested that there is a middle-class element in the population which feels that the time has come for a

[1] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 July 1957.
[2] See articles in *Die Gegenwart*, 13 July and 10 August 1957.
[3] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 July 1957.
[4] For a statistical analysis of women's votes in the 1953 Election, which confirms the fact that the C.D.U. had women to thank for their parliamentary majority, see Dr G. Bremme, *Die Politische Rolle der Frau in Deutschland* (Göttingen, 1957), pp. 111–13.

change, that since, despite all the sound and fury, foreign policy is unlikely to be very different in the goals pursued or in the methods of obtaining them, and since the economic policies of the various parties are admittedly much the same, no great risk to prosperity and stability or to national prestige and alliances would result from such a change. Indeed, some individuals in this section of the electorate hold that the new parliamentary democracy in the Federal Republic might be weakened were the same party to remain in power and the same party in Opposition for twelve consecutive years. There are, however, few grounds for believing that a decisive number of voters are reasoning on these lines. An English commentator has put on record the view that what he calls the 'nuclear controversy' could become important in the Government's need to win over the 'floating' voter, which he estimates at approximately one-tenth of the 30 million whom he expects to vote, in view of the Social Democrats' reiterated accusations that the Federal Government has adopted a passive attitude towards problems of nuclear warfare and disarmament.[1]

If, as seems possible, no party wins a clear majority on 15 September, the process of constructing a workable coalition Government may be longer and even more complicated than in 1953.[2] For example, if the C.D.U./C.S.U. were considerably to increase their number of seats without gaining a clear majority over all other parties, and the D.P./F.V.P. maintained or increased their present strength, it would be possible to re-create Dr Adenauer's coalition with the effective majority it possessed until 1956. But if such a coalition is not possible and, alternatively, if the S.P.D. and its allies do not gain enough seats to form a Government, then the Free Democrats, with even a comparatively small increase in the seats they possessed in the Bundestag at the end of the present electoral period, will have the whip hand and would be in a position to bargain with the C.D.U./C.S.U. over their terms for joining the Government. Were both the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats greatly to increase their seats in the Bundestag, they might be able to negotiate with each other and with any smaller party willing to join them for the formation of a Government on the same lines as those at present in existence in certain of the *Länder*. It would undoubtedly, of course, be theoretically possible, on the basis of the number of seats likely to be held by the

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 1 August 1957.
[2] See *The World Today*, November 1953, pp. 463–5.

two parties, for the so-called *Grosse Koalition* to be formed between the C.D.U./C.S.U. and the S.P.D. But it was recognized, even before the opening of the present election campaign, that such a coalition was unlikely to come into being so long as Dr Adenauer remains leader of the C.D.U. The Chancellor in his Election speeches, moreover, seems intentionally to have ruled out such a solution of what, after all, remains until 15 September a hypothetical situation.

H. G. L.

Khrushchev and the 'Anti-Party' Group

THE JUNE CRISIS

IT was announced in *Pravda* of 4 July 1957 that the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., in plenary session together with the Central Revision Commission from 22 to 29 June, had discussed the 'anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov', and had deprived them, together with Shepilov, of their positions in the highest Party organs. All four were expelled from the Central Committee, but apparently retained their membership of the Party. The Central Committee elected an enlarged Praesidium of fifteen full members (instead of eleven) and nine candidate members (instead of seven). Two other full members of the old Praesidium were demoted, besides Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov: Pervukhin, who became a candidate member, and Saburov, who was dropped altogether without explanation.

Most of our information about the events leading up to the crisis comes from presumably inspired accounts in the Italian Communist daily *Unità* and the Polish *Trybuna Ludu*, which are supported at some points by the fragmentary evidence from Soviet sources. It would seem that although the members of the group had, individually or collectively, disagreed with Khrushchev on many issues in the past three or four years, they had until recently opposed him only behind the closed doors of Praesidium meetings. Then, at some unspecified but apparently fairly recent date, they had (according to Shvernik, speaking at Leningrad on 6 July) begun to recruit supporters, hold secret meetings behind the backs of the Central Committee, and place their followers in key posts, with the intention of seizing power. They launched an all-out

attack on Khrushchev at a meeting of the Praesidium convened at their request on 18 June, ostensibly to discuss speeches to be made at the celebrations in honour of Leningrad's 250th anniversary. The furious debate which followed went on for three days. When it began three members of the Praesidium (Kirichenko, a close supporter of Khrushchev, Suslov, who was more likely to support Khrushchev than his opponents, and Saburov, who would almost certainly support the opposition) were absent. Malenkov led the attack on Khrushchev, denouncing him as a right-wing deviationist because his agricultural policies allegedly favoured the peasants at the expense of industrial development, and called for his resignation from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee.

At first Khrushchev was in the minority. The return of the absent members did not immediately alter the situation. This strongly suggests that at least one of those who retained full membership of the Praesidium after the crisis must have voted at some stage against Khrushchev. *Trybuna Ludu* indeed asserts that Voroshilov, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Suslov all vacillated. It is, however, difficult to guess how far or on what issues any of them might have supported the 'group', in that we do not know what resolutions were debated and how many votes were taken. It is quite likely that some of the Praesidium's members tried to keep the balance there in the interests of unity, and perhaps joined the opposition in resisting Khrushchev's demand for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee to settle the quarrel, without however wishing to see him supplanted by Malenkov, Kaganovich, or Molotov as First Secretary.

However this may be, Khrushchev apparently felt his position within the Praesidium to be so precarious that he decided to settle his accounts with the ringleaders of the opposition once and for all. He insisted on the convocation of the Central Committee, which alone, according to the Party Statutes, has the right to appoint and dismiss its Secretaries (though in practice it has generally done so on receipt of a previously agreed proposal from above). His demand was backed by an extraordinary manœuvre. While the Praesidium was meeting, members of the Central Committee (in the first place the military members, according to one report) appeared outside the conference chamber and demanded to know what was happening. The opposition at first angrily rebuffed these impertinent and quite unprecedented attempts on the part of the Central Committee to assert its rights, and ignored reminders that

he Praesidium was, after all, responsible to its electors. By 21 June nore than a hundred members had joined the agitation for a lenary meeting, and the opposition was compelled to yield to heir demand. At this point the majority within the Praesidium ided with Khrushchev (perhaps because the attitude of the nportunate Central Committee members showed that the opposition could expect short shrift from a body in which Khrushchev eemed to have established a firm majority at the Twentieth Conress in February 1956). According to *Trybuna Ludu*, only Aalenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Saburov held out against Khrushchev to the last.

At the joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and he Central Revision Commission Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Aolotov each spoke twice, and submitted written statements which rere read out at the end of the session. Two hundred and fifteen ther participants (out of a little more than three hundred) put heir names down to speak, and sixty of them were called. Not a ingle person spoke in favour of the anti-Party group. *Trybuna Ludu* suggests that Suslov, in the chair, created an impression of verwhelming support for Khrushchev by calling a long succession f his known supporters after the opposition leaders had made their pening statements. In the event the opposition was isolated. Aalenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov apparently did penance. Only one vote was cast against the final resolution of condemnaion: that of Molotov.

THE INDICTMENT

The case against the group, as set out in the Central Comnittee's resolution, states that its members had individually or ollectively opposed most of the major policy decisions on domesic and foreign issues in the past three or four years. The Central Committee and its Praesidium had patiently corrected their misakes, hoping that they would 'get into step with the whole leading ollective'. But they were dogmatic and conservative, remote from he Party and the people, incapable of modifying their obsolete leas. Finding that they were consistently checked in the Praesiium, they had conspired to change the leadership and policies of he Party, and to revert to methods condemned by the Twentieth Party Congress. They had thereby infringed the Party Statutes, which condemned fractional struggle, and laid themselves open to he penalties provided in the 'Resolution on Party Unity', drafted

by Lenin and adopted at the Tenth Party Congress (1921). Shepilov, who until recently appeared to be a favourite of Khrushchev, is described as a careerist and double dealer who joined the group at the last moment. His case does not therefore require special consideration.

The measures which the group as a whole were said to have opposed included de-Stalinization ('the correction of mistakes resulting from the cult of the individual'); the correction of previous infringements of socialist legality and the adoption of measures to prevent their recurrence; the delegation of wider powers to the Union Republics and to local Soviets; the reduction of the inflated State apparatus; and the improvement of incentives to the peasants. Molotov had opposed the virgin lands scheme, and the group as a whole was against the new ('decentralized') system of agricultural planning. More recently, they had done their best to frustrate the reorganization of industrial administration (in accordance with a law enacted last May, on the basis of 'theses' published under Khrushchev's name, which abolishes most of the industrial Ministries and transfers the supervision of industry to local Economic Councils). They had objected to the slogan 'overtake the U.S.A. in *per capita* production of meat, milk, and butter in the next few years', apparently on the grounds that it was unrealistic. They had also opposed the abolition, as from the end of 1957, of compulsory deliveries from the private plots of collective farmers (first announced by Khrushchev).

In the field of foreign policy the group had 'in effect' opposed peaceful coexistence, the relaxation of international tension, and the establishment of friendly relations with all peoples. Molotov, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had obstructed measures to improve relations with Yugoslavia. He had spoken out against the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Austria, the normalization of relations with Japan, and closer contacts between the C.P.S.U. and progressive (non-Communist) parties abroad. He was against the theory of different roads to socialism and the doctrine that war is no longer inevitable in modern conditions. He had denied the expediency of personal contacts between Soviet and foreign statesmen. Kaganovich had supported him on many of these issues, and Malenkov on some of them.

The publication of the Central Committee's resolution was followed by mass Party meetings throughout the country, at which speaker after speaker (tens of thousands of them in Moscow alone)

expressed abhorrence of the anti-Party group, and especially of that most heinous crime, the attempt to 'split the Party'. Some of these speeches, and a number of articles in the Party press, provide additional information of great importance to any analysis of the crisis. Kosygin, for instance, told a Moscow Party meeting that the group had criticized the current rate of economic development in such a way as to suggest that the sacrosanct principle of the priority of heavy industry was endangered. Several speakers accused the three former Praesidium members of 'offences against socialist legality'—that is to say, of complicity in Stalin's persecutions and repressions. Thus Khrushchev, speaking at Leningrad, said that 'all the members of the anti-Party group were profoundly guilty of the crude mistakes and shortcomings which took place in the past, and Malenkov, who was one of the chief organizers of the so-called Leningrad Affair, was simply afraid to come to you here in Leningrad'. (The 'Leningrad Affair' is generally thought to have been a bloody purge of the late A. A. Zhdanov's nominees from the Leningrad Party apparatus in 1949.) Shvernik, head of the Party Control Commission, mentioned 'violations of revolutionary legality committed in the period of mass repressions by Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov'. General Gorbatov, at Riga, said that the reason for the attempt to remove Khrushchev was that he had started the struggle against those crimes which the group had committed in 1937–8 and the following years. Speakers at a meeting of Communist writers in Kiev described how Kaganovich, when he was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1947, had abused, slandered, and threatened leading Ukrainian writers.

Finally, there were allegations that the group was in some way responsible for ideological disarray. According to the Central Committee's resolution, the group had opposed not only de-Stalinization but also measures against the indiscipline caused by de-Stalinization. According to the Secretary of the Uzbek Writers' Union, the group had 'to a certain extent inspired those writers who have tried to reject Party spirit in literature'. Both Molotov and Shepilov have recently taken turns as ideological overseers of literature and the arts. Molotov, according to *Soviet Culture*, made no attempt to deal with intellectual unrest, while Shepilov, according to *Literary Gazette*, adopted a weak, conciliatory attitude towards dissidents, thereby hindering the correction of mistakes and violating the norms of Leninist leadership.

Three features of the indictment deserve special attention. In the first place, the policies attributed to the group are purely negative; the suggestion throughout is that they had not a new idea between them, and feared anyone who had. Secondly, although it is not asserted that the group became a cohesive opposition until fairly recently, Malenkov and Molotov are said to have a record of obstruction dating from the period immediately following Stalin's death. (Matskevich, the Minister of Agriculture, even claimed that Malenkov, as Prime Minister, had in reality opposed those concessions which had been made to the peasants in 1953 and which were generally put to his credit.) Thirdly, there is the ubiquitous implication that the group, unlike Stalin's other surviving lieutenants, bears a special responsibility for Stalin's crimes. Indeed, one speaker asserted that Stalin would not have gone so far but for the baneful advice he had received from members of the group.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

Malenkov's attack in 1952 on some of Khrushchev's cherished ideas about agricultural organization suggested that the two were at loggerheads even before Stalin's death. Every one of the many speeches in which Khrushchev has spoken about the stagnation of agriculture before September 1953 (the date at which he publicly took charge of this sector) was an implicit criticism of Malenkov, who had supervised agricultural policy at Politburo level for several years. The circumstances surrounding Malenkov's resignation from the Premiership in February 1955 seemed to show that it was engineered by Khrushchev and his associates. A month before, Malenkov was attacked in the Party press for his consumer goods policy in terms which suggested that he might be accused of a major heresy, and Khrushchev has since consistently laid great stress on the priority of heavy industry. During his Premiership Malenkov favoured highly centralized government, while Khrushchev, beginning shortly after Malenkov's demotion, has given increasingly wider executive authority to local bodies, and recently has largely dismantled the central government apparatus. At the Twentieth Congress Malenkov alone of the senior Party leaders did not mention the virgin lands programme, the very existence of which had given the lie to his earlier boast that the Soviet Union had 'solved the grain problem'.

Molotov's known differences with Khrushchev all concerned

reign policy, and in fact were substantially as listed in the Central ommittee's resolution. Khrushchev, together with Bulganin and metimes with Mikoyan, had increasingly usurped the Foreign [inister's functions in 1955–6, until Molotov's resignation was ıally announced shortly before the triumphant visit of his old ıemy, Marshal Tito. Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet February 1955 showed that he had reservations about the *pprochement* with Yugoslavia, and that he would object to ıngerous talk about different roads to socialism. His admission at e Twentieth Congress that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had ɜen too conservative and inflexible implied that he had very ·obably been out of sympathy with Khrushchev's bold oppor- ınism. There is no evidence, beyond what can be inferred from s character and past career, that Molotov disagreed with hrushchev's domestic policies.

The signs of differences between Kaganovich and Khrushchev 'e far less clear. While the fortunes of Malenkov and Molotov ɜclined in 1955, Kaganovich appeared to be prospering. He made ıe Revolution Anniversary speech in that year, omitting hardly ıy of the Khrushchevian shibboleths, and mentioning with en- ıusiasm the re-establishment of 'friendly and fraternal relations ith Yugoslavia'. While Bulganin was on tour with Khrushchev, aganovich shared the duties of acting Prime Minister with [ikoyan. It was only after the Twentieth Congress that he ap- ɜared to be losing ground—perhaps because Khrushchev's ›sition was by then so strong that he no longer felt the need to woo aganovich.

Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov did not conclude a firm liance against Khrushchev until recently. In the past, there were any occasions when more than one of them disagreed with hrushchev on some subject; but there were other occasions on hich they disagreed with each other. Yet they always had enough common to make them potential allies. They had been closer to alin than most of their colleagues. Molotov and Malenkov had ch enjoyed a spell as Stalin's heir presumptive, and together ith Beria they had formed the ruling triumvirate after Stalin's ɜath. Khrushchev's uprush had dislodged them from this emin- ıce. Kaganovich may also have resented the *parvenu* Khrushchev, ho was once his protegé, and who had been his immediate sub- 'dinate as recently as 1947. All three were high-powered bureau- ats who owed their power to their skill in operating Stalin's

highly centralized state machine. Any far-reaching measure of decentralization, such as Khrushchev contemplated, threatened to undermine them. They had been compelled for many years past to operate through governmental rather than Party channels, so that any disproportionate increase in the power of the Party as against that of the State might damage their interests. Not one of them held any place in any Party organ except the Praesidium; so that their position at the summit of the Party was secure only so long as collective leadership was interpreted to mean the supremacy of the Praesidium and its security from outside interference.

Even if they had joined forces earlier the group would have stood little chance of resisting Khrushchev's impetuous progress before the last few months of 1956, when a sharp change in the balance of power within the Praesidium was discernible. This was the result of three things: the upheaval in Eastern Europe, the realization that the overstrain visible in the Soviet economy in 1955 was recurring in 1956, and (to a lesser extent) the signs of disarray amongst the Soviet population, especially the intelligentsia. Khrushchev's critics would have no difficulty in making out that the upheaval and the disarray were the results of the new course proclaimed at the Twentieth Congress. It would be less easy to blame him for the chronic tendency of the economy to 'disproportions'; but, to judge from Kosygin's remarks quoted above, the opposition may have complained that investments in agriculture and housebuilding were disproportionately high. It is very likely that they also used this occasion to call in question the measures of decentralization taken in the past eighteen months, which, they might argue, could weaken economic management at a vital period.

Whatever arguments they used, it seems fairly sure that the three 'dissidents' were reinforced at this time by support from other members of the Praesidium, and so became no longer a mere nuisance to Khrushchev but a threat to his political existence. It was probably at this stage, in the autumn of 1956, that Saburov finally turned against him and Pervukhin began to oppose him on questions of economic planning and administration. They, as heads of the two supreme planning bodies, were even more concerned than Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov with the maintenance of strong, centralized governmental control of the economy. (The possibility that Khrushchev's policy of decentralization might bring him into conflict with the planners could be deduced from speeches made by his supporters at the re-

publican and all-union Party congresses at the beginning of 1956.)

This assessment of the balance of forces late in 1956 is conjectural, but there are several clear indications that Khrushchev had suddenly become a good deal weaker. Molotov was appointed overlord of intellectual life, then Minister of State Control. On public occasions, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were seen to have moved from the periphery of the Praesidium to the centre. On visits of inspection to Eastern Europe both groups within the Praesidium were represented: Molotov and Kaganovich accompanied Khrushchev and Mikoyan on their famous flight to Warsaw last October, and Khrushchev and Malenkov visited Budapest together at the turn of the year.

More significant than any of these facts were the published decisions of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee held in December. The Central Committee called for a 'refinement' (meaning a 'reduction') of the target figures for industry in the annual plan for 1957 and the five-year plan for 1956–60. Whether or not it was so intended, and whoever took the initiative, this decision could be construed as an implicit criticism of over-investment in sectors other than heavy industry, and an argument against potentially costly measures of reorganization. Various remarks which he has since made, and the fact that revision of the five-year plan figures has been delayed if not forgotten, seem to show that Khrushchev was not particularly pleased by the decision. The Central Committee's other important decision must have been even less acceptable. It established a new type of central planning body, with 'operative' (i.e. managerial) as well as planning powers. This was a governmental body, with Pervukhin and a powerful team of Deputy Prime Ministers at its head, probably too strong to be overruled by any Party body except the Praesidium, and itself probably strong enough to gather into its own hands those economic control ropes which Khrushchev had untied at the centre and tossed to 'the republics' and 'the localities'—or, in reality, to their Party organizations, which were of course directly responsible to the central Party apparatus.

Khrushchev, then, suffered a partial eclipse at the end of 1956, and rumours went around Europe, apparently originating from Moscow, that he was to be replaced by Malenkov. But as 1957 proceeded, he reasserted himself, in the mind of the public at least, as the dominant and certainly the most dynamic figure in the Praesidium. He was greatly helped by the bumper harvest in 1956,

largely due to the impressive performance of the virgin lands, for which he took full credit. He personally announced a number of measures which he might reasonably expect to have considerable demagogic appeal: the termination as from 1958 of the unpopular (compulsory) State loans; the abolition at the end of 1957 of compulsory deliveries from private plots; and the intensification of efforts to raise the food supply to the American level.

At a Central Committee meeting in February, he reopened the question of industrial administration. The meeting called on the Praesidium and the Council of Ministers to put forward proposals. In the event, what appeared was a set of 'Theses' under Khrushchev's name, with a preamble which showed that the Praesidium had agreed to their publication but left it unclear how far the Praesidium supported them. After a 'nation-wide discussion', in which the Party press treated the adoption of Khrushchev's scheme as a foregone conclusion, the 'Theses', with minor amendments, were embodied in a law at the Supreme Soviet meeting in May. The purport of this law was to dismantle most of the central industrial Ministries and to put the administration of industry in the hands of local Economic Councils. The law differed from the 'Theses' in one important respect: that a handful of Ministries of particular importance to defence were preserved. Even before the law was enacted press statements by Khrushchev's close associates, the Party bosses of Leningrad and Gorky, showed that the Economic Councils would be appointed by local Party organizations and would presumably be under their control.

Khrushchev's behaviour in these months may have consolidated the opposition within the Praesidium. It is possible that some of his policy announcements were made on his own initiative and without a proper collective decision. The fact that not a single member of the Praesidium wrote or spoke in favour of his 'Theses' on industrial reorganization suggests at least that several of his colleagues were dissatisfied with his high-handedness. They may well have thought that the reorganization, which was supposed to be completed by 1 July, was being pushed through with dangerous haste. In any case, the implications of the scheme, for anyone who was out of favour with Khrushchev and whose position depended on the maintenance of a strong centralized government machine, were obvious.

There were rumours from non-Soviet Communist sources that the group precipitated the crisis because they got wind of Khrush-

chev's intention of using the Leningrad celebrations as the occasion for denouncing Malenkov, the author of the 'Leningrad Affair', and perhaps other leaders responsible for past purges. The story that the special meeting of the Praesidium on 18 June was called by the opposition to discuss speeches to be delivered at Leningrad might seem to support this version of events. But it is of no importance who was the aggressor. Clearly, Khrushchev's policies threatened to undermine the opposition, and, at the same time, a situation arose in which he might find himself outvoted in the Praesidium. The events of June 1957 were only the culmination and resolution of a prolonged crisis.

THE RESULTS OF THE JUNE CRISIS

There has been much speculation as to whether Khrushchev's victory brings him closer to the establishment of a personal dictatorship. There are many reasons for believing that it does not. For one thing, although the normal organs of coercion are still in existence, Khrushchev has not rebuilt the intricate Stalinist mechanism of controls and counter-controls which he himself dismantled. Then again, though his policies have concentrated enormous power in the hands of the Party apparatus, this does not mean that he, as First Secretary, is unassailable. Indeed, to make himself absolute he would probably have to devise some counterweight to the Party, to channel power through a number of different networks to which he alone controlled the master-switch. Furthermore, the replacement of his critics in the Praesidium by his 'supporters', who are now in an overwhelming majority, does not necessarily guarantee Khrushchev's supremacy. Their own elevation and the elimination of the opposition may encourage the new Praesidium members to think more independently. It might not be easy for Khrushchev to appeal again to the Central Committee if a majority of his present colleagues, including the important provincial and central Party secretaries and Marshal Zhukov, opposed him on some issue. It appears that Khrushchev owes his triumph at least in part to the support of the military leaders; and it may be that, if this support were demonstratively withdrawn, he could no longer rely on his 'majority' in the Central Committee.

No immediate modifications of Soviet domestic or foreign policies should be expected. If the group had overthrown Khrushchev there would have been great changes. As it is, Khrushchev

will be able to pursue established policies with less obstruction. The effort to make the new system of industrial organization work, and to make good his rather rash boasts about the country's agricultural prospects, should absorb his energies for some time to come. He clearly contemplates no ideological relaxation at home or in the satellite countries. The accusation against the group that they 'opposed the struggle against revisionism' is obviously absurd. They no doubt opposed the measures suggested by Khrushchev on the grounds that they were inadequate. But to say as much might mislead people into expecting that Khrushchev would let dissidents down lightly. The wording of the indictment against the opposition, and a number of articles which have appeared in the Soviet press since the crisis, show that he has every intention of maintaining rigid discipline amongst the Soviet intelligentsia and refraining from ideological compromise in his dealings with Communists abroad.

Though sharp changes are unlikely in the immediate future, Khrushchev will need great skill and strength to keep the Soviet Union on a steady course in the next few years. Will he be able to hold on to his position without manœuvres which might precipitate another and more dangerous power struggle? Can he carry through the most far-reaching measures of economic reorganization since 1928 whilst maintaining a consistently steep increase in production? Will the results of his agricultural policies justify him or confirm the prophecies of his critics? Can he keep discipline in the Soviet Union without reverting to police terror? The very fact that these and a dozen equally important questions await an answer means that the Soviet Union is passing through a crucial period in its history. Khrushchev is determined—his every word and every act declare it—that future generations shall see him as Lenin's true heir, after a dubious interregnum. It is too early even to guess whether his name will stand high in the list of Soviet rulers, or whether his supremacy is merely a strange and exciting episode in the troubled story of Stalin's succession.

T. S.

Morocco Between Two Eras

INTRODUCTION

MOROCCO differs from other Arab States in two important espects. It has a thousand-year-old tradition of independent iational existence, more or less within its present frontiers; and it ias a long Atlantic coast line from which it looks across to America. 't comes second in population among Arab countries, having half is many inhabitants as Egypt but twice as many as Iraq. In fact Morocco and Algeria together contain nearly a third of all the Arabs in the world. Of course, the word 'Arab' is not used here in a trictly racial sense, but as in the phrase 'the Arab world', meaning hose peoples who have an admixture of Arab blood; who use the Arabic language for daily speech, or for cultural and governnental purposes, or for both; and who moreover feel themselves to be Arabs. Casablanca, the economic capital of Morocco, has '50,000 inhabitants and is probably the largest city in the Arab world outside Cairo; one-third of its inhabitants are European.

When the Treaty of Fez in 1912 put a temporary end to the independence of Morocco, the country was completely untouched by nodern life; as the inhabitants today put it, 'We Moroccans were isleep.' Her geographical position, at the extreme Western end of he world as it was known before the discovery of America, enbled Morocco to withdraw into herself even more completely han other Islamic countries did. Having defeated the Ottoman ittempt at domination, she avoided even that limited modernizing nfluence which Turkish rule brought with it elsewhere.

It was only two years before the beginning of the first World War when France occupied Morocco. Though new ideas concerning he government of subject peoples were in the air and not without heir influence on French thinking, Morocco was treated as an area or colonization. Government soon became the prerogative of iewly created French departments employing French officials; hese gave priority to the protection and development of colonizaion and after that did their best for the Moroccan people. The ransformation which they worked was amazing. During the fortyour years of the Protectorate, Morocco became in outward appearnce more modern-looking than Egypt or Syria. An elegant European-style capital was built at Rabat and a great city and seaport at Casablanca. These were supported by a magnificent framework of roads, railways, ports, hotels, and government offices—

too magnificent, in fact, when the general backwardness of the country is taken into consideration and its need for widespread but simple and gradual improvements. Medical and educational services provided fully for the requirements of the European population and partially for those of the Moroccans. All this was accomplished by French capital, French officials, French capitalists, and French immigrants who trained and made use of a Moroccan labour force which was inefficient but unorganized and cheap.

The awakening of Moroccan minds was no less remarkable than the material development. As soon as the first generation of young men who had received a Western education grew up, they demanded a share in the administration of their country and in the formation of its policy. Finding their requests refused and themselves treated as subversive, they reacted accordingly. Passionately anxious for their country to take its place in the modern world, they soon convinced themselves, and then their compatriots as a whole, that the colonial regime which had been the cause of their awakening was now hindering instead of hastening their development. The nationalist movement which thus came into being was too strong to be suppressed. Last year, faced with risings in all its three North African territories, the French Government yielded in two of them, Morocco and Tunisia, thus conserving its forces for the attempt to retain the third, Algeria. In these circumstances, the Moroccan nationalists found that they had achieved independence sooner than they had expected; and it is the difficulties which they are encountering in consequence, and the way in which they are trying to deal with them, to which our attention must be directed in the following pages.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The coming of independence, formally recognized in the joint Franco-Moroccan Declaration of 2 March 1956, at once emphasized the importance of certain facts of which the nationalists had not hitherto appreciated the full significance. The most striking was the lack of Moroccan technicians and trained officials. At the coming of independence there were more than 50,000 French officials in the country, and it now appeared that it would be necessary to retain a high proportion of them for the time being if administrative standards were to be maintained. The scarcity of qualified candidates for Government service was such that some of the dozen or so qualified Muslim Moroccan doctors had to be re-

moved from medical work in order to turn them into diplomats. It also speedily became apparent that French residents in Morocco, official or non-official, were not in fact so well off there that they would necessarily wish to stay on, in the changed circumstances, until such time as the Moroccans felt disposed to dispense with their services. Apart from a few idealists, only those who would earn a pension by another few years' service, or who had spent the best years of their life in creating a career or a business in Morocco, were really inclined to see the experiment through to the end.

This was, of course, natural enough, and not altogether unexpected; if political conditions had been favourable, the change might have taken place by degrees to everyone's convenience. The French Government must have looked at things in this light. France had a vast human and financial investment in Morocco, and latterly the French Treasury had been contributing the equivalent of £30 million sterling a year to the Moroccan capital equipment plan. It could be argued that it was worth while continuing this contribution for the present so that if French interests did have to be greatly reduced this could be done slowly and advantageously. A certain number of French statesmen however went further and reckoned that Morocco's financial needs would ensure continued French control of Morocco in the international field, and in particular with regard to Algeria. It is probably unwise to make a grant of independence with mental reservations of this sort, and it was certainly an error to suppose that once Moroccans had regained their political independence they would ever acquiesce, through fear of economic distress, in the denial of independence to the fellow Arab, Muslim, and North African country, Algeria.

Within a few weeks, a dispute arose between the Moroccan and French Governments about the extent to which the French forces in Morocco (whose status had been left completely vague) were entitled to intervene on Moroccan territory in order to hinder the passage of arms smugglers or volunteers across the frontier into Algeria. After a change in the command of the French forces a *modus vivendi* was reached which appeared to work fairly well, though the kidnapping of several Frenchmen, officers and others, in the east and south cast some doubts on the ability of the central Government to assert its authority throughout the country. Last October, however, mutual confidence was again shattered through French mistrust of an attempted mediation between the Algerian leaders and the French Government on the part of the Sultan and

the Tunisian Premier, M. Bourguiba. A plane had been chartered by the Moroccan Government to carry to Tunis five Algerian leaders who had been the guests of the Sultan in Rabat. By the intervention of French intelligence officials this plane was diverted from its course while not in French air-space and directed to Algiers, where the five men were arrested. This action was felt by the Sultan as a personal insult and caused an explosion of popular indignation in both Tunisia and Morocco. Kept under control elsewhere, it resulted in the murder of a number of French people in Meknes.

The Moroccan Government reacted correctly, arresting and trying those responsible, and inflicting some death sentences. But meanwhile the mischief had been done. French officials were naturally more inclined to resign, French business men to cut their Moroccan commitments, and French residents in general to leave. The Moroccan Ambassador was withdrawn from Paris, while in France herself there was agitation in the press and in Parliament to withhold the French contribution to the capital equipment plan French business men were already anxious lest the demands of the labour unions, which form the left wing of the nationalist movement and wish to show their followers some benefits from their support of the struggle for independence, should force costs up to a point at which operation became unprofitable. Now they feared also for the security not only of their property but even of their lives. The result was a tremendous slump. Not only did expansion cease but some firms cut their existing commitments. Hotels in some districts have reported a drop of 50 per cent in the number of clients using them since the beginning of this year; and the number of unemployed or under-employed is probably not far short of 400,000. The position has been made more difficult by a drought which will necessitate the import of several hundred thousand tons of wheat.

In these circumstances the immediate reaction of the Moroccan Government was to turn to America, whose interest in North Africa is great and growing. In fact the U.S. Government has promised a grant of about £7 million and will no doubt assist further if the present negotiations concerning U.S. air-bases in Morocco come to a successful conclusion. Meanwhile steps have been taken to reassure the French investor and French resident. Security has been completely restored. The transfers of capital to France, which undoubtedly took place on a very great scale, were

not interfered with in any way. This year's Trade Fair in Casablanca was organized on a larger scale than usual and with success. Representatives of all the important elements in the State, including the Sultan and the Crown Prince, leading members of the Government, and important Istiqlal leaders not in the Government, for example Allal al Fasi and Mehdi b. Barka, have all been at pains to assure French residents and settlers that they have a future in the country and that they will be treated as welcome guests. The French Government, probably wisely though not very consistently with its general policy, has decided to pay French officials who stay on a bonus of 12 per cent of the basic salary offered by the Moroccan Government. The type of contract to be offered is now known and seems satisfactory.

On the home front, the Sultan has been trying to induce Moroccan capitalists to invest their spare capital in long-term productive enterprises rather than in buying land or houses. Great efforts are being made to extend education and to accelerate and multiply the output of candidates for administrative posts; but it is obvious that it must take years rather than months to produce adequate cadres. The success of these measures will in any case depend in part on the maintenance of security and of a friendly attitude to French co-operation over a long period; and in part on developments of the Algerian situation which are outside the control of the Moroccan Government. At the moment the economic situation, though serious, is not catastrophic. Estimates of French departures vary from 35,000 to 70,000, say 10 to 20 per cent of the whole. This is not an excessive figure when the thousands of former officials are taken into account. But it is the events of the next few months which will decide whether there is to be a recovery or a further wave of departures on a scale which will involve an economic disaster.

THE SOUTHERN FRONTIERS

Another political issue which threatens Franco-Moroccan relations is that of the southern frontiers. The present line on the Wadi Draa was fixed by Franco-Spanish agreement at the time of the occupation in 1912 and has never been ratified by an independent Moroccan Government.[1] It represents the limit of more or less effective Moroccan administration at the moment of the establishment of the Protectorate. The country south of the Draa

[1] See 'Spain in Morocco', in *The World Today*, August 1956.

was desert or semi-desert and the Sultans had little interest there beyond keeping it a sphere of Moroccan influence. The whole area was undoubtedly considered as 'Moroccan Sahara' by French authorities as late as 1928. During the previous century, Moroccan governors had been established as far afield as Tuat, 500 miles south-east of Tafilalet. In the subsequent thirty years the French occupation spread in the area south of the Atlas, and the administration of these southern regions was gradually assimilated not to that of Morocco but to that which the French had established in the Algerian Sahara.

Farther south still, French Mauritania, which like Tindouf farther north is believed to contain iron and other minerals of immense value, was never part of Morocco. It did, however, take its Arabic speech and its Islamic faith from the Sherifian Empire. In the eleventh century it provided Morocco with the most famous of all its dynasties; and at the beginning of the present century Mauritanians appealed to and received aid from the Sultan of Morocco at the time when the French began to advance northward from Senegal. A little later, early in the French occupation of Morocco, the position in Marrakesh was threatened by the advance of tribesmen under a Mauritanian leader. There is no doubt that today Moroccans regard the reputed vast potential wealth of these southern regions as the natural source of funds for the development of North Africa. Though no claim has been officially advanced, the President of the Istiqlal Party has founded a weekly paper called *Sahara al Maghrib*—The Moroccan (or North African) Sahara—which is devoted to urging the claim of Morocco to the whole of the southern territories; and a group of Mauritanians supporting the unification of Mauritania with Morocco is permanently established in Rabat with the acquiescence of the Moroccan authorities. Some months ago a raid (which was easily disposed of by the French authorities) was carried out in French Mauritania by 'liberation forces' said to have been directed from south Morocco; and after a long period of quiescence there was another in the first week in July. A Franco-Moroccan commission is due to meet and discuss the question of the frontier.

Theoreticians of the Istiqlal Party say that the Moroccan claim will be based on a consideration of the 'natural and historical frontiers and the relative treaties'. In fact the party's objective appears to be the establishment of Moroccan sovereignty and of corporations with French, Spanish, and possibly other participa-

tion in order to exploit the riches which are known to exist. The French appear to be thinking rather of way-leaves and other minor advantages for the coastal Governments. It is however possible that the Moroccan Government may seek to postpone the issue, provided it can get an undertaking that the local inhabitants will be allowed the right of self-determination at some future time. French Mauritania proper has some half-million inhabitants, though it is without towns of any size. It is possible that the Mauritanians would like to exploit Franco-Moroccan difficulties in the same sort of way that Anglo-Egyptian differences were exploited by the Sudanese.

INTEGRATION OF THE THREE ZONES

A problem of a different type is the integration of the former Spanish zone, one-tenth of the area of the country, with a population of over a million, and of the former international zone of Tangier, into the nine-tenths of the country which constitute the former French zone. This division into zones gave rise to completely artificial differences of currency, economic system, administration, and language between the two main areas, with Tangier sharing certain characteristics of both as well as having others of its own.

Disagreement between the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anxious to conciliate foreign opinion, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, anxious to secure real economic unity, has delayed till September the issue of the new 'Charter' for Tangier which had been announced for the beginning of July. Of the two main zones, the northern or Spanish one was much the poorer; and the cost of living and the standard of wages in it was about half that of the southern, or French, zone. With the weakening of the customs barriers, northern produce is now finding its way to the more profitable markets of the south, thus producing a relative shortage in the north with a consequent rise in prices of 50 to 60 per cent. This is being increased still further by the new Moroccan customs tariff, which is applicable in all three zones and is designed to protect Moroccan products and check the import of unnecessary foreign goods. Its introduction has been made possible by Britain's renunciation of her rights under the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856 which limited Morocco's fiscal liberty. In view, moreover, of the heavy unemployment in the south, there has been no migration of labour from the north and wages there remain low.

Officials posted to the north from the south continue to draw their former pay in francs and so earn a larger salary than northern colleagues working beside them.

The obvious first step to economic unity is the replacement of the Spanish currency by the franc. This however will weaken the Spanish currency and calls for compensation. Spain would be glad to receive Moroccan phosphates, but it is difficult for Morocco to take Spanish goods in exchange since Spain produces few of the goods of which Morocco stands in need. Negotiations in Madrid were reported at the beginning of July to have resulted in four agreements. One was described as an 'economic agreement for the monetary unification of Morocco', and another was a trade and payments agreement; the other two dealt with Spanish technical and administrative assistance to Morocco and with cultural relations.

In all these matters Morocco has still to exercise great care in maintaining a fair balance between the two former protecting Powers, whose rivalry has been in no way reduced by the ending of the Protectorate. Spain has maintained her financial aid to the northern zone and there have been no difficulties over the continued presence of Spanish troops. Indeed it is suggested that Moroccans feel that they are a certain safeguard as long as French troops remain in the rest of the country. The main issue in dispute with Spain at the moment is over Ifni, a small enclave in south Morocco, ceded to Spain after the Spanish-Moroccan War of 1861. Spain's legal right to it is undoubted, but its position and small resources make it difficult to maintain. Istiqlal agents, who had already established a sort of shadow administration of their own, were arrested last June and deported to the Canary Islands.

Another complication which the zones have created is the use in the administration of French in the south and of Spanish in the north; this is very embarrassing for officials transferred from one zone to the other. It is hoped to overcome the difficulty eventually by the more general use of Arabic. In the north, where Arabic was already under the Spanish a language of instruction and where primary education was in fact all in Arabic, this change is relatively easy. In the south, however, where all instruction (except in the Arabic language itself) was given in French, the process of arabization has had to be slowed down owing to the lack of qualified teachers.

The Rif, or eastern province of the northern zone, presents a

special problem. Very isolated and very poor, it used often to escape the control of the Sultans in the past. Before the occupation it was for years controlled by a pretender to the throne and then for a short time, in Abdulkrim's day, formed an independent Republic. The spirit of independence still persists and raises a problem for officials of the central Government who are new to the region and to its customs. The position is the more difficult in that the Algerian war has deprived thousands of Rifis of their seasonal employment on the Algerian harvest. The Government has plans to improve the harbour at Alhucemas and to build a new road direct to Fez, thus bringing the heart of the Rif into direct communication with the old capital. If and when these projects are carried out they will go far to end the isolation of this remote region with its very hardy, very independent, and very combative mountain peasantry.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SULTAN[1]

If these are the problems, it remains to consider who are the men and what is the machinery which is attempting to deal with them.

The form of government that has been established appears simple and practical. While the Sultan remains in theory an autocrat and is, in fact, the ruler of the country, he has appointed a Cabinet in which Moroccan Ministers have taken over the functions formerly exercised by French directors; the latter in some cases remain as advisers. While the last word rests with the Sultan, the Ministers are probably as good a team as could have been chosen by any other method. Their main difficulty is their complete lack of any previous experience of ministerial office. On the constitutional side, parliamentary democracy is the declared aim of the monarch and of the Istiqlal Party, and as a first step in this direction the Sultan has nominated a Consultative Assembly of sixty members. This has the right to discuss the Budget and to require Ministers to give it information concerning the work of their departments. The body is genuinely representative of the various aspects of the national life and is presided over by the very independent-minded and dynamic Mehdi b. Barka, one of the leading theoreticians of the Istiqlal Party. The Assembly has formed

[1] While this article was in the press it was announced from Rabat (see *The Times*, 15 August 1957) that the Sultan had decided to change his title to King. The country will therefore in future be known as the Kingdom of Morocco, not as the Sherifian Empire.

specialized committees to deal with the various aspects of policy. The next constitutional development is planned to be the establishment of local elected councils which will give the people some experience of democratic practice on a scale small enough for them to see its working, before proceeding to the election of a Constituent Assembly.

Moroccan governors, known as Amils, have everywhere replaced the French *Controleurs Civils* and Spanish *interventores*. Order, which was relaxed at the time of the hand-over, has been completely restored; and the greater part of the former Liberation Army has been absorbed into the Royal Forces. In the northern zone the standards of road construction and maintenance are being brought into line with the magnificent system in the south.

The first Government after the declaration of independence included members of the Democratic Party of Independence (P.D.I.) as well as of the much more important Istiqlal Party and a number of independents. This was done largely to meet French wishes, since the P.D.I. had enjoyed a measure of French encouragement not so much because it was favourable to France (which it was not) but as a counterblast to the Istiqlal. In a reshuffle some months ago the P.D.I. Ministers were dropped and now form an Opposition. In the absence of elections it is hard to estimate the party's strength. It is very vocal and certainly has offices all over the country; it is however not probable that its popular following is very great. In Opposition, its policy has been one of pure demagogy, clamouring for a more rapid implementation of extreme nationalist demands. It would like a national Parliament to be elected immediately and demands made on Spain to surrender Ceuta and Melilla. Though not venturing to attack the present monarch, it might develop republican tendencies in the event of his disappearance from the scene.

In spite of this apparent exception, the country as a whole remains remarkably united behind the Sultan, whose prestige and popularity have suffered little from the reaction after the first rapture of independence. Quiet and gentle in speech, the Sultan is nevertheless a hard worker and his days are fully occupied in consultations with his Ministers, in receiving foreign visitors, in attending public ceremonies, and in touring country districts, including the most remote. His continuance on the throne for a number of years would be the greatest assurance of stable government in Morocco. An attempt to settle the question of the suc-

cession, for which no fixed rules exist in Morocco, has been made by the recognition by the Sultan himself, and by the Government and the Consultative Assembly, of his eldest son Prince Maulay el Hassan as his heir. The Prince, who is twenty-eight, has already participated actively in public life in close collaboration with his father. He played a big part in the formation of the Royal Army, of which he is the Chief of Staff, and in the integration of the Liberation Forces into it. Like other Princes, he has had his indiscretions, and he does not command the universal respect which is felt for the Sultan. But there is no doubt about his intelligence or his energy, and the passage of time will, it may be hoped, bring with it also his father's sure judgement and discretion.

The Sultan himself is essentially a man of peace, anxious to maintain the Western connection, and a diplomat who prefers an agreed to an imposed solution. The Prime Minister, Si Bekkai, is a much respected Colonel who lost a leg fighting in the Ardennes. Himself an Independent, his role is that of chairman rather than leader. Drive and popular appeal are to be found rather in the Istiqlal Ministers Bouabid (Finance), Belafrej (Foreign Affairs), Mhammedi (Interior), and Laghzaoui (Security), and in Istiqlal leaders outside the Government such as Allal al Fasi, who is academically inclined but determined, and the dynamic Mehdi b. Barka, now President of the Consultative Assembly. It thus comes about that the trial of strength between the different political forces takes place out of the public eye, and it is sometimes hard to be sure precisely where responsibility lies for a particular action. This was noticeably the case with the arrest of the sons of the Glawi last May. While this action was obviously welcome to the people of the south and fulfilled a point in the Istiqlal Party programme, it was plausibly argued that the Sultan's hand had been forced in the matter, and that he even had no foreknowledge that the arrests would be made. Though a Government communiqué issued two days afterwards assumed responsibility for the arrests it was not possible for journalists to obtain any clear statement as to the motives behind them or the charges which would be made.

The effect on French opinion was very unsettling, since it was felt that if the Sultan could have his hand forced in this respect the same thing might occur with the assurances that he had given to French officials and settlers. Very much the same obscurity clouds the alleged continuance of liberation forces in the far south, their responsibility for events in Mauritania, their precise relations with

the Government, and the identity of the body or the individuals who control them.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the change from French to Moroccan control took place remarkably smoothly and with less disorder and reprisals than most foreign observers expected. In spite of such disturbing episodes as the arrest of the Glawis or the presence of unassimilated Liberation Forces in the south, it can be said that the control of the central Government has been steadily strengthened and extended. The insubordination of one provincial governor who could not adapt himself to the changed circumstances was disposed of with very little difficulty. Nevertheless, in view of the circumstances, an appreciable fall in administrative standards seems inevitable as partly trained Moroccans take over from experienced Frenchmen.

Recently there was the danger of a rift both within and outside the Cabinet between the respective advocates of a more rapid or a more delayed application of the full Istiqlal programme. Such a rift could not have failed to have disastrous results both within the country and in its external relations. The danger seems to have been averted, and nothing could be more reasonable than the views recently expounded by Mr Mehdi b. Barka, who is one of the most representative Istiqlal spokesmen outside the Government. Morocco, he says, must 'keep a window open to the West' and never again withdraw into the isolation which was the cause of her backwardness and final loss of liberty. Frenchmen who are willing to co-operate in the new Morocco can be sure that there is a place for them and that they will be treated as honoured guests. Communist doctrine and Communist assistance are not required; if France is not willing to help, aid must be sought from America. Morocco will not join the Arab League while that body is divided against itself. Arab co-operation should begin with bilateral or multilateral committees to solve specific problems, not by the formation of a clumsy all-including organization. Within Morocco, General Guillaume's idea that democracy should be built up from the bottom is, in an independent Morocco, preferable to democracy begun at the top on a national scale. Morocco shares the general Arab view about Zionism and will not permit organized Zionist propaganda in, or organized emigration from, her territory; but Jews are an integral and economically valuable element of the population, entitled to the same treatment as any other citizen.

Such are the views expressed to foreign listeners by an Istiqlal leader at the present moment. In fact the present approach of the Moroccan Government to its many problems cannot be anything other than empiric. While very successful so far in dealing with their own people, the maintenance of the highly developed and dynamic European economy in their midst presents them with a serious problem. For some years to come there is bound to be a very difficult transition period and only when Morocco has acquired a new economic stability and a civil service which is really its own will it be possible to say in what precise direction the new State will finally move. The country possesses considerable natural resources, capable of much further development; its people are alert and ambitious for its advancement. If Moroccans have the patience to acquire the technical skills necessary for the administration of a modern State, there is no reason why the country should not look forward to a prosperous and worthy future.

N. B.

The Danish Scene, Summer 1957

THE recent visit of Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh to Denmark has increased the interest of the British people in this small island kingdom and especially in its capital, Copenhagen. But how many people outside Denmark realize how widespread the Danish kingdom is? Zealand, the island on which the capital is situated, is one of its five largest islands, the others being Funen, Lolland, Bornholm, and Falster, and the remainder of the Danish realm consists of another 488 islands together with the northern half of Jutland, where Denmark has a common frontier with Germany. The Danish coastline is 4,620 miles long, and no point in the country is more than an hour or two's distance by road or rail from the coast. Denmark is very densely populated, the 1950 census showing 100 persons to the square kilometre as compared with 16 in Sweden, 76 in France, 291 in England, and 16 in the United States. Greenland, the world's largest island, situated almost entirely in the Arctic Circle, and the Faroe Islands, north of Scotland, also belong to Denmark and send representatives to the Danish Folketing. It is well to bear these geographical facts in

mind when considering the problems which face Danish Governments in the administration of a territory that is so widely spread.

Up to the spring of 1957 the country had for some years had a Social Democrat minority Government under the Premiership of Mr H. C. Hansen. But on 14 May a General Election was held, about six months earlier than was necessary under the Constitution. The reasons for the Prime Minister's decision to advance the Election date were entirely economic.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The economic difficulties which have for some years confronted many countries of the world were particularly serious in Denmark. Up to 1954 a sharp expansion of all economic activities was noticeable there, but in that year a foreign exchange crisis occurred which necessitated an adjustment of production and marketing. Economic policy during the following years aimed therefore at restricting domestic demand so as to enable Danish industries to benefit by the rising level of economic activity abroad and expand their exports, with a consequent improvement in the balance of payment. This diversion from the home to the export market was accompanied by a slight decline in production and employment, but industrial exports grew steadily and consumers' spending became more stabilized. In 1956, however, the rate of investment, especially in building, fell sharply, and the situation was aggravated by unfavourable weather and by a strike which, though it lasted only five weeks, involved about 60,000 workers, largely in key industries. This had a damping effect on economic activity both because of direct loss of income and because new investments were deferred. In the summer of 1956 a slight recovery took place, especially in the engineering industry, where production was accelerated in order to make good the losses suffered through the strike. Consequently once the decline was overcome the volume of industrial exports rose once more, and for the year as a whole increased by about 18 per cent, only slightly less than the rise in the two preceding years.[1] The building industry also expanded substantially after May 1956.

These developments were accompanied by a rise in employment and a consequent rise in consumption, due largely to increases in wages and salaries for manual and non-manual workers, real wages during the second half-year increasing by about 2 to 3 per cent as

[1]Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Economic Survey of Denmark, 1957*.

compared with 1955. In the autumn total sales for export and to the home market were slightly higher than for the corresponding period in 1955. On the other hand an appreciable rise in imports occurred, the total volume increasing by some 8 to 9 per cent, while the value, as a result of higher prices, went up by approximately 12 per cent, or more than the expansion of industrial exports was able to cover. Although invisible exports rose too, the balance of goods and services was less favourable for that period than for the corresponding one in 1955. This adverse situation was due in part to the sharp increases in fuel and raw material prices but more particularly to Denmark's inability to expand, and in some cases even to maintain, her agricultural exports, mainly because of agricultural protectionism in other countries. Industrial exports, which did not meet the same barriers, did expand, but the increase was unevenly distributed over the various industries. Thus exports of machinery advanced by 12 per cent, and accounted for some 40 per cent of the total expansion of industrial exports. The decline in agricultural exports especially affected bacon and pigs, being mainly due to a reduction in pig breeding in 1955; however, towards the end of 1955 prices rose and led to a new increase in pig breeding with a consequent advance in bacon exports during the second half of 1956. As regards butter, the poor grazing conditions during the summer of 1956 reduced output, but Danish butter fetched relatively high prices. The position on the egg market, where a substantial expansion of British production affected the Danish market, is not yet clear. By and large it must be said that the steady improvement in the living standard and food consumption of Western Europe did not noticeably benefit the marketing conditions of Danish agricultural products.

The Government's efforts to reduce home consumption were on the whole successful, for its overall rate of increase in 1956 slowed down, rising by only slightly more than 1 per cent as compared with 1955; though in the spring a definite upward trend was noticeable, and in the autumn consumption was at a higher level than during the same period in 1956. These variations were largely due to fluctuations in money income, adjustments in fiscal policy, and price changes. Opinions in the Folketing were extremely divided concerning the right means to adopt in order to put the country's economy on a sound basis, and the Prime Minister realized that a stronger Government was necessary to enforce the severe economic measures that would be required.

ELECTION RESULTS AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The results of the General Election were somewhat disappointing for the Social Democrats. It was hardly surprising that the Communists should suffer losses in view of the Danish people's sharp reaction to the events of the previous autumn in Hungary, but the success of the Single Tax Party, known as the Henry Georgists,[1] was not expected, nor was the fact that its gains should be at the expense of the Social Democrats. The changes, though slight, were sufficient to lose the Social Democrats their numerical superiority over the Right-wing parties. The position in the new Folketing today is as follows (seats in the previous Parliament are given in brackets):

Social Democrats	70 (74)
Radical Liberals	14 (14)
Conservatives	30 (30)
Venstre (Farmers' Party)	45 (42)
Single Tax Party	9 (6)
Communists	6 (8)
German Minority	1 (1)

Informed opinion ascribes the success of the Single Tax Party to general dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living and steadily increasing taxation; but whatever the reason, the party in consequence found itself the balancing factor in the political situation. On 15 May Mr Hansen tendered his Government's resignation but was asked to form a new Government, and on 27 May he succeeded in doing so with the help of the Radical Liberals and the Single Tax Party. This unusual coalition was given a rather mixed reception, as it was obvious that the latter party must have dropped some of the very taxation ideals which had gained it extra seats. In any case, for the first time since just before the war Denmark now has a majority Government which, provided it remains united, will have the power to carry through the measures necessary to put the country on a sound economic footing.

The new Government consists of 9 Social Democrats, 4 Radicals, and 3 Henry Georgists. Mr Hansen again combines the Premiership with the position of Foreign Minister, and Mr Viggo Kampmann remains Finance Minister, while Mr Poul Hansen retains the Defence Ministry. The Radicals have been entrusted

[1] After the nineteenth-century American economist Henry George who advocated a uniform land tax.

with the portfolios of Economics, Education, Agriculture, and Commerce, Industry, and Shipping, while Dr Starcke, the leader of the Henry Georgists and a politican of high repute, is to be a Minister without Portfolio. The Ministries of Fisheries and of the Interior are held by Henry Georgists. It will be interesting to watch the success of this new Cabinet, six of whose members have never held office before. In the case of the Henry Georgists this is not surprising, but the two Radicals, Karl Skytte and Professor Kjeld Philip, Ministers of Agriculture and of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping respectively, are also new to ministerial office. Professor Philip is one of Denmark's most important younger political economists who has studied the problem of national pensions in Sweden, and his knowledge will be useful when the new Danish national pensions scheme is put into effect.

The new Government lost no time in submitting plans for dealing with the economic crisis. On 11 June several Bills were introduced into the Folketing, the most important ones providing for a stabilization loan of Kr.200 million, a Kr.100 million increase in consumption dues, and various economies totalling approximately Kr.100 million. Some smaller measures were quickly passed, but the more important Bills are still under discussion, and the Bill relating to the stabilization loan promises to have a difficult passage. It provides that all taxpayers with a taxable income of more than Kr.14,000 shall subscribe to the loan, and it is meeting with a great deal of opposition. The Director of the National Bank, Svend Nielse, has shown great concern at the constant deterioration of the bank's position *vis-à-vis* foreign countries, and he favours measures restricting investments in trades connected with consumption. Professor Thorkil Kristensen, Finance Minister in the Venstre Government and undoubtedly the most enlightened, honest, and independent-minded Finance Minister that Denmark has had for decades, has recommended a temporary import tax to enable Danish production to gain a larger share of the home market.

SOCIAL SERVICES AND THE NATIONAL PENSIONS PLAN

Social services represent one of the two largest items in the national Budget (the other being defence). Ever since February 1948 a Committee on National Insurance had been working on some amendments to the National Insurance Act to bring it into line with modern requirements. A report was issued in June 1955, and as a result of amendments enacted on 2 October 1956 the

old-age pension scheme then in force was changed into a new national pensions plan. Under this scheme old-age pensions will be payable, subject to certain income limitations, to single women from the age of sixty-two and to men and married women from the age of sixty-seven onwards; but the new age limits will not come into operation until 1 April 1961. For persons without additional income the amount paid as national pension, which is based on the cost of living index for July 1956, will be as follows (previous rates shown in brackets):

	Copenhagen and suburbs Kr.	*Provincial towns and urban areas* Kr.	*Rural Areas* Kr.[1]
Married couples when both receive pensions	5,112 (4,677)	4,848 (4,333)	4,452 (3,844)
Single persons and married couples when only one spouse draws the pension	3,396 (3,163)	3,264 (2,891)	2,976 (2,568)

[1] Kr 19 25=£1.

In addition to these payments, another Kr.115 to Kr.123 a month, in the case of married couples, and Kr.75 to Kr.83 for single persons are paid as clothing allowance. These allowances are highest in the country and lowest in the metropolitan area, thus greatly reducing the apparent difference in pensions in the various parts of the country. Provision is also made for special allowances when needed in the case of (i) married couples where only one spouse draws the pension; (ii) pensioners with children under fifteen years of age; and (iii) pensioners of eighty years and over. Moreover a 10 per cent increase is granted in cases where persons entitled to draw the old-age pension do not apply for it until they reach the age of seventy in the case of men and married couples, and sixty-five in the case of single women.

The national pensions scheme is not the only provision made in Denmark to ease the lives of citizens no longer able to earn their own living. For many decades both the Government and the communities have endeavoured to help the aged, and in this connection old people's homes have been built. A typical example is one in Copenhagen.

De Gamles By—the Old People's Town—can house 1,559 people, 648 men and 911 women. Applicants must have reached the age of sixty-five for men and sixty for women, must be Danish citizens, receive the old-age pension, and must have led unblem-

ished lives. If their application is accepted they cease to receive the pension but are paid pocket money at the rate of about Kr.26 per month. The Old People's Town has two sections: a general one for able pensioners and a hospital for those who are ill. The hospital has wards with from two to ten beds and sitting- and smoking-rooms on each floor for the use of patients who can move about. In the older part of the general section each room is occupied by four pensioners, and this part is used more for male pensioners who do not seem to mind sharing rooms; each floor has its own common sitting-room and dining-room. In the new section each pensioner has his or her own room. Married couples occupy their own room and have their meals served there; single pensioners go to the common dining-room. A library, an installation for showing films, and concerts and theatrical performances are provided for recreation. Pensioners may visit relatives and otherwise come and go as they please. They can also take a month's holiday in the year, and for this purpose receive fourteen days' board, at the rate of Kr.2 per day.

Apart from homes such as the Old People's Town, Copenhagen has by now completed about 5,000 flatlets for the use of more than 6,000 old people in ten different districts of the capital. They have been built with independent housekeeping in mind, every consideration being given to the requirements and mobility of old people. A single old-age pensioner has one room and kitchen, and a married couple two rooms and kitchen. The monthly rent of Kr.28 and Kr.34 respectively includes payment for central heating.

CIVIL DEFENCE

As was mentioned earlier, defence represents a major item in Denmark's national Budget, and within the defence programme plans for civil defence play an important part.

The immense technical development of weapons has faced the Danish civil defence authorities with the same problems as are being encountered in other countries: whether or not to put the whole civil defence system in the melting-pot. In the opinion of Arthur Dahl, Chief of Danish Civil Defence, the work on civil defence accomplished in his country up to date has by no means been in vain. The fundamental civil defence services built up during the war and developed since then on the basis of war-time experience must remain the groundwork on which modern civil defence must rest. While a major war would certainly start with the

heaviest nuclear attacks, it is, many people think, likely gradually to pass on to the use of more conventional weapons; it is also assumed that Denmark would again be occupied by one of the belligerents. The Danes reason that, especially in the case of an occupation, certain simple protective measures must exist which the population can carry out on its own. If the people are allowed to remain in the territory, mobile columns and complicated evacuation schemes would be outside the range of practical possibility and the civil defence services so far established should therefore not be scrapped. The position today is that the basis for any civil defence, an effectual warning and communication service, is fully developed. Command centres and regional centres in all important towns are located in underground concrete shelters outside the built-up areas, but so far rural districts have no primitive warning system in connection with a possible radium fall-out. In the view of the authorities, radical civil defence measures ought to be set in motion in case of any grave political tension, even if the Government may be sharply criticized should they prove to have been unnecessary. In the case of Copenhagen it is assumed that there will probably be no warning period whatsoever before a major attack, and even elsewhere the period may only be a few minutes. Therefore the greatest importance is attached to a combination of evacuation and shelters.

Work on evacuation started in 1938, but new and up-to-date directions were issued in 1951. In each police district an evacuation section has been set up, whose plans cover—as far as this is possible—any situation that may arise. Space forbids the consideration here of any but the plans for Greater Copenhagen. There it is assumed that (i) a spontaneous flight, possibly in panic, may take place; (ii) a tactical evacuation may be ordered at once, before, during, or after an attack; or (iii) orders at longer notice may be possible. If all public means of transport are available, a removal of 80,000 persons per hour is estimated as possible, excluding those thousands who have their own means of transport. Most evacuees will have to be satisfied with only primitive accommodation.

As regards shelters, the aim is to provide shelters for the entire population in peace time. Consequently all newly constructed buildings in the towns have to contain splinter-proof cellars, and these shelters now exist in large numbers on the outskirts of towns. Old buildings naturally have no such shelters, but the law provides that the authorities may demand that they should be established.

On the other hand the Civil Defence Directorate itself must provide public shelters corresponding in number to about 25 per cent of the population in densely built-up areas of towns. These shelters have to be more soundly built than the splinter shelters. At present half of the shelter programme has been carried out, and shelters exist for more than 250,000 persons.

Apart from these two schemes there is the personal service, which consists of (*a*) self-protection of the population, organized both in towns and country, with special attention to the protection of plant, which is compulsory and must be paid for by the owner; (*b*) Municipal Civil Defence, which is paid for by the Government and comprises the customary services, including fire-fighting service; and (*c*) the State Civil Defence (Mobile) Corps, also called mobile columns. These are stationed outside the large towns, i.e. in comparative safety, and can be put into operation in an emergency. They represent the central factor of civil defence and—under the Civil Defence Act of 1949—consist of three brigades, each of three columns, and a Civil Defence Academy for the training of superior officers. The men drafted into the corps are conscripted on a par with men of the armed forces and are trained for twelve months in the handling of modern civil defence equipment. Women have lately been trained on a voluntary basis, mainly in radio and telephone service and as drivers. Another interesting feature is that arrangements have been made for the inspection of all agricultural produce etc. in case of fall-out.

NORTHERN JUTLAND

In conclusion, a few words may be said about that little-known part of Denmark, Northern Jutland. The average Englishman who visits Denmark usually travels through the centre of Jutland, from Esbjerg to Fredericia, and thence through the island of Funen on to Copenhagen; but few venture right up to the north of the Jutland peninsula. Few, too, are aware that every year on 4 July the American Independence Day is celebrated in the Danish-American National Park of Rebild, some sixteen miles south of Aalborg, far up in the Jutland peninsula but the fourth largest and one of the most progressive towns in the whole of the Danish kingdom. A trip from Fredericia by the main railway to Aalborg passes the beautiful port and university town of Aarhus, on the Baltic. The university of Aarhus was founded only in 1928 and is a private institution, supported by the State and coming

under the Ministry of Education, with some 1,500 students.

But while Aarhus is a town well worth seeing, it is Aalborg that will most reward the visitor. Strictly speaking the peninsula of Jutland ends at Aalborg, for it is cut here by the Linfjord and the country to the north can only be reached by a bridge. Up to the second half of the nineteenth century there was a slim land barrier to the west which shut off the fjord from the North Sea, but a violent storm broke the barrier down. At present a movement is on foot to have the gap in the west closed and turn the fjord once again into a fresh-water fjord, which would be welcomed by the fishermen living along it. Aalborg is generally best known as the source of the famous Danish Akvavit, the spirits drunk as 'snaps' which is produced there; but it is also a lively port and a thriving industrial town, whose municipal authorities are trying to keep in the lead by offering excellent working conditions for new industries. Thus the town plan, which covers developments for the next fifty years, sets aside 750 acres for new industrial districts and for the further development of Aalborg harbour. The town itself, a mixture of old and new buildings, has the distinction of being the only town in Denmark which has set up a 'Traffic School for Children' where children are given practical lessons in road sense. The school covers an area of 3,500 square yards, divided into streets, where every situation which may arise in adult urban traffic can be reconstructed. It is run by the police traffic department, and children from the ages of seven to twelve are taught during regular school hours how to behave in traffic. All of them are given something to do—some drive a car or ride a scooter or bicycle, others are pedestrians, road workers, or even proud policemen. At the end of the lessons experienced policemen tell the children what mistakes they made. It is claimed that the effects of the school can already be seen in the reduced number of accidents.

The last biggish town on the Baltic side of North Jutland is Frederikshavn, whence steamers sail to Sweden and Norway, and from where a narrow-gauge railway runs to the Skaw (Skagen) at the northernmost tip of Jutland where the Baltic and the North Sea meet. Here is no rocky Land's End or John o' Groat's, for the coast is flat and sandy. But there seems to be a constant wind, and the loneliness of this outpost of the Danish kingdom is most impressive, with ships large and small passing by from East and West, from the Soviet Union, Norway, England, or Germany, and fishing-smacks plying their trade on the horizon. A. H. H.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 No. 10 October 1957

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Notes of the Month

Arrests and Deportations in Singapore and Ghana

MANY critics observed that the independence of Ghana would release tensions that had been controlled under colonial rule, and it was expected that Dr Nkrumah would take a 'tough' line. The Ghana Citizenship law, enacted last April, defined citizenship very narrowly and enabled the Government to treat a large number of persons as aliens and thus subject to deportation orders. The 'tough' policy was inaugurated at the end of July with action against critics of the Government whose views were held to be subversive. On 31 July the deputy editor of the *Daily Graphic*, Mr Timothy, was deported to Sierra Leone, and orders were issued for the deportation to Nigeria of two Moslem Ashanti leaders whose citizenship of Ghana was challenged. These orders were followed by court proceedings at Kumasi where Mr Geoffrey Bing, Q.C., described as Dr Nkrumah's constitutional adviser, appeared for the Government. On 12 August Mr Justice Smith refused to grant injunctions against the deportation orders, but it was understood by the two Moslem leaders that the orders were not to be enforced while further proceedings were pending. Meanwhile, there had been a stirring of opinion in the world outside. The Commonwealth Press Union made a protest in moderate terms against the expulsion of Mr Timothy and this was followed by a similar protest from the International Press Institute at Zürich.

While the world's press was showing some anxiety about the trend of events in Ghana, another series of executive actions that seemed arbitrary was being taken in Singapore. Under the new Constitution the maintenance of order at Singapore was a responsibility of the Chief Minister, Mr Lim Yew Hock, and it was by his authority that thirty-nine members of the People's Action Party (and two more a few days later) were arrested and detained on the night of 22 August. So far only one of them has been brought to trial, for possessing subversive documents. The arrests were justified in a White Paper issued the following day, which drew

attention to Communist plans for the infiltration of the People's Action Party and for the preparation of a Communist *coup d'état* on the lines which have been so shamefully familiar in other countries. Not much direct evidence was produced, nor can it be in a society like Singapore which lives so near the brink of Communist terrorism. While the English-language press has supported the Government's action, not without misgivings, the trade unions, some of whose leaders are among the forty-one persons arrested, have made protests. On 12 September the matter was raised in the Legislative Assembly by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who was hampered both by the blow which had been struck at his organization, the People's Action Party, and by unwillingness to defend the Communists. According to the press reports his protests were ineffective and Mr Lim Yew Hock's defence of the Government's policy was complete. Under the existing law the arrested persons may be detained for two years, but may appeal to a tribunal after six months' detention. It can hardly be an accident that this blow to the Communist organization in Singapore was struck just when Malaya was attaining independence. At any rate the Prime Minister of Malaya has expressed his satisfaction at the arrests.

In Ghana, on the other hand, a Communist threat is not evident and several ministers have remarked upon the good order in the country. Dr Nkrumah has insisted that his actions are legal and are even intended to protect the Courts from insult. On 19 August an action was begun at Accra against Mr Colvin, the representative of the London *Daily Telegraph*, for contempt of court in his comments on the deportation proceedings. Two days later Dr Nkrumah announced a new policy strengthening the authority of his Government in various ways. In spite of vehement protests from the Opposition in the House, and undeterred by riots in the streets, he rushed through Parliament a Bill enabling the Minister of the Interior to carry out the deportations. 'No order made under this Act,' ran one of its provisions, 'shall be subject to appeal or to review in any court.' Mr Edusei was appointed Minister of the Interior, and Mr Bing Attorney-General.

When the *Daily Telegraph* case came into court it took the form of a verbal duel between Mr C. Shawcross, as counsel for Mr Colvin, and Mr Bing. The action was stopped and Mr Colvin was awarded damages on the ground that the case was outside the jurisdiction of the Accra Court and should have been heard at Kumasi. Further legal proceedings ensued, and when Mr Colvin and his

counsel paid a temporary visit to Nigeria the former was, at first, prevented from going and the latter, having gone, was prevented from coming back. There was now a general chorus of protest against the enlarged use of executive powers in Ghana, not only from external critics but from the Christian Council of Churches and the Bar Association within the country. To these objections Dr Nkrumah made replies in moderate terms, quoting the case of Archbishop Makarios as a precedent for his action. On 17 September the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations expressed, through the U.K. High Commissioner in Ghana, his 'concern' at the exclusion of Mr Shawcross.

The German Monetary Position

WESTERN Germany's persistent creditor position in the European Payments Union has been an embarrassment ever since 1952. It is one aspect of a favourable over-all balance of payments, and the country's monetary reserves have been swollen beyond any reasonable need. From time to time there has been talk of raising the dollar-value of the mark in order to remedy this state of things. And the recent devaluation of the French franc has called attention to the whole question of the relative values of money units. The prospect of a rise in the German rates of exchange has evoked a speculative movement.

To understand the German position, it is necessary to go back some way into the past. The German monetary reform of 1948 had to deal with a breakdown as complete as that of 1923. Prices and wages had been controlled since 1936, and in principle wages were still being held at the rates prevailing in that year. But wartime inflation had flooded the country with money, of which only insignificant amounts could be spent on available supplies at controlled prices. Black markets offering goods at exorbitant prices did not suffice to keep money moving, and the monetary reform of 1948 swept away the existing currency and issued to the holders in its place minimal quantities of notes and bank deposits.

The subsequent task of re-creating the money supply developed on the banks, and bank advances increased from DM.1,339 million in July 1948 to DM.18,274 million in December 1950. So lavish a creation of purchasing power gave rise to excess spending and attracted an excess of imports. In the European Payments Union, which had just been set up to clear balances between Western European countries and to allow limited credits to debtor

countries, Germany became a debtor beyond the permitted limit.

Remedial measures were agreed on between Germany and the O.E.E.C. The re-discount rate was raised from 4 to 6 per cent, the prescribed reserve requirements of the commercial banks were raised, and other credit restrictions were imposed. The adverse balance of payments in 1950 had been due to excess spending. Excess spending requires supplies of money, and, if cash balances run short, they have to be supplemented by borrowing. The tight credit applied in Germany restricted the supply of money and successfully quelled the excess spending. The creation of money through bank advances was slowed down. After about two years the pressure could be safely relaxed, but the stock of money in Germany (currency plus bank deposits) has remained ever since much below the normal proportion of the national income, by comparison with pre-war Germany or other industrial nations at the present time. The adverse balance of payments was transformed into a favourable balance.

The German banking system is very responsive to the influence of the central bank (lately reconstituted as the Deutsche Bundesbank), because the assets of the banks are nearly all commercial bills and advances, with little admixture of Government securities.

It is remarkable that the condition of tight credit, far from causing depression or unemployment in Germany, has synchronized with a notable improvement in employment. The heavy load of unemployment, which arose from the influx of many millions of refugees from beyond the Iron Curtain, has been absorbed, and the numbers employed in industry have increased by 60 per cent since 1948. The explanation of this surprisingly favourable employment situation is that the existing rates of exchange undervalue the German money unit, so that German costs are kept artificially low in relation to world prices.

The German wage level in 1948 was a survival from the wage freeze of 1936, with but little subsequent adaptation to changes in world conditions which had caused American and British wage levels to be by then more than doubled. The German wage level has, it is true, risen since 1948: average hourly earnings in manufacturing industry have increased from 105 pfennigs to 194, or by 85 per cent. But during the same period American hourly earnings have risen by a further 50 per cent and British by still more. Thus low labour costs were the explanation of the intense demand for

labour which raised the numbers employed in German industry by 60 per cent in eight years.

An under-valued money unit is of little advantage in the export trade of a country which is fully employed, for it sells its exports cheap and has no surplus productive power to extend them. But Germany started in 1948 with a huge surplus productive power in the form of unemployed labour, and German exports have trebled in volume since that year. A state of full employment, however, has now been reached, and the effect of the under-valuation of the money unit will soon be felt not so much in a further expansion of exports as in the pressure of excess demand—uncompleted orders, delayed deliveries, scarcity of labour, rising wages. An up-valuation of the mark would avoid these complications. But the German Government recently (20 August) issued a formal denial of any such intention. And undeniably up-valuation is a process only to be undertaken with caution. Some producers who may have been tempted into export markets by the under-valuation would be driven out of business by any substantial rise in rates of exchange. But if rates remain unchanged rising wages will eventually have the same result.

The devaluation of the French franc was not only the signal for speculation in a rise in the German mark. There also started a speculation against the British pound, based on the crude view that devaluation must necessarily be the appropriate remedy for a weakness in the balance of payments. When an adverse balance is caused by excessive costs, devaluation is the cure. But it may be caused by lax credit and excessive spending, even when costs are unduly low. The contrast between Germany's favourable balance of payments and the weakness of Great Britain is to be explained by the policy of tight credit followed by the former, and the very half-hearted measures resorted to by the latter. Does the sharp rise of bank rate by two points on 19 September point to a real change in this respect?

Frustration in Washington

The President and Congress

THE decline in President Eisenhower's authority and prestige has been the most striking development this year in the United States. Last January he was inaugurated for his second four years of office with all the glory of an overwhelming popular victory upon him—a glory which was his alone, not his party's, since the American voters had elected a Democratic Congress at the same time as they had chosen a Republican President. At the end of August, as the first session of this Eighty-Fifth Congress was ending, the people of Wisconsin demonstrated that dissatisfaction with Mr Eisenhower's ineffectiveness, long current in Washington, had for the first time penetrated down to the ordinary citizen. The state had not had a Democratic Senator for twenty-five years, but to fill the late Mr McCarthy's seat the voters, by a large majority, preferred a Democrat, Mr Proxmire, to a liberal Republican who fought as a loyal supporter of President Eisenhower and all his works.

The real significance of this result is not, as the Democrats claim, that it makes certain their victory in next year's congressional elections, but that it shows a widening split in the Republican Party. Mr Proxmire owed his success mainly to the fact that the conservative Republicans in Wisconsin stayed away from the polls rather than vote for an Eisenhower man. This will strengthen the case of right-wing Republicans all over the country when it comes to choosing candidates and issues for next year's contests. And it will make it even more difficult than it already was for Mr Eisenhower to 'modernize' the Republican Party—his avowed purpose when he accepted a second term of office.

It is not easy to put a finger on the reasons for the decline in Mr Eisenhower's influence. One, which affects the politicians rather than the public, is that he cannot run for election again in 1960; he is the first President subject to the constitutional amendment, ratified in 1951, which forbids a third presidential term and he is therefore already on the way out. Another reason is that he has been reluctant to impose his authority on his own officials. His habit of appointing men whom he believes—either from personal experience or, more often, from the advice of his assistants—to be able, and then trusting them to do their job, has meant that there have

been public differences of executive opinion, even at Cabinet level, over the administration's policies, notably over the Budget. Yet these have not been followed by the dismissal of the men concerned; the recent changes in high places, notably the resignations of the Secretaries of Defence and of the Treasury, are genuinely because both Mr Wilson and Mr Humphrey wish to return to private business, not because the President wished to replace them.

The impression that the President is not really in control of the country's Government has been increased by the frequency with which, at his press conferences in particular, he has appeared ignorant of matters of immediate public concern. This has sometimes gone too far to be excused by the admittedly over-heavy burden which an American President has to carry and the impossibility of keeping one man in touch with all the activities of the executive branch of the Government. President Eisenhower seems to take little interest in political matters, but leaves them to subordinates. He does not fight for his domestic programmes—for federal aid for education, for changes in the immigration laws, and so on—or at least he puts up no sustained fight for them. He has not backed up the 'modern Republicans' who work for his programmes in Congress; as a result they feel let down and cannot be relied upon to work for him again during the coming pre-election session which begins in January, when it will be even harder than it was this year to get Congress to do what the President wants.

The President's bad relations with the Legislature cannot be explained by the fact that the opposition party is in control there. Mr Eisenhower's policies appeal to many Democratic Congressmen as much as, if not more than, they do to many Republicans; it is from the right wing of his own party that the most sustained objections usually come. In the Senate the President has often had more co-operation from Mr Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic leader there, than from Senator Knowland, the conservative Republican who heads the minority. Under the American system, with lax party discipline and with legislation drafted by congressional committees as much as by executive agencies, a fresh coalition has to be built up to get each important Bill through Congress, especially when majorities are as narrow as at present—50 Democrats to 46 Republicans in the Senate, 234 to 201 in the House of Representatives. To organize and cement these coalitions requires the concentrated attention of the President and his assistants—meetings with and favours for key Congressmen,

telephone encouragement before vital votes, constant lobbying—and this is a task which the White House has been neglecting.

All of these presidential faults were at their most obvious during the lengthy battle over the Budget for 1957–8, around which centred much of the controversy during this year's congressional session. The annual Budget is the American President's most concrete statement of what he thinks must be done during the coming year; Congress expresses its approval or disapproval in the form of detailed appropriations for each item apart from those, such as interest on the national debt, which are fixed. But, last January, Mr Eisenhower, apparently shocked by the discovery that he was asking for more than had ever before been requested in peace-time, $73 billion, tacitly confessed that he had no faith in his own calculations: first, he allowed his Secretary of the Treasury, the official who after himself had the fullest responsibility for the Budget, to say that he considered it too large; then the President invited Congress to cut it if it could. After that, in deference to the popular wave of economizing fervour which swept the country, largely as a result of the encouragement which he himself had given it, Mr Eisenhower announced that he could do with less than he had originally requested for a number of purposes, notably for defence and for foreign aid. When it became clear that these concessions were only stimulating Congress to cut funds for these programmes still further, Mr Eisenhower belatedly brought pressure to bear on his supporters in Congress and, more important, appealed on television to the American people to halt a trend which, in his view, was endangering the security of the country. But when, as a result of this, the Senate had been induced to restore some of the military money and was insisting that the House of Representatives must acquiesce, the Department of Defence tactlessly chose this moment to announce yet another cut in its spending.

It is not surprising that the final appropriation for defence was fixed at well below the Senate's figure and well below what the President had asked, and that the Senators who had stood up for him so firmly on this occasion were not prepared to risk a similar betrayal when it came to appropriating funds for the Mutual Security programme. As a result the President has been given only $2·8 billion in new money—he has several billion dollars more in hand—to spend on foreign aid, an amount which he insists is inadequate. More serious, he has not been allowed, as he and his

experts wished, to put the programme on the continuing long-term basis which would have made it a more effective and reliable source of strength for the free world. Even the President's efforts to appease Congress and the country by holding down military outlays may backfire, as a consequence of the Russian success with an intercontinental ballistic missile: American expenditure on developing these particular weapons is, in fact, going up but the Democrats will certainly contend that it should rise much more sharply if the United States is not to remain at a permanent disadvantage in this vital field. This is an emotional issue which affects the pride as well as the safety of the country.

It is noticeable that much of the criticism of the President is now concentrating on the two subjects on which he is an acknowledged expert—defence and foreign affairs—and about which he has strong views. He may have lost what little interest he ever had in domestic matters, he may have given up hope of rebuilding the Republican Party, but he is certainly still determined to establish world peace on a firmer basis before he leaves office. The great achievement with which the congressional session began was the passage of the Middle East resolution, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, which authorized the provision of economic and military aid on a more generous basis and, more important, the use of American armed force to help any Middle Eastern country which requested such assistance, if its independence was threatened by aggression from international Communism. But by the time the session ended the inadequacies of this doctrine as a method of preserving peace had been exposed by the Russian infiltration of Syria: the Communist threat there came from inside, not from an outside aggressor, and no one in Syria asked for American help.

Congress's other major accomplishment in the field of foreign affairs at this session was to approve American membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency and thus to bring into being this medium for co-operation in peaceful use of nuclear power which had first been proposed by President Eisenhower himself. But even here Congress's distrust of giving more power to the President led it to limit the amounts of uranium which he can give to the new agency without legislative approval.

Congress did not even consider American membership in another agency almost equally dear to the President—the International Trade Organization. Moreover, there are ominous signs that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the legislation under

which American tariffs have been progressively lowered, will run into serious difficulty when it comes up for renewal next year. This will be an election year and also one in which, from present indications, there may be an economic recession; both of these circumstances will strengthen the hands of the protectionists. Already recently they have had a number of successes—the imposition of what, even if they are called 'voluntary', are nevertheless restrictions on imports of oil, quotas on imports of woollen textiles, the probability that higher duties will be levied on foreign lead and zinc before long. All of this is especially depressing for other countries since during 1957 American imports have in any case been rising much less fast than have exports, with the result that the old dollar gap has reappeared in the international accounts—and this time there is no prospect of it being filled by another injection of foreign aid.

This would not be so serious if there were any immediate prospect of a renewed buoyancy in the American economy which would bring with it a renewed buoyancy in the demand for goods from abroad. But at present there is little sign of the autumn upturn in economic activity which had been forecast earlier in the year. It looks more and more—although it is too soon to be certain—as if 1957's 'rolling readjustment' along a statistical plateau will continue until well into 1958. In a country which has become accustomed to a steady expansion, the psychological effects of such a check could be serious, as stock prices on Wall Street have recently been suggesting, even though a high level of prosperity is maintained and even though a real depression, in terms of the nineteen-thirties, is a practical impossibility under today's conditions.

This year's check to expansion is blamed by the Democrats, and by an increasing number of business men, on the Administration's—or rather on the central bank's—tight credit policy which continues to push up the cost of borrowing money. But the authorities argue that such restrictions are essential if inflationary pressures are not to get out of control; unfortunately, however, they have not been effective in controlling the cost of living, which has risen steadily during the past year—a factor which helped the Democratic candidate in the Wisconsin election. These contradictory economic trends are naturally being studied by Congress, which for some time has had committees inquiring into both monetary policy and the price situation. Another congressional investigation which will also continue to fill the headlines, although it will

hardly pay the Democrats such satisfactory political dividends, is that into crime and corruption in the trade-union movement.

While the past session of Congress seemed to spend more time on investigation than on legislation, and while from the President's point of view its record was unsatisfactory, it nevertheless did deal with a quantity of domestic matters. Some of them seemed rather parochial—permission was given to New York State to develop the hydro-electric potential at the Niagara Falls; some of them were accomplished inadequately—the Immigration Bill did not make any permanent provision for the Hungarian refugees; some of them were considered mainly as a means of embarrassing the President —the Government was told to build nuclear reactors to produce industrial power, instead of leaving this to private enterprise. But there was one great achievement in the session: the passage of a Civil Rights Bill, designed to protect the voting rights of Negroes in the southern states, the first such legislation to get through the Senate for over eighty years, since immediately after the Civil War.

Here again, vacillation by the President almost lost him the only piece of domestic legislation on which he had set his heart at this session. At a late stage in the debate the discovery that one clause of the Bill gave the Government far wider powers than had been realized, even by the President himself, and the suspicion that the Department of Justice was trying to 'pull a fast one' on Congress, put a serious obstacle in the way of the Bill in the Senate, where its chances were in any case poor because of the dominant influence of Southerners in that body. When the offending clause had been dropped, a complicated legal argument arose over whether those accused of interfering with voting by Negroes had a right to trial by jury. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, a Bill was approved which was much less strong than the one which the President originally proposed but which, if administered with intelligence and determination, should enable the voting strength of Negroes in the South to develop until they become an effective political force in the region. Such a development should eventually end the problem of racial inequality there by making the present discrimination politically impossible.

In Washington the significance of the Civil Rights Bill lies in the fact that it was achieved without splitting the Democratic Party; it showed that the Southerners had realized that if they killed this moderate Bill, on which so many concessions had been made to their point of view, they would lose what sympathy they had in the

country at large and eventually have something much worse thrust upon them. But since Congress adjourned it has become clear that the extremists in the South feel that they have been deserted by their representatives in Washington and are desperately bitter about it. This has much to do with the disappointing new outbreaks of agitation against racial integration in the schools; these accompanied the opening of a new school year in which a few more communities on the borders of the Deep South are beginning to mix a few carefully selected Negro children with white pupils, in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States that segregation in education must be abolished with 'all deliberate speed'.

The negotiation of a satisfactory compromise on the civil rights issue was almost entirely due to the tireless generalship of Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas, the political hero of the last few months. In spite of his serious heart attack some time ago, he is at the moment the favourite candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960. But the civil rights debate enhanced the reputations of two leading Republican possibilities as well—the only potential candidates that party has produced so far, and both from California: Senator Knowland, who worked as hard for a compromise as did Mr Johnson, and the Vice President, Mr Nixon, who necessarily kept behind the scenes but nevertheless managed to let everyone who mattered know what he was doing. The next presidential election is too far off for such speculation to be worth much, but one thing is sure: if the present feeling of frustration in Washington—and with Washington—persists, the American people will be looking for a man who is prepared to govern effectively, for the leader whom they thought they had chosen when they elected General Eisenhower.

N. B.

The Uneasy Truce in Cyprus

It is six months since E.O.K.A. offered to suspend operations on condition that Archbishop Makarios was released from the Seychelles. News that the British Government had decided on his release, which was announced in the House of Commons on

28 March, met with wild jubilation on the part of Cypriot Greeks. Relief that the long ordeal of violence and counter-measures was now over played as great a part in Cypriot rejoicings as devotion to his Beatitude. For about two months Cypriots relaxed. Restrictions were eased. Soldiers no longer carried guns; goodwill flowed between them and the local community. Trade revived and outwardly life reverted almost to normality. But this carefree mood was soon to be replaced by anxiety, for as the weeks went by it became increasingly obvious that no political settlement was in sight. Hopes were finally dashed at the end of May when the British Government rejected Archbishop Makarios's offer to take part in bilateral talks on behalf of the Cypriot people.

In his letter to the Prime Minister, Mr Macmillan, Archbishop Makarios accused the British Government of failing to observe the last United Nations resolution[1] on Cyprus, which had called for a peaceful, democratic, and just solution and the resumption of negotiations. Nevertheless, he was prepared to take part in talks with Britain on condition that the emergency measures, including the ban on his return to Cyprus, were ended. But the British Government saw no possibility of progress on this basis, especially in the light of the Archbishop's record since his release from the Seychelles. The Archbishop had publicly rejected the Radcliffe Constitution and the N.A.T.O. offer of mediation, and had refused to recognize the right of the Turks to a say in the island's future. Moreover, he had failed to disassociate himself unequivocally from terrorism, and this, in the view of the British Government, was of paramount importance. In a reply made through the British Ambassador in Athens on 30 May, the British Government denied that it had failed to 'create an atmosphere of peace'[2] and made the inevitable counter-charges against the Archbishop. Faced with this deadlock, Cypriots resigned themselves to an uneasy peace. Much as many of them might desire a settlement, local political initiative in favour of moderation was paralysed by the power of Makarios, which was greater than at any other time. Firmly entrenched in Athens and surrounded by extremists, he managed to exert long-range but effective control over the island's political life. His strength could be measured by the fact that even the leftists, formerly represented by the banned A.K.E.L.[3] party, came out in full support of the Ethnarchy line.

[1] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1013, of 26 February 1957.
[2] ibid. [3] Reform Party of the Working People.

POLITICAL UNREST

Masked men, aping the tactics of the terrorists, continued to pay off old scores throughout the summer. But no political motives were attributed to these crimes. E.O.K.A. itself abstained from violence apart from attacks against the left (which did not start until August) and an incident at Prastio in which a British officer was wounded. At the time of the truce offer the terrorists had suffered heavy defeats and were urgently in need of a breathing-space in which to regroup. The Cypriot public, irrespective of its support for *Enosis*, was strongly opposed to a renewal of violence with its certainty of counter-measures such as house curfews, which were unbearable during the extreme heat of summer. Any breach of the truce would, therefore, have to be appropriately timed with some British 'provocation' if public support was to be obtained. Violence, moreover, would have been inconsistent with the line which Greece was expected to adopt during the forthcoming appeal to the United Nations—namely that while E.O.K.A. had observed the last U.N. resolution Britain had failed to do so by continuing anti-terrorist measures. On the political front, however, E.O.K.A. became increasingly active. And the background of restlessness and uncertainty created by the lack of a political settlement provided an easy field for its efforts. Directives were publicized mainly through P.E.K.A.,[1] the political wing of the terrorist organization. Demands centred on the return of the Archbishop, the release of all detainees, and the end of the Emergency Laws. P.E.K.A. repeatedly claimed that only the Ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios, had the right to represent the Cypriots, and that any settlement must be negotiated by the British directly with him. Leaflets remained as aggressive as ever in tone and sometimes contained threats of renewed violence. Parents were 'warned' not to send their children to the new Government schools which were being built under the £38 million development programme. The E.O.K.A. leaflet published below is typical of these attacks:

NOTE CIRCULATED TO PARENTS IN NICOSIA[2]

E.O.K.A.

With regret we have observed your anti-national behaviour in sending your child to the Technical School where our enemies may corrupt his

[1] Political Committee for the Cyprus Struggle (Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos).

[2] 14 July 1957.

spirit with their propaganda. There exist our own proper schools which offer Greek culture and education.

If you do not decide to transfer your child to a Greek school then you and your child will be branded as common traitors. Your own name and that of your child will be published so that you will be despised by the people and condemned wherever you may be.

There is still time.

E.O.K.A.

The main objectives of the E.O.K.A. leaders at this time were to keep the issue alive, to create friction between the Cypriots and the security forces, and to sustain the grip of intimidation. Memorial services to dead terrorists became a regular feature of village life. On these emotional occasions portraits of the deceased were displayed and patriotic poems extolling the 'glories' of E.O.K.A. were recited by boys and girls over the coffins. As a precaution against disorders, troops were usually sent to the area and the villages cordoned off. Despite the presence of about 35,000 troops, ever-increasing numbers of Cypriots were encouraged to defy the authorities by slogan writing and other illegal activities. The risk of clashes with the security forces was greatly intensified. Relying solely on subversive means of communication, P.E.K.A. called a general strike for 25 May in protest against the Government's refusal to release the detainees and end the emergency. The majority of Cypriots were anxious to make up for time and money lost when terrorism was at its height. Strikes other than labour disputes were still illegal, and it was a glum population which shut its shops in Nicosia and Limassol. Elsewhere the response was also poor. The significance of the event was the fact that a people reluctant to strike should have preferred to risk prosecution by the authorities rather than ignore E.O.K.A.-inspired orders.

Towards the end of the summer E.O.K.A. resumed violence, mainly through attacks on left-wing and Communist Cypriots, who were accused of treachery and collaboration with the 'Anglo-Turks'. The E.O.K.A. leader, Colonel Grivas,[1] an extreme reactionary and a religious fanatic, suffers from an almost pathological phobia of Communists. The motives for these attacks, however, are not yet clear. The explanation may lie in the desire to advertise the inherently anti-Communist character of the terrorist organization in order to impress American opinion at a time when Archbishop Makarios was about to start campaigning for the cause in the United States. Alternatively the terrorist leaders may

[1] Pseudonym 'Dighenis'.

have decided that it was now necessary to silence and discredit their hereditary opponents. For, despite some loss of popularity to E.O.K.A. which is probably only temporary, the Cypriot left wing, with its admirable record in labour and municipal affairs, constitutes for the long term the only serious challenge to the Nationalists in the local struggle for power.

In public the mayors, trade-union leaders, and other notable personalities faithfully followed P.E.K.A.'s political lead. In private the suggestions made for amendments to the Radcliffe Constitution showed that by no means all Cypriots had lost interest in self-government. Hopes were expressed that a moderate left-wing party would eventually develop in the place of the banned A.K.E.L., which was Communist dominated. But responsible Cypriots advised that no such initiative would be possible in the absence of the Archbishop. The first step towards breaking the deadlock was to allow him back in the island. The measure, they argued, entailed no risks now that the great majority of the people were strongly opposed to violence. But, with Grivas and other known terrorist leaders at large, the Cyprus authorities were unwilling to take the risk. Moreover, the return of the Archbishop at this stage was certain to inflame the Turks, and the likelihood of new communal riots could not be dismissed.

The Turks had become more active on the political front than ever before. The release of Archbishop Makarios had created grave misgivings as to Britain's intentions, and his subsequent statements also contributed to a hardening of the Turkish attitude. Early in May, Dr Kutchuk, the political leader of the Turkish Cypriots, returned from a long visit to Turkey and, with Ankara's full support, insisted that partition at an early date was now the only solution. Turkish impatience was accelerated by the fear that a British Labour Government in a year or two might concede Greek demands. Privately Turks stated that they would only give up the idea of partition if the Greeks abandoned all claims for self-determination, which, to quote a prominent Turkish spokesman, was 'just another word for *Enosis*'. Alternative demarcation lines and plans for compensation were now regular topics of conversation in Turkish circles. No compulsory exchange of populations was envisaged. But the Turkish communities are dispersed throughout the island; and there is no obvious dividing line. It was likely that many families from both communities would want to move. Mountain villagers, for instance, were unsuited to life in the

plains; and many difficulties would arise. But the Turks insisted that, whatever the hardships involved in partition, anything was preferable to Greek rule. At the beginning of June all the Turkish Municipal Councillors resigned, on the grounds that the rights of Turkish citizens were not effectively protected in the Councils owing to the fact that Greeks had the majority and were 'turning the Municipal Councils into political organizations in order to achieve their own political aspirations. . .' Taken at face value the move was untimely, since the Cyprus Government was about to publish recommendations by an expert on municipal problems which were believed to contain better safeguards for the Turks. This sudden gesture was, thus, generally interpreted as an attempt to illustrate the impossibility of co-operating with the Greeks in any form of self-government, such as the Radcliffe Constitution, where they had the majority. At the end of July, Dr Kutchuk, fortified by another visit to Turkey, stated at a press conference in Nicosia that under partition Turkey would claim all the section north of the 35th parallel—about half the island. (The Turks formed 18 per cent of the total population when the last census was made in 1946.) All that could be said in favour of such wild demands was that they left plenty of room for eventual retreat without any loss of face.

Relations between the British administration and the Cypriot Greek leaders were also strained. The gulf was widened by an acrimonious and protracted exchange of letters between the Administrative Secretary, Mr John Reddaway, and the Greek mayors on the question of violence. In response to persistent requests that the detainees should be released, Mr Reddaway first challenged the mayors in May to denounce violence and publicly proclaim that in the event of renewed terrorism they would support the security forces. Three of the mayors were extreme leftists. Past failure to give active support to E.O.K.A. had cost the left wing considerable popularity. At a time when its leaders were trying to retrieve their position it was unrealistic to expect them to commit themselves openly to an anti-terrorist line. The denunciation of violence would, moreover, have been tantamount to a denunciation of E.O.K.A., which was still basking in the aura of 'resistance'. In the absence of a lead from the Archbishop, no Cypriot was likely to risk such provocative tactics. Much embarrassed, the mayors evaded the issue in their reply—only to be censured by the Cyprus Government for 'condoning the use of terrorism as a political

weapon'. A widespread lack of confidence in the administration, which was intensified by such misunderstandings, led to repeated demands that a British parliamentary delegation should visit Cyprus, but these appeals were to no avail.

ILL-TREATMENT

Tension mounted as the result of a campaign alleging ill-treatment by the security forces. Such allegations were not new, and were first broadcast by Athens Radio in the summer of 1955. But the campaign, which was intensified after two British officers were convicted by court martial in April 1956 of assaulting a Cypriot during interrogation, did not reach its peak until a few months ago. This aroused suspicions that its main objective was to replace terrorism as a means of keeping Cyprus in the news and discrediting the British. Other factors may also have been responsible. First, Cypriots who had betrayed the cause could only hope to justify their actions in the eyes of their compatriots by pleading torture. Secondly, under terrorist conditions the Crown when prosecuting frequently had to rely on prisoners' confessions and statements, owing to the difficulty of bringing witnesses to court. It automatically followed that defending counsel would seek to get such evidence rejected as inadmissible on the ground that it was obtained under duress or by means of some other irregularity Rough handling necessary to effect the arrest of armed men, or in the heat of the moment, was officially admitted. Most observers agreed that the troops on the whole showed restraint under conditions of great provocation. Men in the security forces, nevertheless, felt that they sometimes got a raw deal as far as allegations of ill-treatment were concerned. The judges in the Special Court would sometimes listen to long sagas of brutality involving a specific man, and then decide that these allegations were irrelevant; and evidence of rebuttal would not be allowed. By this time the damage to a man's reputation had been done, especially in the absence of effective counter-action by the Cyprus Government. In one case extensive accusations were made against a British officer for alleged brutality to two detainees. The judge ruled that the accusations were irrelevant but expressed no opinion as to whether they were true or not.

The first trial of Nicos Sampson brought the whole question of ill-treatment into the limelight. Sampson, a Cypriot Greek journalist, was acquitted of the murder of a British police officer

and finally convicted of carrying a sten gun. Giving judgment in the Nicosia Special Court on 23 May, Mr Justice Shaw found that all allegations of torture were untrue, but severely censured the police for failing to provide him on arrival at Nicosia with dry clothing and immediate medical attention for injuries sustained during his struggle with them on arrest. Sampson had been made to travel face downwards from Dhali to Nicosia in a truck in drenching rain with no covering other than his shirt, trousers, and two pullovers. This 'unconscionable' treatment, Mr Shaw stated, 'raised a doubt' as to whether his confession, which formed a vital part of the Crown's evidence, was free and voluntary. The trial of Vasso Loiza also attracted much attention. Miss Loiza, who was accused of carrying letters for E.O.K.A., testified on oath that she had been beaten, stripped, and tortured by an interrogator. A British doctor stated in evidence that he had found her to be suffering from slight hysteria, that she had bruises and abrasions but no signs of serious injuries. The judge disbelieved Miss Loiza's evidence. And, since she had made no incriminating statements or confessions, her allegations of ill-treatment were dismissed as irrelevant and it was left to the Cyprus Government to refute them in a cryptic and unconvincing announcement. Other recent cases of interest in relation to ill-treatment are those of Georghios Sphongaras, Andreas Karacostas, and Michaelakis Thrassyvoulides. The Supreme Court ruling[1] in the first, and the Nicosia Special Court judgments[2] in the other two deserve to be read in full. Suspicions that Cypriot complaints, although often either exaggerated or completely false, might contain an element of truth were increased by the mysterious illness of Nicos Georghiou. He was suddenly taken seriously ill while in custody at the Platres interrogation centre. Attempts were made to save his life at Akrotiri R.A.F. hospital, but he died two days later after a brain operation. At the inquest on 28 July Mr Justice Morgan, the Coroner at Limassol, stated that death was probably caused by inter-cranial haemorrhage and purulent bronchitis occasioned by some unknown external agency of which there was no direct evidence.

The persistent refusal of the Cyprus Government to allow an independent inquiry into specific complaints created a bad im-

[1] Obtainable from the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Nicosia, upon payment of the customary fees.

[2] Obtainable from the Registrar of the Special Court, Nicosia, upon payment of the customary fees.

pression in the island and abroad. The Government's arguments[1] are summarized below:

> The Governor has publicly stated that while it would be unrealistic to rule out the use of physical force when effecting the capture of a dangerous terrorist, this was quite a different matter from calculated violence to obtain information and he has said that all allegations of this kind had been and would continue to be properly investigated. . . The Governor has also stated that at present a public inquiry would play into the hands of the detractors of Government and do more harm than good; not because Government has anything to hide, but because it would tend to focus attention on these malicious allegations which is exactly what Eoka and its supporters want. . .

Officials also opposed an inquiry because it would endanger the lives of Cypriots required to give evidence for the Government and handicap the security forces in anti-terrorist operations. Independent observers, however, believed that a suitably qualified British Commission could have obtained most of the essential information without compromising Government witnesses. And that although a public inquiry was clearly not practicable at this stage, much could have been achieved through private investigation. The discrepancies in Cypriot evidence alone would have helped to put the campaign into correct perspective.

SECURITY MEASURES

Throughout the spring and summer the Government continued security operations. Arms dumps were discovered, and new suspects were taken into custody; two terrorists were captured heavily armed. Government policy was based on the assumption that terrorism was, to quote the E.O.K.A. leader, merely 'suspended', and that it would be renewed at a politically opportune moment—possibly after the Greek Government's fourth appeal to the United Nations General Assembly, should the outcome prove unsatisfactory to the extremists. Moreover, Grivas and other terrorist leaders showed no signs of accepting the safe-conduct offer out of Cyprus. To anyone familiar with the psychology of Hellenic nationalism the offer, which by Greek standards would have involved a serious loss of face, was doomed from the start. On 23 May the fifty-four-day curfew at the mountain village of Milikouri ended. This was the longest curfew since the emergency

[1] *Allegations of Brutality in Cyprus* (Cyprus Government, Nicosia, 11 June 1957). See also reply of the Cyprus Bar Human Rights Committee, *Times of Cyprus*, 16 June 1957.

started and its object was the capture of Colonel Grivas. Tales of hardship had attracted much publicity and caused some bitterness. On the last day press correspondents were allowed into the village. Many difficulties had been experienced by the villagers at first, but as more troops were moved in escorts became available to take the people out to cultivate their fields. In the brief time allowed by the security authorities for investigation, foreign correspondents had the impression that the occupation of Milikouri had gone off smoothly and that relations between the villagers and the troops were remarkably good.

In June a scheme was started for the release of the less dangerous E.O.K.A. suspects. Those considered potentially suitable were screened for several weeks in a special camp. If finally accepted they were then sent to Pyroi Transit Camp, where restrictions are few and two Cypriot Greek officials experienced in social problems are available to advise on the many problems facing their return to normal life. The great majority of detainees have escaped trial and conviction only because of the difficulty of bringing witnesses to court under terrorism. And as long as the threat of violence exists the Government is unlikely to agree to mass releases.[1] Emergency regulations have been eased by stages. On 8 August thirty-six regulations, including the need to obtain an exit permit, were withdrawn. In practice the concession meant very little. Exit permits, a hangover from the Suez crisis, were usually more of a nuisance to the visitor in a hurry than to the Cypriot resident. Many of the Emergency Laws were duplicated in the ordinary legislation. The Detention of Persons Law, under which E.O.K.A. suspects are detained without trial, has now been extended by twelve months. Early in the autumn, however, the death sentence ceased to be mandatory for discharging firearms and throwing bombs; and life imprisonment replaced the death sentence as the maximum penalty for carrying firearms. And the death sentences on Sophocleus and Sampson were commuted to life imprisonment.

The chances of peace, nevertheless, remain uncertain. In August a major explosion, which fatally injured a terrorist, showed that Cypriot Greeks were still producing bombs. At the end of the month another explosion, which fatally injured four Turks, led to the discovery of explosives in a Turkish house, and increased fears that the Turks were contemplating an active role in the event of a second round by E.O.K.A. A defiant leaflet, circulated in Nicosia

[1] About 900 E.O.K.A suspects are at present detained.

on 8 September and signed by 'Dighenis', for the first time since the truce, showed that however much most Cypriots and even the Greek Government might desire a settlement, a hard core of fanaticism had yet to be overcome:

> . . . If it becomes necessary I shall appeal to the Greek nation and the political world of the free fatherland urging them that in view of the Anglo-Turkish conspiracy against us they should actively partake in our struggle and revise their alliances according to Greek interests alone. I am confident that my voice, the voice of a fighter well known to the Greek people, will undoubtedly be heard.[1]

N. C.

The Independent State of Laos

THE Kingdom of Laos was admitted as a member State of the United Nations in December 1955. This event for many Laotians was of great significance. It effectively symbolized for them the widespread acceptance of the attainment by their country of genuine independence and full sovereignty as a unitary State. For Laos, historically speaking, unity and independence go hand in hand, and the struggle for them is no new thing dating from the twentieth century. The importance of unity is stressed in the first article of the Lao Constitution, which states that Laos is a single indivisible Kingdom.

The earliest unit that could be termed Laos emerged in the fourteenth century A.D. as a group of small Tai states, *muongs*,[2] which had formed themselves as malignantly powerful growths upon the body of the decaying Khmer Empire. They were held together—in a sense unified—by allegiance to the rulers of Luang Prabang.[3] In 1563 the then ruler of Luang Prabang, Sai Setthathirat, moved his capital to Vientiane.[4] At this time Lao power

[1] Reuter. *The Times*, 9 September 1957.

[2] The French system of transcription of Lao terms has been used purely for reasons of convenience.

[3] Luang Prabang was known at this period as Muong Swa, Vientiane as Muong Chan, Xieng Khouang as Muong Phoueunh, North Thailand as Lan Na. The title Lan Chang, from which the romantic name Kingdom of a Million Elephants has appeared, may already have been applied to the territory claimed by Sai Setthathirat

[4] For historical accounts of Laos see: P. Le Boulanger, *Histoire du Laos français* (Paris, Plon, 1930); G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948); 'Présence du Royaume Lao', *France-Asie*, No

was at its height over a considerable area centred round the middle basin of the Mekhong river. Sai Setthathirat appears to have laid claim to large areas in what is today northern and north-eastern Thailand,[1] the Tranninh plateau, today the province of Xieng Khouang, as well as north and central Laos proper. In spite of an alliance with Siam, the growing power of Burma under Bureng Naung could not be withstood; and during the latter half of the sixteenth century this first Laos disintegrated under Burmese pressure from the west and Annamese pressure from the east.

The second Laos, the Laos of the seventeenth century, reached the zenith of its power under the great ruler Soulingavongsa. To the Lao people this period represents their Golden Age.[2] The area dominated at this time included Luang Prabang and the north, Xieng Khouang, and central and southern Laos to Khong near the present-day Cambodian border.[3] Dynastic quarrels following on the death of Soulingavongsa caused the State to disintegrate into its constituent parts, each in their disunited weakness having to pay tribute to or submit to the control of their more powerful neighbours, Annam, Burma, China, and Siam.

Soulingavongsa died *c.* 1711, and a century later Chao Anou, the ruler of Vientiane, which owed allegiance to Siam and had lately been removed from its direct control, almost succeeded in unifying Laos for a third time. He failed after a bold attack aimed at Bangkok itself. His failure was disastrous for the people of Laos. Vientiane was reoccupied by Siamese forces in 1828, and during the nineteenth century large areas of Laos were placed under Siamese administration. Chao Anou died in captivity in Bangkok and the ruler of Xieng Khouang was executed by order of the Emperor of Annam for handing the Lao leader over to Siam. The Xieng Khouang region came under Annamese control and Annamese claims later gave the French an opportunity to intervene in the area. The Ho invasions from Yunnan disturbed Siamese con-

118–19, Tome XII (Paris, 1956); Katay D. Sasorith, *Le Laos* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1953).

[1] Thailand is used in referring to the modern State of that name and Siam in its place when the reference is to a period before 1932. Tai refers to the 'race' of which the Lao like the Siamese or Thai are members, and to the language group as a whole.

[2] *A European account of this period exists, written by a Dutch merchant,* Geebaerd van Wusthof. For bibliographical note see *France-Asie*, No. 118–19, p 1153.

[3] The southern *muong* of Laos was Cham Bassac. It is now a province of the Kingdom of Laos and its ruler has renounced his hereditary claims. See Sasorith, op cit., p. 82.

trol in both north and central Laos, where Bangkok's rule, if not absolute, was nevertheless expanding northwards and eastwards. French intervention, at first ostensibly in support of the claims of the Emperor of Annam, commenced in 1885 and halted and reversed the trend towards Siamese domination.

A series of Franco-Siamese treaties between 1893 and 1907 brought into being a unified Laos for the third time, for all practical purposes as a colony of France.[1] In 1907 the frontiers of Laos became approximately what they are today.[2]

In 1945 the latest phase of the struggle for independence began. It was at first a guerrilla war of defiance against Japanese control and had its early centre in the southern provinces, where the ruler of Cham Bassac, Prince Boun Oum, aided by both Laotians and French, played a leading role. The movement for independence reached rapid maturity in a struggle against the returning French. In 1941 a protectorate treaty was signed between Marshal Pétain and King Sisavangvong of Luang Prabang. This treaty recognized the King as ruler of Luang Prabang and of Houei Sai to the north, Xieng Khouang to the east, and Vientiane to the south. The treaty provided an approach to a new unity for Laos under a sole ruler, but independence was not yet involved. The Japanese authorities, consistently with their policy in the area, prevailed upon King Sisavangvong to proclaim the independence of Laos on 8 April 1945. But on 30 August the King declared the loyalty of Laos to France.

By this time a real movement for independence had commenced in Vientiane.[3] On their part, the French were beginning to obtain a foothold in the south. In Vientiane Prince Phetsarath (viceroy and prime minister of the Luang Prabang government) declared the independence of Luang Prabang on 1 September 1945, and, on the 15th, the creation of the Kingdom of Laos under the constitutional rule of King Sisavangvong, by the fusion of the State of Luang Prabang and the four southern provinces not included in the treaty of 1941. This movement had a high degree of popular support. A provisional constitution was promulgated and a provisional government formed. This government was to be respon-

[1] In fact a distinction, more theoretical than actual, was drawn between the provinces directly administered and Luang Prabang, which was ruled through the King and a Council

[2] As a result of the Franco-Thai war of 1940–1, areas of Laos west of the Mekhong were absorbed into Thailand. These were restored to Laos in 1946

[3] For a detailed account of this period see Sasorith, op. cit., pp. 59–63.

sible to a provisional House of Representatives. King Sisavang-vong was subjected to a period of house arrest at Luang Prabang, but he eventually accepted the legality of the provisional constitution and the provisional government formed in Vientiane. He became the constitutional ruler of a unified Kingdom of Laos on 23 April 1946. One day later French troops entered Vientiane, and occupied Luang Prabang on 24 May. The provisional government and many prominent Laotian personalities went into exile, and the National Movement for Independence was formed in Bangkok under Prince Phetsarath, who had escaped with difficulty from Luang Prabang. Prominent members of this movement were the princes Souvannaphouma and Souphanouvong (brothers of the viceroy), Phaya Khammao, and Katay D. Sasorith. The latest phase in Laos's struggle for independence was about to begin.

Historical evidence, such as it is, suggests clearly enough that two major factors influence the nature of political development in Laos; first, dynastic quarrels arising within the family of a ruler or between the rulers of the various *muongs* confederated from time to time; secondly, pressure from more powerful neighbouring States. When one Power has been dominant in the region—whether Annam, Burma, Siam, or, in the most recent instance, France—Laos has tended to fall under the influence of that Power. At other times, unless a Lao ruler has been strong and determined enough to impose a confederation, Laos has tended to split into its constituent *muongs*, each dependent to some extent on its immediate foreign neighbour. Struggles between opposing foreign Powers have had similarly disintegrating effects. The two factors, internal differences and foreign pressures, have naturally a complex influence one upon the other. In the somewhat changed political climate of the post-war world the influence of such factors cannot be discounted.

At the present time the unity of Laos is no longer in question from the political point of view. By the Franco-Lao Convention of 19 July 1949 Laos was recognized by France as being an independent State with a constitutional monarchy and a democratic form of government. Laos joined the French Union as an Associated State. At that time Laos was still prepared to accept certain economic and financial ties with France. The 1949 Convention was superseded by the Treaty of Friendship and Association of 23 October 1953. Since that date, by means of friendly but determined negotiation with France on particular issues, mainly with

regard to the economic and financial provisions of the Treaty, Laos has made it clear that the road to independence has been of its own making and that it accepts independence only in its own definition.[1]

The resistance movement (Lao-Issara) was dissolved in October 1949[2] when many exiles returned to their home country and took part in the new government, in the administration, or in the political life of the country. However, an ultra-nationalist section of the resistance movement did not accept that real independence had been or could be attained by the methods of the majority and they continued militant action under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong. From very small beginnings the movement attained a certain strength from close association with the Viet-minh[3] and engaged in fighting which culminated in two 'invasions', one of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces in April 1953 and the other of central and south Laos in December of that year The Royal Government of Laos has always maintained that the Pathet Lao, as this movement has been known since 1953, is under the complete domination of the Government of North Vietnam.

At Geneva, in April 1954, the Royal Government insisted on its sole right to speak for the Kingdom as a whole. By the Geneva accords Pathet Lao forces were to regroup, prior to their re-integration into the nation, in the two northern provinces of Phongsaly and Houa Phans. An International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos was set up under the chairmanship of Indian representatives with Canadians and Poles participating. The right of the Royal Government to administer the whole country was upheld by the Commission[4] and has since been clearly accepted by the Pathet Lao in the declaration of August 1956.

Behind the insistence of the Royal Government on the internal nature of the continuing dispute, i.e. that it is a dispute involving questions of reintegration, not of unification, can be seen the old fear of local divisions being deepened by external pressures. During the previous premiership of Prince Souvannaphouma, in August 1956, meetings of Royal Government and Pathet Lao delegations were held in Vientiane, and a joint declaration on reintegration

[1] For an account of recent political events in Laos see: B. Fall, 'The International Relations of Laos', *Pacific Affairs*, March 1957, pp 22–34.
[2] Sasorith, op cit, Documents annexes, p. 131.
[3] For a Royal Government estimate of strength see *Memorandum adressé le 13 Avril 1955 à la commission internationale* (Royal Government of Laos, Imprimerie Française d'outre-mer, Saigon, 1955), Annexe No. 2, p. 28.
[4] ibid., Addendum, pp. 1–2

was made. This was confirmed at the end of the year. In fact this declaration was very wide in scope and, in addition to proposals for supplementary elections and the participation of members of Pathet Lao in a government of national unity, included an agreement on a neutral foreign policy. The right of Pathet Lao to form a legal political party—the Lao Patriotic Front and other political organizations—was conceded. The reintegration of military and civil members of Pathet Lao was to be worked out in detail by a mixed commission, and here a continuing source of disagreement was found.

Soon after the August declarations the members of the Royal Government visited Peking and Hanoi and sought and obtained declarations of respect for Lao independence and territorial integrity. The Prime Minister also visited South Vietnam, France, Britain, and the U.S.A. Visits had been exchanged with India in the previous year: Laos has obtained a sympathetic response from the Government of India and has publicly affirmed its adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence of Prime Minister Pandit Nehru. Laos permits the existence of foreign bases only to the extent agreed to in the Geneva Agreement,[1] declines to join any military alliance, and accepts foreign aid if no political commitment is involved.

The fixed determination of the Royal Government under Prince Souvannaphouma to follow a policy of vigilant but absolute neutrality[2] has caused concern in the West. Such an ideal has its obvious dangers, but it has a strong appeal locally. This policy, and, too, the conscious seeking by Laos of declarations of friendship and respect for independence from neighbours and other Powers, can perhaps be understood as arising in part from considerations of historical experience. Laos values also the authority of the United Nations, for Laos can exist only in a world ruled by law. But national unity does not necessarily rest secure on a political basis alone. There are other considerations, racial, social, economic, and geographical, which must be taken into account.

Since the break-up of the Khmer Empire the dominant people in Laos have been those of Tai stock. Linguistically, with the exception of the Lu' of north-west Laos, whose dialects must be classed with those of the Tai peoples of Burma, the dialects of the

[1] Official text of the joint declaration by the Prime Ministers of the Kingdom of Laos and the People's Republic of China, August 1956. Quoted in *Lao Presse*, 30 August 1956

[2] *Lao Presse*, 13 August 1956.

major groupings of Tai peoples in Laos and on the right bank of the Mekhong are closely related. This, on the whole, makes for unity—though it could create a problem *vis-à-vis* Thailand. Even if it is not perfectly proper to speak of Lao as a standard spoken language, the existence of a single script and the rapid development of Lao as the official language since independence, together with the spread of education controlled from the centre, mean that a standard Lao is quickly evolving.

In terms of custom and culture the Laotians feel themselves united; and Hinayana Buddhism is not only the official religion as written into the constitution but is also practised throughout the Kingdom among the Lao people. Linguistically and racially more closely connected with China, Laotians share, nevertheless, the common background of an Indianized culture, which developed in characteristically Laotian ways out of the contact of their ancestors with the Khmers, who were already influenced by Hindu and Buddhist ideas.

Two considerable minorities exist in Laos and the problem of their assimilation into the nation is a large one for the Lao Government to solve. The Meo people, who inhabit the upland forests and plateaux of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces, have migrated southwards into these regions in the course of the last hundred years. They engage in shifting agriculture and from this method, so destructive of valuable timber, the efforts of the Lao Government have as yet only begun to wean them. The Meo are non-Buddhistic and their strongly developed sense of community is fostered by the 'sorcerers' who wield great influence among them. Assimilation will not be easy. The Kha[1] of the plateau region to the east of Pakse are the descendants of the pre-Tai inhabitants of Laos. In the Lao-Kha borderlands natural assimilation, both linguistically and in terms of dress and living habits, has proceeded much further than in the case of the Meo, but there remain many purely Kha villages where the people maintain the traditional way of life under their own chiefs. There is, of course, liaison between these chiefs and the provincial and central administrations; but they enjoy at present a status of semi-autonomy and represent for the Government a certain security problem. In the past some chiefs considered themselves to owe allegiance to

[1] This is a Lao term applied to the tribes but not used by them. It has somewhat opprobrious implications and is used here purely for convenience. A modern term recently introduced by the Lao is 'Lao Theung' or 'the Lao of the uplands and forests'.

the ruler of Cham Bassac, the southern *muong* which is now a province of the kingdom.

The Lao people themselves are valley dwellers, growing an annual crop of irrigated rice of the glutinous variety. To a large extent a self-sufficient subsistence economy is operated. No considerable surplus of products for sale is produced and country markets are on a very small scale where they exist at all. The large markets in the Mekhong towns are dominated by Vietnamese and Chinese growers and vendors. Most rice land is in family holdings and the problem of landlordism does not create strong social tensions. Where it exists it frequently bears an intra-family aspect and rent is paid in terms of a reasonable percentage of the rice crop grown. The family and then the village remain the basic social units. Village authority rests in the village headman and a group of respected older men together with the head of the monastery, a Buddhist monk. In recent times the village school-teacher, often a young man, has had a part to play. But age confers respect in Laos. This type of organization, arising out of the relative self-sufficiency of villages or groups of villages, often in a mountain valley with strictly limited communications, produces a definitely parochial outlook. By means of education in schools for the children and by printed propaganda, the Government is attempting to widen the horizons of the villagers and make them conscious of the nation as a whole, where their widest outlook to date has perhaps been merely the old *muong*.

In the towns retail and technical trades and such activities as the provision of prepared food and drink are in the hands of Chinese and Vietnamese. Officials of the Government, administrators, and members of the civil service and of the teaching profession are normally Lao. Officials appointed from the centre frequently have a regional connection and at the level of District Officer (Chao Muong) are very often local men. Provincial Governors (Chao Khoueng) in some areas are members of the old hereditary ruling families of the region to which they are appointed.

The most serious problems which face Laos are economic. Laos was the least exploited and the least developed of the Indo-Chinese States under French rule. The only considerable export was tin from mines in the Tha Khek region of central Laos, where production now approaches a thousand tons a year.[1] The mineral

[1] B. Bochet, *L'aide économique et technique française au Laos, France-Asie*, No. 118–19, p. 1126.

wealth of the country still remains a potential, not an actual, asset.

In the field of agriculture small quantities of coffee produced in southern Laos are alone a source of cash. Cotton grown in the same area is used locally and the production of rubber, always on a very small scale, and tobacco is at a standstill. More capital and more technical aid are required if the possibilities of agriculture are to be developed. A further serious difficulty is the shortage of labour. More efficient methods of rice growing would have to be introduced in order to release labour for cash crops, and changes of this sort would involve a major revolution in the habits of the farmers. The overcoming of prejudice against the introduction of more productive strains of rice is in itself a considerable problem. In the field of forest products benzoin from north Laos is of value Difficulties of terrain and communication stand in the way of easy exploitation of the enormous resources of timber. Shortages of capital and labour are another obstacle.

Laos, in fact, receives considerable amounts of foreign aid, both financial and technical, from the U.S.A., France, the Colombo Plan, and Unesco. Schemes for the technical training of young Laotians are operated with Unesco, Colombo Plan, French, and American aid.

The major part of American aid is used to support the armed forces and the police.[1] These forces represent the largest single concentration of manpower in the country and their spending power has been sufficient to contribute to the prevailing inflation. American aid is also available in the fields of road construction, agricultural development, and education.

Aid from France is directed chiefly to the development of internal communications. In this field France had made its largest contribution to development in Laos before the war. The construction of roads in the difficult Lao terrain represented a considerable feat of engineering. As a result of war and internal strife this system is in need of large-scale repair and reconstruction. France is also responsible for part of the cost of the development of communications by air and still holds a large stake in education.

With help Laos is making slow progress towards a more stable economy, but any quick solution to economic problems cannot be foreseen. Economic dependence is naturally resented in a country which has achieved political independence; but if Laos is to earn

[1] $40 million out of $50 million per year, according to Fall, op. cit., p 32

its own living the value of its exports must be multiplied almost tenfold.

Perhaps the greatest obstacles in the way of unity and independence lie in the very situation of Laos geographically. Difficulties of navigation make the natural outlet of the Mekhong almost useless without the expenditure of astronomical sums in improvement.[1] Variable depths of water, obstacles, and rapid currents rule out large-scale use of the numerous tributaries. From the point of view of land communications Laos is not a natural unit. The mountainous north is virtually cut off from Luang Prabang. Luang Prabang's only outlet by road is across the hill route to Xieng Khouang. From Xieng Khouang another hill route leads to Vinh in North Vietnam. Central Laos has a choice of outlets, across Thailand to Bangkok or eastwards to Vinh and Tourane. The outlet for Vientiane, the capital, is Bangkok and it is 500 miles distant across Thai territory. Only from Pakse in the south is there an easy road leading to Saigon and this involves crossing Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The economy of Laos is obviously deeply affected by these geographical factors. The development of natural resources, whether for sale as exports or for use in a programme of local industrialization, involves the need for a large-scale expansion of communication facilities. For this purpose great demands for funds and for labour will have to be met. In the past Laos has suffered from the pressure of powerful neighbours. Paradoxically enough, in the modern world in which Laos finds itself, having won unity and independence in the political field, it is isolation in the economic sense and not association that provides the greater danger. It is clear that Laos is determined to accept aid only on terms which suit it. Laos needs aid during the period, however long or short it may be, in which it is preparing to meet the new economic challenge. Laos will grow strong as that challenge is met.

E. H. S. S.

[1] In the dry season eight trans-shipments are necessary between Phnom Penh and Luang Prabang.

Political Trends in Pakistan

WHEN Mr Suhrawardy, Pakistan's present Prime Minister, took office in September 1956, he made no attempts to minimize the magnitude of the task facing him. The founder of the State, Mr Jinnah, had died—leaving it to face its teething stages alone. The first Prime Minister had been assassinated, the second dismissed, the third removed as abruptly as he had been installed, and the fourth had resigned because of his party's loss of confidence in him. General elections, which had been frequently promised, had not been held, and the Constitution, which had taken nine years to complete, was already being criticized as inadequate. Pakistan's basic problem remained one of political stability, as Mr Suhrawardy emphasized on taking office. The thousand miles which separated the eastern from the western wing of the country acted also as a psychological rift; problems in the East appeared on a different emotional plane to the westerners, and vice versa. It was felt at the time that the new Government, being a coalition of the Awami League and the Republican Party (holding majorities in the East and West Pakistan legislatures respectively), would tend to bring the two parts of the country closer together and provide a satisfactory basis for a popular administration.

With the new Government in power a year, and the country celebrating the tenth anniversary of its foundation, the political situation seems as confused as ever. The chief reason for this is that no satisfactory formula has yet been devised which would appeal to both parts of the country. In the eastern or Bengali province, successive administrations have sought a greater measure of independence from Karachi, and this aspiration recently found expression in the resolution passed by the East Pakistan Assembly for complete provincial autonomy, leaving only the questions of defence, currency, and foreign affairs in the charge of the central Government at Karachi. Extremists among the Bengalis took this to mean that their province would get all the foreign exchange earned by it. As jute is probably the most important source of hard currency for Pakistan, the reactions in the Western province to this measure were far from sympathetic.

In the western province political life is still dominated by the large landowners and provincial political conflicts turn on personalities rather than on theoretical issues. East Pakistan is looked on as a remote region, which few West Pakistanis have troubled to

isit. Absorbed as they are in their own disputes, they cannot ppreciate the radical demands of their distant compatriots. In the yes of West Pakistanis, Bengalis have had more than their fair iare of representatives in the central Government. Bengal has rovided three of the five Prime Ministers since 1947, including ie present one. Even more, the West Pakistanis tend to understimate Bengal's need for increased funds to further the economic evelopment of the province and resent the increased allocation 'hich the province has received for 1957–8 when its potential :sources have not yet been fully utilized. They were bitterly disppointed over the refusal of their eastern partners to accept Urdu ; the only national language. Finally, the West Pakistanis resent ie allegation that batch after batch of unsympathetic adminis-·ators, chiefly from the Punjab, is forced on Bengal, in spite of the ict that every effort is being made to encourage the Bengali in-:lligentsia to enter Government service.

In the absence of a common effort to fill the void created by eography, the tendency to think in regional terms has been enjuraged. The people of West Pakistan speak Urdu—or at least it commonly understood by them—but the East Pakistanis read, 'rite, and think in Bengali. The former are oriented towards the Iiddle East, the latter derive their inspiration from Calcutta. 'hese differences are also reflected in their poetry, literature, and ·t, although, with the growth of a national consciousness, new ›rms of expression are being worked out. But a parallel movement ı the political field has been slow to develop, and the various arties have not sought the active support of the nation by forıulating new programmes In a broadcast to the nation immediely after his appointment as Prime Minister, Mr Suhrawardy nphasized this lack when he said: 'I hope that political parties ıll take early steps to arouse political consciousness in the people ıd educate them in the problems that concern us, and offer to ıem reasonable and honest practical solutions and leave it to them › decide their course of action.'

At one time the Muslim League, as not merely the most imɔrtant but also the only party to command the support of akistanis in both parts of the country, served this purpose. Under ıe leadership of Mr Jinnah, and his lieutenant Mr Liaquat Ali han, it was identified in the public mind with the struggle for ationhood which culminated in the division of India. But, unlike ıe Indian Congress, the League ceased to have a programme once

its primary aim—the creation of Pakistan—was achieved. It neglected its party organization and its social doctrine, thus losing both its sense of purpose and contact with the rank and file. After the death of Mr Jinnah in 1948, the leaders were preoccupied either with the day-to-day problems of administration or with internal struggles among small coteries for power.

It came as no surprise that the restless Bengalis, who tired easily of this state of affairs, threw out the Muslim League ministry in East Pakistan at the first available opportunity. Even the most hostile opponent of the Muslim League could not have foreseen the magnitude of its defeat when elections to the Provincial Assembly were held in 1954. Out of 309 seats it won 10 versus the 237 seats previously held. The main reason for the victory of the opposition, the so-called 'United Front', was its promise of a more autonomous administration for the province. Resentment at the mismanagement of affairs, and the delays caused by the administration in far-away Karachi, turned the electorate against the provincial Muslim League, and the defeat was, in fact, an expression of acute dissatisfaction with the central Government.

The events which followed were important because they indicated the shape of things to come. For the first time since 1947 a popular administration had been entrusted with ruling the province, but the United Front proved more successful in sweeping itself into office than in sweeping out the inefficiency and corruption associated with the outgoing ministry. The United Front was a loose association of small parties united by little more than opposition to the Muslim League. Within a month, inflamed passions had led to serious rioting in the jute mills of Narayanganj, and offered the Governor-General in Karachi, Mr Ghulam Mohammad, the opportunity to step in by dismissing the ministry of Mr Fazlul Huq[1] and appointing a new Governor, Major-General Iskander Mirza, with complete powers to rule the province. The outgoing government was inefficient but popular; the new regime, though efficient, could not win the sympathy of the radically-minded population, who bitterly resented being ruled from Karachi. Moreover, the efficiency imposed from above was not a substitute for the natural growth of a democratic system, and once parliamentary institutions were restored, the familiar picture of intrigues and of splinter-groups seeking new alignments presented itself. The new United Front ministry of Mr Sarkar,

[1] On 30 May 1954.

ppointed in June 1955, ruled without the help of the provincial egislature for almost a year because, as Mr Sarkar explained, most f its members were also members of the Constituent Assembly in Karachi, whose meetings they were attending. It was not until 2 May 1956 that the provincial legislature was convened to discuss the Budget, which had to be approved by 31 May. The Speaker of the Assembly refused to allow the presentation of the Budget and a breakdown of the political machine ensued. On 6 May the President took over direct control of the province and ertified the Budget. The Sarkar ministry was restored on 1 June 956.

In West Pakistan the situation was more complex because the lifferent provinces in the West were each angling for maximum epresentation under the prospective Constitution which had been lebated for nine years. It was therefore decided to merge all vestern provinces and states into one administrative unit; and vhen, in October 1955, the so-called 'One-Unit' Act had been put nto effect, it appeared that a stable political life might result from hese changes. On 29 February 1956 the Constituent Assembly oted the Constitution which established Pakistan as a federal reublic composed of two provinces. Muslim Leaguers have since omplained that the Government rode roughshod over their suseptibilities in this matter, but their complaints were not without rony since their own party had been in charge at that time in Karachi. The West Pakistan Muslim League opposed the appointnent by the central Government of Dr Khan Sahib, an indeendent, as Chief Minister of the province. Dr Khan Sahib was hus forced to form his own party, the Republicans, in the West 'akistan Assembly and in April 1956 the Muslim League lost ontrol of the province to the Republicans. Four months later the League lost power in the central Government.

Had the decline of the League led its successor parties to fill the esulting political vacuum, stability might have returned to the ountry. But it did not, and the reason for this is to be found in he differences amongst the various political parties. Ten years vithout general elections, and with frequent suspensions of legisative assemblies, have made it difficult for parties to function and mpossible to enforce discipline on their members, either inside or utside the Assembly. More serious still, there are no real differnces of political principles among them. One reason for this is hat the idea of Pakistan as a political force failed to develop

further once it had been realized. Once Pakistan was established, the League leaders failed to evolve a political philosophy for it. Secular ideas were ruled out as being repugnant to Islam; yet, apart from being a homeland for Indian Muslims, there was no very clear notion of the nature of the new State and the course it ought to take. For a long time, of course, the party in power was preoccupied with the problems of administration and of resettling over 7 million refugees from India; it was only the momentum of a fierce nationalism that carried it through difficulties. But even with the first rumblings of opposition, there were few signs, either on the left or the right, of constructive social thinking, or of any serious discussion of the issues arising out of the planning of an underdeveloped economy. Political intrigue flourished in an atmosphere in which none of the parties formulated a distinct political programme or was in a position to put it to the test. As a result, fantastic suggestions or bitter recriminations have taken the place of principles or party discipline. And in the final analysis, the differences are reduced to this: that some parties are in power, and others are not.

The Republican Party is not much more than the old Muslim League of West Pakistan in modern dress. The League leaders must take the blame for its formation on themselves, for had they not been so inflexible in their refusal to accept Dr Khan Sahib as Chief Minister of the new amalgamated province in the West the latter might not have been provoked to form a separate party. Dr Khan Sahib was joined by politicians of various shades of opinion who, each for his own reasons, had decided to break with the Muslim League. But the Republican record in office so far has not had much to commend it, especially regarding land reform. The difference between the two parties can perhaps best be illustrated by one incident. On 20 March 1957 about thirty Republicans crossed the floor of the West Pakistan Assembly (on a Muslim League motion asking for the undoing of the 'one-unit' system), and would have brought the Khan Sahib Government down had the President not intervened to suspend the Constitution and take over the administration.[1] It was claimed that the renegades later recrossed the floor and supported their own party; indeed Dr Khan Sahib said of his followers that the action of such 'wavering elements could not be considered an honest withdrawal of support'. Although parliamentary government was once again re-

[1] On 21 March 1957.

stored on 15 July under a new Republican leader, Mr Abdur Rashid Khan, the resignation of the provincial Governor, Mr M. Gurmani, on 27 August will not be without its repercussions on a very unstable political situation.

The Awami League, which has been the ruling party in East Pakistan since September 1956 and partner of the Republicans in the central coalition, is the nearest approach in Pakistan to what one may call a party of the left, but its actual performance has been rather different. This is due in large measure to the personality of its leader, Mr Suhrawardy, who is a lobby politician of the pre-1947 vintage rather than a leader capable of producing a party programme. Consequently its membership has been subjected to severe internal strains and its left and right wings have recently been involved in an open rift from which Mr Suhrawardy, thanks to his considerable political acumen, emerged victorious.

The dispute arose because the leftist group within the party accused Mr Suhrawardy of executing a *volte-face* regarding both his domestic and his foreign policies. As opposition leader, Mr Suhrawardy had been a vehement critic of the Government's policy of joining military pacts; as Prime Minister he defended Pakistan's adherence to both the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. on the ground that the country needed allies who would support it against India over Kashmir. Although formerly an ardent advocate of a greater measure of autonomy for East Pakistan, he dismissed the 'autonomy' resolution passed last April by the Provincial Assembly (in which his own party held a key position) as a 'political stunt'. The leader of the dissident group, Maulana Bhashani, who is Mr Suhrawardy's most formidable opponent in East Pakistan, criticized both these attitudes adopted by the Prime Minister as 'violations of the Awami League's fundamental principles'. Matters were not made any easier by Mr Suhrawardy's attempts to link up with the Krishak Sramik Party of Mr Fazlul Huq, with the aim of outmanœuvring the Maulana, thus reinforcing the right wing of his party at the expense of further alienating the left. The rank and file of the party regarded both men as indispensable, and several attempts were made to heal the breach. As regards the first of the two disputes, i.e. over foreign policy, Mr Suhrawardy, by constant argument and debate, won over the Bengali educated classes, who had formerly looked on the policy of alignments with suspicion. Two events, following on each other, served to vindicate him in this. The first was the

United Nations Security Council's resolution[1] on Kashmir supporting Pakistan's stand, while the second, the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Karachi in June, which went down well with his supporters, was another triumph for him. But the demand for greater devolution of power for East Pakistan was quite another matter, and here the Maulana skilfully played on Bengali emotions. Since the Kagmari session of the Awami League in February 1957 the two leaders, if not their followers, seemed to be moving farther away from a compromise, and the inevitable climax came in June when the League Council decided, by 800 votes to 46, to endorse Mr Suhrawardy's foreign policy. In spite of the result being so one-sided, the members reflected their bewildered and undecided state of mind by passing another resolution unanimously asking the defeated Maulana to continue as president of the Awami League in East Pakistan. They have not persuaded him to do this, however, for the 'red Mullah', as he has often been called, does not consider himself a spent force; and, with the worsening food situation playing into his hands, he has formed a new organization, the National Awami League, to advance his view that the only answer to the province's chronic problems is to release it from the administrative burdens imposed on it by a far-away central Government.

The future of the one party which offered hope of leadership, and which had built up a sound local organization, hangs in the balance. Maulana Bhashani is now seeking wider support for his movement, with the help of such radical allies in West Pakistan as Mr Ifthikar ud Din, editor of the *Pakistan Times*. He may not be successful in the West where his extreme demands have always been looked on with suspicion, but in his own province his popularity with the masses and his organizing ability make him a force with whom Mr Suhrawardy may yet have to contend. The Prime Minister does not seem to have consolidated his position after his victory: recently he accused his rival of being pro-Nehru and also appealed to him to rejoin the Awami League. In the West Mr Suhrawardy has earned the hostility of the Muslim League by forcing a Bill through the National Assembly providing for joint electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims in West Pakistan, although it had been agreed last October, when communal rolls were abolished in East Pakistan, that the West would continue to have separate electorates. He has said in support of his

[1] Of 24 January 1957.

action that once Pakistan was established the two-nation theory (which declared that Hindus and Muslims in India were separate nations) lost its force for that country. The Muslim League stalwarts, whose party claims credit for the creation of Pakistan, have considered this statement sacrilegious. It is an issue out of which they hope to make political capital, for their leader in the Punjab, Mr Daultana, has challenged the Prime Minister to refer the question to the West Pakistan electorate in the belief that Mr Suhrawardy's policy would not command mass support. His party 'having no standing in West Pakistan, Mr Suhrawardy has become more and more dependent on Republican support for the life of his Government. The Republicans, absorbed in their own private quarrel with the Muslim League, have exacted their own terms, both by pressure for the restoration of their ministry in West Pakistan and through their more recent and successful demand for the dismissal of the provincial Governor, Mr Gurmani. General elections, now scheduled for a date 'as near to March–April 1958 as possible', may well take place if pressure on the Government continues to grow, although an election commission has ruled out the possibility of holding them by that date and has blamed the Government for this lack of preparation. The overall situation remains confused and fresh alignments are likely to be made.

The President, General Mirza, who represents the views of the civil and military administration, is watching these developments closely. The gap between the administration and the politicians is widening; the administrators have little patience with the practices of irresponsible politicians, and may even believe that Pakistan could do without party government for some time. Their aim is to provide a sound administration, to act as the steel brace rather in the old Indian Civil Service tradition, so that the country, divorced from politics, could go ahead with its plans for economic development. The President has made known his views on Pakistani democracy, which he believes should be 'controlled' or based on the American presidential model. He has so far exerted a moderating influence on the politicians but, in spite of the best of intentions, whenever he is compelled by a situation to intervene and make a choice, to that extent he is involving himself in politics. On the other hand, to hand the country over to the Civil Service entirely would mean reducing it to a dictatorship of a new élite; otherwise, Pakistan must continue to be governed by politicians.

The parties must learn to seek their mandate from the people, and those in the opposition must be prepared to offer an alternate programme. The dispute with India has diverted attention from pressing political and economic reforms. Perhaps it is due to the long autocratic tradition of Muslim rule in India, perhaps because the Pakistani leaders do not share Mr Nehru's sense of urgency in making democracy a success in Asia, or perhaps because of the alarming gap between the leaders and the people revealed by the East Pakistan elections in 1954, that general elections have been put off from year to year. But elections are imperative if the alienation of the people from their leaders is not to be increased, and for a country that has chosen to be associated with the cause of the Western democracies, there is no other way.

S. K.

THE WORLD TODAY

Volume 13 *No.* 11 *November* 1957

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Notes of the Month

The Crisis in Argentina

THE fortunes of Argentina have never seemed worse than they do today: even in the worst days of the Perón regime there was some hope that things might improve, or that Perón would go. Now it is all too much to be feared that he might come back. The profoundly disturbed political state of the country is inextricably entangled with the economic crisis. The general strike shows the extent to which the trade unions are refusing to co-operate with the Government, and the only result of prolonged labour disturbance is bound to be a progressive economic breakdown.

The high hopes of two years ago when Perón had fallen have vanished, and the missed opportunities for reform and the application of discipline have revealed the Government's lack of policy or lack of internal unity. The signs of weakness and division have been ably exploited by the trade unions—with or without instructions from Perón in Caracas—and the friction between labour and the Government has been exploited by both sections of the Radicals. At the fall of Perón the political situation was relatively simple and the emotional climate was most suitable for the imposition of the austerity needed to restore the squandered economy. But that needed discipline cannnot be applied now, and the Army and the Government have shown themselves fatally divided on a number of fundamental issues. General Aramburu is on the whole a reasonable man, with something of a social conscience, who would be sympathetic towards labour if economic circumstances allowed. His tenure of office is dependent to some extent on the goodwill of the extremists in the armed forces whose aim is to throw away democratic pretences and install a strong dictatorship that would put the trade unions in their place, rigorously extirpate all vestiges of *peronismo*, and, in the economic sphere, substitute controls for expansion.

The moderates, led by Aramburu, have so far held to their plan for elections in 1958: the idea of electing a Constituent Assembly

to reform, among other things, the electoral law seems chiefly to be designed to introduce proportional representation instead of the present system of bloc representation,[1] so as to ensure that the 'wrong' party does not gain control. The wrong party would be Dr Frondizi's 'Intransigent' Radicals, with a neo-*peronista* platform, or some more direct form of *peronismo*.

The Constituent Assembly is sitting, quite fruitlessly, and all that has been gained so far is a none too encouraging analysis of the polling that elected its members. Out of a total of just over 8 million ballots cast the largest single number were blank (2,115,860), and it is assumed that this represents the Peronista vote—the Peronista Party is banned and its one-time members were instructed to vote blank. The *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo*, the right-wing branch of the Radicals under Dr Ricardo Balbín, polled 2,106,500 votes, and Dr Arturo Frondizi's left-wing 'Intransigent' Radicals 1,850,600. The remaining 2 million votes were distributed among several minor parties.

The evident hardening of the Peronista front among the trade unions may be the result of machinations by Perón himself in Caracas—allegations are numerous but the truth is elusive—or it may be a reflection of its electoral success; or it may also be an attitude that is easily adopted by the unions for bargaining purposes, since it constitutes a familiar rallying ground from which to fight an apparently weak Government.

The imposition of a state of siege—under which personal freedoms are limited—in order to arrest recalcitrant union leaders was thought to be the work of the military extremists, forced on General Aramburu against his will. The unions' retaliation in the form of further strike action was to be expected. The battle, it seems, will be between labour and the military extremists, with General Aramburu a powerless onlooker, and the two Radical parties declining in importance unless they can contribute some constructive ideas.

The economic background for this explosive drama could hardly be more sombre. Domestically, inflation has reached altogether new levels; there are shortages and obstructions; transport, electric energy, and the petroleum industry are in a backward and neglected state and are preventing economic recovery; agriculture is

[1] Under the bloc system in Argentina two-thirds of the seats in Congress go to the majority party, however small its majority. With proportional representation no party would have an absolute majority unsupported by others.

ı long way from recovering its old buoyancy . . . the recital is ndless. Internationally, Argentina will perhaps just succeed in ›alancing her trade for 1957 at around U.S. $1,000 million in ach direction, but there are debts of some U.S. $500 million to ;uropean countries, and the most urgent capital needs to restore ·fficiency to the basic industries and services represent some J.S. $1,200 million, for investment over the next four or five years.

Clearly—and this is fully appreciated by all but the most violent ıationalists in the Army—foreign capital, particularly private apital, could do a great deal to fulfil these investment needs, but olitical stability is obviously an essential condition. The longer olitical stability is delayed by the failure of the Government and he union leaders to agree on some form of economic discipline, he greater will be the opportunity for Perón to return in the role of eacemaker, and the greater will be the discouragement of foreign apital and the longer the delay in Argentina's economic and social ecovery.

It is to be hoped that General Aramburu will not allow himself ɔ be forced by the extremists into any tough policy, since in resent circumstances and states of mind it would only provoke ɔugher reaction.

'orty Years of Soviet Power

IN honour of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution the)epartment of Propaganda and the Institute of Marxism-Leninm attached to the Party Central Committee have issued so-called Theses' whose aim is to provide a correct interpretation of the vents and policies of the last forty years. These were published ı all the national papers of 15 September 1957, taking up the 'hole issue. Their publication is particularly important because talin's *Short History of the Communist Party* has been discredited, 'hile the new history, promised at the Twentieth Party Congress, as not yet appeared. The following subjects were dealt with.

(i) 'Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and Consolidaon of Dictatorship of the Proletariat in U.S.S.R.'—The Revolution 'as born out of the growing contradictions of capitalism. Russia, being ıe weakest link in the chain of imperialism, became the centre of the ıternational revolutionary movement. The Communist Party, inspiring ıe revolutionary masses, with their help overcame the opposition of ɔunter-revolutionary forces and of defeatists within the Party (Kamen-'r, Zinoviev). The Revolution, unlike other such movements, establishd true democracy based on dictatorship of the proletariat and freedom

from exploitation. However, the imperialists, led by the governing circles of Britain, the U.S.A., and France, saw in it a menace to their parasitic existence and strove to strangle it by military intervention. At the cost of terrible privations, the workers and peasants, led by the Communist Party, defeated both the interventionists and the counter-revolutionaries. In this they were helped by the working classes in the capitalist countries.

(ii) 'The Construction of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the main result of the October Revolution.'—The construction of socialism was hampered by the chaos resulting from war and civil war, and by the active hostility of imperialist countries. It was also necessary to overcome the hostile groups within the Party acting as the hidden agents of the defeated exploiting classes within the country. The unprecedented successes of socialist construction aroused the fears of international monopolists, in particular those of Britain and the U.S.A., and induced them to support and arm German Fascism. To pave the way to socialist transformation of the countryside, the Party persuaded the mass of the peasants that collectivization and mechanization offered the only way to a wealthy and cultured life. However, fierce opposition to collectivization on the part of 'kulaks' forced the Soviet State to liquidate the 'kulaks' as a class.

(iii) 'Heroic Deeds of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War.'—'The Second World War was started by German Fascism but this was merely the fiercest gang of the Imperialists.' The imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain, and France, in direct contradiction to their national interest, spent vast sums to help German monopolists to nourish Fascism and arm its forces. They encouraged Hitler in his claims on Austria and Czechoslovakia, and refused Soviet proposals for joint action against Fascism. [No mention is made of the Soviet-German alliance of 1939–41.] Even when Germany had enslaved eleven European countries and the threat of defeat hung over Britain, the imperialists hoped that the U.S.S.R. and Germany would be weakened by a mutually destructive war and they could then dictate peace terms to both. The United States and Britain promised a Second Front in Europe in 1942, but this promise was fulfilled only in 1944 when it was clear that the Soviet Army was capable of defeating Germany alone. Even then, their main concern was penetration in the Balkans, which enabled Germany, without withdrawing any forces from the Soviet Front, to break through in the Ardennes. Churchill's appeal for an immediate Soviet offensive to relieve pressure on the Western Front was complied with despite very unfavourable circumstances, and was completely successful. 'Considerable contribution to the defeat of Germany was made by the people of France, Britain, the United States, and other countries.'

(iv) 'The Communist Party, Leader and Inspirer of Victories of the Soviet People.'—The October Revolution shows that the decisive condition for the fulfilment of the historic role of the working class is the leadership of the Communist Party. Thus, whoever attempts, consciously or unconsciously, to weaken the leading role of the Party

helps the foes of Communism. The Party's greatest asset is its unity and discipline. Thus it unanimously condemned Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov, thus demonstrating the moral-political unity of Soviet society.

(v) 'Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and the Struggle of Peoples for Peace.'—Soviet foreign policy is based on the interests of Soviet workers, which is identical with the interests of workers throughout the world. The Soviet Union has repeatedly raised the question of disarmament etc. But the monopolist-reactionary forces and the governing circles and militarists of the U.S.A. have encircled the socialist countries with military bases and aggressive blocs. The main aggressive role is again allotted to German militarist-*revanchistes*. The U.S.S.R. consistently stands for peaceful regulation of all disputed questions.

(vi) 'Influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on the Historic Fate of Mankind.'—All peoples saw in the Revolution an inspiring example, and in the structure it created discerned the pattern of that future towards which the workers of all countries aspire. The pattern of world power has changed radically in favour of the socialist camp. The Soviet Union as the most powerful and experienced member constantly helps and supports other socialist countries, who regard it with brotherly gratitude and friendship. Socialism is impossible without the dictatorship of the proletariat, but its forms and the ways of achieving it, as well as the tempo of socialist transformation, may vary. The growing crisis of capitalism has led lately to the spread of rotten ideas of 'national Communism' and reformism which essentially reflect right-wing socialist influence on unstable elements in the Communist Parties. The example of the Soviet Union and its national policy has inspired the dependent countries in their struggle for independence. The colonial system is rapidly falling apart. Since the second World War half the population of the world has achieved independence. The people of former colonies can rely on disinterested help from socialist countries in strengthening their economic and political independence.

The Aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution

THE Hungarian Revolution of a year ago, though a classical example of a liberal uprising, was the first instance of one to be directed against a Communist dictatorship. The revolution, which was preceded by a reformist movement, had four stages.[1] The first, from 23 to 29 October 1956, ended with the defeat of the Soviet army and the armoured units of the Communist Party. The second, the stage of victorious revolution, lasted from 29 October to 3 November. The third and tragic phase of renewed Soviet aggression began on 4 November and ended on 11 November, during which fighting was confined between the Soviet army and the Hungarian people. The fourth stage, after the defeat of armed resistance, lasted almost two months, while two forces faced each other in Hungary, one consisting of the occupation army, the other of the Hungarian workers, who had the Workers' Councils as their spokesmen. Although the Kádár 'government' had already been appointed on 4 November by the occupation authorities, it was not this which defeated the passive resistance of the Hungarian people but the power of the Soviet army, which made use of Kádár as its spokesman and intermediary. Nothing could more clearly have proved the latter's lack of authority than the abduction of Imre Nagy by the Soviet authorities on 22 November, in spite of the safe-conduct Kádár gave him.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KÁDÁR REGIME

From 12 November to 12 December Kádár negotiated with the Budapest Workers' Council—at that time the principal authority in the country—with the object of achieving the workers' return to the factories. To this end he promised the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, a multi-party system, the publication of trade agreements with the Soviet Union, and the right of the Workers' Councils to run the factories. These were, however, only verbal promises. Kádár refused to give any written statement, and on 25 November he revoked them.

Meanwhile the Soviet army authorities dissolved a number of revolutionary councils, and this was codified by a decree of the Kádár Government on 8 December. Four days later the Govern-

[1] See 'The Hungarian Revolution', in *The World Today*, January 1957.

ment declared the Budapest Workers' Council illegal, and a decree issued simultaneously abolished all Workers' Councils above the factory level. Thus by the middle of December it had become clear that the Kádár regime was unable to fulfil the function for which it had been appointed, namely that of appeasing the Hungarian people by mere promises. That this was its original task seems to be evident from Kádár's broadcast on 4 November, in which he defined his Government as born of the revolution, both in name and spirit, and promised a number of the concessions demanded. At this early juncture, and even up to the beginning of 1957, the passivity with which the Western world and also the non-committed nations responded to the Soviet aggression was not yet conclusive; the Soviet Union would therefore have preferred it if Kádár could have produced a provisional settlement by reconciliation. But when passive resistance in Hungary continued it became clear that coercive measures would have to be applied. The Soviet authorities had already arrested and deported a number of young people in November, a fact admitted by the chief of the Hungarian Press Department on 3 December. These deportations were not selective: young people were rounded up in the streets with the object of frightening the population into submission. A further instrument of coercion was the introduction of summary jurisdiction, not only against crime but also against incitement, the unlicenced possession of fire-arms, and failure to report such possession. Special courts were set up to deal with such charges.

By these and other measures, codified by decrees issued by Kádár but enforced by the Soviet occupation army, the fourth, passive stage of the revolution was brought to an end by the beginning of January. The last section of the working class to continue with its strike was the miners, but finally they too were forced to resume production. On 28 December the Writers' Union still dared to issue a declaration to the effect that the Soviet aggression was a 'historical mistake'. Soon afterwards it was suspended. It could be said that the revolution was finally over by 11 January, when the last armed rising took place in the heavy industrial centre on the island of Csepel.

At the beginning of January, Khrushchev and Malenkov visited Budapest. So did Chou En Lai, in the course of his extensive world tour. During these visits Kádár's status was affirmed, despite his inability to fulfil his initial task. It is only thenceforward that one can speak of a 'Kádár regime', which followed on the last stage of

the revolution. The chapter of this regime is still not closed, although the trend of events during 1957 points to certain conclusions in the future.

One cannot help speculating over the reasons the Russians had for retaining Kádár, despite his initial failure. The fact that he had participated in Imre Nagy's Government and subscribed to the revolutionary programme up to 2 November perhaps gave them an even stronger hold over him than over an uncompromised Communist politician. Moreover, he had also been a victim of Rákosi and was therefore a suitable person to put forward the thesis of Rákosi's responsibility for subsequent events. It was also assumed that Chou En Lai was in favour of Kádár as opposed to an unequivocal reversion to Stalinist politicians, although the latter are also represented both in the Government and in the Party leadership. Finally, one should not entirely rule out the fact that a monolithic dictatorship, unlike parliamentary governments, abhors any change.

INITIAL EFFORTS TOWARDS COMPROMISE

The Kádár regime as it gradually developed, not by evolving its own policy but by following Moscow's advice, can be defined as a dictatorship which is re-establishing Stalinist practice in all its rigidity in the political sphere while endeavouring to satisfy certain popular demands in the spheres of economics and administration. This dictatorship imposed from above is endeavouring to muster support from below by bribery, through improvement of the standard of living, and above all by making small concessions, more apparent than real. It is pursuing a dual policy throughout· that of oppression of, and compromise with, the people. Emphasis either on the former or the latter has been fluctuating; this has also been determined by external events and economic conditions.

The definite shift of accent from compromise to oppression did not become evident until April. In the first three months of the year there were still many signs of a willingness to compromise. During this period the loss of prestige suffered by the Soviet Union in the free world, following on its two aggressions against Hungary, was still evident. After the solution of the Suez crisis, the Atlantic Alliance was mended and the United Nations had more time to spare for Hungary; doubts and questionings were rife among the Communist Parties in the West; the non-committed countries, whilst sitting on the fence, were leaning rather to-

wards the West, and the Soviets' effort to mobilize them against the Eisenhower Doctrine did not sound very convincing just after the policy of oppression which they had applied in Hungary. Moreover the Polish Government had still not endorsed the authorized version of the 'counter-revolution', and the re-established Soviet intimacy with Yugoslavia had suffered considerably from the cautious support given by the Yugoslavs to certain aspects of the revolution. Therefore it was essential that any relapse in Hungary should be averted.

Moreover, in the absence of an organized party, the backbone of every Communist society, the State was still too weak to ignore the mood of the masses. The revolution was not yet condemned outright; responsibility for it was attributed almost entirely to the Rákosi-Gerö regime, accused of creating 'a climate suitable for counter-revolution' through its 'sectarian dogmatism'. Naturally, the actual 'counter-revolution' had to be represented as organized by the 'imperialists' in order to justify the intervention by Soviet troops under the terms of the Warsaw Pact, which *inter alia* affirms non-intervention in the internal affairs of the contracting parties, armed assistance being foreseen only in the event of an attack on one of the parties.[1] Thus it was necessary to equate the revolution with an imperialist armed attack. Imre Nagy and Losonczy were still not called traitors but 'revisionist deviationists', and on 2 February Gyula Kállai, in a speech to medical students, protested against the allegation that the Hungarian youth who took part in the fighting, and the workers who took part in strikes, were 'counter-revolutionaries', although he added that they deserved no praise for these activities. In the same speech he referred to circumstances which had disturbed Soviet-Hungarian relations but assured the students that these would be duly rectified. This implied, if rather obscurely, that Soviet troops might withdraw. The possible enlargement of the Government by non-Communist members was also mentioned from time to time. It was still assumed that new elections might take place after the expiration of the Parliament's mandate in May 1957. References were made to multi-party systems in other Communist States, such as prevail in Poland and China, and the possibility of elections on the Polish pattern was not excluded, inferring that in spite of what had

[1] The Warsaw Pact, concluded on 14 May 1955 (the day before the signature of the Austrian State Treaty), was the instrument providing legal justification for the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania.

taken place the Kádár regime might still revert to a Gomulka-like solution. And the majority of the leaders of the reformist epoch, writers and intellectuals, were not yet under arrest.

The Workers' Councils were still acknowledged on the factory level, although it had been made quite clear that political problems were not their concern. While the workers' revolutionary institutions were gradually emasculated, their demands for wage increases were satisfied in an almost generous manner. All that mattered was to liquidate their resistance and get production back to normal. In January 1957, the factories of Budapest employed 400,000 men, 15,000 less than a year before, a decline probably to be accounted for by the numbers who had left the country. But although the number of workers had decreased only by 3½ per cent, output had fallen by 28 per cent, whereas the sum total of wages was 22 per cent higher than in January 1956. The average income of an industrial worker had risen from 1,112 forints in January 1956 to 1,417 forints in January 1957. Clearly the factories were working shorter hours and paying out higher wages. As soon as the Kádár regime came into power concessions were also made to the peasants, which to date have not been revoked. Chief of these was the abolition of compulsory grain deliveries: the peasants were free to sell their products at normal market prices and thus substantially augment their income. Moreover, there had been no repeal of the decree issued during the revolution whereby peasants could not be compelled to join co-operatives and members of Kolkhozes were free to leave them. As a result of this the number of co-operatives was considerably reduced through voluntary dissolution.

The regime also made concessions to the middle class by reintroducing private initiative for the small artisan and the retail trade. Through these various measures it finally succeeded in getting the economic machinery going again. At the same time the strict regulations which had hitherto governed the life of the people were to some extent relaxed. The compulsory teaching of Russian was still not reintroduced. Western books and films suddenly appeared, and for some time no Russian films were shown. The theatres were allowed to perform Western plays or plays by Hungarian authors of the *ancien régime*, preferably those of a lighter genre. These concessions to popular taste in non-political matters aimed at camouflaging the ban on politically engaged reformist literature. Newspapers were permitted to transform

hemselves from mouthpieces of socialist tenets into tabloids with ossip columns on the private lives of film stars and other idols of he Western world. The general tone of the press conveyed a cer- in inspired levity. Prostitution, hitherto banned, was once more ade legal. On the surface every means was employed in order to ake people forget the revolution and all that it involved.

In short, broadly speaking, the Kádár regime, which had at first ndeavoured to exploit the revolution for its own purposes, now ried to perform a vanishing trick by making people, both at home nd abroad, believe that the revolution had never taken place. This olicy was probably devised in Moscow on the lines of the New conomic Policy (NEP) adopted in the Soviet Union by the enth Party Congress in 1921. NEP abolished the compulsory equisitioning of agricultural products, encouraged private initia- ve in industry and trade, and introduced a general relaxation in oviet life. It was adopted shortly after the Kronstadt mutiny and ie widespread famine in order to appease the dissatisfied ele- ients amongst both peasants and workers, tired of their past ifferings under wartime Communism. Lenin called it 'a calculated etreat in order to regain the lost contact with the masses'. The esponse of people in Hungary to the NEP policy can only be nderstood by taking into account the general disillusion over the roven inability of the Western world to provide any tangible ipport during and after the revolution. Thus a resigned pre- ccupation with everyday life followed as an anti-climax to the evolutionary fervour.

Parallel with such concessions in non-political spheres ran the ebuilding of the dictatorial power, first of the State and later of the arty. Decree laws enacted in December and January reinstated etention for reasons of public security, i.e. the concentration amps. Under these laws, any persons whose activities or be- aviour endangered public order or security, and in particular the ndisturbed continuity of productive work and transport, might e detained. On 19 March a further decree reintroduced the de- ortation of 'persons dangerous to the State and public security' om their legal domiciles to another location where they were kept nder police supervision. This system had been introduced by ákosi and later abolished under the first Government of Imre lagy. Among the severest decrees was perhaps the one introduc- ig the death penalty for inciting to or advocating strikes in a ictory with more than a hundred workers.

At the same time a new State security police was gradually recruited which now, jointly with the Russian occupation authorities, became responsible for the maintenance of order. This new militia was recruited almost entirely from former members of the security police and Party officials. To begin with, a number of these people still hesitated to come forward, fearing retaliation after the acts of vengeance taken against the secret police during the revolution. Moreover, at that time it was still conceivable that the Western Powers might be able to achieve the evacuation of the Soviet army from Hungary. However, the clearer it became that Soviet power in Hungary had been fully and permanently re-established, the more eagerly former members of the secret police and Party officials offered their services. Thus the Kádár regime, which has made Rákosi responsible for the revolution, has been applying his methods of coercion with a security force recruited from his former police force.

By March it had become increasingly evident that the overtures made towards the workers and intellectuals were having disappointing results. Ever since then, the regime's policy has implied a tendency to restore the conditions prevailing before 1953. By the end of February steps were already being taken against the trade unions' efforts to retain their independence and their right to strike. At the beginning of March an article in the Party paper *Népszabadság* by József Révai, the former ideologist of the Rákosi group, attacked the Party leadership for its one-sided approach to the events of October. According to Révai, the Party leadership was holding the Rákosi-Gerö regime entirely responsible for these events and had not carried into practice the dual fight against Rákosi's dogmatism and the revisionism of Imre Nagy, being too lenient towards the revisionists and too severe towards the dogmatists. The reappearance of an adherent of Rákosi was interpreted as a tactical stroke of Kádár's, aimed at threatening those who were unwilling to co-operate with him with a still worse solution than the present one—the complete re-establishment of Stalinist practice. It is, however, equally possible that the move was suggested from Moscow, for it coincided with the views expressed there, condemning those who were stressing the shortcomings of Stalin while underestimating his great merits; indeed it could even have been suggested by Moscow in order to remind Kádár himself that there was still another alternative.

At the end of March, Kádár went to Moscow. In the statements following this visit he fully adopted the Soviet version of the revolution, which referred to Imre Nagy as a traitor. Doubtless the foundations of the new ideology and policy were laid down on this occasion, and the Kádár Government was either ordered or permitted to step up its policy of coercion and re-establish a full-fledged Party dictatorship. Further agreements were also concluded on Soviet economic help to Hungary, and the perpetuation of the Soviet occupation was settled.

FROM CONCILIATION TO COERCION

The change from conciliation to coercion now definitely set in. The spiritual leaders of the reformist movement were arrested one after the other. First to go were the Communist writers Gyula Háy, Zoltán Zelk, Tibor Tardos, and lastly Tibor Déry, the novelist under consideration for this year's Nobel Prize. These were followed by Attila Szigeti, who had been chairman of the revolutionary council in Györ and who in the earlier stage of the Kádár regime was still permitted to take part in an official delegation to Bulgaria, and István Bibó, who as Minister of State in the Nagy Government continued to work on the new socialist and democratic constitution of Hungary even after the second Russian attack. Both of these belonged to the National Peasant Party. Zoltán Tildy, the former head of the Republic and leader of the Smallholders' Party, was placed under house arrest. The Writers' Union, temporarily suspended in January, was now finally dissolved. Meanwhile the Attorney General of Budapest issued a statement that the Government promised neither reconciliation nor clemency to those who desired to overthrow the system.

The policy of coercion was no longer carried out by the Soviet authorities but by the newly recruited security force, working hand in hand with the reorganized Party. Shock troops of the Party were again penetrating into every walk of life, abolishing non-Party organizations and institutions formed during the revolution and even previously. Thus the right of free organization conceded to students was revoked, and at the end of March the Communist Youth Federation was brought into being as the sole authorized youth organization.

The changes in Kádárist practice were clearly demonstrated in the case of the two journalists Gyula Obersovszky and István Gáli, both former Communists who, during the revolution, had

edited *Igazság*, the paper of the revolutionary youth movement. After the second Russian attack they continued to issue pamphlets. They were amongst the first to be arrested and, as a typical Communist *non sequitur*, their case was coupled with that of a girl medical student who during the fighting had killed one of the secret police. On 8 April the two journalists were sentenced to three and one years' imprisonment respectively. On 20 June the Supreme Court revised this sentence and instead condemned them to death. Only after the outcry of Western intellectuals, including such Communists as Picasso and Aragon, was this sentence commuted to life imprisonment. The other accused, however, the girl student, who had not the solidarity of the international intellectual world behind her, had to die.

There were three main landmarks in the re-establishment of rigid Party dictatorship and perpetuation of the colonial status *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union: the conclusion of the Soviet-Hungarian Agreement of 27 May on the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary; the session of the Hungarian Parliament—the first to be held since the October revolution—which opened on 11 May, and the annual Party Conference, held in June.

The Soviet-Hungarian Agreement provides for the 'temporary' stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary on the basis of the Warsaw Pact. It contains no reference to the number of occupation troops. This is at present estimated at about 70,000, as compared with about 25,000 before the revolution. Jurisdiction over Soviet soldiers in the cases of civil and criminal offences is reserved to the Hungarian courts on the pattern of the Soviet-Polish Agreement, but such reservations have probably little meaning in practice. At the same time the old sycophantic attitude towards Russia was now fully revived. No ministerial statement was complete without an expression of gratitude to the great Soviet Union for having liberated the Hungarian people from the imperialist counter-revolutionaries. The Russian language again became compulsory in schools. Everything emanating from Russia was again described as bigger and better and nobler. Such gestures might be considered by the Western observer as of minor significance—as mere words. In a Communist dictatorship, however, matters of form acquire great importance, as it is only through such symbols that any attitude can be expressed, in the absence of any free political life and speech. This is why the change of tone towards the Soviet Union, i.e. reversion to the idiom that prevailed during the Rákosi regime,

has again proved a strong irritant. For the same reason the abolition of the Kossuth coat of arms by Parliament became a symbol of Kádár's strengthened position.

The parliamentary session in May clarified the regime's position in many other respects, apart from the revival of subservience to 'the heroic Red Army' which, for a second time, had spared no sacrifice 'in order to liberate Hungary'. During this session Parliament extended its mandate by a further two years—the country was said to be too busy with reconstruction to stand the strain of elections—thus destroying any likelihood of new elections on the Polish pattern. Full responsibility for the events of October was now attributed to Imre Nagy and his group: these were no longer described as tools of the counter-revolutionaries but as counter-revolutionaries themselves, who had sought to wreck the Workers' State and restore the *ancien régime*. The impressive list of counter-revolutionaries, including names borrowed from the Almanac de Gotha, as well as those of the late Regent, Archduke Otto, the Cardinal Archbishop, and members of the Anglo-American Intelligence Service, were relegated to the role of accessories. 'Revisionist tendencies' were also blamed for the disorientation of youth and of the intellectuals who, according to Kádár, had endeavoured in October to take over the power from the working class. The only stratum towards which Kádár still expressed a conciliatory tone was in fact that of the writers and intellectuals: he promised that in future the State would no longer interfere with them in the same bureaucratic and petty manner as in the past, and he also endorsed up to a point the writers' criticism of the past dictatorship of thought.

The formulae voiced in Parliament in a purely demagogic manner by Kádár and his spokesman Marosán were recapitulated in more scientific and dogmatic fashion by Gyula Kállai in the Party's ideological review *Társadalmi Szemle*, which reappeared in May for the first time since the revolution. This reappearance in itself confirmed that after the confusion and hesitations of the initial period the 'authorized version' had now been supplied by Moscow. Responsibility for the mistakes of the past was divided: the onus was laid on Rákosi for the excessive industrialization which by 1953 had led to a substantial decrease in wages, and also to the personality cult and offences against Socialist legality. Otherwise the merits of this era were greatly stressed. According to Kállai, Imre Nagy's mistakes went back to 1953, for it was then

that he started to mobilize the middle classes and accepted their definitions of freedom and democracy. He was also an offender against Party discipline and central authority; this led to the anarchism of petty bourgeois intellectuals who, although claiming to be an opposition group *within* the Party, were in fact fighting *against* it. The conclusion for the future was the abolition of all fractional opposition within the Party, a slogan identical with Lenin's call during his NEP policy for 'Party unity'.

The regime's fundamental dogma, however—so Kállai's article states—asserts that the dictatorship of the proletariat, if overthrown, cannot be succeeded by any other system than by a Fascist counter-revolution. It is this dogma on which the new Party has been organized, on which all classes are being reared through the various Party cells, and which, like all dogmas that bear the stamp of infallibility, cannot fail to have a certain influence on such believers as prefer religion to rationalism. It purports to demonstrate even to some of those who participated and believed in the revolution that their aspirations were hopeless, for no democratic regime, but only Fascism, could have resulted from it.

According to Kállai, Imre Nagy was not driven into his counter-revolutionary attitude; he consciously prepared and plotted the downfall of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kállai admitted that a substantial number of the workers took an active part in what he called the 'counter-revolution'. But, he wrote, this was largely due to the over-industrialization which took place between 1949 and 1954, as a result of which 400,000 people of peasant and middle-class origin were recruited into industry. From now on such a 'class-alien element' must be excluded from political life. The solution should be a smaller Party, with a limited but reliable membership—the same conclusion as was drawn by Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921.

Kádár himself, whether wittingly or unwittingly, has admitted that his policy need not necessarily be endorsed by the majority of the people. 'It is not the task of the leadership,' he said,[1] 'to carry out the wishes and the will of the masses. However odd this may sound, I say it explicitly. . . In the past, we were faced with situations when the working strata acted against their own interests. What is the task of the leadership in such a situation? To carry out mechanically the wrong conceptions? No, this is not its task. Its task is to represent the interests of the masses.'

[1] In his closing speech in Parliament, 11 May 1957.

At the end of June the annual Party Congress was held, at which Kádár reported in the name of the Central Committee. One of his principal themes was vigilance, the need to remember the lessons of October and fight relentlessly against revisionist tendencies. He stressed the intensification of the class war and the need to retaliate for the provocations in October. At the same time, there was still a slight conciliatory undertone in his statement that those who had been misled should not be treated as enemies and punished but led back to the right path.

The Congress's resolution, which was substantially devoted to rewriting the history of the revolution, did contribute one novel motive: had the Soviet Union not intervened, Hungary would have been divided into two. Later, in August, this was elaborated to the effect that Hungary would have shared the fate of Korea and Vietnam, as it was the aim of the imperialists to set up a separatist state in Trans-Danubia. The Party membership was listed as 345,000 (about 40 per cent of the pre-revolutionary Party) and the number of cells as 13,000. The reduced number was deemed an advantage, as those who were hesitant in a crisis no longer belonged to the organization. Also recommended were the re-establishment of Party seminaries and Party classes, the reintroduction of compulsory teaching of Marxism-Leninism in all colleges and universities, and the organization of discussion groups for clarification of all daily problems of a theoretical nature.

The tone of both the parliamentary session in May and the Party Conference in June contained an element of self-satisfaction. The members of the Government and the Central Committee of the Party, who are in fact identical, seemed to be congratulating themselves on having been able to get 'back to normal' six months after the revolution. This self-satisfaction was based on three achievements. The first of these was their positive success in resurrecting the Party and the security forces. The two, in fact, are almost identical. The number of Party officials is estimated at 40,000 and the new Party-controlled police force at about 130,000. Thus about half the Party members consist of the functionaries and police force. The second achievement was what they called the defeat of the imperialist intrigues, by which they in fact meant that they were able to rebuild their new Party and State machine under Soviet protection without interference from the Western world.

The third achievement was that of economic reconstruction. Here the Kádár regime has indeed achieved remarkable results,

largely due to an entirely new approach in Soviet policy. For the first time in the history of the Soviet world, the Soviet Union adopted a role in respect of Hungary similar to that played by the United States in Western Europe by means of the Marshall Plan. Just as the latter employed economic aid to deflect the peoples of Western Europe from Communism, so the Soviet Union, together with the other States in the Communist world, endeavoured with its 'Marshall Aid' lavished on Hungary to deflect the Hungarian people from revolution against Communism. This aid amounted to over 1,000 million rubles, three-quarters of which consisted of supplies of goods and one-quarter of Western currency credits. Thus it was possible to stop inflation, which would have automatically developed as a result of increased purchasing power and reduced stocks of commodities. Wage and salary increases added 7 billion and the increase of the farmers' income 4 billion forints to purchasing power, which was estimated by the Government at 53 billion forints for the planning year 1957. In spite of a 30 per cent reduction in industrial output, merchandize to the value of 50 billion forints has been made available with the help of the Soviet loan. Further to reduce the gap, the State increased the prices of a large number of commodities.

It appears that consumer goods are now more plentiful, as a result not only of Soviet aid but also of the shift of emphasis from heavy to light industry. Capital investments have been reduced to a minimum. Defence outlay has been cut from over 4 billion forints to less than half of this sum. In the list of investments housing has priority. The object of this policy is doubtless to conciliate the masses, now once more deprived of their basic liberties, by providing them with a slightly better standard of living. In certain respects it is a revival of Malenkov's 'cotton-frock' policy, but its temporary character is inherent. Whereas Marshall Aid was an outright gift, the aid granted to Hungary consists of loans which must be paid back after 1961. A new Three-Year Plan is in preparation, to begin next year. This is supposed to re-establish the balance between heavy and light industries, between capital outlay for investments and the manufacture of consumption goods. There is more and more talk about profiteering in the private sectors of trade and industry and the consequent need for stricter supervision. Comparative leniency is still shown towards the farmers. The expert on agricultural policy in the Central Committee is Lajos Fehér, who in the past was connected with Imre

Nagy. In this sphere, therefore, a 'revisionist policy' continues, and peasant holders of small and medium-sized plots who a few years ago were counted as kulaks are now treated as allies. Yet in Party literature the retrograde state of agriculture is a recurrent theme, and one of the principal tasks of Party members is said to be the 'conversion' of the peasants to socialist production.

The regime, although claiming to represent the working class, has been ruthless in depriving it of its rights. The Workers' Councils were first divested of their right to appoint factory managers.[1] Thereafter they continued as advisory bodies under trade union supervision but under newly appointed, reliable, Communist leadership. Even so, they were not permitted to subsist, and, according to a decree of September 1957, they were finally dissolved and replaced by newly 'elected' shop-stewards' committees. The trade unions, which at first claimed independence from the Party and the right to strike, were again put under the unequivocal control of the Party apparatus. Although they form a mass organization with 2 million members, their authority is even more fictitious than it was before the revolution. Their sole function seems to consist in receiving suggestions and complaints from workers, thus giving the appearance of a right to criticize.

HUNGARY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The publication of the report of the Committee of Five appointed by the United Nations in June and the subsequent meeting of the General Assembly at the beginning of September induced the Kádár regime again to give prominence to the events of October 1956 and to embroider the earlier versions. The U.N. report has not been published in Hungary *in toto*, only in extracts, mostly distorted and out of context. The intensity with which the anti-United Nations campaign was conducted suggests that the report reached a wide public through broadcasts from the West.

The Government also led a nation-wide campaign to collect protests against the special session of the U.N. Assembly devoted to Hungary, which took place from 10 to 14 September 1957.[2] For this purpose the National Patriotic Front was revived, with all the weather-beaten fellow-travellers in charge, but of course under

[1] See above, p 462.


[2] The Assembly passed a resolution requesting its President to take steps 'to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly' and to report and make recommendations to the General Assembly

Party guidance. Even the Hungarian writers, including all the non-imprisoned leaders of the reformist movement, were induced—allegedly by means of promises of more lenient treatment for their detained colleagues—to sign a protest. The protest, however, was signed by *every* Hungarian writer and thus lost its significance. By this collective signature it could not be said that any one of them had capitulated, and in this way the writers unmistakably conveyed that they were acting under pressure. Before the U.N. Session, the Deputy Foreign Minister was sent on a tour round the capitals of the Afro-Asian nations to argue that no service to world peace would be rendered by U.N. interference. Of the speeches made during the U.N. debate, only those by the Soviet group spokesmen were reported. Despite his intense press and publicity campaign, Kádár did not seem unduly worried lest the United Nations should take any effective steps, as was borne out by his statement in September that 'had the imperialists intended to interfere, they would not have waited, saying, "Let them first govern for ten months".' Indeed, there seems little likelihood of the Assembly's resolution being enforced. The revealing but belated debate has therefore more significance for future history than for present politics.

A. R.

The French Sahara and its Economic Unity

'In a few years the Sahara will be producing millions of tons of oil.' This was the prophecy of the French Prime Minister when, at the end of December 1956, the Senate approved, by 296 votes to 38, the Government project for reorganizing the Sahara into a single economic unit by means of the 'Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes.' 'The cock of Gaul loves scratching the sand,' Lord Salisbury is supposed to have said at the Berlin Conference of 1884, when the boundary was being drawn between the Sudan and the Sahara, and to many Frenchmen now the words are indeed those of truth spoken in jest. The economic possibilities



of the Sahara have become even clearer in the last few months—though over the same period little has happened to lessen the political tensions in the surrounding areas which militate against their full realization. The rapporteur of the National Assembly's Economic Commission summarized the potentialities thus: 'Iron ore from Tindouf, copper from Djebel Klakh, manganese from Guettara, coal from the Kenadsa basin or Spaia, oil from Ouargla or Edjele; with 400 billion francs invested over a period of years we could procure 100,000 million francs' worth of mineral and petroleum products a year.'

The iron-ore deposits found at Tindouf are in fact very considerable. They are at present estimated at 2,000 million tons, with a 50 per cent iron content. But exploration is continuing further. A rough calculation is that 2,000 million francs invested would give an annual production of 10 million tons. At Fort Gouraud iron ore of first quality has been located, with a 65 per cent iron content. Here investment of the order of 50,000 million francs will be necessary. Comparable figures for manganese and copper are not at present available, but there seems no doubt that the deposits are considerable. As far as oil is concerned, a recent estimate puts the deposit at Hassi Messaoud alone at a good 100 million tons, while there is natural gas in huge quantities at In Salah. The meaning of all this for France, for Europe, and, not least, for Africa is becoming increasingly apparent as reports come in of fresh discoveries,

of the beginning or continuation of work on transport routes, and of the desire of foreign companies to obtain concessions in the Sahara. In France herself, the public awakening to the potentialities of the situation made possible some months ago the launching of two new companies whose function is to direct into Saharan exploration and production some of the total private savings of the French people. They are, respectively, the Société Financière pour la Recherche et l'Exploitation du Pétrole (FINAREP), with a capital of 3 billion francs, and the Compagnie de Financement de Recherche Pétrolière (COFIREP), with a capital of 2½ billion francs. Four French companies are at work exploring for oil in the Algerian Sahara: the Société Nationale de Recherches de Pétrole en Algérie has permits for a total area of 217,000 sq. km.; in co-operation with this company the Compagnie Française des Pétroles d'Algérie has permits for a further area of 158,000 sq km.; the Compagnie des Pétroles d'Algérie (in which Shell Petroleum Ltd has a majority shareholding of 65 per cent) has permits in the central Sahara over an area of 160,000 sq. km.; and, finally, the Compagnie de Recherches et d'Exploitation du Pétrole au Sahara (in which the Shell group has a 35 per cent holding) is at work in the area north of the Hoggar from Adrar to the frontier of Tripolitania. Some areas under permit are at the present time becoming available for new prospectors as the original permits lapse, and it is clearly the policy of the French Government to seek to attract foreign capital. Overall, the ideal proportion of foreign capital in the Saharan venture would, from the French point of view, probably be of the order of 33⅓ per cent. In individual arrangements with particular foreign companies the French are requiring a 50–50 participation with French interests (as in the case of the B.P. application).

It is only since the end of the war that geological survey for the purposes of mineral exploration have been extended south from Algeria to the Sahara. In fact, in 1947 the Société Nationale de Recherches de Pétroles en Algérie was alone in undertaking large-scale exploration, by aerial survey followed by geological research and gravimetric survey, on the northern fringe only of the Sahara. Even as far as North Algeria is concerned, it is no more than about fifty years ago that the first efforts to find petroleum were initiated. As for the Sahara itself, it was only around the turn of the century that France took possession (the term is more applicable in the legal than the physical sense) of it with a view to securing the

hinterland of the coastal territories of North, North-West, and West Africa, and opening up lines of communication, however tenuous, between them. At the beginning of the present century In Salah and the other oases of the Algerian South were the bases from which the *méharistes* set out on their expeditions by camel to bring into obedience the few tens of thousands of Touaregs living in the region of the Hoggar. At the same time, other groups of *méharistes* (from the French colonies, these) were operating from bases near the Niger river (Timbuctoo had not been reached until 1894) against the compact and warlike Touaregs of the South, numbering some four hundred thousand. Through Mauretania, the movement was in the opposite direction, striking northwards from Senegal. In this way, the Adrar was reached in 1900, while the southwards movement from Algeria was halted at Colomb-Béchar by dissident groups from south Morocco. It was not until as late as 1934 that final pacification was brought to the French Sahara, when, in March of that year, part of Giraud's column, having occupied Tindouf, made contact in the region of what is now Fort Trinquet with a platoon or two of *méharistes* from French West Africa which in 1933 had occupied what is now Fort Gouraud.

If, during this period of forty years or so, rough boundaries were settled on between the various coastal territories of French interest backing on the Sahara, and if, in particular, such boundaries seem to put the Algerian South unduly far south—to within a few hundred kilometres of the Niger territory—such boundaries must not now be allowed, so the French Assembly and Senate have decided, to stand in the way of recognition of the essential *economic* unity of the French Sahara. The new law (57-27 of 10 January 1957) has not created new political frontiers, but a 'Common Organization of Saharan Regions'—though this necessarily now impinges directly on the administrative interest of two Ministries in Paris (Interior and Overseas France), three Governor-Generalships (Algeria, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa), and four Overseas Territories (Chad, Sudan, Mauretania, and Niger).

Looked at from the point of view of physical geography, this Saharan region is bounded on the north by the southern limits of the palm groves and on the south by the beginnings of the coarse vegetation known as *cram cram*, used for the grazing of cattle. Thus delimited, the northern boundary would run from Gouli-

mine, near the southern coastal extremity of Morocco, through Tamanart, Ouarzazate, Tadijout, Bou-Denib, Figuig, Ai'n-Sefra, Laghouat, El-Kantara, Gafsa, to Gabès in Tunis; and the southern boundary from Nouakchott (in Mauretania), right across French West Africa through Tidjikja, Ouatta, Asselan, Agadès, and Fada (in Chad). The resultant area is some 4,300,000 square kilometres, or eight or nine times the size of France. Intense aridity is the essential characteristic which gives the region its unity. It is reliably estimated that not more than 1,700,000 human beings live there. To say that they inhabit the region, or to attempt to measure density of population in the normal sense, would be most misleading. There are, in fact, vast areas which not only are uninhabited but which are never even traversed by man—such are the Tanezrouft, the greater part of the *Erg* (sand mountain) of Chech, and all the *Erg* of Mourzouk. On the other hand, in the palm groves of Tjerid in Tunisia the density may reach 1,200 persons to the square kilometre.

Certain parts of the Sahara go for as much as six years without more than 4·5 millimetres of rain, or for ten years without rain of any significance—though here and there torrential rains may occasionally occur, even in areas of remotest desert. Ground temperatures frequently reach 60–70 degrees Centigrade, and air temperatures of 53 degrees at In Salah, 55 degrees at Timimoun, and even 57 degrees at Tindouf are to be expected. The normal night temperature in inhabited points is at least 30 degrees, and at In Salah the mean night temperature in July is 37 degrees. While it has one of the lowest rainfalls in the world, the Sahara has one of the highest evaporation rates. Four litres of water per day for cooking and drinking per head is a dangerously low limit, and the normal ration, where physical labour is expected, is ten litres.

All this constitutes a tough proposition for mineral exploitation, which a few years ago would have been out of the question. But in areas with comparable climatic conditions, in the U.S.A., Australia, and the U.S.S.R., it is being shown that modern technical knowledge can meet the challenge. France intends to meet it too. In the meantime her rule in the Sahara has brought disease under very much greater control, with the result that even in the remotest regions the population is increasing rapidly. In the last ten years in Mauretania, for example, the population has increased by 30 per cent.

Mauretania, however, though she is to join in the governing

body of the Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (Common Organization of Saharan Regions), does not as yet belong to it territorially speaking. (Nor, of course, do Tunisia and Morocco, though their accession is equally provided for.) Mauretania remains attached to French West Africa, though the new law is intentionally framed so as to constitute an open invitation to Mauretania's local Assembly to bring her in completely if it wishes. 'To begin with, the O.C.R.S. comprises . . . zones forming respectively part of Algeria, Sudan, Niger, and Chad' (Article 2). The High Commission, which is to define and co-ordinate the programme of common (economic and social) action of the Saharan regions and control its implementation, comprises sixteen representatives of the local populations elected by their Assemblies and sixteen representatives of the constitutional Assemblies of France herself. Though her territory is not, as yet, directly included in the Common Organization, Mauretania is entitled to send two representatives, as may also the territories of Niger, Sudan, and Chad respectively. Algeria is to send eight. The representatives from the Assemblies of France are made up of eight Deputies, four Senators, two Counsellors of the French Union, and three members of the Economic Council. If and when Mauretania joins the Common Organization she is then to send seven representatives, while at the same time the representation from the Assemblies of France will be brought up to twenty-one, in the following proportions: ten Deputies, five Senators, three Counsellors of the French Union, and three members of the Economic Council.

To be correctly appreciated, the delicacy of this open invitation to Mauretania must be seen not only in the light of the need for transport lines across her territory to the coast, but even more against the general background of political evolution in the territories of the French Union. The *loi-cadre*, or 'framework law', of 23 June 1956 led to the passing, on 5 February 1957, of thirteen decrees which have conferred a status of semi-autonomy on the territories of French West and Equatorial Africa.[1] Each will now have a Government Council (*Conseil de Gouvernement*) of six to twelve members, all elected by the local Assembly, and presided over by a *Chef de Territoire* (a new appellation for the Governor). Considerable responsibilities will devolve on the Vice-President (the local member with the greatest number of votes), but the

[1] See 'New Conceptions of French Policy in Tropical Africa', by René Massigli, in *International Affairs*, October 1957.

French are not yet ready to agree to the appointment of local Prime Ministers, which would have been tantamount to the granting of complete autonomy. The Government Council will be more responsible to the local Assembly than in the past and will be obliged to resign if it loses the confidence of the Assembly. Powers are reserved to the French State in respect of finance, defence, foreign affairs, higher education, customs, and radio communication. A single High Commissioner of the French Republic, responsible to the Minister of Overseas France, will direct French activity in these fields and co-ordinate the work of the *Chefs de Territoire*, with the assistance of two Grand Councils of Government, sitting respectively at Dakar and Brazzaville.

No less was the need, in setting up the Common Organization for the Saharan Regions, for delicate treatment of Algeria, for many residents there saw a menace of one kind or another in any legislation that might tend to detach the Algerian South from the Algerian littoral on the Mediterranean. And, of course, political uncertainties in Algeria at the present time constitute an obstacle in the way of the success of the Sahara scheme, since the main routes, such as they are, for the transportation of minerals found in the Sahara lie across Algeria, or at least in its central area.

But, properly worked, the scheme can bring benefits to Algeria—as to all the French African territories—in a way nothing else can. The Common Organization has as its mission in the economic and social sphere to promote all measures calculated to improve the standard of living of the populations and to ensure their social advance, with due regard to their traditions. For the programme of modernization and equipment, the Organization is to prepare and co-ordinate plans for study and research. In the light of the results, it is to set in motion general programmes of development, particularly in the fields of energy, mining, water supply, industry, and agriculture; to establish and implement a basic plan for transport and communications; to promote the setting up of extractive and transforming industries; and, when conditions permit, to create industrial zones (Article 3). The French Government may, by decree, pass special measures to take effect in the areas comprised in the Organization, superseding legislative provisions already in force. Such decrees may relate to economic development and the establishment and functioning of industrial zones, and may apply to matters of land, law, agriculture, mining, water, Customs, immigration, transport, communications, company law,

investments, and the taxation thereof. Exceptional fiscal measures may be introduced to favour the setting up, equipping, or extension of enterprises of special importance.

In addition to the High Commission already described, which will exercise general supervision, the Common Organization will have a Delegate General—the appointment of Monsieur Max Lejeune was made in the summer, after some delay—who will be the nominee of, and responsible to, the French Government for the working out and putting into effect of the programme. He will be assisted by, and preside over, a Technical Directing Committee. The appointments have recently been made by decree of six representatives of French Government Departments[1] (two each from the Ministries of Overseas France and of Algeria; one each from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Industry) and eight individuals chosen by virtue of their work in public or private bodies concerned with Saharan development—in particular, the Bureau d'Organisation des Ensembles Industriels Africains, the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-mer, the Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole, the Bureau Minier de la France d'Outre-mer, the Bureau des Recherches Minières de l'Algérie, and the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique. It was expected that the names of representatives of the participating territories would be made known in October. Provision is made for technical and financial assistance from metropolitan France, and the Delegate General is also authorized to negotiate loans or participation in Saharan enterprises with international and foreign bodies, subject to French Government approval. The Delegate General is further responsible for the defence of the region and for the maintenance of law and order. The national character of the management of industrial concerns is to be safeguarded in any event, and to that end privileged classes of shares may be included in the capital of new companies established to work in the Sahara. The Organization will have its own *Bulletin Officiel*, and a report on its activities will be annexed to the annual Finance Bill as it comes before the French Parliament.

Transport is the technical problem of first importance that has to be overcome before the Sahara can be made to yield its benefits. Twenty-five per cent of the investment needed for the development of the Edmonton district of Canada had to be put into the provision of transport facilities, and it will not be a smaller

[1] See *Journal Officiel*, 7 September 1957.

proportion that will be required in the Sahara, which is now almost without roads or railways. It is true that the advent of the automobile and the lorry has led to growing use of five great tracks across the desert from north to south. They link Agadir to Saint Louis (via Tindouf and Atar); Colomb-Béchar to Gao (via Adrar and Bidon V); Algiers to Zinder (via In Salah and Tamanrasset); Biskra to Djanet; and Tunisia to Chad (via the Fezzan). These routes, in addition to air transport, may, and do, assist in supplying the work of exploration and production, but they cannot bear the load of carrying away the products mined. For this, rail transport is considered the only possibility in the end. The problem has been where to add to the few existing lines. The normal (Continental) gauge railway from the Algerian coast to Colomb-Béchar (constructed to serve the Moroccan mines) has recently been extended to Abadla. Two other lines, both narrow gauge, touch the northern Saharan fringe. These lines run from Algiers through Djelfa and Perregaux to Colomb-Béchar, and from Philippeville through Touggourt and Gabès to Tozeur. It is not considered useful at the moment to extend the line Colomb-Béchar–Abadla further (the ultimate objective is French Nigeria, at Gao), not even as far as Adrar (which is connected by one of the five motor routes already mentioned). The French Transport Commission and the Economic Council preferred instead to recommend the building of a line to Guettara, with a branch line to Taouz. This would provide for any development of mining at Guettara and any increase in the working at Taouz. This project is a 'Saharan' project, therefore, and it represents at any rate a temporary postponement of the Mediterranean-Niger plan. Meanwhile work on a standard-gauge track linking Touggourt with Biskra (and supplementing the light railway) is expected to be completed early next year and to carry to the coast at Philippeville oil wagons whose freight will have come by pipeline from Hassi Messaoud.

Lack of water and low rainfall are the problems next highest on the list of difficulties. This was a problem that had occupied the genius of Ferdinand de Lesseps, whose vision was no less great here than in his grand design of the Suez Canal. The scheme, abandoned because of cost, was to link the broad depression (much of it below sea level) lying to the south of the Aurès mountains and Biskra, in eastern Algeria, by maritime canal to the Gulf of Gabès, hoping thus to modify the climate of the region by the formation of a kind of 'inland sea'. Though nowadays the chances

of any such climatic effects are discounted, a similar scheme is receiving serious attention. Its essential aims would be to produce hydro-electric power and contribute to the irrigation of the surrounding areas.

From the circumstances in which French (or, now, French-derived) concepts of administration have developed in the various parts of Africa where France is interested, it is natural to find certain differences of approach to mining law in these territories. The features they have in common are the lack of distinction between desert regions far removed from means of communication and points of loading and shipment, on the one hand, and the more populated coastal regions, on the other. In both the fiscal and the Customs regimes of Algeria, French West and Equatorial Africa, Morocco, and Tunisia, divergencies exist comparable to those which characterize mining law. Increasingly, it should become the task of the Common Organization to iron them out.

E. H. W.

Some Student Problems in East German Universities

THE varying forms and possibilities of traffic—not so much of goods but of people—between the divided parts of Germany have always afforded a most sensitive political barometer indicating the pressures between East and West. To Germans who try to pay frequent visits to the Soviet Zone or *vice versa* the changes in East German bureaucratic procedure concerning travel permits, the methods and formalities, and even the varieties of human behaviour at Soviet Zone border-stations are often indicative of changes in the general political atmosphere of which otherwise no sign is given. In recent months some significance has been attached to the fact that suddenly people who had left the D.D.R. (German Democratic Republic) some time ago for no apparent political reason, except that they were tired of living under the conditions prevailing there, are now no longer allowed to return for mere visits to their former places of residence; hitherto this had been

permitted ever since 1953 without threat of persecution. Although this reversal of policy has never been publicly stated or explained, it is generally assumed that in the long run it has been caused by the fact that the reports given by those 'refugees' to their friends and relatives in the East about their new existence and way of life in Western Germany have been in too great contrast with official East German propaganda about the West.

Another change in policy of this kind, however, has been announced publicly, and has thereby aroused much wider attention and comment in the West. It concerns the restrictions on travel by young people and students from the D.D.R., which were issued by the Secretary of State for Affairs of Higher Education, Dr Wilhelm Girnus, on 24 May 1957. This was the first time since June 1953 that such restrictions had been established, following a period when policy in general was not unfavourable towards contacts of all kinds between youth in East and West Germany and even with young people from certain other countries of the Western hemisphere. The order in question states in its first paragraph that 'henceforth all travel by pupils of the 9th to 12th forms of general institutes of education, as well as by students to countries belonging to N.A.T.O. [these are listed], is subject to special written permission.' The particular instances in which such permission can be given by the authorities of the institute are:

(*a*) if the journey is in the interests of study and the fulfilment of the study plan and has the support of the university authorities;
(*b*) if applicants intend to participate in meetings organized by social organizations of official State institutions of the German Democratic Republic in the service of a peaceful approach between the D.D.R and the country concerned,
(*c*) if urgent family affairs make such a journey necessary.
(*d*) In cases of violation of this regulation the persons concerned will lose the support of the State for continuance of their study, i.e. loss of scholarships or of permission to study for a limited or unlimited period.

In practice this excludes all visits in a private capacity except to close relatives in the Federal Republic or for the purpose of participating in events organized or officially sanctioned by the authorities of the D.D.R. in their own particular political, cultural, or economic interests.

What are the inner reasons for such a step, at a time when other Eastern European countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, and even the U.S.S.R. itself, tend to be more open-

minded than in the past towards the establishment and extension of contacts among youth and students in the West? One can only guess at them, and in the last resort one guess is as good as another, since such conjectures can only be based on a variety of possible psychological reactions on the part of the East German Government to a given situation. It may be worth while, however, to try to describe the underlying situation among young people, and particularly students, in the East Zone of Germany as it appears to an observer who has for some time had—and still has—the opportunity of meeting, talking, working, and occasionally living with them. These observations, for what they are worth, will confine themselves to students in East Germany. In view of what one hears from other countries in the Eastern bloc, it must remain a very open question how far their situation is still representative of the whole area. In East Germany one encounters features of an almost archaic Stalinism now very largely absent in other East European areas. Moreover, these observations must remain factual. In so far as psychological factors enter into them—and they play an important role in a description of attitudes under Communism—such observations are intended to be merely descriptive and for the purpose of explanation rather than of moral judgement.

Study in a Communist society is not merely an occupation aimed at educating and perfecting the personality and abilities of individual students as an end in itself, which incidentally also serves and benefits the whole of society. It is pure and devoted service to the State, i.e. hard work for society and its ultimate goal. Society, i.e. the State, calls upon and selects the student, maintains him financially, and consequently assumes responsibility for periodically testing not only his abilities but also his unwavering loyalty to this society of workers and peasants which makes him what he is. The financial cost to the State is enormous. One university in Berlin, the Humboldt University, reports an expenditure of DM-East 96 million for scholarships in the last four years. More than 50 per cent of all students come from workers' and peasants' families. An obligatory three-year course in social sciences and political economy for all students is intended to ensure full understanding of and agreement with the aims and fundamentals of Marxism as the basic philosophy underlying all learning. Within the academic year, lasting ten months, followed by at least six weeks of practical professional service, every progressive step of study is fixed by a minutely detailed syllabus which

is binding upon both teachers and students. In the pursuit of his subject the student is hardly ever left to himself and his own sense of duty. The whole student body is divided into seminar-groups of about twenty members, working collectively under both a lecturer and an assistant party-tutor. These seminar-groups link together students of the same age-group, as people who within a fixed period have to fulfil the same study-plan and collectively to watch over the individual's application to study discipline.

Political control of the university is in the hands of the 'pro-Rector', political instructors, senior staff who are Party members and in particular the F.D.J. (Free German Youth, the Party youth movement) university groups. Adherence to this well-knit system of selection and control has long since ensured that all students are by now members of the F.D.J.

Since the student is a paid (i.e. State-financed) member of this 'study-collective', every change of syllabus or local change of universities is subject to official permission by the university authorities. The student's vacation is also under control, even to the extent that he must obtain official permission to travel outside the D.D.R. and must report all his comings and goings.

Lack of application in a student's work or signs of political unreliability are treated at first by criticism and self-criticism within the seminar-group. In more serious cases this procedure takes place in general discussions before the entire student body. If the whole student body decides unfavourably about the student, he is then reported to the pro-Rector, who may discipline him, relegate him, or even take the matter to the police. At any given time this procedure may be set in motion by the agents in political control at the university. The student body must then decide whether or not they dare judge the issue for themselves and then act in defence or condemnation of the culprit.

In addition to this outward system of control the seminar-groups and the entire student body are riddled with willing or unwilling regular informers who make it possible to extend control into the most private forms of contact and conversation. Thus a continuous stream of 'material' is being filed away by the authorities for future reference in case of need, whether or not they decide to act upon it immediately.

This Russian system, applied with German thoroughness and talent for detail, should long since have turned East German universities and colleges into the perfect workshops for the educa-

tion of those 'cadres of progressive intelligentsia' which they are intended to produce. And indeed this system is so perfect that within ten years it has achieved the defeat of its own original purpose: to ensure an absolutely foolproof distinction between real loyalty and outward conformity. For, in order to maintain this distinction, there must be a certain amount of real freedom of expression, without which complete conformity will obscure all certainty about the real convictions of people right up into the ranks of the highest functionaries of the system.

One is inclined to feel that this attempt to make the system ever more perfect is an indication of a profound awareness among leaders in East Germany that the ideological battle has been lost long ago. There is no real trust in loyalty, merely the strict maintenance of formal obedience. But at the same time this part of the battle may be said to have succeeded among students in East Germany, inasmuch as formal disobedience on a decisive scale, as an act of disagreement in principle, is no longer possible.

The example of Hungary conclusively demonstrated, what the uprising in Germany in 1953 had begun to show, even to those many people who would feel no scruples of conscience about a total revolt against the authority of the State—namely that there is nothing to be gained by this method of total revolution, even in terms of simple power politics. Thus formal obedience or political refuge in the West are the only alternatives left to them.

It is, therefore, very difficult indeed to arrive at any statistical estimate of the number of young people who in the course of the last ten years have become what the State would regard as loyal Communists. All one can say with conviction is that it is very small indeed. Even among the possibly 20 or 30 per cent who appear actively and even wholeheartedly to identify themselves with the system in leading positions of all sorts, one may detect in an individual, if one gets to know him well enough on a sympathetic human basis, an underlying, secretive sort of cynical detachment. The figure of 20 to 30 per cent is based on official statements made by Soviet Zone authorities themselves. The secretary for student affairs in the Central Committee of the F.D.J. recently complained in a speech that of the 6,000 students at Halle University only 30 per cent wholeheartedly supported the workers' and peasants' State; 65 per cent were said to be indifferent, while 5 per cent would have to be regarded as open enemies of the State and the Party. The large majority of students seem to combine the func-

tions of formal obedience with complete inner detachment, and this has, not only for loyal Communists, some almost alarming aspects. They must be word-perfect in the terminology of dialectical materialism and fully able to recite from Marxist Scriptures when asked to do so. They must be able to go through the political functions of normal university life as through the movements of a ritual dance in which masks are worn. To many the 'scientific' and dogmatic language of dialectical materialism makes it possible to escape personal 'confessions of faith'. Among the numerous deviations from strict Party doctrine, 'formalism' is known only in the realm of art, and is very difficult to detect in a philosophical system that is bound to such an extent to formulae and to rigid doctrinal statements.

Thus many students are only able to support the situation in which they find themselves by developing a double personality Under the layer of formal obedience lies their real existence, their life as individual persons and members of families, as people with professional ambitions, private interests, and individual problems With the obvious caveat as to the dangers and distortions inherent in generalizations, one may nevertheless attempt to describe some aspects of their attitude which, in the writer's view, are important for an understanding of these young people.

Quite a few of them, perhaps even a majority, no longer suffer very consciously from the need to maintain this 'schizophrenic' existence. They have begun to accept it as a means of survival which must persist as long as the situation itself lasts. Under cover of the necessary minimum of conformity they want to avail themselves of the present possibilities of education and subjectively to make the best of it. Medicine, mathematics, sciences, languages, architecture, technological subjects are sufficiently 'neutral' to be valuable in any case, and there is a tendency to take refuge in these subjects. Law, teaching, and theology are spheres of learning in which the ideological battle has to be fought outside as well as within the university department of 'social sciences', and here one must be prepared to fight or else to throw up the sponge from the very beginning. It is for students in such subjects that life is hardest intellectually and spiritually, and much more dangerous.

It is indeed difficult to understand what really sustains them in this state of inner detachment and prevents their inner allegiance to the system. In contrast with neighbouring countries of Eastern Europe, young people in Germany have no competing ideologies

to which to cling. It is safe to say that nationalism is really a dead issue there at the moment. It has been exploited successively by Nazis and Communists alike and finds no support in the present generation of Germans, whereas in Poland, Hungary, and even Czechoslovakia the situation seems to be different. The reunification of Germany appears to German students to be a humane, a political, and an economic necessity rather than a national issue of ideological significance. In very many cases their inner detachment or resistance seems to spring from a general resentment against the injustices and the inhumanity of the system, and against its distortions of life, a resentment which has its roots in subconscious feelings rather than in rational reflection. It is a fact that, with very few sporadic exceptions, there is no longer a real 'Auseinandersetzung', a conscious intellectual effort to meet Marxism head-on as a system of thought to be grappled with. Such an attitude has been replaced by a wholesale refusal to take Marxism seriously as a subject: to most students it has acquired the flavour of undesirable mental callisthenics.

This vague negativism and resentment among many students has two main consequences. It is always ready to flare up in more or less rational acts of protest or resistance whenever the chance offers. There is no doubt that during the period of the Hungarian uprising the atmosphere in East German universities was full of unrest, nervousness, and expectancy, which it took all the energy and caution of people with a grasp of the situation to control. The danger of such an inner vacuum created by a resentment, often not consciously defined, is that it can be filled by anything that seems to offer legitimate reasons for giving vent to it. The sudden inrush of any other ideology which is not Communist may meet with very little resistance. The cases of quite a number of young refugees from the East prove this very strikingly.

Positively speaking, this vacuum also creates a vast demand among students and young people in general for objective knowledge which has not passed through any official ideological sieve. All factual information, even if undistorted by ulterior motives of propaganda, which purports to provide a basis for comparison that has been especially prepared for them will be viewed with suspicion. But the written and spoken word that is borne out by a direct encounter with living people and objective facts will carry conviction. Hence the ever-increasing desire to visit the West and see for themselves. The same interest pervades many fields of

study, and not a few professors and lecturers seem inclined to help students to pursue it. At a conference of S.E.D. leaders, Party instructors, and university staff held in Berlin on 13 May 1957, Herr Walter Ulbricht himself found it necessary to point to many obvious flaws in the effort for socialistic education. He cited the example of teachers at the Academy for State and Law who, while using Marx and Engels superficially as textbooks, had carried on fundamental study with the help of Western bourgeois legal literature. He complained in general about the emphasis frequently laid on the factual instruction of students rather than on 'socialistic education'. In view of all this, the strong effort to restrict contacts with the Western Federal Republic achieves its real significance. As Herr Ulbricht himself put it at the above-mentioned conference, 'We must take into consideration that our position is not the same as in other countries with a people's democracy, because here we have to carry on a struggle between two systems in one country with an open border.'

Finally, mention should be made of an interesting fact that can be observed when students from the Soviet Zone get the opportunity to visit the West. To the casual observer who meets them only briefly they will appear in their behaviour and speech to be much more positive towards their own situation at home, much more critical towards the Western way of life, than in most cases they really are. This has sometimes led to the impression that Marxist education is now exerting a fairly widespread influence among young people who know nothing else. But in the first place it is not true that they know nothing else; for possibilities of real contact with trends and developments of West German life are incomparably greater than those of any other East-West contacts in Europe. In this sense the border is still really open for those who care. Secondly, the vocabulary of many of these young people is misleading. They often use words that they learn at home with a different context from that of the official Marxist meaning.

But there is a real core in this impression in that the psychological situation changes as soon as people enter the Western atmosphere. While it is relatively easy to maintain a negative and critically resentful attitude towards the home situation *within* that situation, it becomes difficult to do so in a different environment. This is particularly true with respect to those who feel bound to return; it is much less so in relation to refugees. The long separation has made immediate contact and understanding in the West

increasingly difficult to achieve. The realization that it will probably still be a long time before reunification takes place has given rise to resignation and even bitterness towards all those who are onlookers, however sympathetic they may be. The tendency of many naïve Westerners towards a patronizing sort of sympathy rouses feelings of loyalty which lie dormant at home. All facile black-and-white propaganda makes visitors from the Zone really furious, because they feel their own vital issues to be misunderstood and thereby degraded. Their decision to stay where they are is, much more often than others realize, taken for responsible and valid reasons, and as such it should be viewed sympathetically rather than stigmatized as stupid or indifferent.

This is particularly true with regard to those students whose critical attitude at home is really rooted in the framework of a *Weltanschauung* or a deep personal faith. Of them little has been said here, but it is obvious that there is also real suffering among those who find it hard to become reconciled to the 'schizophrenic' existence forced upon them and who decide to stay in spite of a severely felt load of compromise and guilty conscience. Because in their case the split of personality becomes really apparent and needs to be reconciled, they will feel constant pressure within themselves. It may be said that they are a minority, perhaps a very small one. Possibly they may be included among those 5 per cent whom the authorities feel the need to describe as enemies. But, whatever the category in which one may place these young people for the general purpose of describing their situation, one final conclusion should be permitted: it is not a situation which, for their own sake and for that of the West in general, can safely last for ever without harming them permanently. N. M.

Criticism and Counter-Criticism in China

Effects of the 'Rectification' Movement

THE BACKGROUND

WHEN the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party met from 20 September to 9 October 1957, one of the reports it heard was on the 'rectification', or *cheng-feng*, movement.[1] The

[1] For an account of the origins of this movement see 'Mao Tse-tung and the

report, which was delivered by the Party's secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, was approved unanimously, but no details of it were released in the announcement of the meeting.[1] One thing is certain: the report, if released, would throw a great deal of light on the bewildering series of events that have occurred in China over the past six months since the launching of the rectification campaign The purpose of the present article is not so much to describe those events as to attempt to provide some explanation for the course they took; however, a brief résumé will be necessary to provide a background.

On 8 May 1957, the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party opened the first of a series of forums at which leading non-Communists were invited to criticize the regime. The object was to lay bare grievances which the Communist Party would then remedy during the course of its rectification campaign which had been launched on 27 April 1957.[2] Similar forums were held in Government departments and universities and among writers, journalists, and generally among the upper layers of the non-Communist intelligentsia.

The response might be described as encouraging. While some feared that the invitation was designed to trick them into uttering anti-Communist views, many people made use of the forums to deliver forthright criticisms of various aspects of the regime. It is not possible here to discuss in detail these criticisms, which throw a great deal of light on how China is ruled. Suffice it to say that, whether mild or bitter in tone, they all testified to the way in which the Communist Party has extended its grip over every sphere of life, and to the arrogance and brutality that often characterize the exercise of absolute power by the Party cadres.

The criticisms apparently alarmed the Chinese leaders, for after only a month the official Communist Party newspaper, the *People's Daily*, made a counter-attack. In an editorial entitled 'What is this for?' the paper discussed a threatening letter received by a man who had supported the Communist Party against some of its critics. It said: 'We regard this letter of intimidation as an import-

Chinese Communists' "Rectification" Movement', in *The World Today*, August 1957.

[1] New China News Agency, 9 October 1957 It was an enlarged session, 416 people being present, it included Party First Secretaries down to the level of Regional Committees. Mao Tse-tung is reported as having spoken before the end of the session.

[2] The text of the Central Committee's directive was released by the New China News Agency in English on 30 April 1957.

nt event because it is indeed a warning to the broad masses of the eople and is a signal given by certain people who exploit the ectification campaign for waging an acute class struggle.' Describng these 'certain people' as 'rightists' (a term apparently originated y a non-Communist) it went on: 'They try to take advantage of his opportunity to overthrow the Communist Party and the working class, overthrow the great cause of socialism, drag history backvards to the bourgeois dictatorship. . .' The keynote of the anti-rightist' struggle had been struck: some critics of the Communist 'arty were misusing the rectification campaign for the evil end of liminating the Communist Party and socialism altogether.[1] Vhile the *People's Daily* at first contented itself with general ccusations, non-Communists began to vie among themselves in he vehemence of their attacks on colleagues whose criticisms had pparently displeased the regime. Of these Chang Po-chün, the Minister of Communications, and Lo Lung-chi, the Minister of he Timber Industry, had been clearly selected for the roles of rincipal villains. It was alleged that they made an alliance against he Communist Party, using as one of their main tools Chu An-'ing, who had been appointed editor of the *Kuang Ming Daily* n 1 April 1957. At the annual session of the National People's Congress (26 June to 15 July) they and many others issued confessions after Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, and Lu Ting-yi, he head of the Communist Party propaganda bureau, had led a trong attack on the 'rightists'.

This was merely the beginning. Not only have those men been ince allowed no peace; the anti-'rightist' campaign has spread far eyond its first purlieu, the non-Communist politicians. 'Rightsts' have been unearthed among students, teachers, writers, rtists, journalists, business men, and even among members of the Communist Party and its youth league. With some justification he campaign has been described as 'a violent political and ideoogical struggle which will be deeper and more complicated than he successive political movements and ideological reform movenents of previous years'.[2] Apart from the education that the masses re expected to derive from the denunciation of the 'rightists', hey are also being subjected to a new set of ideological and

[1] *People's Daily*, 8 June 1957. This editorial was followed up by similar ones n 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 June. Further editorials were published as the campaign eveloped; but the import of the first one was so obvious that Chu An-p'ing esigned his editorship of the outspoken *Kuang Ming Daily* the same day.

[2] *Wen Yi Pao* (Journal of Literature and Arts), editorial, 21 July 1957.

political instruction programmes. Special ones have been launched among students, business men, peasants, and soldiers. It is claimed that the 'rectification' movement is being continued simultaneously; but Communist cadres are probably too busy criticizing rightists to worry about their own defects—even if anyone still has the courage to mention them.

WAS IT A TRICK?

What is the explanation of this startling reversal of policy, whereby critics who had thought themselves permitted to speak out have been turned upon? The instinctive answer, one that has been suggested both in China and in the West, is that Mao played a monstrous confidence trick when he made his speech of 27 February 1957 on the resolution of 'contradictions' within the ranks of the people; that he promised that critics would be immune to reprisal; but that this was merely a device to bring into the open anti-Communist sentiment within the country. In particular, it is alleged that in his speech as originally delivered he did not include the six criteria by which critics were to be guided, which were an important part of the version published on 18 June 1957. (The principal criteria were acceptance of Communist leadership and of the 'socialist path'.)

Some support is given to this analysis by the *People's Daily* editorial of 1 July 1957. It said: 'From 8 May to 7 June, our paper and all Party papers carried out exactly this policy [not to publish counterblasts to criticisms] in accordance with the directive of the Communist Party's Central Committee. The purpose is to let the evil spirits and demons of all kinds "contend freely" and to let the poisonous weeds gain a luxuriant growth so that the people will be startled at such things in the world and will take action to wipe out these low scamps. . . Some say: this is a dark plot. We say: this is an open plot. For we told the enemy beforehand. demons can be wiped out only when they are let out of the cage, and poisonous weeds can only be got rid of when they are allowed to come out of the soil. Do peasants not weed several times a year?'

While the sinister language of this editorial is itself suggestive of a plot, one of its contentions seems to be correct: namely, that the Communist Party had never concealed its aim that the object of free criticism was the ultimate victory of the correct line of Marxist truth; that Mao, however unguarded his remarks had

been, had never implied that all criticisms would be allowed to be voiced unrefuted.

There is the evidence, first, of a number of editorials published in the *People's Daily* between the date of Mao's speech and the invitation to the non-Communists to air their views.[1] These emphasized the need for non-Communists to continue to pursue Marxist ideological studies. One said bluntly: 'What should the intellectuals learn? . . . we consider the study of Marxism-Leninism indispensable.'[2] Clearly, Mao had not sanctioned any abandonment of the State philosophy. In another editorial the leadership of the Party was reaffirmed. 'Of course, one should not set respect for the independent and equal position of the democratic parties against the leading role of our Party in the political life of the whole country.'[3]

Even more convincing evidence is provided by the speeches of Chang Po-chün and Lo Lung-chi to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference just after they had heard Mao's speech. Chang had this to say on the leadership of the Party: 'There is a sort of contrary view that there is not enough democracy. Inasmuch as democracy is to be developed, why stress the leadership of the Communist Party? Why stress democratic centralism? This way of speaking is welcome in a capitalist society, but we are not following the capitalist road but a socialist democratic road under the guidance of the working class.'[4] No anti-'rightist' could have put it better. That Lo Lung-chi was clear how far he could go is evidenced by the pains he took to ensure in advance that he would not be misunderstood. 'The criticism of individual Party members, no matter whether such criticism is proper or not, does not mean opposition to the Party, much less counter-revolution.'[5] These two men clearly perceived the frontiers of criticism.

Others apparently did not, and a dispute developed among non-Communist dons which brought forth a significant article by Teng Ch'u-min. He wrote: 'Chairman Mao's speech I heard personally. Chairman Mao stated that the poisonous plants grew just as much as 'the beautiful flowers but the peasants weed every year, and that it actually will not do to tell the poisonous

[1] 'Strengthen ideological and political work in the schools', 29 March 1957; 'Educators must receive education', 6 April 1957; 'Industrialists and business men should continue to remould themselves and render acitve service', 22 April 1957.
[2] *People's Daily*, 6 April 1957. [3] *ibid*, 26 April 1957.
[4] *ibid*., 19 March 1957. [5] *ibid*., 23 March 1957.

plants not to grow—you can just go ahead and cut them. He also stated that idealism, the opposite of dialectical materialism, should be criticized, and it would be a mistake if it were not.'[1] The similarity between his reference to peasants weeding every year and that in the *People's Daily* editorial of 1 July 1957 is obvious.

One may conclude, therefore, that Mao in his speech did not say that any criticism would be accepted. Neither he nor the Communist Party in its official journal suggested that any of the regime's basic tenets had been abandoned. Consequently, one must reject the idea that the call to critics to speak out was merely a trick. Nevertheless, one must assume that Mao's original remarks were sufficiently unguarded to allow people less astute than Chang Po-chün and Lo Lung-chi to be confused. In particular, it seems likely that the six criteria were omitted from the original speech, not in order to lead people astray, but because Mao assumed that the frontiers of criticism must after seven years be fairly clearly defined.

In his controversy with other dons, Teng Ch'u-min said: 'After hearing Chairman Mao's report, some of us might be inclined to think that Chairman Mao only encouraged us to "bloom", but as far as I can see there is "close" in "bloom". For example, the grass should be weeded just as idealism should be criticized.'[2] Furthermore he suggested that four criteria should be laid down to guide criticism; it seems unlikely that he would have suggested them if Mao had already provided the official six.

THE CHANG PO-CHÜN/LO LUNG-CHI ALLIANCE

It is possible to imagine that a number of people were led astray by the looseness of Mao's remarks and the general atmosphere of relaxation of pressure on non-Communists that accompanied the launching of the rectification campaign. But it is hard to picture Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi, politicians whose astuteness is attested by their present positions within the regime, being among them. After all, they clearly indicated that they had not misunderstood Mao's speech.

An examination of the criticisms which they made and which have now been held against them deepens the mystery. For it is quite clear that the two men, far from being 'rightists', never

[1] *Kuang Ming Daily*, 26 April 1957.

[2] Remarks reported in *Kuang Ming Daily*, 21 April 1957 His use of the term 'bloom' is derived from Mao Tse-tung's phrase: 'Let the hundred schools contend; let the hundred flowers bloom together '

strayed from the narrow path of fellow-travelling orthodoxy. Chang, for instance, has been accused of wanting to destroy the leadership of the Communist Party with his proposal for a 'political planning institute'. But leaving aside Chang's denial that this was his intention, the scanty reports of his scheme make it clear that it was merely a means to allow the democratic parties greater participation in political work—a proposal well within the bounds of the Communist Party's policy towards the democratic parties of long-term co-existence and mutual supervision.

In his confession to the National People's Congress,[1] Lo Lung-chi felt compelled to admit as his major fault a suggestion that a committee of members of the Standing Committees of the Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference should be set up to consider wrongs committed during the campaign against counter-revolutionaries. By not asking the original Party organs to right the wrongs done, he had attempted to negate the Party's leadership; this was the accusation levelled against him, and he accepted it. Yet the version of Mao's speech published only a month previously contained an identical proposal.

A similar analysis can be applied to Chu An-p'ing, who has been depicted as the tool of the Chang-Lo alliance. At a forum on 1 June 1957, Chu attacked the concept of the 'Party empire'. The tone of his remarks and the fact that he had the boldness to address them specifically to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai encourage one to believe that he was, as was alleged in the accusation against him, attacking the leadership of the Communist Party. In fact he made it clear that this was not his intention. He said: 'I think a party leading a nation is not the same thing as a party owning the nation.' In other words, it is quite all right for the Communist Party to lead the nation, but they should not occupy every post and thus exclude all non-Communists. Again, this is quite in accordance with the Communists' announced line towards the other parties.[2] A further proof of the validity of the suggestion that these three men did not utter 'rightist' views is provided by their accusers. One is struck by the frequency with which they have to say that Chang's and Lo's acceptance of, say, Communist Party leadership is merely superficial.

Even the suggestion that Chang and Lo combined with Chu

[1] *People's Daily*, 16 July 1957.
[2] See the fuller version of Chu's remarks published in *People's Daily*, 2 June 1957.

to incite the people and disseminate anti-Communist views does not really stand up to examination. Chu An-p'ing is accused of 'lighting fires' under the guidance of the Chang-Lo alliance; it is suggested that by sending reporters to nine cities to hold forums he was inciting the people. But there was no reason why he should not, as a newspaper editor, aid the rectification campaign in this way. The real grievance against him is that the views that his reporters uncovered were far more critical of the regime than the Communist Party found acceptable.

As for Chang and Lo, they are hard put to it in their confessions to point to evidence of their alliance. It would seem likely that the two men are rather ambitious and saw in the new role assigned to the democratic parties a chance for fresh personal advancement They worked together within the China Democratic League to encourage 'blooming' and 'contending'; but no accuser has yet proved the allegation that they led a nation-wide plot against the Communist Party. Certainly the two men have not confessed to it In fact Lo Lung-chi said: 'In the explanations made by many persons in the press the term "Chang-Lo alliance" has been freely used, and it is believed that this alliance is the supreme directing organ for the rampant offensive against the Party. . . I suggest that the leading party and the people make a thorough investigation. If anything is found that tends to show my deliberate concealment of certain schemes and plots in the Chang-Lo alliance I am prepared to receive the due punishment.'[1]

THE COMMUNISTS' NEED FOR A PLOT

If Chang and Lo are then comparatively blameless, why have these harsh accusations been levelled at them? Many people did infringe Mao's six criteria and could genuinely be called 'rightists'. Why the need to manufacture the idea of the plot? And why accuse two such unpromising candidates as its leaders?

Answers to these questions must perforce be speculations; but a consideration of the general situation resulting from the launching of the rectification campaign suggests fairly plausible ones. The Communist Party suddenly found itself faced with a completely unexpected crisis in the universities. Undisturbed by the fears that restrained many of their elders from voicing their true views, the students quickly started to criticize the leadership of the Communist Party, and socialism. Encouraged by their teachers

[1] In his confession published in *People's Daily*, 16 July 1957.

and by reports of similar activities in other universities, they demanded the abolition of Party leadership of education and the abandonment of political courses at the universities. At Peking University, a 'Hundred Flowers Society' was formed to 'struggle for democracy, freedom, and human rights with the Party'.[1] At Nanking University, Marxism-Leninism was described as 'a theory of the capitalist society, it is now out of date'.[2] Riots occurred at schools as well as universities, the most serious being one at Hanyang in which Communist officials were beaten up. The school's vice-principal and two other men have since been executed for inciting this riot.

The seriousness of the situation is confirmed by the remarks made at a conference of professors held by Chang Po-chün on 6 June 1957. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, the famous anthropologist, said: 'The university students have been set in motion and their feelings have been worked up. . . Once the students are aroused to action the situation is likely to deteriorate. The students are looking for leaders everywhere; if teachers join in there will be bigger trouble. Of course it is easy to put it down. Three million soldiers will put it down, but public support will go and the Party's prestige among the masses will be finished.'[3] Two other professors compared the situation to that on the eve of the May Fourth Movement (the episode in 1919 when students led a nation-wide protest against the award of Germany's possessions in Shantung to Japan). As one said: 'If the students appear in the streets and are followed by the masses, things will get beyond control.'

While the Communists have admitted the widespread nature of this student discontent,[4] they have asserted that it was a case of the majority being led astray by a minority of 'rightists'. Obviously, it would be too damaging to admit such general disaffection among the students without explaining it away. It would seem probable that it was necessary to posit the existence of a nation-wide plot to account for this unpleasant phenomenon. (The Chang-Lo alliance was linked even with the Hanyang riot; yet though the local leaders of the riot were executed its ultimate 'instigators' still retain their ministerial posts.) It would seem reasonable to assume, further, that the Communist decision to put a stop to 'blooming' and 'contending' was motivated by an evaluation of the situation similar to

[1] New China News Agency, 27 June 1957.
[2] *Wen Hui Pao*, 29 June 1957.
[3] A report of the conference was carried by the *People's Daily* on 4 July 1957.
[4] See, for instance, An Tzu-wen in *Chinese Youth*, No. 17, 1957.

that of the professors at Chang's conference. They did not want to take any chances of the students leading more general riots.

Why were Chang and Lo chosen for the roles of chief plotters? One can only suggest that since these two men were clearly directing two major democratic parties in the implementation of 'blooming', it would have been impossible to accuse anyone else of using their leadership of these parties to attack the Communist Party. It may well have been the connection between the two men and the newspapers the *Kuang Ming Daily* and *Wen Hui Pao* that was the decisive factor; for it was reports in these newspapers that indicated the widespread nature of unrest.[1]

A SPLIT WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY?

One further question that deserves consideration is whether or not the Communist leaders disagreed over the decision to halt criticism. There was certainly evidence before the launching of the rectification campaign that high-level cadres were not too happy about it, and a warning was issued to them in the columns of the *People's Daily*: 'Leading personnel who fail to see or are unable to solve correctly the internal contradictions within the ranks of the people are undoubtedly in danger politically. The danger arises not only from their lagging behind history but from the possibility of becoming dizzy with success because the revolutionary victory has made them leaders of the people.'[2]

After the counter-attack on the 'rightists' started, two of the latter alleged that Mao had been forced to agree to it by Liu Shao-ch'i, the Party's First Deputy-Chairman and Mao's heir apparent, and P'eng Chen, the Mayor of Peking and a member of the Politburo.[3] One might imagine that Mao Tse-tung would be reluctant to take a step calculated to destroy any chance of success for his moderate line. But whether he would have wanted to continue the line in the face of the obvious dangers is another matter On this point it will be safer to wait for further evidence before suggesting that there really has been a top-level split within the Chinese Communist Party.

R. L. MacF.

[1] Chang Po-chün was a Director of the *Kuang Ming Daily*; P'u Hsi-hsiu, a close friend of Lo Lung-chi, was a senior member of the staff of the *Wen Hui Pao*.

[2] *People's Daily*, editorial, 23 April 1957.

[3] See reports of the remarks of Ch'ien Wei-ch'ang in the *People's Daily*, 17 July 1957, and of those of Hsü Liang-ying in the same paper on 29 July 1957

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

THE WORLD TODAY

***Volume* 13 *No.* 12 *December* 1957**

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Notes of the Month

France and Arms for Tunis

THE painful incident caused by the American and British 'token' consignments of arms to Tunisia has raised difficult issues for the N.A.T.O. Powers as well as for France. Franco-Tunisian relations are in themselves difficult and complex. The convention of 20 March 1956 accorded Tunisian independence on terms not stated precisely, but covered by the newly invented word 'interdependence', whose content was to be worked out in subsequent agreements. Those agreements have never been made. Interdependence was intended by France to include co-operation in defence and foreign policy, with France retaining ultimate responsibility for both, at least for a time. It became clear within a very short time that these views were not shared by the Tunisian Government, which was soon pressing for the withdrawal of all French troops from Tunisia (except for Bizerta) and for complete control of foreign policy.[1]

The greatest stumbling-block to an agreement was the divergence of views regarding Algeria. Though whole-heartedly on the side of the Algerian nationalist movement, President Bourguiba has fought hard to avoid an open breach with France, without losing ground at home to the more extreme nationalists who look to the now exiled leader Salah ben Yussef. He has endeavoured to steer a middle course, by sandwiching protestations of friendship for France between even stronger protestations of sympathy for Tunisia's 'Algerian brothers', and by offering what Tunisia calls 'asylum' to Algerian refugees, and what France regards as aid to the rebel forces that is 'almost official in character', to quote the words of a French Parliamentary Commission's report published last July. France has deeply resented this attitude, and particularly since, while fighting in Algeria with one hand thus tied behind her back, she has been expected by Tunisia to feed the hand that bites her. For Tunisia is poor and is asking for extensive economic aid from France.

[1] See 'A Year of Independence in Tunisia', in *The World Today*, June 1957.

This is the background to the French Government's delay in responding to Tunisia's requests for arms. In the circumstances, it is comprehensible that the French should be anxious that arms supplied to Tunisia should not be diverted to the rebels; and whatever guarantees were offered regarding arms from France, Great Britain, or the United States must remain of doubtful value as long as it was possible for arms from other sources—say, from Egypt—to be so diverted. What the French hoped to gain from the delay is less comprehensible, since, as a sovereign State, Tunisia could not be prevented from looking elsewhere for arms if she so desired; and the longer the delay the more likely she was to do so, particularly in view of Tunisian irritation at the renewed frontier incidents in October, in which French troops pursuing Algerian rebels over the border came into conflict with Tunisian troops. As far back as 26 September, President Bourguiba had categorically undertaken that the arms which he had promised to the Tunisian people would be forthcoming during October, and had reiterated his determination to seek arms only from the West. The fact that Franco-Tunisian negotiations, resumed on 30 September, should then have been held up by a thirty-six-day French Government crisis is, unfortunately, only one more reminder of the relevance of Sir Winston Churchill's warning to M. Mendès-France, in January 1955, of the dangers of 'the empty chair'.

The incident also highlights the difficulties that French North African problems are creating for the N.A.T.O. Powers. The Algerian problem remains French in the sense that no Power other than France is juridically empowered to solve it. But her inability to do so inevitably constitutes an 'internationalization' of that question in the sense that the consequences of her failure create problems for her N.A.T.O. partners. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty makes the N.A.T.O. Powers responsible for the defence of the Algerian *départements*. They cannot, therefore, remain indifferent to what happens there, nor can they automatically accept the French thesis that N.A.T.O. solidarity means acquiescence in, if not approval for, French policy, or lack of it, whatever the consequences may be for North Africa and the Arab world. On 14 November—the very day on which the British and American Governments announced their decision to send arms to Tunisia—the French Foreign Minister reaffirmed the French refusal to contemplate 'any internationalization of the Algerian problem' and consequently turned down Moroccan and Tunisian

proposals for a joint conference with the aim of reaching a settlement acceptable to both French and moderate nationalist opinion. Both Tunisia and Morocco have a vital interest in the victory of moderate, rather than extremist, nationalist forces, since the triumph of the latter in Algeria—which becomes more probable with the prolongation of the fighting—would render their own struggles with extremist elements far more difficult and would open up grave dangers for the future stability of the whole of North Africa.

There are more immediate and obvious repercussions of French policy. At present half the French forces are in Algeria, instead of in France or Germany; the cost of Algerian 'pacification' has helped to create a French economic crisis of such dimensions that France is now seeking a loan from one or more of her N.A.T.O. partners; and in the United Nations, France's position is becoming more and more difficult for N.A.T.O. Powers to defend, for much European as well as Arab opinion is nearer to the views of the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments than to any of those so far acceptable to the majority of Frenchmen.

At present, the French Government seems to be divided between those who are anxious to protest, whatever the consequences, and those who, in the words of *Le Monde's* commentator, do not want 'to add a Franco-American to a Franco-Tunisian crisis'. British assurances that France ought to be the main source of the supply of arms to Tunisia, and the resumption of the Franco-Tunisian conversations interrupted by the fall of the last Government, may help to bring a settlement of Franco-Tunisian problems before the N.A.T.O. meeting in mid-December and so clear the way for consideration of some of the wider issues that the difficulties have revealed.

The New German Government and its Programme

RETURN to power with an overall majority in the federal Election of 15 September did not in any way make easier Dr Adenauer's task of Cabinet-building, and it was not until six weeks later (almost exactly the same length of time as in 1953[1]) that he was able to complete his Government. Not merely must confessional balance be maintained between Catholics and Evangelicals within the Christian Democrat majority party, but regard must also be had to sometimes conflicting sectional and

[1] See *The World Today*, November 1953, p. 463.

Länder (regional) interests. In the event, the new Cabinet contains eighteen members (two less than in 1953): nine are Catholic and nine Evangelical. Sixteen belong to the Christian Democrat Party, and of these four are members of the Christian Social Union wing in Bavaria which increased its vote in the federal Election by 10 per cent in comparison with 1953. There are also two representatives of the German Party. An illustration of 'confessional arithmetic' and other Cabinet-building difficulties, including personal differences, is the omission from the Cabinet of Herr Kiesinger, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Bundestag, a leading member of the C.D.U., a strong supporter of the Chancellor's policy, and a Catholic—but from Baden-Württemberg and not from Bavaria. Had he been an Evangelical he might have found himself with some ministerial office; he had been 'tipped' for the post of Minister of Justice, but this was given to Herr Schäffer, former Finance Minister and a Bavarian Catholic

Among the many comments in the German press during and since the formation of the Government, some are of special interest because they look to the future. One article raised the 'uncomfortable question' as to how a Chancellor unable to command the prestige of Dr Adenauer would find his way through all the difficulties to the formation of a Cabinet which would coincide with his own judgement. Another speculated on the possibility that the Christian Democrat Party might not retain its cohesion for long under another Chancellor. Other commentators discussed the relationship between Government and Opposition in the Federal Republic. While one held that the Chancellor should display a somewhat greater authority in relation to interest groups within the Government parties, and rather more conciliation towards the Opposition, another roundly declared that what was needed was a recognition of the fundamental principle of democracy, namely that not the majority alone, however large that majority may be, but majority and minority, Government and Opposition, together represent the State.

Dr Adenauer was re-elected Chancellor on 22 October by the new Bundestag, by 274 votes to 192, but for the first time with nine abstentions, presumably on the part of members of the C.D.U. In the Bundestag Dr Adenauer's Government has 287 seats (out of a total of 497),[1] 118 more than the Social Democrat Opposition The Government cannot, therefore, command the two-thirds

[1] Excluding twenty-two non-voting representatives of Berlin.

majority required for any alteration of the Constitution unless it has the support of the forty-one Free Democrat members—and they have declined to commit themselves either for Government or for Opposition. On 29 October Dr Adenauer presented to Parliament his Government's programme of 'no experiments' in economic policy, for which he declared the electorate had demonstrated its support. The Chancellor promised the long-awaited taxation and financial reforms and the mobilization of capital in order to increase production, but emphasized that only if an increase in productivity were achieved would higher wages and shorter hours be permissible. While social reform would continue, the Government would encourage self-help and private initiative, to prevent 'degeneration into a total welfare state'.[1]

Turning to external relations, the Chancellor urged the need for the closest Western co-operation. The Federal Government was determined completely to fulfil all the obligations arising out of its membership of N.A.T.O., both with regard to the size of its contribution and to the dates set for that contribution. This was, however, the sole reference in the speech to problems of defence and rearmament (probably because there were still under discussion plans for changes in the conscription law to allow for a defence service which might include units not under N.A.T.O.'s control). Reunification was described as the 'great national task' and its achievement as an obligation of the four great Powers from which they could not be released by the German people, and which the Soviet Union had expressly recognized and admitted as recently as 1955, in Geneva and Moscow. The German Federal Government continued to hold fast to the view that it alone had the sole legitimate right to represent German interests abroad and to act as spokesman for the 18 million Germans in the Soviet-occupied zone. This claim, Dr Adenauer said, had been decisive in causing the Government to break off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia when that country recognized the German Democratic Republic.

The breaking off of relations with Yugoslavia, which took place on 19 October, has been much discussed in Western Germany, not least in the context of previous efforts towards 'loosening' and 'activating' the Eastern policy of the Federal Republic. Dr Pfleiderer, the German Ambassador in Belgrade, who died suddenly in Bonn two days before Tito's recognition of the D.D.R.,

[1] *The Bulletin* (issued by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government), 5 November 1957, vol. 5, No. 43, p. 1.

was reported to have recommended very shortly before his death that, despite the Polish/Yugoslav statement accepting the Oder/Neisse frontier as final, possible further action by Tito should be forestalled by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland. There has since been considerable difference of opinion as to whether any alternative action was open to the Government, and whether breaking off relations with Tito was, or was not, likely adversely to affect the chances of achieving reunification, by 'calcifying' relations between the Federal Republic and the Slav nations to the east. It was pointed out, on the one hand, that the severance of relations with Yugoslavia need not and should not be permitted to prevent action by the Federal Government to establish diplomatic relations with Poland, which had recognized the D.D.R. as long ago as October 1949. On the other hand, some commentators believed that, although Tito's diplomatic recognition of the D.D.R. undoubtedly constituted an unfriendly act, to break off relations with Yugoslavia was not the only retaliatory action open to the Federal Government. It was argued, for example, that it would have been possible to withhold further reparation payments (under the Debt Agreement of March 1956), with a hint that if Tito chooses to recognize two Germanies, then the other Germany must take its share in paying the agreed sum for damages, for which Federal Germany, as the only legal successor to the former German Reich, had made itself responsible.

The discussion, in other words, turns on whether the Federal Government has been too 'legalistic' in its approach to relations with the East, failing to take into account what critics call 'political realities', or whether, in fact, nothing has been done to jeopardize relations with Eastern Europe. The Eastern policy of the new Government, in particular, will be closely followed both by supporters and opponents during the coming months.

Some Facts and Figures on Soviet Oil

OIL and coal were among the industries of the Soviet Union most affected by the war. Oil production fell from 33·1 million tons in 1940 to 19·4 million tons in 1945. The reason is not far to seek: most of the old oilfields were situated east and north of the Caucasus and were thus either overrun by the Germans or, in the case of the most important of them all, Baku, were close to the front line. Recovery after the war was slow: not till 1949 did production reach 33·4 million tons. Expansion continued at about

5 million tons a year till 1953, but has been much more rapid since, reaching 52·8 million tons in 1953, 59·3 million in 1954, 70·8 million in 1955, and 83·8 million in 1956. The target envisaged for 1961 is 135 million tons.

This spectacular advance is due to two causes: more efficient exploitation of old oil-wells, and rapid expansion of the newly discovered oil-bearing areas. The Caucasian oilfields have been in production for a century. Their exploitation was based on natural oil pressure insufficient to ensure a long life to a well. As a consequence, output soon dropped and wells had to be abandoned after a relatively short productive life. Until recently most of the output of new borings went to compensate for this wastage.[1] With the introduction of water injection and other means of maintaining artificial oil pressure the life of oil-wells was considerably extended. New and efficient machines have been put into operation, in particular the revolutionary turbo-drill, a Soviet invention which has aroused considerable interest in the West and has significantly speeded up drilling operations.

Production in Baku never recovered its pre-war level. From 22,231,000 tons in 1940, it dropped to 15,305,000 tons in 1955.[2] But this decline has been completely overshadowed by the rapid expansion of new oilfields, mainly in the region between the Volga and the Urals. Many new oil discoveries have been made in this district, and it is now assumed that the whole region, extending about a thousand miles from north to south, is one vast oilfield estimated to contain 80 per cent of total Soviet oil resources. Exploitation of this so-called 'New Baku' has been rapid. Unfortunately no Soviet statistics are available covering oil production by individual oilfields; the only information relates to production by republics. According to these, R.S.F.S.R. production, mainly concentrated in New Baku, rose from 7,039,000 tons, or 23 per cent of U.S.S.R. production, in 1940, to 61,300,000 tons, or 70 per cent, in 1956.[3] This figure includes output from Sakhalin and other small fields, but this is not likely to be large.

Central Asian output is comparatively small. The largest field, in Turkmenistan, has increased its production sixfold since 1940 and in 1955 produced over 3 million tons. The total Central Asian output for 1955 amounted to 5,652,000 tons. No Soviet statistics

[1] *Planovoye Khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1957.
[2] *U.S.S.R. Economy. Statistical Abstract*, 1956.
[3] *R.S.F.S.R. Economy: Statistical Abstract*, 1957.

on estimated total oil reserves have been published since the 'thirties. The last figure given was 5,000 million tons.

It will be seen that in spite of the shift of the oil industry towards the east, most of the new Soviet industrial areas beyond the Urals still have to depend on oil brought from European Russia. The average distance of railway haulage for oil is given as 1,309 km. in 1955, twice that of coal and an increase of 104 km. on the 1950 figure.[1] In order to save railway freight, a pipeline has recently been completed from New Baku to Omsk, a formidable task, involving the crossing of the Ural mountains and of many large rivers. Further pipelines are projected from Omsk towards Eastern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. The original pipeline is to be paralleled by another, of much larger diameter. According to a Government statement issued on 25 September, new large deposits of various raw materials and sources of power have been discovered by geologists in the last few years. The full exploitation of these would necessitate the recasting of the existing Five-Year Plan and the drafting of a long-term plan covering the next five to seven years. Discoveries of new resources in coal, oil, and gas were also mentioned in the *Pravda* leader on the following day, but it is not clear whether in the case of oil these are merely an extension of the existing fields or, which would be much more valuable, new discoveries in Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union.

The only indication from Russian sources of exports of oil and oil products is a figure of 6·4 per cent of total exports for 1955. At a rough estimate this would give a value of $200 million. Against this must be set an import of 2·8 per cent, probably from Rumania, which may be re-exported again under a Soviet label. A British estimate[2] of Soviet oil exports puts the figure at 5 million tons for 1956, of which 3½ million tons go to Western Europe. They account for only a very small part in the oil imports of most European countries, with the exception of Iceland, Finland, and Yugoslavia At present Egypt, which received 1 million tons in the first ten months of 1956, is the biggest importer of Soviet oil and oil products, but most of the trade treaties with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean specify deliveries of oil and oil products, no amounts being given. Until recently Israel covered a considerable proportion of her oil needs by imports from the Soviet Union On 8 February 1957, however, the cancellation of all oil contracts with Israel was announced in the Soviet press.

[1] *Voprosi Economiki*, No. 6, 1957. [2] *Petroleum Press Service*, No. 2, 1957

The Movement of Hungarian Refugees

WHAT has been the fate of the refugees who left Hungary at the time of the revolution a year ago? According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, up to October 1957, 174,300 refugees had arrived in Austria and 19,800 in Yugoslavia, making a total of 194,100.

The Hungarians allege that over one-eighth of this total, i.e. about 26,000 people, have returned to Hungary. It is difficult, however, to place complete credence in these figures. The total number of official repatriations from Austria and Yugoslavia amounts to about 8,000, and it is hard to believe that some 18,000 people have been able to return from the various other countries unnoticed by the authorities in charge.

The majority of the refugees to Austria crossed the frontier in November and December 1956. When this was closed both by Hungarian frontier police and the Soviet Army, almost 20,000 people fled to Yugoslavia during January and February 1957. Of those who crossed the Austrian frontier, 153,000 have so far been resettled, about 78,000 in Western Europe and 75,000 in countries overseas. There are still about 23,000 refugees in Austria. Some of these will remain there, but the majority are waiting for resettlement.

The corresponding figures in Yugoslavia are less favourable. So far, some 60 per cent of the arrivals have re-emigrated; 2,600 have been repatriated (i.e. about 13 per cent of the total, as compared with only 3 per cent of those in Austria); and about 5,000, i.e. about a quarter (as compared with one-eighth in Austria), are still awaiting resettlement.

A total of 165,000 refugees is officially estimated to have been accepted in various other countries. By far the largest number has been resettled in the countries of the British Commonwealth, as follows: Australia, 9,000; Canada, 26,000; Eire, 540; New Zealand, 1,000; South Africa, 1,300; the United Kingdom, 21,500—making a total of 59,340.

Contrary to expectations, the United States Government has limited the number of refugees. Up to date 35,700 have been admitted to the U.S.A., and there is little hope of a further increase. On the other hand, the Government of Canada seems to be agreeable to resettling a further number, and though there is a temporary hold-up at present it is hoped that Canada alone will eventually receive as many refugees as the United States. The one country

which set no limit whatsoever was France, yet only about 12,000 people have elected to settle in that country. Apart from the general tendency to go overseas, as far as possible from the Soviet world, an additional deterrent in the case of France is probably the large number of Communists amongst the workers and the preponderant influence in the factories of the Communist-controlled C.G.T. For whatever has been said in Moscow and Budapest, the bulk of the refugees belonged to the working classes.

The Kádár regime's approach to the refugee problem has three different aspects. The first is that of political prestige both at home and abroad. The emigration of almost 2 per cent of Hungary's total population, the fact that these people prefer to live in the free world either for political or for economic reasons, is an indictment of the regime. Therefore the thesis has been evolved in Budapest that the refugees did not leave of their own free will but were induced to do so by 'imperialist propaganda'. The fact that a substantial proportion of them were young men between fourteen and twenty-five has created a new *genre* in Hungarian journalism, that of heartbreak stories written in the cheap, sentimental style of the penny dreadful on the abduction of juveniles and the anguish of their families.

Secondly, from the practical, political point of view, the exodus of these people has probably helped in the stabilization of the Kádár regime. For a large number of its potential enemies, who, had they remained in Hungary undetected, would have considerably increased its lack of security, have now voluntarily left the country. This is why efforts to secure repatriation have been half-hearted. In the first place, the Kádár Government does not in most cases offer their return fare to refugees. Furthermore, the amnesty for returning refugees, which expired on 31 March, has not been extended.

Thirdly, in the sphere of economics, it was at first assumed that the exodus of a large number of industrial workers would hamper production. Yet it helped the regime to solve the question of unemployment which arose at the beginning of the year. Moreover, it also provided vacancies for university and high-school graduates. This has been a permanent problem during the past few years, as the output of the high schools was much greater than the number of potential posts in industry and the civil service. The maladjustments of the economic and educational systems can now be more easily resolved.

One is almost tempted to speculate whether the Soviet authorities, and later the Kádár regime, may not have deliberately delayed closing the frontiers until the end of February in order to derive these advantages for their political and economic reconstruction. But however tempting such a speculation might be, it presupposes a subtlety in the Communist regimes which has not been borne out by past experience.

The Middle East since Suez

It is written of Germany in the 'forties of the last century that 'few persons had any consistent and clear conception of the form which a national and united Germany was to take, but the desire to achieve it was a very vivid reality.' The parallel between the Germans of a century ago and the Arabs of today is in many ways striking. The Arabs are now obsessed by the same kind of consciousness of national unity as inspired the Germans a hundred years ago. As Mr A. J. P. Taylor has observed, every German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent. The frontiers which divide the Arabs are as artificial as those which divided Hanover from Prussia, or Saxe-Weimar from Hesse-Cassel. The interest in maintaining the *status quo* is vested in the same kind of social classes. The outside forces which tend to prevent or delay union are similar, and are impelled by motives which have much in common. It would be taking the analogy too far, perhaps, to see in Colonel Nasser's Egypt the Prussia of the Arab world. The Arabs may not yet have thrown up their Bismarck; on the other hand, the Germans of 1848 lacked the stimulus to unity of an Israel in their midst. But that there is a close affinity between the two movements there is little doubt.

It is at any rate certain that one of the most significant features of the months which have passed since Suez has been the underlying strength of Arab solidarity. To many Western observers this strength has been concealed by the superficial dissensions which have divided the Governments of the Arab world. The steadfast adherence of the Iraqi Government to the Baghdad Pact, for instance, has tended to make many forget the devices to which that Government has had to resort in order to remain in power. The success of King Hussein's coup in April has driven out of our minds the strength of the opposition to the present regime in Jordan. Thus the Governments of Iraq and Jordan have each succeeded in maintaining good relations with the West, and so in creating the impression that deep differences divide the Arab world, but there is evidence that their success has been achieved in the face of public opinion. And on almost every major issue in the last twelve months, the rulers of the Arab world have had in the end to steer clear of action which might put in doubt their faith in Arab unity. After his visit to the United States in the early spring, when it looked as if the State Department had won over

King Saud to the Western way of thinking, the King had to go out of his way to reassure Colonel Nasser. Again, the Iraqi Government was forced to reject the plan for a pipeline to the Mediterranean which would not pass through Syria. For though such a scheme would ensure that the flow of royalties would not be interrupted, it would also deprive another Arab State of its present advantages. And during the recent Turco-Syrian crisis the Iraqis, though firmly allied to Turkey through the Baghdad Pact, felt themselves compelled to tell the Syrians that an attack on Syria would be regarded as an attack on Iraq.

It cannot be repeated too often that the things which bring the Arabs together—the common language, common religion, and common culture—have more meaning to them than the things which keep them apart, which in any case depend mainly upon a small ruling class. The conviction held by the Arabs that they belong together, and that they are different from the West, goes very deep. It is the basis of their feeling of unity, and it is the source of their inclination towards neutralism. It is reinforced by their sense of inferiority derived from recent subjection to the West. It is strengthened by the fear that the West has not given up its hope of re-establishing its position of domination from which the Arabs have lately liberated themselves. All these feelings have made the Arab world sensitive to the doctrines propounded at Bandung two and a half years ago, and receptive to the simple myths of imperialism and colonialism. The Suez adventure convinced them of the truth of these doctrines. For here, they felt, was a pair of imperialist Powers acting exactly as the Bandung gospel said that they would act. Cyprus, Algeria, even Little Rock, have rammed the lesson home, and so have the actions which the British were forced to take a few months ago in the Yemen and in Muscat.

During the past year the Russians have been profiting from this situation with the greatest of skill and ability. Enjoying the advantage denied to the West, that they have no commitments or inhibitions about Israel, they have been able to give unstinted support to Arab nationalism. It is this freedom from responsibility for what might happen to Israel that has enabled them to continue to ship arms to Egypt and Syria. It has permitted them with some plausibility to pose as the altruistic friend of the independent Arab, anxious to help him, at whatever cost to themselves, along the road to military power and economic development. And the

liberty of action conferred on the Soviet State by a totalitarian economy has enabled the Kremlin to offer this aid on terms with which the United States and Britain cannot compete, restricted as they are by democratic usages such as accountability to the taxpayer and respect for the law of supply and demand.

Little enough is known of the Russian programme of economic aid for Syria, except that the loans which the Russians are to make will bear interest at the rate of 2½ per cent per annum. In the United States and in this country the taxpayer would have just cause for complaint if American or British aid were to be granted to Syria on such terms. And even if it were, it would be difficult to convince the Syrians that no ulterior motive existed. In any event, the State Department and the Foreign Office would necessarily be bound to stipulate that the aid granted must not be used against Israel. If so, it would at once be said that strings were attached. Yet it is useless to ask the Syrians to reflect upon the reasons for the unprecedented generosity of the Russians, or to suggest to them that 2½ per cent cannot be an economic rate for money, even in Russia. For the Russians have been careful to point out that no conditions have been attached to their assistance. Moreover the Arabs have as yet little experience of Russian duplicity, or of the methods of peaceful penetration as practised by the Kremlin. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Russian offer should have been accepted with acclamation. Nor is it surprising that the Kremlin should desire to make Syria their 'shop window', to demonstrate to the doubters what Russian aid can do for an undeveloped country.

In its reply to the Russian initiative, the West has for many months been severely handicapped. Suez has compelled the Arabs to view with suspicion any approach made by the British or the French. The French have been doubly suspect because of the entente between Paris and Tel Aviv. In any case, economic weakness in both Britain and France has been a crippling limitation on their present freedom of action. Inevitably the lead has had—at last—to be taken by the United States. But in dealing with the Arab world the State Department has suffered from two serious disadvantages. The support which the Americans gave to Israel in her early years prevents the Arabs from taking any American initiative at its face value. And since last November the Americans have had to avoid at all costs incurring in Arab eyes the stigma of guilt by association with the British and the French. This has stood

in the way of the formulation by the West of any joint policy on the Middle East. The Western response to the Russian penetration of the Middle East has thus been almost exclusively American. And finally, perhaps because of their immense material interests in Saudi Arabia, the Americans have decided to build their Middle Eastern policy around the position of King Saud. It has not been lost on the Kremlin or on the uncommitted Arab that American policy accordingly depends upon the most reactionary regime of the whole area.

Other manifestations of American policy during the past twelve months have hardly been much happier. The Eisenhower doctrine, asserting as it does the readiness of the Americans to come to the aid of any Middle Eastern State which is the victim of Communist aggression, was well received by the Turks and the Persians, it is true, for they have good reason to know what Russian imperialism can mean. It was accepted also by the Government of Iraq, for that Government was committed already to the Baghdad Pact. It was accepted by the Lebanese and King Saud, though by both with less enthusiasm than the Iraqis. But elsewhere, and notably in Egypt and Syria, to say nothing of large sections of the intelligentsia in Baghdad and Beirut and Amman, the doctrine is thought to be irrelevant to Middle Eastern realities. For many Arabs have yet to be convinced that they are in any danger from Communist aggression. We must face the fact that the only aggression of which they have had recent experience is that of November 1956. Apart from the so-called imperialist Powers, the only enemy of which they are really afraid are the Israelis. Mr James Richards, the special envoy President Eisenhower sent to the Middle East to explain the doctrine, succeeded only where he was preaching to the converted. The score of new converts was singularly disappointing.

Nor has the recourse to gunboat diplomacy been any more effective when employed by the hitherto unblemished hands of the State Department. The dispatch of the Sixth Fleet to Beirut during the height of the crisis in Amman this spring, followed by the American airlift of arms to Jordan during the Syrian crisis, were dramatic gestures perhaps. But they have not increased the popularity of the West in the Middle East. Nobody can be certain that King Hussein would have fallen if the Sixth Fleet had not been sent to Beirut. Nobody can be certain that the Syrian crisis would have taken a different course if the Americans had not shown the

strength of their hand by the airlift. What is certain is that both incidents have enabled the anti-Western elements in the Arab world to proclaim that the Americans react, when pressed, in the same way as the British or the French, and that the American type of imperialism is no better than the British.

It is true that the Baghdad Pact is still in being. A year ago it looked as if the British action against Egypt would wreck the agreement altogether. As things were it was not till last May that the Iraqi delegates consented to receive the British back into grace and to sit down at the same table with them. As it happens, the Pact has been strengthened by the agreement of the Americans to become members of the military as well as of the economic and subversion sub-committees of the Council, though they have still failed to apply for full membership of the Pact. The neutralist criticism of the Pact, that it is evidence that the West regards the problem of the Middle East as one to be settled by military measures only, has to some extent been met by an attempt to use the Council as an instrument through which economic aid can be passed by the West to its members. There have been promising developments as a result in the field of communications and the peaceful use of atomic energy, particularly since the meeting of the Council at Karachi last June. All the same, it is impossible to deny that the Pact's main object is to enable its members to defend themselves against Russian aggression. To this extent its Middle Eastern members cannot be regarded as uncommitted. The Pact has therefore continued to be one of the principal targets both of Russian propaganda and of the neutralist and the uncommitted At all events, there have been no signs of any fresh recruits for the Pact, and a change of regime in Iraq, the one Arab member of the Pact, would almost certainly be followed by the defection of that country.

Some have lately professed to see signs that there are doubts in Cairo about the wisdom of Egypt's foreign policy during the past few months. It is plain from the financial discussions between Colonel Nasser and Mr Eugene Black in Cairo, between the Egyptians and the British in Rome and the French in Geneva, that Nasser is anxious for some degree of rapprochement with London and Paris, but if this is so the reason seems to be clearly economic and not political. It is true also that there have been many arrests of Communists in Cairo, and that the line put across on the 'Voice of the Arabs' continues to be that Egypt is uncommitted and

desires to follow a policy of strict neutralism. But it would surely be wrong to argue from all this that Nasser is really showing any signs of returning to the Western fold. It may well be that the dispatch of Egyptian troops to the Aleppo area this autumn was due to the wish of Colonel Nasser to reassert his prestige in Syria, given the speed with which the Russian penetration of that country is progressing. After all, a political and military union between Egypt and Syria has already been decided upon in principle, no doubt as a first step towards the realization of a Greater Arab Empire such as that which Mahomet Aly built up in the early part of the nineteenth century. If Syria were really to become a Russian satellite, these ambitions could never be fulfilled. The good relations which still exist between King Hussein and the West constitute another obstacle to these plans; hence no doubt the bitter attacks by Cairo Radio on the King last month. But in spite of all this, the Egyptians have agreed to accept Russian economic aid to the equivalent of £60 million, and it is significant that this arrangement was negotiated during the visit paid to Moscow in November by General Abdel Hakim Amer, the Egyptian War Minister and Commander-in-Chief.

It would accordingly be unreasoning optimism for the West to draw much comfort from the prospect in Egypt. On the other hand there are parts of the Middle Eastern scene on which the West can look with a little more satisfaction. Outside the Arab world, the Turkish Government, though weakened perhaps by the recent elections, has shown itself strong enough to avoid panic during the tension created by Soviet propaganda on the Turco-Syrian frontier. The Turks can now get down to the real problems of the country—the economic difficulties caused by too rapid expansion, and the need to face the realities of the Cyprus question. Like the Turks, the Persians have throughout remained steadfast to the bonds which link them with the West. Israel has accepted with a good grace the humiliations imposed on her by the Suez settlement, consoled perhaps by her exploitation of the port of Eilat. Indeed, the Ben Gurion Government has exercised great restraint. Partly owing to the presence of U.N.E.F. in Sinai, border incidents attributable to the Israelis have been rare, though further strains will be set up inside the country and on her frontiers by the Government's intention to admit an additional 100,000 immigrants a year. And inside the Arab world itself, the power of the princely families in the Persian Gulf is unshaken, and their treaties with the

British remain in force. Libya and the Sudan have not yet fallen under Egyptian hegemony. The new Lebanese Government, after the General Election of last summer, has failed to declare itself against the West. Whatever the strength of the opposition may be in Jordan, King Hussein is still in power, even if the Syrians and the Egyptians have withheld from him the subsidies they promised when the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was brought to an end. And in Iraq, though Nuri-es-Said is no longer in office, his successor is continuing his policy, and the country's development programme is beginning to show results which all can see.

But it would be foolish to suppose that there is nothing to trouble these patches of calmer waters. For new storms are approaching from a different point of the compass. The agreement concluded by the Italians and the Persians for the exploitation of new Persian oilfields last summer is highly complicated. But it is already clear that it is understood throughout the Middle East as being an arrangement which will leave the foreigner with only a quarter of the profits. It therefore represents a great advance upon the now conventional 50-50 agreements. At least one of those agreements—that between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraqi Government—provides that the share of the profits which the producer is to receive shall be at least as large as that accorded by the foreigner to neighbouring countries. The precedent set by the Italian agreement has already been followed in the contract which an American firm is negotiating with the Persians for building the pipeline from Kum to Iskanderun. It therefore seems inevitable that the West will shortly be faced with a demand from Iraq, from the Persian Gulf, and possibly from Saudi Arabia, for a revision of the existing agreements, and this may well lead to friction. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the countries which can be expected to make such demands are just those in which during the last year the West has managed to hold its own.

Statesmanship of the highest order will therefore be required of the Western negotiators during the coming months if these difficulties are to be overcome. But if they are surmounted, there will remain the still more intractable problems posed by Arab nationalism. In the deadly duel of coexistence now being fought between East and West, the story of the past year has shown that almost all the advantages lie with the East. The anti-Western bias of Arab nationalism, the deep suspicion of the West felt by every Arab, the sense of responsibility which is bound to mark our dealings

with their enemy Israel—all these impel the Arabs to turn towards the Russians, and suggest to them that there must be a basic incompatibility between themselves and the West. These are the advantages in which the strength of the Russian position consists, advantages which the Russians themselves have done little to create and which they need do little to exploit. They accrue to them as the unearned increment from years of Western error and neglect. To all this must now be added the advantage conferred by industrial and technological superiority, for that is the inescapable inference which is being drawn by the Arabs from the evidence of the Sputniks. Faced with such a challenge, on an issue so vital, are the nation-States of Western Europe capable of producing an adequate response so long as each continues to rely on its own individual effort? And if not, is a collective approach less likely to succeed?

B. S.-E.

Changing Military Thought in the Soviet Union

MILITARY thought sounds a very large subject, and could include almost anything from global strategy to military history. The present article will restrict itself to one aspect of military thought: military thought in the Soviet Union, not on a basis of secret information, which is out of the question, but as revealed in those military journals normally accessible to the Soviet professional officer. It will therefore not include speculation about Soviet military plans or capabilities, or deal with the statements of Government and Party leaders on subjects of nuclear warfare which are obviously designed for propaganda purposes. It will, rather, discuss what the Soviet officer is reading about military thought today, and how it differs from what he was reading a few years ago while Stalin was alive.

STALINIST MILITARY DOCTRINE

Before contemporary military thought in the Soviet Union can be assessed, we must have a clear idea of that doctrine as it

was officially maintained under Stalin. Naturally it was termed 'Stalinist', and its origin was attributed to an Order of the Day issued by Stalin on 23 February 1942, just after the successful defence of Moscow.[1] Stalinist military thought maintained:

(*a*) That there are five constant factors which win wars, listed by Stalin in this order: (i) the stability of the home front; (ii) the morale of the armed forces; (iii) the quantity and quality of divisions; (iv) the armament of the armed forces; (v) the abilities of the commanders.

(*b*) That there are a number of non-constant temporary factors which influence the course of the war and may prolong it, but which do not affect the outcome. The most important temporary factor is strategic and tactical surprise.

(*c*) That Western military thought, being unable to progress, because capitalism cannot develop the five constant factors to a sufficient degree to win a war, relies on adventurist strategy and on temporary factors such as surprise. Therefore capitalist countries are doomed in advance to defeat in any war with the Soviet Union.

(*d*) That the defence policy of the Soviet leaders in peace time should be to prepare the country for active defence, using its vast land space, that is, a planned retreat into the interior of the country which would wear down the advancing enemy. Once full mobilization had been achieved, all five constant factors would come into play and the enemy would be destroyed after a massive counter-offensive.

This was the Stalinist position, and it was one of extreme simplicity and lack of realism in the post-war world. It was extremely soothing to the Soviet people, for it meant that under no circumstances could the West win a war against the Soviet Union; no matter how advanced were their military preparations, they just could not defeat the Soviet Union. Let us now see how this theory has fared at the hands of the post-Stalin military thinkers in the Soviet Union.

The Five Constant Factors

First of all let us consider the formula of the five constant factors. This formula was consistently and faithfully repeated, and attributed to Stalin, by all leading military figures until the summer of 1954—that is, until the present leadership of the Soviet armed forces began to take shape. The last identifiable article in the military press in which the formula was quoted word for word and attributed to Stalin was on 9 May 1954. After that the formula continued to be used, frequently re-worded, although it was not described as Stalinist. Thus Marshal Zhukov frequently spoke of

[1] *Stalin's War Speeches* (Hutchinson, 1946), p. 28.

the 'regularities' or the 'basic rules' of modern warfare, which had been mastered by the Soviet Army. Our first point must be, therefore, that the Soviet Army had begun to deprive Stalin of his military reputation some eighteen months before his denunciation by Khruschev at the Twentieth Party Congress last year.

In February 1955 Malenkov fell, and Marshal Zhukov became Minister of Defence. Almost immediately a great change came over the way in which military thought was dealt with in the Soviet Army. There was a definite increase in the number of articles on military doctrine published in the military press, and from their content it was clear that a basic decision had been made to re-educate Soviet officers away from Stalinist unrealities. The first move, which was fairly cautious on the subject of the five constant factors, was made by Marshal Rotmistrov, a senior Marshal of armoured forces, in a stimulating article in the Soviet Army paper *Red Star* (24 March 1955) entitled 'For more imaginative work on Soviet War Science'. Rotmistrov wrote:

It can easily be understood that the growing importance of the factor of surprise in no way diminishes the importance of the constant factors deciding the outcome of a war. What is more, the role and significance of these factors is increasing. Surprise aggression cannot bring about a decisive result or lead to a victory in a war against a strong and serious opponent, if the surprise aggression is carried out by a State whose home front is insufficiently stable and reliable, if the morale of the aggressor's army is lower than that of his adversary, and so on.

This quotation, while emphasizing the continued need for mastering the constant factors, was the first to introduce some further conditions, implying, for example, that surprise aggression might succeed against a weak opponent, or if the aggressor's morale is higher than the defender's. Later on in this article, as we shall see, Rotmistrov spelt out this point more clearly. And since his article appeared, Soviet military thinkers have developed the subject of constant factors in war still further. An article in *Red Star*, 6 March 1957, included the following passage:

Nothing is so dangerous in our Soviet military thought as dogmatism in studying the various problems of war. We used to suffer from attempts to reduce the whole of military science to Stalin's pronouncements on the constant factors which determine the course and outcome of a war. It is true that this theory in its essentials is based on Lenin's ideas on the conditions necessary for victory over aggressors. But it did not embrace all the factors which decide the course and outcome of a modern war. For example, one could point to the fact that it omits very important

factors such as battle preparedness, organization, the military art, and the state of military doctrine on both sides. One cannot forget that the factor of surprise has grown considerably in importance in modern circumstances.

The appearance of Lenin as Stalin's successor as the fount of military knowledge will not have escaped the reader's notice, and in passing it is interesting to note that this is one of the most striking innovations in post-Stalin military literature. However, from these quotations it can be seen that most military thinkers are still convinced that there are constant factors which really decide the outcome of a war. But there has been a trend towards altering the emphasis of these factors and increasing their number in order to face the realities of atomic warfare and the great increase in the importance of the factor of surprise.

The Factor of Surprise

It is to surprise as a factor that we must now turn, but it is clear that we cannot discuss Soviet military thought on the value of surprise outside the context of atomic and nuclear warfare. And here we come upon one of the biggest changes in military thought since the death of Stalin. On 24 September 1946 Stalin pronounced upon atomic warfare and laid down the official Soviet line which was hardly challenged in public, believe it or not, until 1955. Stalin said: 'I do not believe that the atomic bomb is as serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are intended to intimidate the weak-nerved. But they cannot decide the outcome of war since atomic bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose.' It was left to Marshal Rotmistrov, in the article already mentioned, of March 1955, to strike the first realistic note. He said:

It is necessary to state clearly that in certain cases a surprise aggression with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons may appear to be one of the decisive conditions for the achievement of success, not only in the initial period of a war, but in the war as a whole. Surprise aggression by imperialist invaders may bring them considerable success especially when it is carried out against States which cannot meet it with adequate resistance because of the weakness of their economy and the awkwardness of their geographical position. When the aggressive State is not in a position to secure ascendancy in all the constant factors, then it is not possible for surprise alone to guarantee victorious outcome of a war.

This statement introduces for the first time the possibility, not admitted by Stalin, that other countries may possibly secure ascendancy in the constant factors.

Another important article on this subject was written by Major-General Talenski, a Professor in one of the Soviet Military Academies and one of the most prolific of their military writers. In May 1955 he wrote: 'With the appearance of new weapons possessing tremendous powers of destruction, the importance of the surprise factor in modern war has enormously increased.'

The years 1956 and 1957 brought the development and successful testing of new and more frightful weapons both in the range of nuclear bombs and in rockets and ballistic missiles. Marshal Zhukov on 28 January 1957[1] said of these weapons: 'We have an excellent defence industry and we have nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long-range rockets. We can take atomic and hydrogen bombs to the furthest corners of the globe.' And speaking to a military audience two months later the then Minister of Defence said: 'There is no corner in the world where an aggressor could take cover from our annihilating blows. . . If they are not banned, atomic weapons at present, and especially in the immediate future, will be adopted more and more in place of conventional arms; should a big military conflict break out, atomic weapons will inevitably be used as the main means of defeating the enemy.'[2] In an interview given on 7 September 1957 the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Vershinin, went into even greater detail about the way in which Soviet thinkers were developing the use of the weapons at their disposal.

Defence Policy

But this is not the main emphasis in the Soviet military press. It is the implications of nuclear warfare on the hitherto accepted tenets of Soviet military thought. Having established the increased importance of the factor of surprise, the Soviet military thinkers next examined the Stalinist concept of active defence, and found that they had to abandon it in conditions of nuclear warfare. It will be recalled that Stalin laid it down that in the event of war the Soviet armies should conduct a fighting withdrawal into the interior of the Soviet Union, luring the enemy on to his eventual destruction. Here is what Marshal Bagramyan, head of one of the Soviet Military Academies, had to say on this:

The importance of the surprise element increases with the contemporary development of armies and techniques, since the unexpected blow may be struck not only at the forces deployed at the front, but also at

[1] *Red Star*, 30 January 1957. [2] *ibid.* 20 March 1957.

strategic objectives, important political and economic objectives far from the front line.[1]

And Marshal Zhukov, speaking in February 1956, said:

Never before has the task of defending the interior of our country been so vital a matter as it is today.[2]

According to the press in March of this year, the air defence of the Soviet Union has been raised to the status of a fourth arm of service, ranking with the land Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. Both the Home Defence Fighter Command and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery appear to have been placed under the command of one man, Marshal Biryuzov, to judge from the All-Union Conference of Outstanding Servicemen, held in March 1957, at which Biryuzov was one of the main speakers. Earlier, Marshal Biryuzov had written:

As is well known, the rapid increase in the speed and range of modern aircraft, as well as the greater heights at which they fly, have enormously increased the significance of the surprise factor. Jet-propelled aircraft, carrying atomic or thermo-nuclear weapons, are capable of covering great distances very quickly and striking a blow at a country's administrative, industrial, or military centres situated well in the interior.[3]

Strange as it may seem, these very obvious conclusions were never once mentioned to the ordinary Soviet military reader until 1955, two years after Stalin's death.

Contempt for Western Military Progress

The fourth element of Stalin's military thought was contempt for Western military progress, and it was set out by Stalin himself over ten years ago in an open letter to a Soviet military historian, Colonel Razin. Stalin wrote that the time had long since passed for respecting the 'reactionary teachings of Western strategists'. This thesis has now been officially abandoned. The head of another Soviet Military Academy, Colonel-General Kurochkin, wrote:

If the aggressors unleash a new war, it will be a very complicated and bitter one. We would have to face a powerful and well-armed enemy who would have mastered completely contemporary war science. It would therefore be an unforgivable error to underestimate the strength,

[1] *Oktyabr*, No. 5, 1955. [2] Speech to Twentieth Party Congress, 1956.
[3] *Voennie Znania* (*Military Knowledge*), No. 8, 1956.

resources, and capabilities of the enemy. It is essential to study his strong and weak points soberly, his capabilities and his plans and his methods of fighting which he has adopted as a result of the latest developments.[1]

Marshal Moskalenko, the Commander of the Moscow Military District, reiterated this re-appraisal of Western efficiency in *Red Star* on 23 February 1957:

We should not forget that great changes have taken place in the armed forces of the Imperialist States, in organization and battle preparedness. We must take these changes into account when assessing the strong and weak points of our opponents. Soviet soldiers are being taught to defeat a powerful and cunning enemy, very well equipped and with great mobility and manœuvrability.

DOCTRINE OF THE MILITARY LEADERS TODAY

Up to this point, we have seen how the present military leaders in the Soviet Union have dealt with Stalin's military doctrine. Now let us take a look at what they have put in its place. First, the military implications of the new vulnerability of the interior of the Soviet Union to nuclear attack and the abandonment of the theory of active defence. Here are two indications of the way in which Soviet military men are thinking: the first comes from a book published last year in Moscow, entitled 'Contemporary Military Developments':

It is impossible to limit anti-atomic measures to engineering constructions, shelters, and other methods of protection. In order to prevent the enemy from having an opportunity to achieve surprise with atomic weapons, we must carry on ceaseless intelligence work of all kinds, and keep every action of the enemy under constant observation. Constant observation of the enemy's activities allows us to carry out two tasks simultaneously. One is to be able to strike a powerful blow with the air force and long-range artillery against the enemy's means of atomic attack as soon as they are discovered, with the object of foiling or weakening his atomic blow. The second is to be able to discover the enemy's preparations in time and to send warning to the troops on the danger of atomic attacks.

Major-General Talenski put it this way:

The problem is not merely one of explaining the surprise factor or of studying facts and examples of the use of surprise in the last war. Our task is to work out a solution seriously paying particular attention to methods and systems of advance warning of a surprise aggression by an enemy, and of dealing him preventive blows at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.[2]

[1] *Military Thought*, No 5, 1955. [2] *ibid.*

And General Kurochkin:

In order to increase the guarantee of the safety of our frontiers from surprise attack, we must be in a state of constant readiness, and know how to strike a preventive blow against the aggressor preparing to attack.[1]

These two quotations surely emphasize not only that the Soviet soldier is being prepared psychologically for a preventive attack in certain, though limited, circumstances, but that the great problem facing the Soviet military leaders is how to survive the initial attack with nuclear weapons. Among the prime needs here is the inculcation of a spirit of readiness and vigilance in the Army and the civil population. It is not enough to have an efficient army, or decentralization of administration and industry; the people must realize what harm lack of vigilance can do. In this connection, the Soviet leaders have inaugurated a campaign to rewrite the history of the last war, to show how the Germans benefited in 1941 and 1942 from slackness and short-sightedness in the Soviet Army. General Talenski has taken a leading part in this campaign:

We must study the role of surprise in modern war in the context of the lessons which we learnt from the operations in 1941–42. First of all we must recognize that our military science at the beginning of the war was not at the high level it should have reached. Its greatest weakness was that it did not work out the problems dealing with sudden attack.[2]

The military-historical journal *Military Herald* was even more outspoken:

It was unpreparedness of the armed forces which was the basic reason for the dispersed and unco-ordinated actions of our individual military formations and for the heavy losses sustained by the Soviet air force from unexpected attack by the enemy air force on aerodromes and so on. The Soviet Army retreated to Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov not because this was all part of a plan of active defence which did not and could not exist, but because of the failure to take the necessary measures to put the troops into a state of military preparedness.[3]

The new Minister of Defence, Marshal Malinovski, is one of those who have written on this theme. On 23 February 1957 he ridiculed the idea that the Soviet Army's retreat into the interior in 1941 was due to anything more creditable than military defeat owing to lack of readiness for a surprise attack.

Secondly, while much time and space is given to problems of surviving a sudden attack by nuclear weapons, Soviet military thinkers envisage another kind of warfare waged with conventional armed forces, particularly armour and artillery. They appear to be think-

[1] *ibid.* [2] *ibid.* [3] *Military Herald*, No. 4, 1956.

ing in terms of coming to grips with an enemy on the ground after the nuclear attacks have taken place, and possibly also of making up for nuclear destruction at home by seizing valuable and strategically important territories with conventional forces—areas which are less likely to be targets for nuclear attack. This, however, is to a certain extent guesswork; but at least we have ample evidence that conventional forces are not in any way being shelved or disregarded in the Soviet Union. Volume 41 of the latest edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1956) contains an article on 'Strategy' by a prominent Soviet military theorist, Lt-Gen. Krasilnikov, in which the writer states:

The Soviet Union is convinced that the latest weapons, including those of mass destruction, do not lessen the decisive significance of land armies, navies, and air forces. Without strong land armies, without a strategic air force and a tactical air force and a modern navy, together with a well-organized co-operation between them, it is impossible to wage war successfully.

In the book already quoted, 'Contemporary Military Developments', there is a chapter devoted to Armour, in which the following passage occurs:

Since the appearance of atomic weapons, a number of articles have been printed in the bourgeois military press putting forward the theory that the day of armour has passed. There is little need to expose the error of this theory. It is obvious that in atomic warfare the armoured forces will retain their battle usefulness to the full.

An article in the periodical *Voennie Znania* (*Military Knowledge*) is even more explicit:

The role of the armoured forces has grown particularly in the light of the new weapons which have appeared. Tanks, compared with other weapons, are relatively less affected by atomic weapons and can exploit the gains of an atomic blow more effectively. . . We have completely mechanized and motorized our army; high quality tanks and self-propelled guns are included in our infantry formations. The armoured forces are the basic striking force of the land army of the Soviet Union.[1]

As late as 21 August 1957 the military press contained such passages as:

It is perfectly obvious that the role and importance of armoured units has not been reduced, but become much greater because they are most suited to carry on military operations under conditions where weapons of mass destruction are used.

Similar articles were written about artillery. On 17 November

[1] *Voennie Znania* (*Military Knowledge*), No. 7, 1956.

1956, a distinguished artillery officer, General Samsonov, wrote:

The emergence of atomic weapons inevitably brought into being a new type of atomic artillery. However, the new types of artillery do not do away with the need for old types of cannon, howitzers, and mortars. These still have many operational tasks on the modern battlefield, tasks which cannot be accomplished by atomic weapons or which it would not be expedient to accomplish by such weapons.

Thirdly, the importance of the ordinary soldier still remains high: 'Soviet military science does not neglect the growing importance of new technical developments in modern war,' wrote Colonel Kashirin in *Military Knowledge*, 'but the growth of technology and new weapons can in no way diminish the importance of the human masses in war. The appearance of new methods of waging war does not only not reduce the role of the soldier in war, but actually increases it.'[1]

We see, therefore, something of Soviet military doctrine today and the changes which have come over it since the death of Stalin. These changes may be summarized as follows:

(*a*) Propagandistic, unreal, and misleading elements have been purged from Soviet military doctrine, among them the legend of Stalin's military genius. The most effective contribution here was of course Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Congress.

(*b*) The myth that the Soviet Union monopolizes the factors which automatically bring victory in war has been abandoned. The number of vitally important factors in war has been enlarged and elaborated, and Western military thought and Western weapons and methods are described as up-to-date and dangerous.

(*c*) Nuclear weapons, while not annulling these constant factors, have increased the amount of damage which a surprise attack can inflict, and have complicated the problems connected with defending the country because it is not only the frontier regions which must be ready to ward off an attack, but every single major industrial, military, or economic objective throughout the Soviet Union.

So the tasks of Soviet military thinkers must now be to find military measures to reduce the effects of nuclear attack, to train the armed forces and the people in the spirit of vigilance and readiness, to carry out dispersal of objectives, and, in the extreme case of discovery that a nuclear attack is imminent, to be ready to

[1] *Military Knowledge*, No. 8, 1956.

launch a preventive blow with nuclear weapons. All measures must be taken to awaken the Soviet people to the dangers of surprise attack and to train them in air-raid precautions so that the effect of nuclear explosions may be reduced. The defence of the homeland does not mean an end to conventional forces, which may well be given a new lease of life by new weapons and by being used to continue the war on land after the first nuclear blows have been struck.

ARMY-PARTY RELATIONS

In conclusion it may be worth asking the question: has this change in Soviet military thinking any influence over the planning of Soviet foreign policy and on relations between the Army and the Party? The Army's influence must surely be found here: the logical implication of the abandonment of a safe interior area in the Soviet Union into which to withdraw in case of war is that nuclear war no longer allows the Army to buy time *after* the war has begun. Any delaying tactics necessary to place the Army in a position to attack, or to defend itself, must be political moves undertaken in peace time, and closely co-ordinated with the Army's mobilization, civil defence, and training programmes. Army pressure on questions of foreign policy is probably, therefore, against international commitments likely to require military action out of step with the preparation programme, and in favour of a foreign policy sufficiently flexible to allow the Soviet Government to withdraw if the Army should advise that it is not ready to face a global war.

As for Army-Party relations, the present trend in military thought might bring the Army and Party closer together. The doctrine recognizes that most of the preparations for nuclear war, such as Civil Defence and making the people aware down to the smallest hamlet of their responsibility in war, are not feasible without the network of Party organizations and a Party-dominated police. The Army also recognizes that in the event of the dislocation of the central Government in war, the only organization which could retain the reins of administration would be the Party. The Army on its own might find great difficulty in administering and feeding the whole country after nuclear explosions, nor could it run the civil administration as well as fight the war. It might be able to take over specific areas in limited numbers, but at the lower levels all plans depend on keeping the Party and its nation-wide

network alive and vigorous for use in emergency conditions. The Army as an institution, speaking of course on purely professional grounds as the body responsible for the defence of the Soviet Union, is therefore unlikely to back up any move to dismantle or cripple the Party and its network in the present international situation.

J. M. M.

One Year of Gomulka

Illusion and Reality in Poland[1]

IN the first flush of the Polish revolution of October 1956 there was a tendency among some Western observers to visualize the Polish situation too much in Western terms, and to underrate the limiting factors of a democratic evolution. A more accurate and realistic assessment was expressed by Professor Julian Hochfeld, speaking a year later in the Sejm, or national assembly, in a debate on a new law governing local elections adopted at the end of October 1957. He said: 'This law is not an ideal one from the viewpoint of the demands of a formal democracy. It constitutes as much progress on the path towards democracy as we can afford.'

This frank admission closely followed the tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, at which Mr Gomulka spelled out very plainly his own definition of the limits to freedom. He insisted that the 'conservatives', or unregenerate Communists of the old school, were only a secondary danger, and the first task was to eliminate the 'revisionists', or radical reformers, whom he attacked in violent terms: 'To them, October means the continuation of their own political line to blow up the Party, to attack the people's regime, to spread defeatism, and to undermine the socialist system... The most representative of the revisionist wing was the periodical *Po Prostu*. With one stroke of the pen, they cross out the entire history, the entire

[1] The writer of this article was in Poland during the Poznan riots of June 1956, and again in October of that year, when Mr Gomulka came to power and successfully withstood the threat of Soviet intervention. He observed the Polish elections in January 1957, and has just returned from a further visit to Poland

socialist gain beginning with the October revolution in Russia.' And in the November issue of *Zycie Partii* a Communist writer, Adam Schaff, commented: 'Our Party is a Marxist and Leninist party, we are firm enemies of social democracy, and for this very reason, and on behalf of the ideological unity of the Party, we are not going to tolerate the heralds of social democracy in our midst.' There can be little doubt that this voices the opinion of Gomulka himself.

The tenth Plenum passed a resolution calling for a sweeping Party purge and postponed the Party Congress, which was due to take place in December, until the middle of 1958, to allow time for this process to be completed first. The purge is not only intended to abolish rival factions and restore a monolithic unity, but also to remove 'corrupt and demoralized elements' which have forfeited public respect. In fact, Mr Gomulka laid great stress on this aspect, and understandably so, since it is vital for the Communists to seek some basis of popular consent for their continued monopoly of power if that power is to be exercised by the new and more democratic methods, instead of through the machinery of repression.

Special Party commissions are to be set up throughout Poland to verify every Party card. In principle, their selection is to be controlled by members of the Central Committee in accordance with the lines laid down by Gomulka. In practice, however, this may well prove unworkable, and the local Party branches will then have the last word. In that case local interests would predominate, whether revisionist or conservative or simply plain careerist. One frequently hears admission that the purge will be a long and difficult business, and the risk is that it may merely result in a settlement of personal scores, instead of a cleansing of the Augean stables. This could be serious in a Poland where the Communist Party, having destroyed all opposition and political alternatives, constitutes the last organized element of stability apart from the Roman Catholic Church.

Thus a visitor to Warsaw one year after the 'Polish October' found the Communist Party in a state of acute crisis, and there were disturbing signs of Communist doubts and fears. Censorship of the press is now being much more rigidly enforced. Western diplomats and correspondents living in Warsaw say that their Polish friends have become more elusive and more guarded. In mid-October, three young Polish journalists, Atkins, Moczulski, and Wolowski, were arrested, ostensibly on charges of illegal cur-

rency deals, but actually for passing information about Party matters to Western correspondents. On 13 November *Trybuna Ludu* published an interview with the Minister for Internal Affairs, Mr Wicha, in which he made some ominous remarks about the need for Poles to be careful in their attitude to visitors from capitalist countries. He said: 'Some citizens of our State forget that among these newcomers there are also persons with an unfavourable attitude to the structure of People's Poland, and who are making efforts to gain confidence and to obtain information which will be used to slander Poland, and often even used for aims of intelligence services, as is indicated by the information in our possession.' The Minister also gave a warning against 'some foreign radio stations which have evidently passed from hypocritical praises showered on us till recently to malicious criticism and slandering of the activity of our Party and Government'. At the same time, travel to the West has been greatly curtailed on the ground of a foreign currency shortage, a reason which is undoubtedly genuine but which does nothing to relieve the atmosphere.

On the other hand, the writer travelled freely wherever he wished in Poland and met an almost embarrassing number of people. In some cases they were more reticent than before, more anxious that their names should not be quoted, but it is hard to say how far this was due to a natural recession from the outburst of suppressed feelings in October 1956, or to a prudent reading of the signs which Poles have learned from centuries of painful experience. They did not produce any examples to suggest a revival of police terror. Indeed, they were emphatic in declaring that a return to that system would be impossible without provoking an upheaval in Poland far more deadly and disruptive than the Hungarian tragedy. On 11 November the Warsaw district court sentenced three former high security officials to long terms in prison; Roman Romkowski, once Vice-Minister of Public Security, got fifteen years; Jozef Rozanski, formerly in charge of interrogations under the direct orders of the Soviet police chief General Serov, got fourteen years; and Anatol Feigin, former head of the political security branch, got twelve years. But it was noticeable that the papers gave only the bare announcement.

There has certainly been a marked check to the pace and scope of the democratic process in Poland, which might even have been expected after the first enthusiasms had spent their force. But

Poland still enjoys a degree of freedom unique in the Communist camp, and most of the reforms remain intact. They can be summed up as the ending of criminal excesses by the secret police; the achievement of a limited degree of sovereignty in relations with the Soviet Union, especially in economic matters; the adoption of a new agricultural policy and a new deal for the independent farmers; the creation of a *modus vivendi* with the Roman Catholic Church, providing substantial Communist concessions; the replacement of bureaucratic despotism in industry and administration by a policy of decentralization; and a limited revival of small private enterprise.

On the issue of personal liberty and freedom of expression, which usually attracts most interest in the West, the Gomulka Communists argue that criticism is still free unless it attacks the political basis of the regime or takes an anti-Soviet line damaging to Polish-Soviet relations. When it is pointed out that such a definition could be extended to cover virtually any independent thought, the usual reply is, firstly, that the presence of Gomulka is a guarantee against such an abuse; and, secondly, that certain limitations must be accepted on behalf of the Polish *raison d'état*. People like the young Party rebels in *Po Prostu*, now suppressed, are accused of having no political sense and wanting to go too far. The logical conclusion of their reasoning, it is argued, was the dissolution of the Party, which it was too much to expect in a Communist Poland. Their articles had actually helped the dogmatic conservatives by giving them ammunition, and the revisionist heresy must therefore be rooted out as a necessary prelude to dealing with the other faction. One Polish Communist editor said: 'What the revisionists fail to realize is that the real struggle goes on inside the Party, behind closed doors. Everybody knows the revisionists, because they are mostly writers and journalists who came out quite openly. But the pro-Soviet extremists work behind the scenes inside the Party machinery, and this makes them far more dangerous.'

In such a strongly Catholic country as Poland, the question of personal freedom is closely linked with religious liberties and the fate of the Church. In this important respect the changes effected by the Polish thaw have been maintained. The marriage of convenience between Mr Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski is still recognized on both sides as serving the national interest, and although some Communists think that the Party made too large a

concession in restoring the right of the Church to give religious instruction in State schools, they usually agree that the Primate has rendered notable services to Poland by using his great influence to counsel patience and restraint. It is not uncommon to hear a Communist say: 'The reason why Poland did not suffer the fate of Hungary was that we had Gomulka instead of Nagy, and Wyszynski instead of Mindszenty.' In their inward thoughts few Communists are convinced that the Party can outlive and outfight the Church, but they do what they can. The *Pax* organization led by Piasecki, which incorporates Catholic collaborators with Communist rule, remains in existence and retains its large revenue from the publication of religious books and tokens, but it has been weakened by many resignations and is heavily discredited. The Government attitude is that the fate of *Pax* should be settled by the Catholics themselves, but no doubt Communists are interested in preserving an agency which still hampers church unity. The only direct counter-attack takes the form of a revived Polish Society of Atheists and Freethinkers, which held its first national congress at Bydgoscz early in November and claimed an initial membership of 4,000. Meanwhile, Cardinal Wyszynski has spent much of his time meeting different sections of the population, discussing their social problems, and giving them guidance on their attitude as Catholics and patriots; as, for example, when he addressed a meeting of Catholic lawyers at Czestochowa in October.

In the vital field of Polish relations with the Soviet Union, Mr Gomulka has been more successful in reaching a working agreement with Mr Khrushchev than many people, perhaps including Gomulka himself, expected. The former Soviet exploitation of the Polish economy has been replaced by normal trade relations, providing Poland with Soviet raw materials, such as iron ore, manganese, and chrome, which the Poles badly need and cannot obtain elsewhere. In return, the Soviet Union buys, at world prices, Polish coal, locomotives, rolling stock, and ships. Polish economic co-operation with East Germany and Czechoslovakia has also increased, as part of the Communist answer to Western plans for a common European market. Russian military and civilian advisers have gone home, in a shower of Polish decorations, and although Russian divisions remain stationed in the Legnica area, in south-west Poland, they are now there much more as the result of agreement between two allies than as the garrison of an occupying Power.

The fall of Marshal Zhukov caused few tears to be shed in Poland, where he had the reputation of being a determined enemy of Polish independence. One senior Polish Communist told the writer of this article that when Zhukov visited Poland with Bulganin after the Poznan riots in 1956 he made a very bad impression, and the talks with him were difficult and painful. In some Polish army circles, it is also believed that Zhukov and other Soviet commanders wanted to bring Poland under direct Russian administration after the breach between Moscow and Tito.

In the Polish countryside, the new agricultural policy, which helps the independent farmers instead of hounding them, has paid good dividends in the past year on both sides. Thousands of peasants have already received title-deeds confirming their ownership of the land taken back into private hands after the massive dissolution of collective farms. The real income of the private farmers has risen by one-fifth since 1955, and the price of land has increased, in some areas, to five or six times its previous value. Greater supplies of building materials have been made available, and the amount of new housing and repairs in the villages is in striking contrast to the position in the cities and towns. In response to this encouragement agricultural production has risen sharply, but this has not led to a fall in food prices. Although the farmers are now getting much higher prices—in some cases double the previous figure—for their compulsory deliveries of produce, they prefer to default on their State obligations and to sell on the open market, where prices are even higher. At the end of August 1957 the arrears in compulsory deliveries of grain amounted to 100,000 tons; arrears of potatoes totalled 220,000 tons, and of livestock for slaughter 47,000 tons. Early in November the Government drafted a law whereby farmers in default will have to pay an equivalent compensation in cash.

The Communist authorities have not abandoned the ultimate objective of socializing the Polish countryside, but the old, forceful methods have been replaced by a genuine voluntary system. Broadly speaking, there is a marked contrast between the hard-working, efficient farmers who felt complete frustration in the collective farm, and the more ignorant or lazier peasants who cannot face competition. In many cases, these weaker brethren would like to return to the shelter of the collective, and Communist policy is to encourage such desires and to form voluntary collectives, but on new terms intended to make them self-supporting and not de-

pendent on State subsidies. Many new collective farms have, in fact, been started during the past year on this new basis. Even the private farmers mostly belong to marketing co-operatives, and great interest is being taken in the Danish co-operative system.

In administration and industry, the picture is far more complicated and unsettled. The current watchword is 'democratic centralism', which is an attempt to remove the dead hand of bureaucracy and encourage local initiative, while retaining a broad control of policy at the top. For example, the new law on municipal elections provides for more candidates than vacancies for councillors, thus giving the voter a limited degree of choice; councillors are to be subject to recall by their electors; and their selection is made dependent on personal qualities and fitness for responsibility, rather than on their representation of political—meaning Communist—interests. How this works out must depend, of course, on the amount of co-operation shown by the local Party branches.

A system of industrial decentralization is being attempted which the Poles claim to have originated, but which is also visible in East Germany and which seems to have stemmed from the Soviet Union as part of a new 'peaceful co-existence' drive designed to catch up with living standards in the West. Ministries in Warsaw formerly exercised complete control, down to the smallest detail; the ministry responsible for State restaurants, for example, even supplied the exact recipes for the dishes served. The new plan is to retain only a central policy control through the State Planning Commission, and to group the factories and technical services in a particular branch of industry into an association serving its own special needs and interests. The factories remain nationalized, but receive what it is hoped will be a life-giving injection of self-administration.

In this process the workers' councils have so far played only a confused and indecisive role. Nobody has yet succeeded in working out a clear line between their functions and those of the factory director, the trade unions, and the Party office in the works. The Government is also anxious not to encourage the latent pressure for wage increases, which some factories and workers' councils managed to extract, virtually by force, in the first heyday of the October changes. On this issue Mr Gomulka speaks the same language as the Government in Britain; higher wages must depend on increased production. In Poland, however, while the right to strike is admitted in principle, it has been denied in practice. On

the other hand, the Government has sought the co-operation of small private enterprise to relieve the most pressing shortages and to produce more bricks and cement for building and more clothing and simple household goods. In some respects this policy has not fulfilled official intentions, because private enterprise not infrequently turns to less essential outlets which promise a quick and easy profit, instead of working within its allotted sphere.

The economic situation in Poland remains critical, with a pressing danger of inflation and low living standards which are a constant breeding-ground for discontent and potential explosions. Little progress has yet been made in providing new housing and consumer goods, and lack of incentives over a long period has fostered a spirit of apathy among the workers, reflected in a high rate of absenteeism and unwillingness to do more than the bare minimum. This largely psychological problem is further complicated by the extensive spread of corruption among a population driven to supplement its meagre wages by illegal practices, ranging from petty pilfering to organized black-market operations. At the gates of an engineering factory, for example, one can see police checking workers in an effort to combat the practice of stealing factory materials for sale outside. It is a common habit for people to pay large sums to obtain one of the coveted posts as manager of a 'commission shop', or assistant in a department store, which offer lucrative opportunities of diverting goods under the counter and selling them for personal profit. In October Mr Gomulka urgently demanded a national campaign against this widespread corruption, and the police made extensive raids on private traders, but this does not strike at the roots of the problem.

If one attempts to sum up this complex picture, it must be stated that a muzzle has now been placed on freedom of public expression in Poland, on grounds of expediency which might all too easily be used to revoke other personal liberties as well. In other respects, however, most of the new reforms embodied in the Gomulka programme were still in force a year after the October revolution. Nor are hopes for further progress lacking, even within the iron hoops of Soviet hegemony and a Polish Communist Party determined, above all else, to stay in power. While the new Sejm cannot honestly claim to exercise a sovereign control over Government action, as was the intention first proclaimed, its committees have had some success in securing amendments to Government Bills. By contrast with the puppet assembly of former years, it is at

least a forum for discussion, and one which now includes a small, but influential, group of independent Catholic deputies. Furthermore, the Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party are making genuine efforts to change their former purely subservient role for a more active life of their own. Their leaders are taking the line that their parties should serve the interests of the small producers who always played, and still play, an important part in Poland: the Democratic Party aiming to speak for the small artisans and craftsmen in the towns, and the United Peasant Party seeking the support of the farmers. Both parties still accept Communist leadership, but their direct appeal to economic forces might possibly end by yielding political results which cannot yet be foreseen.

And, finally, the writer recalls a visit paid in November to a Polish village school, where the history textbooks of the Stalin period have been replaced by new ones and the lessons on Communist political theory abolished. All the 200 children were receiving religious teaching from a Catholic sister visiting the school, and a crucifix hung on a classroom wall. The teachers in these State schools, one felt, were the unsung heroes who kept the Polish spirit alive in the rising generation and whose work is perhaps the best guarantee of an enduring attachment to freedom in Poland.

G. H.

The Eastern Rivers Dispute between India and Pakistan

FROM time immemorial six rivers have supplied the waters so urgently needed for the irrigation of the Indus Basin. Three of these, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, are known as the western rivers. Their flow into Pakistan is in no way subject to the physical control of India. The eastern rivers, on the other hand, the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi, cross directly from India into West Pakistan, and as Pakistan is the downstream riparian of all three, India is in physical control of their flow into Pakistan. The continued supply of water from the eastern rivers is a matter of life and death for Pakistan, and indeed it is imperative to increase the quantities of

water at present supplied by them very considerably and very soon so as to ensure adequate food supplies for the constantly growing population of West Pakistan.

Before the partition of India there was never any doubt that the area now forming part of the territory of Pakistan was entitled to draw supplies of water from the eastern rivers. The Punjab Boundary Commission, in drawing the boundary between India and Pakistan, did not concern itself with the question of water supplies hitherto enjoyed by the two countries, and indeed Sir Cyril Radcliffe, its chairman, stated expressly that he thought 'he was entitled to assume with confidence that any agreements . . . as to the sharing of water from the canals (forming part of the irrigation system of the Indus Basin) or otherwise will be respected by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned'.[1] That this assumption was fully justified is borne out by the report of the Partition Committee that 'there is no question of varying the authorised shares of water to which the two zones and the various canals are entitled'.[2] India did not then suggest that she might at some future date dispute the right of Pakistan to the continued use of the waters of the eastern rivers. Yet, early in 1948, during the spring sowing period, India cut off all supplies from the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur Canals. It would appear that India took the view, not only that she was entitled to disregard such obligations, if any, as might have been binding upon her before partition, but also that as a sovereign State she had the right to make such use of the water resources in her territory as in her discretion she thought fit.

As a result of the action taken by India the position of Pakistan became so precarious that a quick interim solution had to be found in order to persuade India to resume the supplies which had been so abruptly cut off. This interim solution is contained in a somewhat indeterminate Agreement concluded between the Governments of India and Pakistan on 4 May 1948. The Agreement recites the fact that India has 'revived' the flow of water into the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur Canals and provides (in part) as follows: 'The East and West Punjab Governments are anxious that this question [viz. the canal water dispute] should be settled in a spirit of goodwill and friendship. Without prejudice to its legal rights in the matter the East Punjab Government has assured the

[1] Award of the Boundary Commission, para. 8.
[2] Report of Committee B, para. 15.

West Punjab Government that it has no intention suddenly to withhold water from the West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources. The West Punjab Government on its part recognizes the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab.' It may be observed that whatever reliance may be placed on this Agreement, it was concerned only with the two canals specifically referred to, and not with the flow of water from the eastern rivers generally. This limitation must be borne in mind in considering the respective arguments of the Parties to the dispute.

Before these arguments and their legal implications are considered in detail mention must be made of subsequent developments which to some extent may ultimately cause these questions to be of no more than academic value. For some years the World Bank has lent its good offices to the Parties in an attempt to solve the intricate problem of irrigation by the building of canals and large-scale irrigation works. This attempt, taking into account the widely divergent views of the Parties, now proceeds on the basis of allocating the entire flow of the western rivers to Pakistan and the entire flow of the eastern rivers to India, subject however, in the latter case, to a specified transitional period during which India would continue to supply to Pakistan the historic withdrawals hitherto made by Pakistan from the eastern rivers. Unless and until an agreement is reached, on the basis of the negotiations now proceeding under the auspices of the World Bank, the legal merits of the case are of supreme importance, not only because there is no certainty that agreement will ultimately be reached, but also because even in the event of such agreement being reached the relations between the Parties will continue to be governed, for some considerable time, by the legal position as it exists at present.

The legal questions arising in this context may be considered under the following headings: (i) Is India bound by any obligations existing since before partition with regard to the flow of waters from the eastern rivers? (ii) What, if any, is the legal effect of partition on pre-existing obligations? (iii) What is the effect of the Agreement of 4 May 1948 between India and Pakistan? (iv) Are there any rules of international law governing the mutual rights and obligations of upstream and downstream riparian States? (v) What, if any, are the means of settlement, judicial or otherwise, of the dispute between the Parties?

(i) *India's Obligations before Partition*

Prior to the partition of India it was always regarded as axiomatic that irrigation works should be constructed and waters allocated without regard to boundaries, irrespective of whether the latter were boundaries between provinces or between provinces and Indian States. Existing uses, such as those here in question, had to be respected, and such disputes as arose had to be submitted to the central authority for determination. East Punjab, as it was then called, was under well-defined obligations to permit the flow of the eastern rivers into West Punjab, and it is reasonable to assume that if India had intended to dispute these obligations she would have raised the matter before the Arbitral Tribunal set up to resolve questions arising out of the partition of British India. Yet, notwithstanding that certain related questions were submitted for the determination of the Tribunal, India did not at any time raise the question of the continued flow of water from the eastern rivers into Pakistan. There can be little doubt, therefore, that an obligation existing at the time of partition was acknowledged by India.

(ii) *The Effect of Partition on India's Obligations*

India's argument appears to be that whether or not there was any legal obligation prior to partition, no such obligation would have survived the emergence of India as an independent State. This argument is closely related to the difficult problem of State succession. The question of the succession of India and Pakistan to rights and duties formerly vested in British India arose in an acute form when the two countries claimed membership in the United Nations. It will be remembered that prior to partition British India enjoyed a considerable degree of international personality which had enabled her to become a member of the United Nations. When both India and Pakistan claimed separate membership, three views were put forward. The first was that no change had occurred in the international status of India and that India was accordingly entitled to retain the right of membership formerly vested in British India, while Pakistan was in a position similar to that of Belgium when the latter country seceded from the Netherlands, and that Pakistan was accordingly not entitled to claim automatic membership in the United Nations. The second was that both India and Pakistan had inherited the right of membership, and that accordingly neither country was required to

apply for membership. The third was that the division of British India had resulted in the extinction of the legal personality of that entity, and that accordingly both countries were required to apply for original membership.

The first view found favour with the Secretariat of the United Nations, and India's membership was deemed to be a continuing membership, while Pakistan was required subsequently to make application for admission to membership in her own right. It is extremely doubtful whether the analogy to the secession of Belgium from the Netherlands can be regarded as valid, especially as in the case of the partition of British India the new States acquired their separate legal personalities by virtue of measures enacted by a third party. However this may be, the view must now be accepted that India inherited the legal personality of British India while Pakistan emerged as a new State. The legal effect of this view would seem to be that India continued to be bound by such international obligations as normally survive a change of physical rather than legal status. It may be observed that India pressed the view of continuing legal personality which ultimately found acceptance, and for this reason, if for no other, it would be incongruous now to allow her to 'blow hot and cold' in so far as concerns her legal duties flowing from previously existing obligations. The question, however, which still remains to be determined is whether the obligation to permit the continued flow of the eastern rivers into the territory of Pakistan is an obligation which normally survives a change of condition of the kind here referred to.

State practice does not provide a conclusive answer to the question where, as in the present case, it is concerned with duties owed to a territory formerly forming part of the same legal entity, and not, as is usually the case, with duties owed to a third State. If the duty had been owed to a third State, the latter would have been entitled to insist on its being discharged in accordance with previously existing treaty obligations, the more so as the obligations here in question were not of a political character. This, in fact, has been the view of the Indian Government. The answer, it is believed, must be the same in the present case where the duty is owed to a newly created State formerly forming part of the same legal entity. The partition of British India occurred with the concurrence of all concerned, and it cannot be said that the 'secession' of Pakistan was achieved against the will of India. In these circum-

stances it can hardly be denied that India continues under an obligation to permit the flow of the eastern rivers into Pakistan.

The case of Pakistan derives additional support from different legal considerations. If the duty previously owed by East Punjab is regarded as a servitude impressed upon a specified part of the territory now forming part of the Republic of India, the continuing obligation of India would necessarily result from the existence of such a servitude. There is no dearth of servitudes in the system of international law, and State practice and international tribunals alike have frequently acknowledged their existence. It is of the essence of an international servitude that a particular part of the territory of the 'servient' State shall serve the purposes of the 'dominant' State. The right to draw on canal works and waterways for purposes of irrigation and the generation of hydro-electric power, and the correlative duty to permit the use of water for these purposes, may be said to constitute almost a classic example of an international servitude, and if the present problem is viewed in the light of the existence of a servitude to allow such use, Pakistan's case in the eastern rivers dispute is immeasurably strengthened. It may be added that the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947 provided that treaty obligations having an exclusive territorial application to an area comprised in the Dominion of India were to devolve on India (while those having an exclusive territorial application to an area comprised in Pakistan were to devolve on Pakistan).

(iii) *The Agreement of 4 May 1948*

This Agreement, which was concluded without prejudice to the legal rights of the Parties (although, in strict accordance with its wording, it was to be without prejudice to the legal rights of the East Punjab Government), was merely an expression of the future intentions of the Parties and their anxiety to settle the dispute in a spirit of goodwill. India nevertheless seems to regard the document as confirming her legal right to exercise unfettered control over the waters of the eastern rivers. Any such contention, if it were to be seriously put forward, would be wholly untenable. The wording of the Agreement clearly implies that in the view of the Parties themselves their respective rights and duties were doubtful and uncertain. The words 'legal rights' are not in any way amplified or defined, and indeed no such amplification or definition could be expected in the light of the events resulting in the Agree-

ment. Moreover, as previously pointed out, the Agreement w not even concerned with the dispute as such, but only with matte concerning the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur Canals. The ind terminate nature of the Agreement, in so far as concerns the leg merits of the case, is such that no valid conclusions can be draw from it either way. It may be added that subsequent registratic of the Agreement by India, in accordance with article 102(1) (the Charter, cannot confer on it any greater value than it inherentl possesses. The conclusion is therefore justified that the Agree ment did not, and could not, affect the legal position as it existe immediately after the partition of British India.

(iv) *The Rules of International Law governing the Rights and Dutie of Riparian States*

Reference must now be made to certain rules of internationa law which—quite generally and independently of the present dis pute between India and Pakistan—govern the rights and duties o riparian States of international rivers, and more especially th duties owed by upstream to downstream riparian States. Th problem of the joint use of international rivers by two or mor riparian States is, of course, not new. There is an abundance o judicial precedents, and there are also many treaties and officia pronouncements of Governments to afford guidance in the matter The law is rather more developed in the field of joint rights o navigation (frequently regulated by bilateral or multilatera treaties) than in the fields of joint user for the generation of hydro-electric power and for the purposes of irrigation, but even in the latter field there are certain rules of law which are widely recognized.

The greatest contribution to the case law governing the rights and duties of riparian States has been made by the Supreme Court of the United States which has frequently been concerned with disputes relating to so-called 'inter-State streams'. The value of the judgments of the Supreme Court for the determination of disputes between sovereign States has, however, been questioned on the ground that the Supreme Court had to base its decisions on the interpretation of American municipal law, as distinct from international law. It is believed that this criticism is ill-founded because the degree of independence of the constituent States is such that the Supreme Court has had to apply principles of international law when dealing with disputes between them. Moreover, the

decisions of municipal courts constitute a subsidiary source of international law and may therefore be taken into account in the determination of disputes between sovereign States. Two principles emerge from the decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as, incidentally, from the decisions of the highest tribunals of other countries. The first is the principle of 'equitable apportionment' of the waters of international rivers, and the second is that a State may not unilaterally divert the waters of such rivers so as to prejudice and injuriously affect the rights of other riparian States. These two principles have been followed by most States in different parts of the world, and it is significant that the principle of 'equitable apportionment' was expressly adopted by the Indus Commission which was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Benegal Rau to consider the dispute arising from certain irrigation projects in the Punjab.

Space does not permit of detailed consideration of the numerous treaties concluded in the course of the last hundred and fifty years which, in one way or another, contain restrictions of the right of sovereign States unilaterally to divert the flow of international rivers to the detriment of co-riparian States. India, it would appear, is one of the very few remaining States which still insist on the unfettered exercise of sovereign power in this matter, and her contention that she is entitled to take unilateral action before the existing arrangements in the Indus Basin are replaced by a new agreement must be regarded as ill-founded.

(v) *Means of Settlement of the Eastern Rivers Dispute*

Leaving out of account the attempts at mediation of the World Bank which, it must be hoped, will be successful, the question arises as to the means which may most usefully be employed to settle the present dispute between the Parties. Two suggestions have been made in the past. First, it has been suggested that the issues should be submitted to an arbitral tribunal, and secondly that the dispute should be determined by the International Court of Justice. The first suggestion has foundered on India's insistence that the terms of reference of such arbitral tribunal as might be set up should be limited to consideration of the validity of the Agreement of 4 May 1948. It is obvious that if the dispute were to be submitted to a tribunal on this limited basis, which would not even include power to interpret the Agreement itself, the real issues between the Parties could not be considered at all. The issues,

as has been seen, are of such complexity that they cannot be determined without giving a tribunal a free hand to consider the matter in the light of international law generally, without limiting it to consideration of a single indeterminate Agreement.

The alternative suggestion is that the dispute might be submitted to the International Court of Justice. It can be assumed, in view of India's attitude in the past, that no agreement will be reached between the Parties to submit the dispute to the Court in accordance with article 36(1) of the Statute. The exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in accordance with article 36(2) of the Statute is likewise precluded because India's declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is confined to disputes arising after 26 January 1950 and expressly excludes disputes with other members of the Commonwealth. Moreover, it is feasible that India might rely on the contention that the matters in issue between the Parties are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of India 'as determined by the Government of India', such matters being similarly excluded from India's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court.

It is clear, having regard to these obstacles, that there is no likelihood whatever of the issues between the Parties being submitted to judicial or arbitral determination. Meanwhile, therefore, unless and until the efforts of the World Bank bear fruit, it follows from a review of the legal position that India is under a duty to preserve the *status quo*. On the other hand, while in strict law there is no time limit to India's obligation to preserve that status, it is obviously in the interests of both Parties to reach agreement because in the absence of such agreement the water resources at the disposal of Pakistan will become wholly inadequate. Moreover, mere preservation of the *status quo* does not provide a lasting solution to India's own problems. The deadlock between the Parties can therefore only be solved by such mediation as is being attempted by the World Bank which alone can provide the capital resources so urgently needed to increase the water supply and irrigation facilities in both countries.

F. H.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY, HERTFORDSHIRE

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